美國政治亂局給普京可趁之機

The White House national security adviser HR McMaster insists the evidence of Russian efforts to subvert US democracy is incontrovertible. His boss Donald Trump thinks the Federal Bureau of Investigation has better things to do than investigate the Kremlin’s interference in the 2016 election. Vladimir Putin’s Russia has been a big part of the reason for rising global insecurity. The absence of sober American leadership is now a bigger one.

白宮國家安全顧問H•R•麥克馬斯特(HR McMaster)非?？隙ǖ卣f，俄羅斯顛覆美國民主的行為證據(jù)確鑿。而他的老板唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)卻認(rèn)為，聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局(FBI)調(diào)查克里姆林宮干涉2016年美國大選是不務(wù)正業(yè)。弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的俄羅斯一直是全球安全局勢日益惡化的一大原因。如今，美國缺乏頭腦清醒的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人成為一個更主要的原因。

The latest gathering of foreign policy and defence chiefs at the Munich Security Conference was nothing if not gloomy. Speaker after speaker stepped up to the podium to recite the list of threats. Mr Putin’s meddling in western elections sits alongside Russian revanchism in Ukraine; violent chaos in Syria and beyond, together with the spread of Islamist terrorism; North Korea’s quest for long-range nuclear missiles; and Beijing’s military build-up in the South China Sea.

各國外交政策和國防領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人齊聚的慕尼黑安全會議(Munich Security Conference)最近一次會議愁云慘淡。演講者一個接一個登臺，將目前全球面臨的威脅清單背誦一遍：普京干預(yù)西方選舉和俄羅斯在烏克蘭的“收復(fù)”失地行動;敘利亞及其周邊地區(qū)的暴力沖突和伊斯蘭恐怖主義的蔓延;朝鮮研制遠(yuǎn)程核導(dǎo)彈;以及北京在南中國海的軍事實力構(gòu)筑。

More unnerving than any one flashpoint is the pervasive sense of powerlessness. It was one thing to enunciate the challenges. Missing was anything much in the way of solutions. We must all stick together, show resolve. This is what politicians say when they are lost. Resolve to what purpose?

比上述任何一個引爆點更令人不安的是，一種四處彌漫的無力感。指明現(xiàn)在面臨哪些挑戰(zhàn)是一回事。至于解決辦法，則沒有人說得出來。我們必須團結(jié)一致，展示我們的決心。這是政治家們在不知所措時常說的話。但我們展示決心的目的究竟是什么?

Leadership of the west rests with a US president at war with most of the American foreign policy establishment. Outsiders puzzling at the direction of US policy are told to dismiss the words of the president and commander-in-chief and focus on the course set by two generals — Jim Mattis at the Pentagon and Gen McMaster. But can we be sure Mr Trump is bluffing or might he indeed visit fire and fury on Pyongyang?

領(lǐng)導(dǎo)西方的重任落在一位正在跟美國傳統(tǒng)外交政策圈大部分人掐架的美國總統(tǒng)身上。對美國政策方向感到困惑的局外人被告知，不要理會美國總統(tǒng)兼三軍總司令的話，關(guān)注兩位將軍——五角大樓的吉姆•馬蒂斯(Jim Mattis)和國家安全顧問麥克馬斯特將軍——為美國設(shè)定的路線。但是，特朗普是在虛張聲勢、還是或許確實想讓平壤領(lǐng)教一下火和怒，我們能確定嗎?

The post-cold war Pax Americana had entered its twilight before Mr Trump took office. US hegemony could not outlive the redistribution of economic power to the east and south — above all the rise of a China determined to reassert a global role. Barack Obama’s “leading from behind” was in part an admission of the shift. But Mr Trump’s embrace of a policy shaped around belligerent nationalism, repudiation of the rules-based order and his admiration for Mr Putin has collapsed America’s political authority abroad.

在特朗普上臺之前，冷戰(zhàn)后美國治下的和平(Pax Americana)已經(jīng)日薄西山。隨著經(jīng)濟實力的重心向東方和南方轉(zhuǎn)移(尤其是一個決心重新在全球扮演角色的中國的崛起)，美國的霸權(quán)難以為繼。巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)的“幕后領(lǐng)導(dǎo)”( leading from behind)的做法部分承認(rèn)了這一轉(zhuǎn)變。但特朗普奉行圍繞好戰(zhàn)民族主義形成的政策、否定基于規(guī)則的秩序并對普京欽佩有加，使美國在海外的政治權(quán)威分崩離析。

American power provided the glue of the international order — the backstop for the regional arrangements that by and large have kept the peace since 1945. There is nothing in sight to replace it. For all the financial pledges offered to Nato, Europe is still not sure it wants to defend itself properly. What counts as an alliance system in east Asia has rested entirely on the strength or otherwise of bilateral ties with the US.

美國的力量是國際秩序的粘合劑——這是各項地區(qū)性安排使世界自1945年以來大體上保持和平的后盾。目前還看不到有任何力量可以取代它。盡管北約獲得了一切資金上的保證，歐洲仍不確定自己想不想承擔(dān)起妥善保衛(wèi)自己的責(zé)任。東亞的聯(lián)盟體系完全取決于各個國家與美國的雙邊關(guān)系牢固與否。

It is in the Middle East, though, that the impact of US retreat has been most keenly felt. Militarily present in the daily assault on the remnants of Isis, politically the US is nowhere to be seen. Not so long ago Washington was the reference point for the policies of every player in the region. No one did anything before first considering what might be the likely reaction in the White House.

不過，最深刻感受到美國退卻的影響的地區(qū)是中東。雖然美國通過參與每天對伊斯蘭國(ISIS)殘余勢力的襲擊在軍事上顯示了存在感，但在政治上美國毫無存在感可言。直到不久以前，該地區(qū)的每一方在制定政策時都還將華盛頓作為參照物。每一方在采取任何行動之前，都會首先考慮白宮可能的反應(yīng)。

Now allies and adversaries alike sense they can act with impunity. When Israel bombed Syria the other day after an incursion into its airspace by an Iranian drone, it was Mr Putin who secured restraint. Saudi Arabia considers it has carte blanche to wage war in Yemen. Turkey is fighting Kurdish forces in Syria that have been armed by the Americans. Iran knows all too well that Mr Trump’s threatened repudiation of the deal would rupture Washington’s relationship with Europe.

現(xiàn)在，盟友和對手都覺得，他們可以想怎么做就怎么做，不用擔(dān)心會有什么后果。當(dāng)以色列因伊朗無人機從敘利亞起飛進入以領(lǐng)空而轟炸敘利亞時，站出來呼吁各方保持克制的是普京。沙特阿拉伯認(rèn)為其完全有權(quán)在也門發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭。土耳其正與美國武裝的敘利亞庫爾德部隊作戰(zhàn)。伊朗非常清楚，特朗普威脅要撕毀與其達成的協(xié)議將破壞華盛頓與歐洲的關(guān)系。

Then there is Mr Putin. Gen McMaster could hardly have said anything else after the justice department’s indictment of 13 Russian individuals and three companies for conspiring to change the outcome of the 2016 election. The indictment was a tribute to the work of special counsel Robert Mueller and a studied rebuke to those Republicans in congress who have joined the president in attacking America’s legal institutions. For all that, Mr Trump still has nothing bad to say about Mr Putin.

緊接著是普京。在美國司法部以密謀改變2016年大舉結(jié)果為由，對13名俄羅斯人和3家俄羅斯公司提起訴訟之后，麥克馬斯特將軍說了開頭提到的話，因為不那樣說就不合適。這份起訴書是對特別檢察官羅伯特•米勒(Robert Mueller)所做工作的褒獎，也是對和總統(tǒng)一道攻擊美國法律制度的共和黨議員的精心策劃的反擊。即便在這樣的情況下，特朗普仍沒有說一句普京的壞話。

Such divides are not going to make it easy to come up with an intelligent Russia policy. The problem is that there is nothing left except a choice between Mr Trump’s obsessive desire to strike a grand strategic bargain with Mr Putin and a hardening sentiment in Congress that says the attempt to manipulate American politics must be met with an escalating scale of punitive measures. Since the president’s plan is now a pipe dream, the odds are that the US will follow the second course. That promises another nuclear arms race and raises the threat of an unintended military clash in one of the world’s hotspots.

由于這種分歧，制定出一套明智的俄羅斯政策絕非易事。難辦的是，美國目前別無選擇，只能從以下兩條路中二選一：特朗普一門心思想跟普京達成一項戰(zhàn)略性大交易;國會則強硬地表示，對于操縱美國政治的企圖，只能用不斷升級的懲罰性措施來回應(yīng)。既然總統(tǒng)的計劃現(xiàn)在看來是白日發(fā)夢了，那么美國較大可能會選擇第二條路。這可能會引發(fā)另一場核軍備競賽，并帶來全球熱點地區(qū)發(fā)生意外軍事沖突的威脅。

There is no mystery about what would amount to a sensible course. The west learned during the cold war that the ingredients of productive engagement with Moscow are a readiness to confront aggression and a willingness to seek out areas of potential agreement. Deterrence and dialogue, I think it used to be called. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction did not preclude a procession of arms deals and confidence-building measures.

明智的道路是什么，這個問題不難回答。西方在冷戰(zhàn)期間就已經(jīng)明白，與莫斯科進行有成效接觸的方法，就是在做好應(yīng)對侵略的準(zhǔn)備的同時，仍然有意愿尋找可能達成一致的地方。我記得這個方法就叫做威懾與對話并行。誓要致對方于死地的原則，并沒有妨礙雙方達成一系列軍備控制協(xié)議并出臺建立信任的措施。

Something of the same is needed now. In the absence of a coherent worldview in Washington no one should bet on it. The western policy chiefs in Munich were right to be worried about Mr Putin’s disdain for a rules-based international order. They should be more concerned about the failures of the US — and its allies — to come up with some answers to lower the temperature.

現(xiàn)在需要的是就是這樣的策略。由于華盛頓沒有一個清晰的全球觀，誰都不應(yīng)該對此抱多大希望。齊聚慕尼黑的西方政策制定者有理由為普京蔑視基于規(guī)則的國際秩序感到擔(dān)憂。但他們應(yīng)該更為這件事感到擔(dān)憂：美國及其盟友未找到一些辦法，為眼下的局勢降溫。

[email protected] 譯者/何黎