國(guó)家安全是美國(guó)保護(hù)主義的新幌子。美國(guó)總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)在這種虛偽的幌子下簽署了命令,對(duì)美國(guó)進(jìn)口的鋼鐵和鋁征收高額關(guān)稅。但金屬并不是保護(hù)主義最令人擔(dān)憂的新領(lǐng)域。據(jù)麥肯錫全球研究院(McKinsey Global Institute)稱,實(shí)物商品與服務(wù)的貿(mào)易多年來(lái)一直持平,但過(guò)去10年商業(yè)和信息的數(shù)字流動(dòng)增長(zhǎng)了45倍。真正該擔(dān)心的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)并不在實(shí)體商品領(lǐng)域,而在技術(shù)領(lǐng)域,經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義者希望將技術(shù)圈護(hù)起來(lái),以避免來(lái)自中國(guó)等國(guó)家的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)威脅。
The US has already launched a so-called Section 301 investigation. The results are due this summer, but it will probably result in stricter barriers on Chinese investment in American data and IT. That could shut out companies such as, say, Tencent, or result in new tariffs on a wider variety of Chinese products — or even usher in new visa rules for Chinese immigrants.
美國(guó)已經(jīng)啟動(dòng)了所謂的“301條款”(Section 301)調(diào)查。調(diào)查結(jié)果將于今年夏天公布,很可能會(huì)給中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)數(shù)據(jù)及信息產(chǎn)業(yè)的投資帶來(lái)更嚴(yán)苛的壁壘。這可能會(huì)將騰訊(Tencent)等企業(yè)拒之門(mén)外,或者導(dǎo)致美國(guó)對(duì)更廣泛的中國(guó)產(chǎn)品征收新的關(guān)稅——甚至針對(duì)中國(guó)移民引入新的簽證規(guī)則。
Last week, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US announced it had launched a review into Singapore-domiciled chipmaker Broadcom’s bid to purchase Qualcomm, a leading US semiconductor business. The move followed pressure from Texas senator John Cornyn and California representative Duncan Hunter, who have each received more than $15,000 in donations from Qualcomm’s political action committee, according to Federal Election Commission records. Treasury secretary Steve Mnunchin, who chairs Cfius, said last week that the US was “fully prepared” to use its powers to prevent the deal should it threaten national security.
美國(guó)外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)(Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 簡(jiǎn)稱CFIUS)上周宣布,他們已對(duì)新加坡芯片制造商博通(Broadcom)收購(gòu)美國(guó)領(lǐng)先的半導(dǎo)體企業(yè)高通(Qualcomm)的交易展開(kāi)審查。(美國(guó)總統(tǒng)特朗普已經(jīng)封殺了博通敵意收購(gòu)高通的交易,稱他這么做是為了保護(hù)美國(guó)的國(guó)家安全。——編者注)此前,德克薩斯州參議員約翰•科寧(John Cornyn)和加州眾議員鄧肯•亨特(Duncan Hunter)向CFIUS施加了壓力,聯(lián)邦選舉委員會(huì)(Federal Election Commission)的記錄顯示,他們兩人都收到了高通政治行動(dòng)委員會(huì)超過(guò)15000美元的捐款。美國(guó)財(cái)長(zhǎng)、CFIUS主席史蒂文•姆努欽(Steven Mnuchin)上周表示,美國(guó)“已做好充分準(zhǔn)備”,如果這筆交易威脅到國(guó)家安全,將動(dòng)用權(quán)力阻止。
The arguments being made against the deal range from worries that Broadcom would shrink Qualcomm’s investment in crucial areas such as 5G, to fears that the US cannot remain digitally competitive and secure if a Singaporean company owns Qualcomm. But that fails to take into account the way in which both the US tech industry and the administration itself currently operate.
反對(duì)這筆交易的理由包括,擔(dān)心博通會(huì)縮減高通在5G等關(guān)鍵領(lǐng)域的投資,以及若高通被一家新加坡公司所有,美國(guó)將無(wú)法在數(shù)字領(lǐng)域保持競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力與安全性。但這個(gè)理由沒(méi)有考慮到美國(guó)科技產(chǎn)業(yè)及政府自身目前的運(yùn)作方式。
Cfius frets that Broadcom, which has lined up $106bn in debt financing from private equity groups Silver Lake, KKR and CVC for the deal, will take a short-term profit approach and cut Qualcomm’s rich research and development budget, which is 20 per cent of revenues. That is a legitimate worry: private equity has a history of reducing R&D when the debt loads are high. Cfius’s theory is that if Qualcomm is starved of investment, the US will lose a “national champion” in the tech race against China.
CFIUS擔(dān)憂的是,已從私人股本集團(tuán)銀湖資本(Silver Lake)、KKR與CVC獲得1060億美元債務(wù)融資的博通,會(huì)采取短期獲利策略并削減高通的巨額研發(fā)預(yù)算,這部分預(yù)算占高通營(yíng)收的20%。CFIUS的擔(dān)憂是合理的:當(dāng)債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)很高時(shí),私人股本向來(lái)會(huì)縮減研發(fā)開(kāi)支。CFIUS的理論是,如果高通缺乏投資,美國(guó)將在與中國(guó)的科技競(jìng)賽中與“冠軍頭銜”失之交臂。
Yet this ignores the fact that Qualcomm has “strategic collaborations and interests in China that dwarf those of Broadcom”, according to Stacy Rasgon, a Bernstein semiconductor analyst. Many big US tech companies have substantial interests in China, even though some of them have been privately jumping on the nationalisticbandwagon in recent months. They have been using the “better us than China” argument when lobbying against the groundswell of enthusiasm for additional regulation of the technology sector on a variety of fronts, from antitrust to privacy.
然而,據(jù)伯恩斯坦公司(Bernstein)的半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)分析師斯泰西•拉斯岡(Stacy Rasgon)稱,這種擔(dān)憂忽略了一個(gè)事實(shí),即高通“在中國(guó)擁有的戰(zhàn)略合作關(guān)系與利益遠(yuǎn)超博通”。美國(guó)許多大型科技公司在中國(guó)擁有可觀的利益,盡管近幾個(gè)月其中一些公司私下里一直在追趕民族主義的浪潮。在反對(duì)對(duì)技術(shù)行業(yè)實(shí)行從反壟斷到隱私權(quán)等多方面的額外監(jiān)管時(shí),“我們總比中國(guó)企業(yè)強(qiáng)”一直是這些企業(yè)慣用的理由。
The problem is that neither the US tech industry nor the government can have it both ways. In the 1980s, under the Ronald Reagan administration, there was briefly a push for a more cohesive industrial policy around technology, but it was ditched as soon as George H W Bush took office. Then, in the late 1990s, the Department of Defense worried that the Japanese were making 92 per cent of the flat panel displays used in military equipment. It launched an effort to create a homegrown industry for this technology. Billions of dollars and several years later, Japanese firms had a 96 per cent market share. Today’s worry, of course, is that we start with tariffs on aluminium and steel and end up in a digital trade war that cannot be won.
問(wèn)題是,無(wú)論是美國(guó)的科技行業(yè)還是美國(guó)政府,都無(wú)法兩者兼得。上世紀(jì)80年代,在羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)執(zhí)政時(shí)期,曾短暫推行更具凝聚力的科技產(chǎn)業(yè)政策,但老布什(George H W Bush)一上臺(tái)就拋棄了這種政策。后來(lái),在90年代末,美國(guó)國(guó)防部(Department of Defense)擔(dān)心日本正在制造92%的用于軍事設(shè)備的平板顯示器,于是努力為這項(xiàng)技術(shù)創(chuàng)造了一個(gè)本土產(chǎn)業(yè)。幾年過(guò)去了,美國(guó)花了幾十億美元,日本企業(yè)卻占據(jù)了96%的市場(chǎng)份額。當(dāng)然,如今我們擔(dān)憂的是,從對(duì)鋁和鋼鐵征收關(guān)稅開(kāi)始,我們最終將陷入一場(chǎng)無(wú)法取勝的數(shù)字貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。
The government is right to want to look out for national security interests and to have a hand in how strategically important sectors are managed. But protectionism is not the way to do it.
政府希望維護(hù)國(guó)家安全利益,并參與管理戰(zhàn)略意義重大的行業(yè)是正確的。但保護(hù)主義并不是實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)的途徑。
The US government has a terrific record in terms of funding blue sky research that results in huge economic value for the private sector — touchscreen technology, GPS and the internet itself came out of the Pentagon. We should be bolstering rather than cutting funding for such research, and perhaps even allowing the public sector to take a greater cut of the profits if the research is commercialised, as Nordic countries and Israel do. That would help offset popular criticism that results when companies such as Apple or Google or Qualcomm, after benefiting greatly from publicly funded basic research, end up stashing much of their profits offshore.
美國(guó)政府在資助藍(lán)天研究方面有著了不起的記錄,為私營(yíng)部門(mén)帶來(lái)了巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值——觸摸屏技術(shù)、GPS以及本身即誕生于五角大樓的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)。我們應(yīng)增加而非削減這類研究的資金,甚至在這類研究商業(yè)化的情況下,允許公共部門(mén)獲取更多的利潤(rùn),就像北歐諸國(guó)與以色列所做的那樣。這將有助于減輕輿論的批評(píng)——蘋(píng)果(Apple)、谷歌(Google)或高通等公司在從公共資助的基礎(chǔ)研究中獲得巨大利益后,最終卻把大部分利潤(rùn)藏在海外。
It is true that China protects its own tech sector. But it is also true that America has homegrown tech troubles. Rather than slapping tariffs on foreign goods or swallowing the claim that companies doing business with economic adversaries are somehow national champions that will ensure state security, we should take a closer look at our own digital ecosystem. Large US incumbents are crushing innovation. Educational reform is desperately need to train workers for jobs where they will not be displaced by robots.
的確,中國(guó)也在保護(hù)自己的科技產(chǎn)業(yè)。但美國(guó)也確實(shí)存在著本土的科技問(wèn)題。與其對(duì)國(guó)外商品征收關(guān)稅,或拒絕承認(rèn)與經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)手做生意的公司在某種程度上其實(shí)是能夠確保國(guó)家安全的領(lǐng)袖企業(yè),不如讓我們好好反觀一下自己的數(shù)字生態(tài)系統(tǒng)。美國(guó)的大企業(yè)正在破壞創(chuàng)新。美國(guó)迫切需要教育改革,以培訓(xùn)勞動(dòng)者從事那些不會(huì)被機(jī)器人取代的工作。
We can best bolster growth not by protecting US companies from overseas buyers, but by investing in infrastructure. Addressing those issues is the right way to protect national security.
促進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)的最好辦法不是保護(hù)美國(guó)企業(yè)不被海外買(mǎi)家收購(gòu),而是投資于基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。解決這些問(wèn)題才是保護(hù)國(guó)家安全的正確途徑。