美國(guó)政要第2課

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The Role of Alliances and Future Operations
-- Interview with the Chairman of the National Defense Panel, Philip A. Odeen(April 10, 1998) 訪國(guó)防小組委員會(huì)主席菲利普•奧迪思
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: How do you view the role of alliances in international security and regional stability in the future? Will it be changed somewhat in content and form from today?
MR. ODEEN: I think alliances will continue to be very important in the future. I mean, our principal alliance is still active, and it is changing of course with admission of new countries, it’s gotten larger. Its military purposes are not as clear because you don’t have a Soviet threat any more.
The first time NATO1 had operated2 outside of its own area was when they went into Bosnia. That was quite a change. And so I believe you’ll see NATO wiling to operate outside of the European theaters more over time, but as the alliance gets larger and more and more countries are involved, it also makes it harder to get a consensus, to get agreement, and so it will be more difficult.
The United States has really dominated NATO for many, many years, but our position is not as powerful as it was, I think probably because the big threat is gone. The Soviet threat’s gone. So although the structure is still there, but I think the American influence is not quite as strong, and in 5 or 10 years it may be weaker yet.
In Asia, we don’t really have alliances like that. Japan, of course, is still a major ally. Korea is probably the most obvious ally, but they are really focused on the North Korea problem. If North Korea were to go away, if they ever did combine, that alliance would be of much less purpose at that point. There has been a strengthening of the U.S.-Japan relationship over the last 2 or 3 years, and I think Japan is much more essential, critical.
So I think it’s harder to forecast in Asia, because it depends very much on Japan to some extent. Will Japan’s economy recover? If America stays involved in Asia, I think there’s a good chance that Japan will remain as they are. If America begins to pull back, there will be a lot of pressure in Japan for them to build up their armaments.
So there’s a lot of dynamics3 going on in Asia between China, and Japan, and the United States that are very hard to forecast. You can’t forecast it. I don’t think it’s inevitable that we have to be hostile to one another. I think there are many opportunities for the relationship to get closer over time. And I hope that’s what will happen. And I think both China and the United States-perhaps maybe our most important foreign policy objective ought to be to maintain a good relationship with one another, because we’re both large and potentially hostile countries, and if we become hostile, it’s going to be bad for everybody. We’ll both have to spend more money in defense. There will be many problems.
So I think it’s very important that we continue to try to build good relations, good trade relations, investment. I think it’s very healthy to have Chinese students in the United States, more Americans going to China. We need to work on that, I think. It’s very important for both countries that we do that.
MR. CHEN: It is likely that urban operations4 will become more important in the future. What are your comments on the importance of urban operations?
MR. ODEEN: One of the things that’s happening in every country in the world, China and everywhere, is the cities are getting much, much larger, and people are leaving the country and moving to the cities, because of course there are job opportunity there. And that’s happening in Africa. It’s happening everywhere, and especially in areas like South America, Central America. But it’s happening in most parts of the world. And also the urban areas tend to be the areas where the discontent-that’s where radical elements may be. It’s easier to organize in large urban areas. So if there are terrorist groups that are opposing the government, and the government has to come in and help them, you’re going to have to operate in cities. And it’s something that’s very difficult for military forces to operate in cities. Nobody likes to fight in cities. The military are very vulnerable.
One of the things that the U.S. military has to do is to learn both better tactics5 and also develop better equipment. The Marine Corps6 is setting up a training area in California, out in the desert, an urban training facility to train in how to work in cities, what are the tactics you use, how do you operate effectively.
There’s also a good bit of money being spent on better technology. There are sensors that can detect a person behind a wall, because of very small temperature differences and using various kinds of radars, and infrared, and things like that. So there may be different ways to use technology to make it more effective to fight in those circumstances.
But this is something that generally the American military has avoided fighting into-they can just go around them, and leave them, and try to stay out of the cities. But that will not continue to work I don’t think.
MR. CHEN: What is your comment on the importance of U.S. power projection capability in the future? Does the U.S. attempt to strengthen its power projection capability mean a reduction in its forward presence in the future?
MR. ODEEN: We are a long way away without having to take as much logistic7 support along. The Air Force has concepts for deploying aircraft squadrons8 with only very small amounts of support in relying on a resupply to send your replacement parts and black boxes from the United States, using airlift rather than putting big maintenance activities at air fields, finding ways to resupply more rapidly from the distance, rather than having it all there.
Even the use of smart weapons9 requires less weight, less tonnage. Fewer weapons will do the job, so you don’t have to have as much stuff. The old style iron bombs are very heavy and difficult to move.
So there’s a lot of new concepts, tactics and equipment that let us put forces a long ways to the United States, very quickly, and more easily because you don’t have to take as much stuff along.
One of the things when we were doing our study, when we traveled dither to Asia or to Europe, the question always was, are you going to keep 100,000 Americans-there was about 100,000 in Asia, about 100,000 in Europe. Are you going to keep them there for a long time? But it’s a political sign of American commitment, and if there are no forces there, people are not assured that we’ll bring them when they need them, so they see them as a sign of our commitment, sign of our guarentee. In Korea, for example, if there are Americans there, and the Americans are going to get involved, to get killed on day one if there’s an attack from the North Koreans, they know that the Americans will be involved. If they’re not there, then there may be questions, there may be doubts. So maybe having them there is a deterrent in a difficult situation like Korea.
And even though we’re better at deploying, it’s always easier if you’re closer, and especially if you have bases for ships to go in to refuel, and for maintenance10. Like we have in parts of Japan or Singapore, or Australia, Guam, places like that. Because the distances in Asia are so great, from the United States to Southeast Asia or Northeast Asia, it’s helpful to have them.
So I believe we’ll have forces fully deployed for a long time. I don’t know how long that is, but I don’t see-the fact that we can deploy them better, I don’t see that mattering, because I think much of why they’re there is political rather than military.

WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 詞匯提示
1.NATO(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 北約
2.operate [] v. 遂行軍事行動(dòng)
3.dynamics [] n. 發(fā)展動(dòng)力
4.urban operations 城市作戰(zhàn)
5.tactics [] n. 戰(zhàn)術(shù)
6.the Marine Corps 海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)
7.logistic [] n. 后勤
8.squadrons [] n. 空軍中隊(duì)
9.smart weapon 精確制導(dǎo)武器，智能武器
10.maintenance [] n. 維護(hù)，保養(yǎng)

QUESTIONS AFTER LISTENING 聽(tīng)后答題:
1. How did MR. ODEEN think about the role of alliances in the future?
A.Alliances would quit the stage in the future.
B.Alliances would continue to be very important in the future.
C.Alliances would beless important in the future.
D.Alliances would be narrowed in scope in the future.
2. Why did MR. ODEEN think that their position in NATO now was not as powerful as it had been?
A.Because the U.S. is weaker than before.
B.Because European countries are stronger than before.
C.Because the neo-isolationism is stronger in the U.S..
D.Because the Soviet threats have gone.
3. Which of the mutual relationships is much more essential and critical for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region?
A.U.S. -Korea.
B.U.S. -Britain.
C.U.S. -Japan.
D.U.S. -Germany.
4. Why did MR. ODEEN think that the foreign policy objective in both China and the United States ought to be maintaining a good relationship with one another?
A.Because both are large and potentially hostile countries.
B.Because both are large and friendly countries.
C.Because both are developing countries in the world.
D.Because both are developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
5. What is happening in every country in the world according to Mr.ODEEN?
A.It is the cities are getting much, much larger.
B.It is the population is getting large and larger.
C.It is the weather is getting warmer and warmer.
D.It is the environment is getting worse and worse.
6. What does the U.S. military have to do in dealing with urban operations?
A,To develop nuclear weapons.
B.To learn better tactics and develop better equipment in how to operate in cities.
C.To expand its military forces.
D.To strengthen its Marine Corps.
7.What’s the meaning of the sentence “we are a long way away without having to take as much logistic support along.”
A.We have a long way to go to set up an urban training facility.
B.We have a long way to go to deploy new military forces in the Mideast Asia.
C.We can deploy a new force far from the bases without heavy logistic support.
D.We have to take much logistic support all the way from the bases.
8.What’s the purpose of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region in ODEEN’s words?
A.It is to avoid a war.
B.It is to take a commitment.
C.It is to keep stability.
D.It is to deter a threat like North Korea.
9.In what places are there U.S. military bases for ship refueling and maintenance according to Mr. ODEEN?
A.Japan, Australia and Taiwan.
B.Korea, Japan and Singapore.
C.Thailand, Japan and Guam.
D.Japan, Singapore, Australia and Guam.
10.What’s the meaning of the sentence “I don’t see that mattering.”
A.I don’t understand the matter.
B.I don’t find out the matter.
C.I don’t think the matter is vital.
D.I don’t know the matter.

【參考譯文】
聯(lián)盟的作用與未來(lái)作戰(zhàn)
陳伯江：您怎樣看待聯(lián)盟在未來(lái)國(guó)際安全和地區(qū)穩(wěn)定中的作用？在聯(lián)盟的內(nèi)容和形式上，將會(huì)出現(xiàn)哪些與今天有所不同的變化？
奧迪恩：我認(rèn)為聯(lián)盟在今后仍將非常重要。我的意思是，我們的主要聯(lián)盟體系仍將不變，但要隨著新國(guó)家的加盟有所變化。聯(lián)盟變得更大了。由于蘇聯(lián)的威脅不復(fù)存在，聯(lián)盟的軍事目的不夠明確。
北大西洋公約組織首次在它以外的地區(qū)作戰(zhàn)就是進(jìn)入波斯尼亞，這是一個(gè)相當(dāng)大的變化。我認(rèn)為隨著時(shí)間推移，你將會(huì)看到北大西洋公約組織愿意更多地在歐洲以外地區(qū)作戰(zhàn)。但是由于該組織的擴(kuò)大，涉及的國(guó)家越來(lái)越多，這也將使它更難達(dá)成一致，因而其行動(dòng)將會(huì)更加困難。
美國(guó)在北大西洋公約組織中起主導(dǎo)作用已經(jīng)有許多年了，但我們的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位不再像以往那樣有力。我認(rèn)為這大概是蘇聯(lián)的威脅已不存在的緣故。所以盡管該組織結(jié)構(gòu)依舊，我認(rèn)為美國(guó)的影響已今不如昔，在今后５或１０年也許會(huì)更弱。
在亞洲，我們沒(méi)有像北大西洋公約組織那樣的聯(lián)盟。當(dāng)然，日本仍是主要的盟國(guó)。韓國(guó)大概也是最明顯的盟國(guó)。但韓國(guó)的重點(diǎn)在北朝鮮問(wèn)題上。如果北朝鮮不再存在，如果他們能統(tǒng)一起來(lái)，在這種情況下，聯(lián)盟的意義將會(huì)大大削弱。過(guò)去２、３年中，美日關(guān)系已得到加強(qiáng)，我認(rèn)為日本更加重要和關(guān)鍵。
我認(rèn)為亞洲未來(lái)的預(yù)測(cè)更加困難因?yàn)楹δ撤N程度上與日本有非常密切的關(guān)系。日本的經(jīng)濟(jì)能否會(huì)繼續(xù)保持現(xiàn)狀；如果美國(guó)開(kāi)始撤軍，日本將面臨發(fā)展自己的武裝力量的巨大壓力。
因此，在亞洲，在日和中美之間存在著大量難以預(yù)測(cè)的發(fā)展動(dòng)向。你不可能預(yù)測(cè)。我認(rèn)為隨著時(shí)間的推移，有許多的機(jī)會(huì)使我們的關(guān)系越來(lái)越密切。并且我希望將會(huì)是這樣。也許我們最重要的外交政策目標(biāo)，應(yīng)當(dāng)是保持我們之間的良好關(guān)系，加為我們都是大國(guó)并是潛在的對(duì)手。如果我們變?yōu)閿橙?，將?duì)誰(shuí)都不好。我們都不得不在國(guó)防上花更多鐵錢(qián)，這將會(huì)帶來(lái)許多問(wèn)題。
所以我認(rèn)為中美兩國(guó)繼續(xù)努力發(fā)展良好的外交關(guān)系、貿(mào)易關(guān)系以及投資是非常重要的。讓中國(guó)學(xué)生到美國(guó)，讓更多的美國(guó)人去中國(guó)也是非常有益的。我們需要為此而努力，對(duì)我們兩國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，這樣做都很重要。
陳：在今后，城市作戰(zhàn)將變得更加重要。您對(duì)城市作戰(zhàn)的重要性有何評(píng)論？
奧迪恩：世界上每個(gè)國(guó)家（包括中國(guó)和其它地方）正在發(fā)生的諸多變化之一，就是城市越來(lái)越大，人們正在離開(kāi)農(nóng)村到城里去，因?yàn)槟抢镉懈嗟墓ぷ鳈C(jī)會(huì)。這種情況發(fā)生在非洲，發(fā)生在世界上大多數(shù)地區(qū)，尤其是南美和中美地區(qū)。
與此同時(shí)，城市也正在成為滋生不滿(mǎn)，即可能出現(xiàn)激進(jìn)因素的區(qū)域。在大城市更容易發(fā)展組織。因此，如果出現(xiàn)反政府的恐怖組織，政府就必須進(jìn)行干預(yù)，軍隊(duì)將不得不在城市作戰(zhàn)。軍隊(duì)在城市作戰(zhàn)非常困難，沒(méi)有人愿意在城里打仗，軍隊(duì)將非常脆弱。
為了適應(yīng)城市作戰(zhàn)，美國(guó)軍隊(duì)需做許多事情。其中之一是既要掌握更好的戰(zhàn)術(shù)又要發(fā)展更好的裝備。海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)現(xiàn)正在加利福尼亞州的沙漠地帶建設(shè)一個(gè)訓(xùn)練區(qū)，該訓(xùn)練區(qū)利用訓(xùn)練城市作戰(zhàn)的設(shè)施，訓(xùn)練如何在城市作戰(zhàn)，采用何種戰(zhàn)術(shù)，以及怎樣有效地進(jìn)行作戰(zhàn)。
為研制用于城市作戰(zhàn)的更先進(jìn)的技術(shù)，也花了不少錢(qián)。現(xiàn)已有多種傳感器能探測(cè)躲在墻后的人，因?yàn)槿伺c墻有微小的溫差，可利用雷達(dá)、紅外線以及諸如此類(lèi)的傳感器進(jìn)行探測(cè)。運(yùn)用技術(shù)使軍隊(duì)更有效地在城區(qū)環(huán)境下作戰(zhàn)的方式可以是多種多樣的。
然而，一般說(shuō)來(lái)，美軍以往總是避免進(jìn)行城區(qū)作戰(zhàn)。他們盡可能繞開(kāi)城市，離開(kāi)城市，并設(shè)法滯留城外。但我認(rèn)為今后不能再這樣繼續(xù)下去了。
陳：您對(duì)未來(lái)美國(guó)力量投送能力的重要性有何看法？美國(guó)試圖在今后加強(qiáng)其力量投送能力是否意味著將減少其前沿存在？
奧迪恩：我們能夠遠(yuǎn)距高部署部隊(duì)，而不需要攜帶太多的后勤保障物品。空軍部署飛行中隊(duì)的做法是只隨機(jī)攜帶很少的補(bǔ)給品，而依靠從美國(guó)本土運(yùn)送各種備件和電子設(shè)備組件的再補(bǔ)給。利用空運(yùn)，可以不在機(jī)場(chǎng)進(jìn)行大修活動(dòng)。我們?cè)O(shè)法更快地從遠(yuǎn)處進(jìn)行再補(bǔ)給，而不是在當(dāng)?shù)赝瓿伤醒a(bǔ)給。
由于智能武器的運(yùn)用，所需要的重量和噸位更少。只需少量武器就可完成任務(wù)，因而你不必運(yùn)送很多物品。老式的炸彈非常笨重，搬運(yùn)困難。
因此，有許多新的概念、戰(zhàn)術(shù)和裝備，使我們能在遠(yuǎn)離本土的地方非?？焖俨⒏菀椎夭渴鸩筷?duì)。因?yàn)槟悴恍枰陨頂y帶太多的物品。
在我們進(jìn)行這一問(wèn)題的研究時(shí)，無(wú)論我們到亞洲還是到歐洲，我們總會(huì)遇到這樣的問(wèn)題：你們將繼續(xù)保持１０萬(wàn)美軍-即大約１０萬(wàn)美軍在亞洲，１０萬(wàn)美軍在歐洲嗎？你們會(huì)長(zhǎng)期保留這些駐軍嗎？海外駐軍是美國(guó)承擔(dān)義務(wù)的政治標(biāo)志。如果我們不在那里駐軍，人們無(wú)法確定當(dāng)他們南要的時(shí)候，我們是否會(huì)派軍隊(duì)去。因此他們把美國(guó)駐軍看作是承擔(dān)義務(wù)的標(biāo)志、守信的標(biāo)志。
例如，在朝鮮，如果有美軍有那里，而且美國(guó)準(zhǔn)備在北朝鮮發(fā)動(dòng)進(jìn)攻的第一天就會(huì)有傷亡，他們就會(huì)知道美國(guó)不會(huì)袖手旁觀。如果美軍不在那里，那么就可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)問(wèn)題和疑惑。所以在像朝鮮那樣困難的情況下，美軍留在那里就可能是一種威懾因素。
雖然我們有很強(qiáng)的部署能力，如果部署距離更近就會(huì)更容易，特別是如果你有能讓船只開(kāi)進(jìn)去加油和維護(hù)的基地，就會(huì)更方便一些。就像我們?cè)谌毡荆蛐录悠?，或澳大利亞、關(guān)島擁有的基地那樣。因?yàn)閺拿绹?guó)到東南亞或東北亞的距離太遙遠(yuǎn)，有這些基地就很有幫助。
所以，我認(rèn)為我們將會(huì)在海外長(zhǎng)期部署足夠的部隊(duì)。我不知道會(huì)有多長(zhǎng)，而且我不認(rèn)為我們有了更強(qiáng)的部署能力與這有多大的關(guān)系。因?yàn)槲艺J(rèn)為他們所以要留在那里的主要原因是政治上的，而非軍事上的。

KEYS TO THE QUESTIONS 參考答案：
1. b 2. d 3. c 4. a 5. a 6. b 7.c 8. c 9.d 10.c