西方自由主義的困境

A gaggle of students are driving at high speed to Berlin. “Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, / But to be young was very heaven,” wrote Wordsworth about the French Revolution. The year is 1989, not 1789, but the poet’s sentiments capture our mood. Having grown up under the Cold War’s nuclear shadow, the temptation to catch a glimpse of its physical demise was irresistible. The instant we heard East Germany had opened Checkpoint Charlie, uniting Berlin, we were on our way. Within 18 hours we were chipping at that wall alongside tens of thousands of others, young and old, German and foreign. With chisels and pickaxes we made our tiny contributions. Two days later we returned to England, hungover, astonished to have avoided any speeding tickets, each carrying a small chunk of the wall.

一群學(xué)生駕車高速向柏林駛?cè)ァ?ldquo;幸福啊，活在那個(gè)黎明之中，年輕人更是如進(jìn)天堂，”華茲華斯(Wordsworth)對(duì)法國(guó)大革命有感而發(fā)地寫道。雖然那一年是1989年，而不是1789年，但詩(shī)人華茲華斯表達(dá)的情緒正契合我們的心情。對(duì)于在冷戰(zhàn)核陰影下長(zhǎng)大的我們而言，親眼目睹冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束標(biāo)志性一幕的誘惑是不可抗拒的。一聽(tīng)說(shuō)東德打開(kāi)了東、西柏林之間的查理檢查哨(Checkpoint Charlie)，我們就上路了。不到18個(gè)小時(shí)之后，我們就和成千上萬(wàn)的民眾(有老有少，有德國(guó)人也有外國(guó)人)一起鑿著那堵墻。我們用鑿子和鎬做出了綿薄的貢獻(xiàn)。兩天后，我們返回英格蘭，酒還沒(méi)醒，卻驚訝地發(fā)現(xiàn)沒(méi)有收到超速罰單，每個(gè)人都帶回了墻上的一小塊磚頭。

We were infected with optimism. As a student of philosophy, politics and economics at Oxford, I imagined I possessed insight into the significance of the moment. PPE’s detractors called it a “pretty poor education”. They may have had a point. But in that moment, studying it seemed pertinent. We subscribed to progress, or rather Progress — belief in which is the closest thing the modern west has to a religion. In 1989 its schism was healed. By unifying its booming western wing with the shrivelled post-Stalinist eastern one, a monumental roadblock had been cleared from our future. No longer would nuclear-armed camps face each other across the 20th-century bloodlands of central Europe. That riven continent, from which Britain no longer stood aloof, would unify. Democracies would take the place of the Warsaw Pact, whose regimes were falling like dominoes to peaceful demonstrators. It was not just autocracy that was dying but nationalism. Borders were opening up. As the historian Eric Hobsbawm was to write, the short and genocidal 20th century, which began with the first world war in 1914, was about to come to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Humanity had proved it could learn from its mistakes. It was a good time to turn 21.

我們受到了樂(lè)觀情緒的感染。作為牛津大學(xué)(Oxford)一名學(xué)習(xí)哲學(xué)、政治學(xué)及經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(PPE)專業(yè)的學(xué)生，我感覺(jué)自己對(duì)這一時(shí)刻的意義擁有洞察力。這一跨學(xué)科專業(yè)的批評(píng)者稱其為一項(xiàng)“相當(dāng)糟糕的教育”。他們或許有道理。但在那一刻，學(xué)習(xí)這個(gè)專業(yè)似乎是有用的。我們贊同進(jìn)步的信念，這是現(xiàn)代西方最接近宗教的信仰。在1989年，現(xiàn)代西方的分裂被彌合了。通過(guò)將蓬勃發(fā)展的西德與萎靡的后斯大林主義的東德統(tǒng)一起來(lái)，我們?yōu)槲磥?lái)清除了一塊巨大的障礙。在中歐這片20世紀(jì)的血染大地上，再也不會(huì)出現(xiàn)不同核武陣營(yíng)相互對(duì)峙。英國(guó)不再冷漠對(duì)待的這塊撕裂的大陸將聯(lián)合起來(lái)。民主國(guó)家將取代華約(Warsaw Pact)，這一組織旗下的政權(quán)在和平示威者面前像多米諾骨牌一樣倒下。走向消亡的不只是獨(dú)裁政權(quán)，還有民族主義。各國(guó)的邊界開(kāi)放了。正如歷史學(xué)家艾瑞克•霍布斯鮑姆(Eric Hobsbawm)寫道，始于1914年第一次世界大戰(zhàn)的短暫而血腥的20世紀(jì)，即將以蘇聯(lián)的解體而結(jié)束。人類已證明可以從錯(cuò)誤中汲取教訓(xùn)?，F(xiàn)在是走向21世紀(jì)的好時(shí)候。

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Almost three decades later, in the aftermath of Donald Trump’s 2016 election victory, I found myself in Moscow. I had been invited to attend a conference on the “polycentric world order”, which is Russian for “post-American world”. It was hosted by the Primakov Institute, named after the man who had been Russia’s foreign minister and prime minister during the 1990s. Yevgeny Primakov was displaced as prime minister in 1999 by Vladimir Putin. While my friends and I had danced on the rubble of the Berlin Wall, a brooding Putin had watched his world crumbling from 100 miles away, at his KGB office in Dresden, a city in what was still East Germany. Later he would describe the USSR’s dissolution as the “greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century”. It was Primakov who championed the term “multipolarity” in a vain bid to dampen America’s oceanic post-Cold War triumphalism. Putin picked up the concept and made it his own.

將近30年后，在2016年唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)贏得美國(guó)大選后，我來(lái)到了莫斯科，受邀參加一個(gè)討論“多中心世界秩序”的會(huì)議，這是俄羅斯對(duì)“后美國(guó)世界”的表述。這次會(huì)議由普里馬科夫研究所(Primakov Institute)主辦，該所以上世紀(jì)90年代擔(dān)任過(guò)俄羅斯外長(zhǎng)和總理的葉夫根尼•普里馬科夫(Yevgeny Primakov)的名字命名。1999年，弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)取代普里馬科夫成為總理。當(dāng)我和我的朋友們?cè)诎亓謮Φ膹U墟上手舞足蹈時(shí)，100英里外，陷入沉思的普京正從克格勃(KGB)位于東德城市德累斯頓的辦公室眼睜睜地看著眼前的世界崩塌下來(lái)。后來(lái)，他把蘇聯(lián)解體形容為“20世紀(jì)最大的地緣政治災(zāi)難”。普里馬科夫曾倡導(dǎo)“多極化”概念，徒勞地試圖削弱美國(guó)冷戰(zhàn)后的必勝信念。普京接受了這一概念，并將其作為自己的理念。

Now here I was at an event attended by the likes of Alexander Bortnikov, head of the FSB (successor to the KGB), and by Putin himself. Though unsmiling, it was the Russians’ turn to celebrate. America had just elected a president who was a fan of walls and an admirer of Putin. While Putin was surveying his wrecked world in 1989, and we were racing down the autobahn, Trump was launching a board game. It was called Trump: The Game. With its fake paper money and property-based rules, it bore an uncanny resemblance to Monopoly — except that the number six on the dice was replaced with the letter T. There is no record that Trump said anything about the fall of the Berlin Wall. At any rate, all that seemed a long time ago.

現(xiàn)在我正在莫斯科參加上述會(huì)議，與會(huì)者還有俄羅斯聯(lián)邦安全局(FSB，前身為克格勃)局長(zhǎng)亞歷山大•波特尼科夫(Alexander Bortnikov)等高官以及普京本人。盡管面無(wú)笑容，但輪到俄羅斯人慶祝了。美國(guó)剛選出一位熱衷修筑隔離墻并且仰慕普京的總統(tǒng)。1989年，當(dāng)普京環(huán)視眼前崩塌的世界而我們飛馳在高速公路上時(shí)，特朗普正發(fā)明一種名為“特朗普游戲”(Trump: The Game)的紙盤游戲。該游戲有假的紙幣和基于地產(chǎn)的規(guī)則，極為類似“大富翁”(Monopoly)——除了骰子上的數(shù)字六被字母T替換之外。關(guān)于特朗普對(duì)柏林墻倒塌的看法，沒(méi)有任何記錄。無(wú)論如何，這一切似乎都已經(jīng)很久遠(yuǎn)了。

What followed was a crash course in how to see the world differently. Still a student of history, though I hope by now a more sceptical one, I was struck by how often our Russian hosts referred admiringly to the Congress of Vienna. This was the 1814–15 conference that sealed the end of the Napoleonic Wars and launched almost a century of stability, which held until the outbreak of the first world war. The new order was underwritten by the Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia. Trump’s victory had opened up the prospect that Russia could return to its historic role as a great power in a polycentric world — one in which each forswore doing anything to undermine the internal legitimacy of any other. No more talk of the inevitability of democracy, or the US-led global order. That was what Putin craved. Others, in Beijing, Ankara, Cairo, Caracas, and even Budapest, share Russia’s hostility to western notions of progress, as do growing numbers of apostates in the west. Are they wrong?

接下來(lái)要學(xué)的是一門關(guān)于如何以不同的視角看世界的速成課程。作為一名仍在學(xué)習(xí)歷史的學(xué)生，盡管我希望如今的自己能更具有懷疑精神，但還是被俄羅斯東道主如此頻繁地贊美維也納會(huì)議(Congress of Vienna)震住了。那場(chǎng)在1814年至1815年間召開(kāi)的會(huì)議為拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)(Napoleonic Wars)畫上了句號(hào)，開(kāi)啟了持續(xù)近一個(gè)世紀(jì)的穩(wěn)定時(shí)期，直至第一次世界大戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)。保障這一新秩序的是由英國(guó)、奧地利、普魯士和俄羅斯組成的四國(guó)同盟(Quadruple Alliance)。特朗普勝選開(kāi)啟了一種前景，即俄羅斯可能重返其作為一個(gè)多中心世界強(qiáng)國(guó)的歷史角色，而在這個(gè)多中心世界，每個(gè)國(guó)家都發(fā)誓不會(huì)做任何破壞別國(guó)內(nèi)部合法性的事情。沒(méi)人再去談?wù)撁裰鞯谋厝恍曰蛘呙绹?guó)主導(dǎo)的全球秩序。這正是普京夢(mèng)寐以求的。在北京、安卡拉、開(kāi)羅、加拉加斯，甚至布達(dá)佩斯，這些地方的人與俄羅斯一樣敵視西方關(guān)于進(jìn)步的觀念，西方內(nèi)部也有越來(lái)越多的人放棄這一觀念。他們錯(cuò)了嗎?

***

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To a person whose life has coincided with the rise of democracy, the spread of market economics and signs that the world had finally subscribed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, merely to pose this question is troubling enough. Wasn’t that debate settled a long time ago? Doesn’t the whole world crave to be western? We can no longer have any confidence in that. It was remarkably arrogant to believe the rest of the world would passively adopt our script. We must cast a sceptical eye on what we have learnt never to question.

對(duì)一個(gè)伴隨著民主興起、市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)散以及全世界最終接受《世界人權(quán)宣言》(Universal Declaration of Human Rights)的種種跡象而成長(zhǎng)的人來(lái)說(shuō)，僅僅提出這一問(wèn)題就足以令人不安。這場(chǎng)辯論不是很久以前已經(jīng)塵埃落定了嗎?整個(gè)世界不都渴望西方化嗎?對(duì)于這一點(diǎn)，我們不能再抱有任何信心。認(rèn)為世界其他國(guó)家會(huì)被動(dòng)地采納我們的信條，這種想法極為傲慢。我們必須用質(zhì)疑的眼光看待那些我們?cè)唤逃肋h(yuǎn)不要質(zhì)疑的事情。

At stake is a quasi-religious reading of western history that stretches back to the Magna Carta, whose 800th anniversary was celebrated at Runnymede in 2015. By limiting the power of the king, the Magna Carta set a precedent for what would later be known as “no taxation without representation.” This short medieval document was lost to the mists for several hundred years — Shakespeare did not even mention it in his play King John. Yet since the 17th century, when the Magna Carta was dusted off by opponents of Stuart tyranny in England, then made its way to America’s 13 colonies, it has morphed into the founding myth of western liberalism. As Dan Jones, a historian of the Magna Carta, describes it, the year 1215 is today seen as the “year zero” of liberal democracy. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was issued after the second world war, Eleanor Roosevelt said that it “may well become the international Magna Carta for all men everywhere”.

這關(guān)系到對(duì)可追溯至《大憲章》(Magna Carta)的西方歷史的類似宗教的解讀。2015年，蘭尼米德(Runnymede)舉行了《大憲章》簽署800周年慶?；顒?dòng)。通過(guò)限制國(guó)王的權(quán)力，《大憲章》為后來(lái)眾所周知的“無(wú)代表不納稅”原則開(kāi)創(chuàng)了先例。這份簡(jiǎn)短的中世紀(jì)文件在隨后幾百年里消失在了迷霧之中——甚至連莎士比亞(Shakespeare)都沒(méi)在歷史劇《約翰王》(King John)中提到它。然而，自17世紀(jì)《大憲章》被英格蘭斯圖亞特王朝暴政的反對(duì)者拂去表面的灰塵并傳播到北美洲的13個(gè)殖民地之后，它演變?yōu)槲鞣阶杂芍髁x的奠基理念。正如研究《大憲章》的歷史學(xué)家丹•瓊斯(Dan Jones)所言，1215年如今被視為自由民主之“元年”。當(dāng)《世界人權(quán)宣言》在二戰(zhàn)后發(fā)布時(shí)，埃莉諾•羅斯福(Eleanor Roosevelt)曾說(shuō)，這份宣言“完全可以成為全人類的國(guó)際憲章”。

For centuries, westerners have held a linear faith in which time is always marching us towards a happier place. The Greeks called it teleology. For Christians, it was the Second Coming of Christ. For Marxists, it was the dictatorship of the proletariat. For nationalists, it was seizing control of their Volk destiny. For Georgian and Victorian liberals on both sides of the Atlantic, and their modern heirs across the western world, it was the progress of human liberty to individual freedom. In 1989 most people believed that last version. The others were either dead or in retreat. Today, only Marxism is dormant. Belief in an authoritarian version of national destiny is staging a powerful comeback. More to the point, non-western visions of history, which were overshadowed by colonial rule, are restaking their claim to relevance. In different ways, China and India have traditionally taken a circular view of history. They still do. Material conditions may improve. But humanity’s moral condition is constant. There is no political finale towards which history is guiding us. To the rest of the world, which accounts for almost nine-tenths of humanity, most of whom are now finally starting to catch up with the west’s material advantages, humankind’s moral progress is a question that can never be settled. History does not end. It is a timeless repetition of folly and correction.

數(shù)世紀(jì)以來(lái)，西方人秉持的是線性信仰，認(rèn)為時(shí)間總是會(huì)帶我們走向更加幸福的地方。希臘人稱之為目的論。對(duì)于基督徒而言，那就是耶穌再臨。對(duì)于馬克思主義者而言，那就是無(wú)產(chǎn)階級(jí)專政。對(duì)于民族主義者而言，那就是掌握人民命運(yùn)的控制權(quán)。對(duì)于喬治王朝和維多利亞時(shí)期大西洋兩岸的自由主義者、以及他們?cè)谡麄€(gè)西方世界的現(xiàn)代后嗣而言，那就是從人類解放邁向個(gè)人自由的進(jìn)步。1989年，多數(shù)人都秉持最后一個(gè)版本的信仰。其他版本要么消亡了，要么倒退了。如今，只有馬克思主義處于休眠之中。對(duì)民族命運(yùn)的獨(dú)裁版信仰正強(qiáng)勢(shì)地重新回到舞臺(tái)。說(shuō)得更確切些，曾因殖民統(tǒng)治而蒙上陰影的非西方版本的歷史正在重申它們的重要性。中國(guó)和印度以不同的方式傳統(tǒng)上對(duì)歷史采取一種循環(huán)往復(fù)的觀點(diǎn)。他們現(xiàn)在依舊秉持這種觀點(diǎn)。物質(zhì)條件或許改善了。但人類的道德?tīng)顩r依舊。歷史沒(méi)有把我們引向任何一種政治結(jié)局。對(duì)于世界其他地區(qū)(生活著將近90%的人類，其中多數(shù)人如今終于開(kāi)始追上西方的物質(zhì)優(yōu)勢(shì)了)而言，人類的道德進(jìn)步是一個(gè)永遠(yuǎn)無(wú)法解決的問(wèn)題。歷史沒(méi)有終點(diǎn)。它永恒地重復(fù)著犯錯(cuò)和改正。

Those who doubt the circular view should look at US history. In 1789, the newly independent American colonies had a life expectancy of barely 40. It took 12 days by coach and boat for Thomas Jefferson to make the journey from his home in Virginia to Philadelphia. Today life expectancy is nearly twice that and Jefferson’s route takes five hours. Now measure America’s story by another yardstick. America’s first president, George Washington, was a world historical figure who cemented America’s democratic character by refusing to wear his general’s uniform for his inauguration. Against all exhortations, he stood down after two terms. He feared a third would set the wrong precedent. Can we say America’s moral progress has matched its material advances? In some ways it undoubtedly has. The US was born with slavery and women had no voice. But faith in the march towards “a more perfect union” is hard to sustain after President Trump’s election. Washington chose to be a modest statesman when the laurel was his for the taking. Trump, on the other hand, is a self-promoter without peer.

那些質(zhì)疑這種循環(huán)往復(fù)觀點(diǎn)的人應(yīng)該看看美國(guó)歷史。1789年，剛剛獨(dú)立的美國(guó)殖民地的人均壽命只有區(qū)區(qū)40歲。托馬斯•杰斐遜(Thomas Jefferson)坐了12天的馬車和船才從位于弗吉尼亞州的家到達(dá)了費(fèi)城?，F(xiàn)在美國(guó)的人均壽命差不多是那時(shí)的兩倍，而杰斐遜這段行程只需要5個(gè)小時(shí)?，F(xiàn)在以另一種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)衡量美國(guó)的歷史。美國(guó)第一位總統(tǒng)喬治•華盛頓(George Washington)是一位世界級(jí)的歷史人物，他拒絕在就職典禮上穿著將軍制服，從而奠定了美國(guó)的民主性。他拒絕了一切諫言，在擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)兩個(gè)任期后毅然下臺(tái)。他擔(dān)心第三個(gè)任期會(huì)樹立一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤的先例。我們可以說(shuō)美國(guó)的道德進(jìn)步與物質(zhì)改善相匹配嗎?在某些方面，毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)是這樣的。美國(guó)誕生之時(shí)有奴隸制，女性沒(méi)有話語(yǔ)權(quán)。但在特朗普總統(tǒng)勝選后，向“更完美的聯(lián)邦”邁進(jìn)的信仰難以為繼了。當(dāng)王冠唾手可得時(shí)，華盛頓選擇成為一名謙遜的政治家。而另一方面，特朗普是一個(gè)舉世無(wú)雙的自吹自擂之人。

Of course, Trump and his counterparts in Europe, did not cause the crisis of democratic liberalism. They are a symptom. This may be hard to digest. Many comfort themselves that Trump’s victory was an accident delivered by the dying gasp of America’s white majority — and abetted by Putin. History will resume normal business after a brief interruption. They are too sanguine. Almost a quarter of America’s white working classes who voted for Barack Obama in 2008 switched to Trump in 2016. Had they, in Hillary Clinton’s unfortunate word, suddenly turned “deplorable”? Or were they driven by a desire to blow up a system that had routinely blamed them for their plight? The same can be asked of the Nissan employees in Sunderland who voted against their economic interests for Brexit. It may have been poetic coincidence that both David Cameron and Clinton stumbled on to the same campaign line: “Stronger together”. It should be little surprise that so many voters on both sides of the Atlantic responded so cynically. The Clintons have earned $235m in speaking fees since Bill Clinton left office — much of it from the same Wall Street banks who foreclosed on so many middle class homes. Within weeks of leaving office Obama accepted a $400,000 fee for a speech to a Wall Street firm — the same as the president’s salary. In the age of Trump, the appetite for Obama’s thoughts is likely to grow. But his fees are an all-too familiar monetisation of public office. The median US income only regained its pre-recession level at the end of Obama’s term in 2015. It is still below where it was at the turn of this century. Meanwhile, almost half of Americans now describe themselves as “lower class” — up from a third in 2000.

當(dāng)然，特朗普和他在歐洲的同類并沒(méi)有導(dǎo)致自由民主的危機(jī)。他們是癥狀。這可能很難理解。很多人自我安慰地認(rèn)為，特朗普的勝利是在普京的幫助下由美國(guó)白人多數(shù)群體的垂死掙扎所導(dǎo)致的意外。在短暫的中斷后，歷史會(huì)重新恢復(fù)正常。他們太樂(lè)觀了。曾在2008年投票支持巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)的美國(guó)白人工人階級(jí)，有將近四分之一在2016年轉(zhuǎn)而支持特朗普。用希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)令人遺憾的話來(lái)說(shuō)，他們是突然變“可悲”的嗎?還是說(shuō)他們是受一種渴望的驅(qū)使，想要?dú)У裟莻€(gè)總是把他們的困境歸咎到他們自己頭上的系統(tǒng)?同樣的問(wèn)題也可以問(wèn)問(wèn)日產(chǎn)(Nissan)在桑德蘭的員工，他們違背了自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益而投票支持了英國(guó)退歐。戴維•卡梅倫(David Cameron)和希拉里挑選了同樣的競(jìng)選口號(hào)——“在一起更強(qiáng)大”(Stronger Together)，這或許是詩(shī)意的巧合。大西洋兩岸的那么多選民都作出如此憤世嫉俗的反應(yīng)，這應(yīng)該沒(méi)什么大驚小怪的。自從比爾•克林頓(Bill Clinton)離任之后，克林頓一家賺到了2.35億美元的演講費(fèi)——其中很多都來(lái)自那些對(duì)眾多中產(chǎn)階級(jí)的房屋止贖的華爾街銀行。在離任后幾周內(nèi)，奧巴馬就為華爾街一家公司演講而得到了40萬(wàn)美元——與總統(tǒng)的薪水一樣多。在特朗普時(shí)代，商界可能更想知道奧巴馬的想法了。但他的演講費(fèi)是司空見(jiàn)慣的對(duì)公職的貨幣化。2015年，在奧巴馬任期末尾，美國(guó)收入中值才剛剛回到了衰退前的水平。目前仍然低于本世紀(jì)初的水平。與此同時(shí)，現(xiàn)在有將近一半的美國(guó)人形容自己是“下層階級(jí)”——而2000年時(shí)的比例為三分之一。

The backlash of the west’s middle classes, who are the biggest losers in a global economy that has been rapidly converging, but still has decades to go, has been brewing for many years. In Britain we call them the “left-behinds”. In France, they are the “couches moyennes”. In America, they are the “squeezed middle”. A better term is the “precariat” — those whose lives are dominated by economic insecurity. More than 160m westerners now work in the so-called gig economy, according to the management consultancy McKinsey, a multiple of where it was five years ago. Of these, about a third do so “out of necessity”. Their numbers are forecast to rise sharply. Their share of US wealth keeps going the other way. The bottom 50 per cent of Americans now own just 1 per cent of the nation’s wealth.

作為一直快速融合(并且還要持續(xù)如此幾十年)的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中的最大輸家，西方中產(chǎn)階級(jí)的反彈已經(jīng)醞釀了許多年。在英國(guó)，我們稱他們“留守者”(left-behinds)。在法國(guó)，他們是couches moyennes。在美國(guó)，他們是“受擠壓的中產(chǎn)”(squeezed middle)。一個(gè)更恰當(dāng)?shù)男g(shù)語(yǔ)是“無(wú)保障無(wú)產(chǎn)階級(jí)”(precariat)——生活上缺乏經(jīng)濟(jì)保障的人士。根據(jù)管理咨詢公司麥肯錫(McKinsey)的數(shù)據(jù)，逾1.6億西方人如今在所謂的零工經(jīng)濟(jì)(gig economy)中工作，數(shù)倍于5年前的人數(shù)。其中約三分之一是“出于需要”這么做。這部分人的數(shù)量預(yù)計(jì)還將大幅上升。但他們?cè)诿绹?guó)財(cái)富中所占份額一直在下降。如今，收入最低的50%美國(guó)人僅占有本國(guó)財(cái)富的1%。

In 1966 Barrington Moore, the American sociologist, wrote, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy.” In the coming years his proposition will be tested. Since the turn of the millennium, and particularly over the past decade, no fewer than 25 democracies have failed around the world, three of them in Europe (Russia, Turkey and Hungary). Poland may not be far behind. In all but Tunisia, the Arab Spring was swallowed by the summer heat. “It is an open question whether this is a market correction in democracy, or a global depression,” says Francis Fukuyama, the scholar who back in 1989 asked whether history had ended. The answer will be found in the US and other western democracies.

1966年，美國(guó)社會(huì)學(xué)家巴林頓•摩爾(Barrington Moore)曾寫道：“沒(méi)有中產(chǎn)階級(jí)就沒(méi)有民主。”在未來(lái)幾年，他的觀點(diǎn)將經(jīng)受考驗(yàn)。自進(jìn)入新千年以來(lái)，尤其是過(guò)去10年，全球不下25個(gè)民主國(guó)家出現(xiàn)了倒退，其中有3個(gè)國(guó)家位于歐洲(俄羅斯、土耳其和匈牙利)。波蘭可能也為時(shí)不遠(yuǎn)了。除了在突尼斯，阿拉伯之春已被夏日熱浪吞噬。“這是民主國(guó)家的市場(chǎng)調(diào)整還是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條，仍有待商榷，”弗朗西斯•福山(Francis Fukuyama)說(shuō)。學(xué)者福山早在1989年就提出了歷史是否已經(jīng)終結(jié)的問(wèn)題。答案將取決于美國(guó)和其他西方民主國(guó)家。

Journalists are always liable to over-interpret the latest big thing. We are also prone to interpret what we did not foresee as serenely inevitable in hindsight. Bear in mind that Brexit was not destined to happen. Holding the referendum was a rash throw of the dice by an inept prime minister. Nor was Trump’s victory inevitable. If just 77,000 Midwestern votes had gone the other way Hillary Clinton would now be president. But it works both ways. Should Marine Le Pen lose the French election and Angela Merkel retain power in Germany, the crisis of western liberalism will not have suddenly ended, though I suspect it will be broadcast as such. Nor, for that matter, would America be secure if Clinton were now in the White House. The self-belief of western elites saps their ability to grasp the scale of the threat.

記者總是傾向于過(guò)度解讀最新的大事件。我們也很容易在事后將我們未能預(yù)見(jiàn)到的事解釋為不可避免。但請(qǐng)記住，英國(guó)退歐并非注定要發(fā)生。舉行退歐公投是一位無(wú)能的首相輕率地?cái)S出的骰子。特朗普的勝選也并非不可避免。如果中西部有7.7萬(wàn)張選票改投希拉里，她現(xiàn)在就是美國(guó)總統(tǒng)。但這一道理兩方面都說(shuō)得通。如果馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)在法國(guó)大選中落敗(英文刊發(fā)時(shí)法國(guó)大選還未結(jié)束——譯者注)而安格拉•默克爾(Angela Merkel)仍執(zhí)掌德國(guó)，西方自由主義的危機(jī)也不會(huì)突然結(jié)束，盡管我懷疑宣傳上會(huì)如此說(shuō)。因此，即使如今希拉里坐鎮(zhèn)白宮，美國(guó)也不會(huì)高枕無(wú)憂。西方精英的自我信念削弱了他們判斷威脅程度的能力。

Last December, Norbert Hofer, a hard right nationalist, came within a whisker of winning Austria’s presidency. We nevertheless celebrated his defeat as the crashing of the populist wave. We are likely to do the same if a French neo-fascist loses with about 40 per cent of the vote on Sunday. Le Pen’s Front National remains France’s largest party in two critical regional strongholds — the industrial north and Provence. As millions more French, British, American and other westerners move from secure jobs with pensions in the years ahead to contractual status without benefits, their sense of precariousness will intensify. “Take back control” may be an empty slogan in a world of inter-dependent sovereignty. But it means something tangible to those who have lost what they once thought was economic security. The western state used to insure individuals against the vicissitudes of the market. It is increasingly withdrawing from that role. Should Emmanuel Macron win the French election, supporters of liberal democracy, including me, must pray that he — and other leaders like him — will succeed. But he will have won on the basis of issuing vague, catch-all promises without a majority party to carry out his wishes. Obama offered similar hope in 2008 when his party was in full control. Eight years later America elected Trump.

去年12月，極右翼民族主義者諾貝特•霍弗(Norbert Hofer)只差一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)就贏得奧地利總統(tǒng)大選。但我們把他的失敗當(dāng)作民粹主義浪潮的折戟來(lái)慶祝。在法國(guó)的兩大關(guān)鍵地區(qū)——工業(yè)化的北部地區(qū)和普羅旺斯地區(qū)，勒龐的國(guó)民陣線(Front National)仍是最大政黨。今后，隨著法國(guó)、英國(guó)、美國(guó)等西方國(guó)家數(shù)以百萬(wàn)計(jì)的民眾失去可提供養(yǎng)老金的穩(wěn)定工作，進(jìn)入沒(méi)有福利的合同工狀態(tài)，他們的不安全感將加劇。在一個(gè)主權(quán)相互依賴的世界，“奪回控制權(quán)”或許只是一句空洞的口號(hào)。但對(duì)于那些失去了他們?cè)?jīng)認(rèn)為的經(jīng)濟(jì)保障的人來(lái)說(shuō)，這意味著看得見(jiàn)的實(shí)惠。西方國(guó)家曾經(jīng)為個(gè)人免受市場(chǎng)興衰影響提供保障。如今，它們正逐漸退出這一角色。如果埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍(Emmanuel Macron)贏得法國(guó)大選(英文刊發(fā)時(shí)法國(guó)大選還未結(jié)束——譯者注)，包括我在內(nèi)的自由民主支持者一定會(huì)祈禱他以及像他一樣的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人取得成功。但他的勝選將建立在做出模糊、籠統(tǒng)的承諾的基礎(chǔ)上，但沒(méi)有一個(gè)議會(huì)多數(shù)黨實(shí)現(xiàn)他的愿望。奧巴馬在2008年民主黨同時(shí)控制參眾兩院之際向美國(guó)人民提出了類似的希望。但8年后，美國(guó)人民選擇了特朗普。

The west’s crisis was not invented in 2016. Nor will it vanish in 2017. It is structural and likely to persist. Those who gloss over this are doing liberal democracy no favours.

西方的危機(jī)并非在2016年才出現(xiàn)，也不會(huì)在2017年消失。這種危機(jī)是結(jié)構(gòu)性的，很可能持續(xù)下去。那些粉飾危機(jī)的人對(duì)自由民主沒(méi)有半點(diǎn)好處。