特朗普的對伊朗戰(zhàn)略是玩火之舉
如果唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)本周設(shè)法撕毀了2015年伊朗與美國及另外五個世界大國達成的協(xié)議——以凍結(jié)大部分核計劃換取解除經(jīng)濟制裁——此舉將成為他迄今采取的最具破壞性且無謂的行動。
Trying (and failing) to destroy Obamacare without anything feasible to replace it was vandalism. Pulling the US out of the Paris climate change accord is cosmically irresponsible, yet offset by the determination of American states and companies to meet the pact’s emissions targets. But to reopen the Iran nuclear deal is to open a strategic Pandora’s box — and Mr Trump is no strategist.
試圖(但未成功)廢除奧巴馬醫(yī)改(Obamacare)卻拿不出任何可行方案取而代之，是一種蓄意破壞。帶領(lǐng)美國退出《巴黎氣候變化協(xié)定》更是極大的不負(fù)責(zé)任，雖然此舉造成的影響被美國各州及企業(yè)實現(xiàn)該協(xié)定排放目標(biāo)的決心所沖淡。但重新談判伊朗核協(xié)議相當(dāng)于打開了戰(zhàn)略上的潘多拉魔盒——而特朗普根本稱不上戰(zhàn)略家。
Not the least remarkable aspect of the Trump administration’s Iran policy mess is that the generals surrounding the president — who are deeply hostile to Iran — all favour sticking with the nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Jim Mattis, US defence secretary and former commander in the Middle East, told the Senate last week that: Iran was in compliance with the deal; the JCPOA was in the US national interest; and the administration should stick with it. The week before that, General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, told the Senate the deal was working, and delaying any eventual Iranian development of nuclear arms.
特朗普政府的伊朗政策亂局中引人注目的一點是，總統(tǒng)身邊那些對伊朗深惡痛絕的將軍們都支持堅守伊核協(xié)議，即所謂的聯(lián)合全面行動計劃(JCPOA)。美國國防部長、中央司令部前司令詹姆斯•馬蒂斯(James Mattis)上周在參議院表示：伊朗遵守了協(xié)議;JCPOA符合美國的國家利益;美國政府應(yīng)堅守該協(xié)議。此前一周，美國參謀長聯(lián)席會議主席約瑟夫•鄧福德(Joseph Dunford)上將對參議院表示，伊核協(xié)議正在發(fā)揮作用，讓伊朗可能最終開發(fā)出核武器的那一天推遲到來。
These are all people who want to push back against Iran, and prevent it consolidating a Shia axis from Tehran to the Mediterranean and down into the Gulf. Yet Mr Trump seems less interested in practical policies to do that than in blowing up what he keeps describing as “the worst deal ever”.
這些高官都希望壓制住伊朗，阻止其鞏固自己的“什葉派軸心”——從德黑蘭到地中海、再到整個海灣地區(qū)。然而，特朗普似乎對實現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)的切實可行的政策不感興趣，只一門心思要撕毀他口中的“有史以來最糟糕的協(xié)議”。
There is plenty of room for the US to add to its already formidable arsenal of non-nuclear sanctions, aimed at Iran’s interventionism in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, or at its ballistic missile programme. Some sanctions experts believe the cumulative effect of such measures could end by torpedoing the JCPOA — by cutting Iran off from international banks — without the opprobrium that would follow were the US to renege on a deal that the UN Security Council voted into international law. But that would all seem a bit low key for Mr Trump.
美國有足夠的余地增加本已非常嚴(yán)厲的非核制裁措施，這些制裁主要針對伊朗核計劃以外的活動——其對伊拉克、敘利亞、黎巴嫩、也門的干預(yù)，或者其彈道導(dǎo)彈計劃。一些研究制裁的專家認(rèn)為，這些制裁措施的效果加在一起，最終有可能通過使伊朗被排除在國際銀行體系之外，讓JCPOA名存實亡，而且這種做法還不會招致責(zé)難;背棄經(jīng)聯(lián)合國安理會投票通過成為國際法的JCPOA，則肯定會招致責(zé)難。但對于特朗普來說，這種做法似乎陣勢不夠大。
The president looks set to “decertify” the Iran deal before the October 15 deadline, after which the US Congress would have 60 days to decide whether to re-impose pre-2015 sanctions. Nothing positive can result from this.
特朗普看上去肯定將在10月15日截止日期前宣布“取消”伊核協(xié)議，此后，美國國會將有60天時間決定是否恢復(fù)2015年之前的制裁措施。此舉不會產(chǎn)生任何積極效果。
The European states that signed the JCPOA — France, Britain and Germany — also want to curb Iranian adventurism in the Middle East. Even Russia, allied with Iran in its support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria’s civil war, finds the Islamic republic’s ambitions hard to assimilate. Moscow, for instance, has tried to rebuild Syria’s crumbling and depleted regular army; Tehran, in Syria as in Iraq, prefers to build Shia militias under its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
簽署伊核協(xié)議的歐洲國家——法國、英國和德國——也希望遏制伊朗在中東的冒險主義。就連在敘利亞內(nèi)戰(zhàn)中與伊朗共同支持巴沙爾•阿薩德(Bashar al-Assad)政權(quán)的俄羅斯，也難以接受伊朗的野心。例如，莫斯科一直在試圖重建敘利亞潰不成軍的正規(guī)軍;而德黑蘭更傾向于打造由伊朗伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(IRGC)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的什葉派民兵——在敘利亞和伊拉克均是如此。
Yet it is the US that will now be seen as in violation of an international agreement, not Iran, repeatedly certified compliant with the JCPOA by its international monitors. Mr Trump is heading for a real breach with Washington’s European allies.
然而，如今將被視為違反一項國際協(xié)議的是美國，而非被國際核查機構(gòu)一再證明遵守協(xié)議的伊朗。特朗普正走向與華盛頓的歐洲盟友的真正決裂。
His belligerence is already strengthening hardliners in Iran, grouped around Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, and the IRGC. This is happening at the expense of pragmatic conservatives and reformist supporters of President Hassan Rouhani, who has twice won elections pledging to use the nuclear deal to open Iran and its economy to the world. Mr Trump is not interested, as he showed at the Riyadh summit in May at which he called on Saudi Arabia to lead a Sunni coalition to isolate Iran.
特朗普的敵對態(tài)度已然讓伊朗國內(nèi)的強硬派更加得勢，這些人集結(jié)在伊朗最高領(lǐng)袖阿里•哈梅內(nèi)伊(Ali Khamenei)和伊朗伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊周圍。與此同時，受到打擊的是支持總統(tǒng)哈桑•魯哈尼(Hassan Rouhani)的務(wù)實保守派和改革派。魯哈尼兩度贏得總統(tǒng)大選，他承諾利用伊核協(xié)議讓伊朗及其經(jīng)濟對外開放。特朗普對此并不感興趣，正如他在今年5月的利雅得峰會上的舉動所示(他在會上呼吁沙特阿拉伯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)建立一個遜尼派聯(lián)盟，以孤立伊朗)。
That was already an act of geopolitical arson. It showed little grasp of the real leverage the US has in the region — which has since diminished further. US military might is without parallel. Yet in Syria and Iraq it depends on Kurdish fighters in the fight against Isis. The Trump administration is proposing to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organisation. It makes a good tweet. But the US is at war with Sunni jihadis, not Shia terrorists, and is fighting in alignment, if not alliance, with Iran.
這簡直是一種地緣政治上的縱火行為。此舉根本未認(rèn)清美國在這一地區(qū)的真正影響力，自那以后，這種影響力已經(jīng)進一步削弱。美國的軍事實力或許無與倫比。但在敘利亞和伊拉克，美國要依靠庫爾德武裝打擊ISIS。特朗普政府?dāng)M將伊朗伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊認(rèn)定為恐怖組織。這條消息在Twitter上發(fā)出來將是一則爆炸性推文。但美國正在打擊的是遜尼派圣戰(zhàn)分子，而非什葉派恐怖分子，而且正與伊朗并肩(如果不是聯(lián)盟的話)作戰(zhàn)。
Iran is often caricatured as ideologically rigid. Yet it has shown persistent agility in turning the policy errors of the US and the west to its advantage. It was the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the vacuum the west left for jihadis to fill in Syria after 2011 — not the 2015 nuclear deal — that furnished the tools for Tehran to forge its Shia sphere of influence.
伊朗常被諷刺為意識形態(tài)僵化。然而，在將美國和西方的政策錯誤轉(zhuǎn)化為自身優(yōu)勢方面，伊朗表現(xiàn)出了一貫的靈活性。正是美國2003年領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的入侵伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭以及2011年后西方國家在敘利亞留下的被圣戰(zhàn)分子填補的真空，為德黑蘭提供了打造什葉派勢力范圍的條件。
The 2015 deal is a rare example of a diplomatic triumph, one that found a medium-term formula to deal with a nuclear threat that could have set off a regional arms race. It stands in strong contrast to North Korea. The Trump administration seems to have no policy there except threats to contain Pyongyang’s threatening nuclear activity — and now wants the same approach for Iran.
2015年達成的伊核協(xié)議是一場罕見的外交勝利。面對原本可能會引發(fā)地區(qū)軍備競賽的核威脅，該協(xié)議找到了一種中期解決方案。伊核協(xié)議的達成與愈演愈烈的朝鮮核問題形成了鮮明對比。除了威脅遏制平壤危險的核活動之外，特朗普政府似乎拿不出任何政策——如今卻想以同樣的方式對付伊朗。
The parallel here is George W Bush’s repudiation in 2002 of the Agreed Framework — the accord painstakingly fashioned by Bill Clinton’s administration in 1994, with a mix of carrot and stick — which brought Pyongyang to the table. After President Bush kicked the table over, North Korea restarted its weapons programme. Similar histrionics will no doubt work equally well with Iran.
不應(yīng)忘記的是2002年喬治•W•布什(George W Bush)宣布廢除了把平壤帶到談判桌前的《框架協(xié)議》(Agreed Framework)——比爾•克林頓(Bill Clinton)政府1994年胡蘿卜與大棒并舉、煞費苦心打造的協(xié)議。小布什總統(tǒng)踢翻談判桌后，朝鮮重新啟動了核武器計劃。毫無疑問，類似的裝腔作勢同樣將徹底搞砸伊核問題。
