美國(guó)政要第3課
Strategy in the Global Era
--Interview with the Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (National Defense University), Dr. Hans Binnendijk (March 10, 1998) 訪美國(guó)國(guó)防大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略研究所所長(zhǎng)漢斯•賓內(nèi)迪雅克博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: I was really impressed by your lecture on “Strategy in the Global Era” given at Georgetown University last week. Your lecture covered a lot of ground1 on current views on strategy. Strategy, especially national security strategy and military strategy are always closely connected to national defense development. Today, I would like to ask you to expand on your views on strategy from the perspective of national defense development.
Strategic thinking cannot be thought of independently of history. Even though U.S. history goes back only over 200 years, it has witnessed the significant changes in the international situation. In thinking about current and future U.S. strategy, what lessons do you think should be especially observed from history?
DR. BINNENDIJK: One of the things that is very important for the U.S. to think about is how to use the fact that technologically, economically, and in terms of political philosophy we are in a dominant position and history shows that is very dangerous if the position is abused2. It is very important for us not to act too unilaterally. If we believe that we have both the right and the might, and we act unilaterally too often, that would be a mistake.
I think in most cases we have to make sure we use international mechanisms to bring coalitions around to get as much legitimacy as we can, before we take major national security actions. A lesson from history is that other countries that had been in a position of relatively greater power, if they had abused that position, other nations tend to join alliances against them, and we don’t want to be in that position.
MR, CHEN: You mentioned the key question from the lessons from history is whether the U.S. can break out of the flexibility-rigidity-conflict cycle3. Could you please describe this cycle in detail?
DR. BINNENDIJK: This cycle tends to repeat itself. Napoleon used a fluid international system to his advantage, creating alliances to isolate his target. Eventually others saw his pattern, aligned themselves against him and created a more rigid bipolar system. And as a result you have the grand alliance against him, and he was defeated twice. In 1814-1816, the Congress of Vienna system4, the Holy Alliance5 was established and the whole purpose was to allow other nations, and particularly the U.K., to balance power that went out of alignment. That actually brought a great deal of stability from 1815-1855, until the Crimean War. It was that balance of power system that was created with the British. That was a very flexible system. You have the U.K. ready to shift alliances very rapidly and act boldly in order to keep the system down. It was by design a flexible system. The first system was not by design. The third system (1860-1914) was also a very flexible system early on. Bismark used it and pushed against Denmark, Austria, and then against France. But after he left the scene and Kaiser Wilhelm took full control, flexibility became more rigid, and you have two alliance systems that led to World War Ⅱ.The league of Nations6 system started out to be very flexible. The whole League was supposed to act against any nation that behaved badly. The system failed, and very quickly became rigid around the Axis powers and the Allied-powers. In the Cold War international system, the flexibility of the system soon turned rigid and bipolar. We were able to avoid conflict there because of nuclear deterrence. The question here is: can we break out of that cycle? We are in a very flexible period right now in the international system. Alliances exist but they’ve been modified. The whole idea is not to have them become too rigid. What we don’t want is a system in which we become bipolar again. An example of that would be if China and Russia’s relationship became much firmer and became an anti-American alliance. That would lead, again, to a bipolar system, which would, I think, be very unfortunate. You do not want the international system to become rigid. You don’t want a situation in which you come to a more bipolar situation.
MR. CHEN: In analyzing the current international situation, you pointed out that there were three revolutions in a complex new system. How are they likely to affect the development of the international situation in the future?
DR. BINNENDIJK: Well, as I said, the three revolutions-the geostrategic7, the information, and the revolution in government by and large have a positive effect on the United States. One of the points I made was that I hope that the attractiveness of globalization8-global markets, the wealth that can come with globalization would be attractive enough for China and Russia and others to want to become part of that system. There is a lot of reward in this globalization process. The hope is that would be powerful enough so that we can break out of the flexibility-rigidity-conflict space.
MR. CHEN: In your opinion, what are the topmost current U.S. interests? How are these interests related to U.S. strategic needs?
DR. BINNENDIJK: I think we have a broad array of interests. We obviously want to secure our homeland and want to make sure that there is no threat to the United States directly, whether it is from Russian missiles or terrorist weapons or whatever-that is the primary concern-since we also have as a major interest-protecting areas that are of vital importance to us, such as the Persian Gulf. We want to retain and adapt our alliances. That’s very important. Extremely important to the United States is the transition under way in Russia and China.
MR. CHEN: When the U.S. is shaping a future national security strategy, what are the main elements that should be considered? What do you think a future national security strategy for the U.S. would look like?
DR. BINNENDIJK: I think the current national security strategy is pretty much on the track. I think the enlargement strategy has thus far applied primarily to Europe. The idea here is to welcome new democratic states into the core of market democracies. And that’s been a pretty successful effort. The most visible would pertain to9 NATO enlargement. But it goes on elsewhere. That seems to be a very positive trend in the world. Engagement also has been quite misunderstood, especially in China, because it has been misinterpreted as containment. Engagement is much more what we’re doing right here.
Now, where should this go in the future? I think that as you look out three or four or five years, trying to make sure that the policy is as inclusive as possible. It means making China a full partner in the international system. And part of the deal with China is that it needs to live up to international norms. China is more and more looking at these international norms. China is more and more looking at these international norms and saying yeah we can live up10 to that. And once China agrees to do that, it can move more and more into the international community.
WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 詞匯提示
1.ground [] n. 范圍
2.abuse [] v. 濫用
3.the flexibility-rigidity-conflict cycle “靈活-僵化-沖突”怪圈
4.the Congress of Vienna system 維也納會(huì)議體系
5.the Holy Alliance 神圣同盟
6.the League of Nations 國(guó)際聯(lián)盟
7.geostrategic [] a.地緣戰(zhàn)略的
8.globalization [] n. 全球化
9.pertain to 關(guān)于
10.live up 快樂地過日子（在這里是好好地行事的意思）
QUESTIONS AFTER LISTENING 聽后答題:
1. What is the lesson from the history in Dr. Binnendijk’s view?
A.It is that a country should act with its allies.
B.It is that the U.S. should abuse its dominant position.
C.It is that a country should act unilaterally.
D.It is that a country should act bilaterally.
2. What cycle did Dr. Binnendijk mention?
A.Flexibility-rigidity-conflict cycle.
B.Flexibility-rigidity-respond cycle.
C.Respond-shape-preparation cycle.
D.Engagement-containment-expansion cycle.
3. When was the Congress of Vienna system and the Holy Alliance established?
A.1914~1916. B.1914~1917.
C.1814~1816. D.1815~1855.
4. How many international systems emerged from Napoleon era to 1914?
A.Two. B.Three. C.Four. D.Six.
5. What kind of international system was it in the Cold War?
A.Bipolar. B.Multipolar.
C.Unipolar. D.Tripolar.
6. What period is it now in the international system according to Dr. Binnendijk?
A.a conflicting period.
B.a rigid period.
C.a stable period.
D.a very flexible period.
7. Which three revolutions are there in a complex new system?
A.The geostrategic revolution, education revolution and information revolution.
B.The information revolution, educational revolution and technical revolution.
C.The geostrategic revolution, the information revolution and the revolution in government.
D.The educational revolution, cultural revolution and technical revolution.
8. What are the topmost U.S. interests in Dr. Binnendijks’ view?
A.To maintain the sea lane safe.
B.To promote the human right in the developing countries.
C.To protect areas that are of vital importance to the U.S..
D.To secure the homeland and make sure that there is no threat to the U.S. directly.
9, What is the main idea about the enlargement strategy according to Dr. Binnendijk?
A.To welcome new independent countries into UN.
B.To welcome new democratic states into the core of market democracies.
C.To welcome the developing countries into NATO.
D.To welcome the ASEAN countries into ATEC.
10.What is one of the main purpose of the engagement policy in Dr. Binnendijk’s words?
A.To make China a full Partner in the international system.
B.To make North Korea a full partner in the international system.
C.To make Russia a full partner in the international system.
D.To make Cuba a full partner in the international system.
【參考譯文】
全球時(shí)代的戰(zhàn)略
陳伯江：上個(gè)星期您在喬治城大學(xué)外交學(xué)院“全球時(shí)代的戰(zhàn)略”為題所作的報(bào)告，給我留下了較深的印象。您的報(bào)告涉及到當(dāng)前戰(zhàn)略問題的許多方面。戰(zhàn)略，特別是國(guó)家安全戰(zhàn)略和軍事戰(zhàn)略，總是與國(guó)防發(fā)展密切相關(guān)。今天，我想請(qǐng)您從國(guó)防發(fā)展的角度，談?wù)剬?duì)戰(zhàn)略問題的一些看法。
戰(zhàn)略思維離不開歷史的考察。盡管美國(guó)的歷史只有２００多年，但它也已經(jīng)歷了國(guó)際形勢(shì)的一系列重大變化。在考慮當(dāng)前和未來美國(guó)戰(zhàn)略的時(shí)候，您認(rèn)為應(yīng)當(dāng)特別汲取的歷史經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)是什么？
賓內(nèi)迪雅克：對(duì)于美國(guó)來說，非常重要的一點(diǎn)，是考慮如何利用我們?cè)诩夹g(shù)、經(jīng)濟(jì)、以及政治哲學(xué)方面的主導(dǎo)地位。歷史表明，如果濫用這種主導(dǎo)地位將是非常危險(xiǎn)的。對(duì)于我們來說，不要過多采取單方面的行動(dòng)是很重要的。如果我們相信自己既有公理又有強(qiáng)權(quán)，從而過多采取單方面行動(dòng)，就將導(dǎo)致錯(cuò)誤。在采取重大的國(guó)家安全行動(dòng)之前，我認(rèn)為在大多數(shù)情況下我們必須盡是運(yùn)用國(guó)際機(jī)制組成聯(lián)盟，以獲得大限度的合法性。一個(gè)歷史的教訓(xùn)是，力量相對(duì)強(qiáng)大的國(guó)家，如果它們自恃強(qiáng)大而欺壓別國(guó)，其它國(guó)家就會(huì)加入反對(duì)它們的聯(lián)盟。我們不想處于這種受人反對(duì)的位置上。
陳：您談到汲取歷史教訓(xùn)的關(guān)鍵問題是美國(guó)能否打破“靈活－僵化－沖突”的怪圈。請(qǐng)您解釋一下這個(gè)怪圈好嗎？
賓內(nèi)迪雅克：這一怪圈趨于不斷重復(fù)。拿破侖曾利用流動(dòng)狀態(tài)的國(guó)際體系，建立起一個(gè)個(gè)聯(lián)盟以孤立其對(duì)手。結(jié)果其他國(guó)家識(shí)破了拿破侖的模式，組成了自己的聯(lián)盟去反對(duì)他，而出現(xiàn)了一個(gè)比較僵化的兩極體系。結(jié)果，那個(gè)強(qiáng)大的反拿破侖的聯(lián)盟兩次打敗他。在１８１４～１８１６年，英、普、俄、奧等國(guó)召開維也納會(huì)議，并在會(huì)后成立了俄、普、奧三國(guó)神圣同盟，其主要目的就是讓其他國(guó)家，特別是英國(guó)調(diào)整失衡的大國(guó)力量對(duì)比，其后果是有了從１８１５~１８５５年（直到克里米亞戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)）的穩(wěn)定。英國(guó)所建立的那種勢(shì)力平衡的國(guó)際體系是一種非常靈活的體系。為了保持該體系的平衡、英國(guó)隨時(shí)可以迅速地變換聯(lián)盟國(guó)并果斷地采取行動(dòng)。它是一個(gè)精心設(shè)計(jì)的靈活體系，第一個(gè)體系不是精心設(shè)計(jì)的。第三個(gè)體系（１８６０～１９１４年）在開始時(shí)也是一個(gè)非常靈活的體系，俾斯麥利用該體系對(duì)抗丹麥、奧地利，然后又對(duì)抗法國(guó)。但在他離開政治舞臺(tái)之后，德皇威廉一世掌握了完全的控制，國(guó)際體系在一開始也是非常靈活的，整個(gè)聯(lián)盟都應(yīng)該對(duì)任何有行為不端的國(guó)家采取行動(dòng)。這一體系很快失靈，變成固定的軸心國(guó)與同盟國(guó)聯(lián)盟。在冷戰(zhàn)國(guó)際體系中，體系的靈活性很快變成固定兩極對(duì)抗。我們?cè)谀瞧陂g所以能避免沖突是因?yàn)橛泻送亍＿@里的問題是：我們能否打破那樣一個(gè)怪圈？在當(dāng)前的國(guó)際體系中，我們處在一個(gè)非常靈活的時(shí)期。聯(lián)盟依然存在，但也在發(fā)生變化?？偟乃悸肥遣灰顾鼈冏兊眠^于固定。我們不希望再次出現(xiàn)兩極對(duì)抗的體系，我認(rèn)為這將非常不幸。我們不希望國(guó)際系變成僵化的，也不希望出現(xiàn)兩極更加分明的情況。
陳：在對(duì)當(dāng)前國(guó)際形勢(shì)的分析中，您指出在一個(gè)復(fù)雜的新體系中存在著三個(gè)革命。這三個(gè)革命可能會(huì)對(duì)未來國(guó)際形勢(shì)的發(fā)展帶來什么影響？
賓內(nèi)迪雅克：我所說的三個(gè)革命是地緣戰(zhàn)略革命、信息革命和政府革命。一般說來它們對(duì)美國(guó)具有積極的作用。我提出的一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)是，我希望全球化的吸引力（全球市場(chǎng)、可能與全球化隨之而來的財(cái)富）將足以使中國(guó)、俄羅斯和其它國(guó)家希望變成那種體系的一部分。在這種全球化的過程中，會(huì)有許許多多的好處。希望全球化的趨勢(shì)能產(chǎn)生強(qiáng)有力的影響，足以使我們打破“靈活－僵化－沖突”的模式。
陳：在您看來，美國(guó)當(dāng)前最大的利益是什么？這些利益怎樣與美國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略需要相聯(lián)系？
賓內(nèi)迪雅克：我認(rèn)為我們有廣泛的利益.很明顯,我們要保證國(guó)家的安全,確保沒有對(duì)美國(guó)的直接威脅,無論這些威脅是來自俄羅斯的導(dǎo)彈還是恐怖主義者的武器,或是其它來源。這是我們的主要擔(dān)心.我們還有另一個(gè)重大利益, 即保護(hù)諸如波斯灣那樣一些對(duì)美國(guó)至關(guān)重要的地區(qū)。我們要繼續(xù)保持和調(diào)整我們的聯(lián)盟。俄羅斯和中國(guó)正進(jìn)行的轉(zhuǎn)變也對(duì)美國(guó)特別重要。
陳：在美國(guó)勾畫未來國(guó)家安全戰(zhàn)略的時(shí)候，應(yīng)當(dāng)考慮的主要因素是什么？您認(rèn)為未來美國(guó)國(guó)家安全戰(zhàn)略應(yīng)當(dāng)是怎樣的？
賓內(nèi)迪雅克：我認(rèn)為當(dāng)前美國(guó)的國(guó)家安全戰(zhàn)略非常正確。到目前止，擴(kuò)展戰(zhàn)略主要是在歐洲實(shí)施，其思路是歡迎新的民主國(guó)家進(jìn)入實(shí)行市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)民主國(guó)家的內(nèi)圈，這種努力現(xiàn)在看來非常成功。最顯而易見的是北約東擴(kuò)，但在其它地區(qū)也在進(jìn)行著類似的擴(kuò)展。這似乎是一個(gè)非常積極的世界性趨勢(shì)。參與戰(zhàn)略一直受到一些國(guó)家的誤解，尤其是在中國(guó)，它被誤解為遏制。我們現(xiàn)在在這里進(jìn)行交談，實(shí)際上也是參與戰(zhàn)略的內(nèi)容。那么這一戰(zhàn)略在未來將如何發(fā)展？我認(rèn)為當(dāng)你展望今后３年、４年或５年，你應(yīng)當(dāng)確實(shí)盡可能弄清這一戰(zhàn)略所包含的內(nèi)容。它意味著使中國(guó)成為國(guó)際體系的全面伙伴。處理作為與中國(guó)打交道的一部分內(nèi)容，中國(guó)需要按照國(guó)際準(zhǔn)則行事，中國(guó)已越來越重視那些國(guó)際準(zhǔn)則，并答應(yīng)可以遵守那些準(zhǔn)則。一旦中國(guó)同意那樣做，它就能越來越多地融入國(guó)際社會(huì)。
KEYS TO THE QUESTIONS 參考答案：
1.a 2.a 3.c 4. b 5. a 6. c 7. c 8.d 9.b 10.a
