FT社評(píng)：亞洲應(yīng)攜手應(yīng)對(duì)朝鮮威脅

“Talking is not the answer” was Donald Trump’s latest tweeted response to a provocative North Korean missile test. The US president’s comment — along with his earlier threat of “fire and fury” — will again raise fears that America is considering a pre-emptive military strike against the North Korean regime.

對(duì)于朝鮮具有挑釁性的導(dǎo)彈試射，唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)在Twitter上的最新回應(yīng)是“對(duì)話不是辦法”。特朗普的言論(與他之前威脅要發(fā)出“火與怒”一樣)將再次引發(fā)外界擔(dān)憂：美國(guó)正考慮對(duì)朝鮮政權(quán)發(fā)動(dòng)先發(fā)制人的軍事打擊。

The exchange of threats between Washington and Pyongyang can create the impression that this is a personal duel between Mr Trump and Kim Jong Un. But if the crisis on the Korean peninsula is to be de-escalated then the major regional powers — above all, South Korea, Japan and China — have a crucial role to play. That makes it vital that they rise above their mutual antagonisms and fashion a co-ordinated approach to a common problem.

華盛頓與平壤之間的互相威脅可能會(huì)給人這樣一種印象：這是特朗普與金正恩(Kim Jong Un)的私人爭(zhēng)斗。但若要緩和朝鮮半島危機(jī)，該地區(qū)的主要大國(guó)(最重要的是韓國(guó)、日本和中國(guó))必須發(fā)揮關(guān)鍵作用。因此重要的是，他們要放棄相互對(duì)抗，并制定協(xié)調(diào)應(yīng)對(duì)方案來解決這個(gè)共同的問題。

Despite the increasing urgency of the crisis, North Korea’s neighbours have tended to see the threat from the Kim regime through the prism of other priorities. In recent times, South Korea has been consumed by a domestic political crisis. Demands for apologies for Japan’s wartime conduct have also been a subject of bitter domestic controversy, making it harder for Seoul and Tokyo to work together on North Korea.

盡管危機(jī)變得日益緊迫，但朝鮮的鄰國(guó)往往從其他優(yōu)先任務(wù)的角度來看待朝鮮威脅。最近，韓國(guó)陷入國(guó)內(nèi)政治危機(jī)。要求日本就戰(zhàn)時(shí)惡行道歉也是國(guó)內(nèi)熱議話題，這加大了韓國(guó)和日本就朝鮮問題合作的難度。

The Japanese government has, until very recently, been more preoccupied by the risks from a rising China than the dangers of the Kim regime. As for China itself, it has been far more exercised by the threat of Thaad — an anti-missile system that the US has installed in South Korea — than by the North Korean menace that Thaad is meant to guard against.

直到最近，日本政府更在意的也是中國(guó)崛起帶來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而不是金氏政權(quán)的危險(xiǎn)。至于中國(guó)，比起操心朝鮮帶來的威脅，中國(guó)更擔(dān)憂的是薩德(Thaad)的威脅，而美國(guó)在韓國(guó)部署這種反導(dǎo)系統(tǒng)就是為了防御朝鮮威脅。

All of these concerns will seem absurdly myopic, if the North Korean crisis spills over into war. Mr Kim is much more of a threat to his Asian neighbours than he is to the US. Japan and South Korea are already well within range of his missiles. And while China is an ally of North Korea, conflict on the Korean peninsula could threaten China with flows of refugees and, in the worst case, with nuclear fallout.

如果朝鮮危機(jī)擴(kuò)大為戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，那么所有這些擔(dān)憂就會(huì)顯得非常短視。金正恩給亞洲鄰國(guó)帶來的威脅要遠(yuǎn)大于他對(duì)美國(guó)的威脅。日本和韓國(guó)已在朝鮮導(dǎo)彈的射程范圍之內(nèi)。中國(guó)雖說是朝鮮盟友，但朝鮮半島若爆發(fā)沖突可能會(huì)有大量難民流入中國(guó)，最糟糕的是中國(guó)可能會(huì)遭受核輻射。

If the governments in Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul accept that they face a common threat, then there may be room for an imaginative regional diplomatic initiative. Even if sending joint envoys to Pyongyang proves impossible in the current circumstances, the three countries could state their joint interest in the de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula — and their willingness to work together towards that end.

如果中國(guó)、日本和韓國(guó)政府承認(rèn)三國(guó)面臨共同威脅，那么還有提出一份具有想象力的地區(qū)外交倡議的空間。即便事實(shí)證明在當(dāng)前局勢(shì)下不可能向平壤派出聯(lián)合特使，這三個(gè)國(guó)家也能宣稱它們?cè)诔r半島無核化上有共同利益，而且也愿意為此攜手努力。

But it is also important to be realistic. The Kim regime currently shows little interest in diplomacy, or in responding to the tentative efforts at rapprochement from the new South Korean government.

但抱著現(xiàn)實(shí)的態(tài)度同樣重要。金家政權(quán)目前沒有表現(xiàn)出外交解決的意愿，也不愿回應(yīng)韓國(guó)新一屆政府試探性的和解努力。

For the moment, therefore, the most important tasks remain deterrence and containment. Even here, there is room for greater regional co-operation. China’s concerns that Thaad might have implications for its own nuclear deterrent would be understandable in a normal security context. But given the acuteness of the threat faced by South Korea, China should now take a more tolerant attitude. In return, both Washington and Seoul could offer reassurances that Thaad will be withdrawn if and when the North Korean threat diminishes. The prospect of Japan acquiring more potent anti-missile systems will also alarm China. But, given the current emergency, Beijing and Tokyo need to reach an understanding.

因此，就目前而言，最重要的任務(wù)依然是威懾和遏制。即便這樣也有加強(qiáng)地區(qū)合作的空間。中國(guó)擔(dān)心，薩德可能影響到其自身的核威懾，這在正常的安全背景下是可以理解的。但鑒于韓國(guó)面臨的嚴(yán)峻威脅，中國(guó)現(xiàn)在應(yīng)該持更加容忍的態(tài)度。相應(yīng)地，華盛頓和首爾可以做出表態(tài)，如果朝鮮威脅解除就會(huì)撤回薩德。日本獲得更強(qiáng)大反導(dǎo)系統(tǒng)的前景也會(huì)讓中國(guó)警惕。但鑒于當(dāng)前緊急局勢(shì)，中國(guó)和日本政府需要達(dá)成諒解。

Finally, there is the Trump question. There is no doubt that even America’s key allies have grave doubts about the judgment of the US president. That makes it all the more important that the major Asian powers take the initiative on the North Korean crisis.

最后還有特朗普的問題。毫無疑問，即便是美國(guó)的關(guān)鍵盟友也嚴(yán)重懷疑特朗普的判斷。這讓亞洲主要國(guó)家在朝鮮危機(jī)上采取主動(dòng)變得更加重要。