特朗普當(dāng)選的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響

Donald Trump has won the presidency, despite losing the popular vote. The US has, as a result, chosen as its next president a man whose inexperience, character, temperament and knowledge appear to make him unsuited for this high office. The consequences of a Trump presidency will be many and various. But the economic ones will not be the least important. His administration might even reverse globalisation, destabilise the financial system, weaken US public finances and threaten trust in the dollar.

雖然沒(méi)有贏得直選票，唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)還是贏得了總統(tǒng)寶座。其結(jié)果是，美國(guó)選擇了一個(gè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)、性格、脾氣和學(xué)識(shí)似乎都不適合這一高位的人為下屆總統(tǒng)。特朗普當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)將帶來(lái)多種多樣的后果。但經(jīng)濟(jì)上的影響將尤為重要。他的政府甚至可能逆轉(zhuǎn)全球化，動(dòng)搖金融體系，削弱美國(guó)的公共財(cái)政，并危及全球?qū)γ涝男判摹?/p>

US-led globalisation is already fragile. Mr Trump seems likely to push it into its coffin. After his victory, the Trans-Pacific Partnership looks dead. That might leave an opening for a Beijing-led alternative: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. But TPP might be replaced by nothing. The proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership was moribund and is now dead. Mr Trump has also suggested repeal or renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

美國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的全球化早已四分五裂。特朗普看起來(lái)將讓其“壽終正寢”。特朗普獲勝后，《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP)似乎已死。這或?qū)⒔o北京主導(dǎo)的“區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定”(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership)打開大門。但可能沒(méi)有任何協(xié)定來(lái)代替TPP。之前垂死掙扎的跨大西洋貿(mào)易與投資伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP)如今也已斷氣。特朗普還建議廢除或者重新談判《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》(North American Free Trade Agreement)。

Above all, he has suggested imposition of high tariffs, especially on imports from China and Mexico, “to discourage companies from laying off their workers in order to relocate in other countries and ship their products back to the US tax-free”. They would almost certainly be contrary to World Trade Organisation rules. They would also create a risk of retaliation. The costs to the US, world trade and the credibility of the trading system might prove very high.

最重要的是，他建議征收高關(guān)稅，特別是針對(duì)來(lái)自中國(guó)和墨西哥的進(jìn)口商品，“以阻止企業(yè)解雇本國(guó)員工，到國(guó)外建廠并免稅將產(chǎn)品運(yùn)回美國(guó)”。這些措施幾乎必然違背世貿(mào)組織(WTO)規(guī)則，還可能招致報(bào)復(fù)。它們對(duì)美國(guó)、世界貿(mào)易以及世貿(mào)體系的可信性造成的代價(jià)可能也會(huì)非常高。

A second area of concern is financial regulation. Mr Trump has supported repeal of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, the regulatory response to the financial crisis. Many financial businesses hate it. Yet the question is whether it would be replaced by a more effective alternative or by a return to the pre-crisis free-for-all. 第二個(gè)令人擔(dān)憂的領(lǐng)域是金融監(jiān)管。特朗普支持廢除2010年為應(yīng)對(duì)金融危機(jī)通過(guò)的《多德-弗蘭克法》(Dodd-Frank Act)。許多金融企業(yè)不喜歡這一監(jiān)管法案。然而，問(wèn)題在于，將有一項(xiàng)更有效的法律來(lái)取代它，還是要回到危機(jī)前的自由放任狀態(tài)。

If the latter, the chances of another, possibly bigger, crisis would surely be enhanced. Yet on financial regulation, unlike on trade, Mr Trump’s populism might protect the US from the worst deregulatory instincts of congressional Republicans rather than the reverse.

如果是后者，那么未來(lái)再次發(fā)生(或許更大)危機(jī)的可能性必將上升。然而，不同于貿(mào)易，在金融監(jiān)管方面，特朗普的民粹主義或許可以保護(hù)美國(guó)免遭國(guó)會(huì)共和黨人放松管制的最壞本能的危害，而不是相反。

Mr Trump also wants a big surge of spending on infrastructure and tax cuts. The former would be desirable, particularly if the projects were sensible. Indeed, it would be deeply ironic if Mr Trump carried out, with Republican support in Congress, precisely the sort of Keynesian fiscal stimulus congressional Republicans adamantly opposed when reasonably suggested by the administration of Barack Obama in 2009. Unfortunately, the timing would be far worse since the US economy of today is vastly closer to full employment than it was back then.

特朗普還希望大幅增加基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施支出和大規(guī)模減稅。前者將是可取的，特別是如果這些項(xiàng)目合理的話。實(shí)際上，如果特朗普在國(guó)會(huì)共和黨人的支持下實(shí)施這一政策將很具有諷刺意味，因?yàn)檎沁@種凱恩斯式的財(cái)政刺激計(jì)劃，巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)政府2009年合理地提出時(shí)卻遭到了國(guó)會(huì)共和黨人的堅(jiān)決反對(duì)。遺憾的是，時(shí)機(jī)已變得糟得多，因?yàn)槿缃衩绹?guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)遠(yuǎn)比那時(shí)更接近充分就業(yè)。

The tax proposals would shower huge benefits on already rich Americans such as Mr Trump. According to the Tax Policy Center, his latest plan would raise the after-tax income of those in the middle fifth of the income distribution by $1,010 or 1.8 per cent. But the top 0.1 of the population would enjoy an average tax cut of nearly $1.1m, or more than 14 per cent of after-tax income. The cumulative increase in federal debt might be as much as 25 per cent of gross domestic product by 2026. Congressional Republicans might wish to offset the latter, at least partially, by slashing spending, including on social security and health. But Mr Trump opposes this.

減稅提議將令已經(jīng)很富有的美國(guó)人(如特朗普)享受巨大好處。根據(jù)美國(guó)稅收政策中心(Tax Policy Center)的數(shù)據(jù)，特朗普的最新計(jì)劃將讓處于收入分布中間五分之一的人口的稅后收入提高1010美元或1.8%。但收入最高的0.1%的人口平均將享受接近110萬(wàn)美元的減稅，超過(guò)稅后收入的14%。到2026年，聯(lián)邦債務(wù)累計(jì)增幅或?qū)⒏哌_(dá)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的25%。國(guó)會(huì)的共和黨人可能希望通過(guò)削減社保、醫(yī)療等方面的開支至少部分地彌補(bǔ)后者。

Together, then, Mr Trump’s populism and the Republicans’ tax-cutting mania might open up large and permanent increases in fiscal deficits. This would then pose a big challenge for the US Federal Reserve. The obvious response would be to tighten monetary policy. Mr Trump has indicated he favours this. But he has also suggested the economy should grow at close to 4 per cent a year. That seems impossible given the slow growth of the labour force.

于是，特朗普的民粹主義與共和黨的減稅狂熱結(jié)合在一起，或許會(huì)導(dǎo)致財(cái)政赤字大規(guī)模不斷增加。這將給美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)帶來(lái)巨大挑戰(zhàn)。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的回應(yīng)很可能是收緊貨幣政策。特朗普曾表示自己贊成這樣。但他也表示過(guò)，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)應(yīng)該以每年接近4%的速度增長(zhǎng)?？紤]到勞動(dòng)力的緩慢增長(zhǎng)，這好像是不可能的。

Yet when choosing a replacement for Janet Yellen, Fed chair, by 2018, Mr Trump might look for someone who would run monetary policy on the assumption that such growth was feasible. The result would be the classic populist blend of ultra-loose fiscal and monetary policies. The effects are likely to be rising inflation, higher long-term nominal interest rates and a weak dollar. That might mark a transformation in the global monetary regime. It could even generate the sort of environment seen in the 1970s, when President Richard Nixon and Arthur Burns, Fed chairman, were in charge.

然而，2018年選擇美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席珍妮特•耶倫(Janet Yellen)的繼任者時(shí)，特朗普或許會(huì)尋找一位在假定這一增速可行的情況下實(shí)施貨幣政策的人士。結(jié)果將會(huì)是經(jīng)典民粹主義組合：超寬松的財(cái)政和貨幣政策的結(jié)合。這很可能將導(dǎo)致通脹走高，長(zhǎng)期名義利率上漲，美元走軟。這或?qū)?biāo)志著全球貨幣機(jī)制的轉(zhuǎn)變。這甚至?xí)?dǎo)致上世紀(jì)70年代的一幕重現(xiàn)，當(dāng)時(shí)掌舵的是總統(tǒng)理查德•尼克松(Richard Nixon)和美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席亞瑟•伯恩斯(Arthur Burns)。

What actually happens depends both on whether Mr Trump does as president what he stated as candidate, and on his interaction with Congress. Some suggest that wiser heads will contain his excesses. Little in his past behaviour suggests this is all that plausible. Make no mistake: Mr Trump’s triumph might destabilise the US and world economies.

實(shí)際會(huì)發(fā)生什么既取決于特朗普擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)時(shí)會(huì)不會(huì)履行競(jìng)選期間的承諾，也取決于他與國(guó)會(huì)的互動(dòng)。有人認(rèn)為，國(guó)會(huì)中頭腦較智慧的人將約束他的過(guò)度行為。但從他過(guò)去的行為中幾乎看不出這可信。別搞錯(cuò)：特朗普的勝利可能會(huì)動(dòng)搖美國(guó)和世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)定。