FT社評(píng)：推動(dòng)中國更加開放

A decade ago, most global companies’ strategic presentations gave pride of place to plans for China. This position is now taken by other areas — big data or artificial intelligence, perhaps. What has changed? China is now bigger, richer and more influential on the world stage. The vicissitudes of management fashion may have something to do with it. But the most powerful driver is probably years of hard experience. As China’s economy has matured, protectionism has remained one of its key organising principles.

10年前，多數(shù)全球公司的戰(zhàn)略演講都會(huì)把中國發(fā)展計(jì)劃放在首要位置。如今這個(gè)位置或許已被其他領(lǐng)域(比如大數(shù)據(jù)或人工智能)占據(jù)。是什么改變了?中國現(xiàn)在在世界舞臺(tái)上更大、更富且更具影響力。管理時(shí)尚的變遷可能有一點(diǎn)關(guān)系。但最強(qiáng)大的驅(qū)動(dòng)因素很可能是多年的艱辛體驗(yàn)。在中國經(jīng)濟(jì)趨于成熟的同時(shí)，保護(hù)主義仍然一直是其關(guān)鍵的組織原則之一。

Global companies maintain their presence in China, depend on its manufacturing capacity, and hire its graduates. In some areas — luxury goods, cars, iPhones — they sell a lot of products there. But the “China First” approach pursued by Beijing has served to shift many industries’ priorities.

全球公司依然保持在華業(yè)務(wù)，依靠中國的制造實(shí)力，并且聘用中國的畢業(yè)生。在一些領(lǐng)域(比如奢侈品、汽車、iPhone)，他們?cè)谥袊袌鲣N售大量產(chǎn)品。但北京方面采取的“中國優(yōu)先”姿態(tài)，已經(jīng)在很多行業(yè)起到了改變企業(yè)重點(diǎn)的效果。

This is the crucial context for news that opposition from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has sunk the $1.2bn acquisition of US cash transfer company MoneyGram by China’s Ant Financial.

這對(duì)于下列新聞是至關(guān)重要的背景：美國外國投資委員會(huì)(CFIUS)的反對(duì)已導(dǎo)致中國螞蟻金服(Ant Financial)收購美國匯款公司速匯金(MoneyGram)的12億美元交易泡湯。

It is plain that if the positions were switched, with an American bidder and a Chinese target, China would block the deal. Other than, perhaps, information technology — where the “great firewall of China” constitutes the world’s biggest non-tariff trade barrier — few Chinese industries are more protected than finance. The country’s banks are state-owned. Foreign banks are allowed to operate in the country, but various official barriers mean they have never made much headway there, despite big investments and official pledges of increased openness. It took a 2012 ruling against China by the World Trade Organization for its market to be opened — nominally — to global payment processors such as Visa and MasterCard. Since the ruling, Chinese regulators have dragged their feet in allowing outsiders to set up shop.

很顯然，如果交易方換位，換成一家美國競購者和一家中國目標(biāo)企業(yè)，中國將會(huì)阻止這筆交易。也許除了信息技術(shù)(在該領(lǐng)域，中國的“長城防火墻”構(gòu)成了世界上最大的非關(guān)稅貿(mào)易壁壘)以外，中國沒有什么行業(yè)比金融業(yè)更受保護(hù)。中國的銀行是國有的。外資銀行被允許在境內(nèi)經(jīng)營，但各種官方障礙意味著他們?cè)谥袊鴱奈创蜷_局面，盡管企業(yè)作出了大筆投資，盡管官方承諾要提高開放度。只是在世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)在2012年作出對(duì)中國不利的裁決后，中國支付市場才——在名義上——對(duì)Visa和MasterCard等全球支付處理商開放。自上述裁決出爐以來，中國監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)在允許外資企業(yè)開展業(yè)務(wù)方面拖拖沓沓。

Whether the MoneyGram deal would have presented a true security risk to the US (the only basis on which Cfius is allowed to rule) is debatable. But the politics are clear. Other than the particular companies that have received premium bids from Chinese suitors, there is no constituency willing to stand up for Chinese investment in the US. Business groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, rather than lamenting federal heavy-handedness, have expressed their own worries about China’s trade policies.

速匯金交易會(huì)否給美國帶來真正的安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)(CFIUS依法可以作出裁決的唯一依據(jù))是值得商榷的。但這其中的政治態(tài)勢是清楚的。除了那些接到了中國追求者溢價(jià)收購要約的具體公司以外，美國社會(huì)沒有一個(gè)群體愿意為中國在美投資站出來說話。美國商會(huì)等商業(yè)團(tuán)體沒有抱怨聯(lián)邦政府霸道，而是表達(dá)了他們自己對(duì)中國貿(mào)易政策的擔(dān)憂。

The anti-China mood in Washington is not restricted to the avowedly and indiscriminately protectionist administration of Donald Trump (the president appoints the officials who staff Cfius). It is bipartisan, and was already taking hold under former president Barack Obama, who blocked the Chinese takeover of the semiconductor equipment maker Aixtron.

華盛頓的反中國情緒不僅限于公然和不加區(qū)分實(shí)行保護(hù)主義的唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)政府(CFIUS的官員是由總統(tǒng)任命的)。這種情緒是兩黨共有的，而且在前總統(tǒng)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)主政時(shí)期就已經(jīng)形成。奧巴馬政府曾經(jīng)阻止中資收購德國半導(dǎo)體設(shè)備制造商愛思強(qiáng)(Aixtron)。

The busted deal follows other measures to restrict Chinese access to world markets in the US, Europe and other countries. But this one must sting. Mobile payments, Ant’s core business, is the cutting edge of Chinese consumer technology. Jack Ma, who chairs Alibaba, Ant’s parent company, is Chinese tech’s global face, and he made a special effort to court President Trump with the promise of US jobs.

這筆交易泡湯之前，美國、歐洲和其他國家還出臺(tái)了限制中資進(jìn)入世界市場的其他措施。但這件事肯定會(huì)刺痛。螞蟻金服的核心業(yè)務(wù)——移動(dòng)支付——代表著中國消費(fèi)者科技的前沿。螞蟻母公司阿里巴巴(Alibaba)的董事長馬云(Jack Ma)是中國科技行業(yè)的全球面孔，他曾付出特別努力巴結(jié)特朗普總統(tǒng)，許諾在美國創(chuàng)造就業(yè)。

The US and the world may only be responding in kind to Chinese protectionism. It would nonetheless be a tragedy if the story ended there. Yes, it is understandable that the world demands reciprocity. But trade officials must keep their eyes firmly on the goal of a more open China — not domestic markets protected from Chinese competition. China can become a true global economic leader only if it changes its ways. Should change come, the world must be ready to welcome it.

美國乃至世界也許只是在對(duì)中國的保護(hù)主義做出針鋒相對(duì)的回應(yīng)。然而，如果故事就此結(jié)束，那將是一場悲劇。沒錯(cuò)，世界要求互惠互利是可以理解的。但是貿(mào)易官員必須把目光牢牢地放在推動(dòng)中國更加開放這個(gè)目標(biāo)上，而不是保護(hù)國內(nèi)市場，使其免受中國的競爭。中國只有改變其行為方式，才能成為真正的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。如果這種改變來臨，世界必須準(zhǔn)備好歡迎。