FT社評：特朗普或毀掉世界貿(mào)易規(guī)則

The framework of rules for global trade has withstood some fearsome ructions over the past few years. The rise of China, which aroused resentment about job losses across the world; the global financial crisis and the threat of renewed global protectionism; mounting inequality within some rich countries frequently blamed on trade: all have strained the World Trade Organisation’s ability to keep the peace.

全球貿(mào)易規(guī)則的整體框架近年來經(jīng)受了數(shù)番可怕的風(fēng)浪：中國崛起，引發(fā)了世界各國對本國就業(yè)流失的憤怒;全球金融危機(jī)，以及全球保護(hù)主義復(fù)蘇的威脅;部分富裕國家不平等狀況日益加劇，其根源常被歸咎于貿(mào)易。這一切都使世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)不得不拼盡全力去維持和平。

Happily, even though the WTO’s rulemaking function has more or less ground to a halt, the laws set down in previous agreements have largely restrained destructive protectionist impulses. All that, however, could end with the US administration of Donald Trump, who regards trade deficits as prima facie evidence of rule-breaking by the counterpart country and holds institutions like the WTO in contempt.

幸運(yùn)的是，盡管WTO制定規(guī)則的職能或多或少陷入了停滯，但此前協(xié)議中訂立的法規(guī)在很大程度上抑制了保護(hù)主義的破壞性沖動。然而，這種局面可能在唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的新一屆美國政府手上終結(jié)。特朗普把貿(mào)易逆差視為貿(mào)易伙伴國破壞規(guī)則的初步證據(jù)，并且蔑視WTO之類的機(jī)構(gòu)。

The revelation that administration officials have asked the Office of the US Trade Representative to draft a list of unilateral measures to go after countries such as China is disturbing if not surprising. The US already has some of the world’s more far-reaching forms of “trade defence” — antidumping and antisubsidy duties — in its arsenal. To go further towards unilateralism, rather than bringing cases to the WTO, threatens to irreparably harm the multilateral trading system as it currently exists.

據(jù)爆料，特朗普政府官員已要求美國貿(mào)易代表辦公室(Office of the US Trade Representative)擬定一份對付中國等國家的單邊措施清單。這一舉動雖說并不出人意料，卻令人不安。美國已經(jīng)擁有一些影響較廣的“貿(mào)易防御”工具，即反傾銷和反補(bǔ)貼關(guān)稅。進(jìn)一步走向單邊主義、而不愿訴諸WTO，可能對現(xiàn)行多邊貿(mào)易體系造成不可挽回的傷害。

There is little doubt that Mr Trump could inflict serious damage with the tools he inherits. Congress has seen fit to give the presidency far more destructive than constructive power. It requires special “trade promotion authority” for the White House to put a trade deal to Congress for an up-or-down vote. But the president on his own can use a variety of pieces of legislation to impose emergency import tariffs based on ill-defined concepts of national security, a “large and serious” balance of payments deficit, a national emergency or retaliation against “unjustifiable” restrictive practices.

毫無疑問，特朗普可以利用他繼承的工具來制造嚴(yán)重?fù)p害。美國國會覺得賦予總統(tǒng)破壞性遠(yuǎn)大于建設(shè)性的權(quán)力是合適的。白宮要將一項(xiàng)貿(mào)易協(xié)議提交國會表決，需要獲得特別“貿(mào)易促進(jìn)授權(quán)”。但總統(tǒng)本人可以利用各種各樣的法律，依據(jù)國家安全、“龐大、嚴(yán)重的”收支逆差、國家緊急狀態(tài)或?qū)?ldquo;不正當(dāng)”限制措施予以報(bào)復(fù)等定義模糊的概念來征收緊急進(jìn)口關(guān)稅。

Of course, these measures will be subject to challenge in US courts or the WTO’s dispute settlement process. But there is always the possibility that Mr Trump will simply ignore a WTO ruling and treat any punitive tariffs imposed on US exports by the litigant trading partner as a hostile act.

當(dāng)然，這些措施會受到美國法院或WTO爭端解決機(jī)制的挑戰(zhàn)。但始終存在這樣的可能性，特朗普可能干脆忽視WTO的裁決，把發(fā)生訴訟的貿(mào)易伙伴國對美國出口征收懲罰性關(guān)稅視作敵對行為。

This will do far more harm than good, within the US and without. The system has, more or less, worked. Under Barack Obama, the USTR became much more aggressive about taking China to the WTO, and won a string of cases including on rare earths, autos and auto parts and windpower equipment. The Chinese economy remains heavily distorted by state intervention, but by and large it has complied with the rulings of the dispute settlement process since it joined the WTO in 2001. Beijing has come to recognise WTO litigation is not an intrinsically hostile act but a way to defuse conflict.

這樣做的危害將大于好處，對美國國內(nèi)和美國以外的地區(qū)都是如此。全球貿(mào)易體系或多或少發(fā)揮了作用。在巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)治下，美國貿(mào)易代表辦公室在將中國訴諸WTO方面變得激進(jìn)得多，并在稀土、汽車與汽車零部件以及風(fēng)力發(fā)電設(shè)備等領(lǐng)域打贏了一系列官司。中國經(jīng)濟(jì)仍被政府干預(yù)嚴(yán)重扭曲，但自2001年加入WTO以來，中國大體上服從WTO爭端解決機(jī)制的裁決。北京方面已經(jīng)意識到，在WTO框架內(nèi)提起訴訟并非本質(zhì)上敵對的行為，而是解決沖突的途徑。

Integrating a vast trading economy the size and dynamism of China’s into the global trading system has not been easy. But it would surely have been more confrontational and disruptive had many of those disputes not been mediated by the WTO.

讓一個擁有中國這般規(guī)模和活力的巨大貿(mào)易經(jīng)濟(jì)體融入全球貿(mào)易體系并未易事。但是，假如許多爭端不是通過WTO調(diào)解，中國肯定會表現(xiàn)出更強(qiáng)的對抗性和破壞性。

Given the time it will take to bring a case to the WTO against unilateral American protectionism, there will be a danger that trading partners will react to US measures with emergency defensive tariffs of their own.

考慮到把一個控訴美國單方面采取保護(hù)主義措施的案件提交至WTO所需的時間，貿(mào)易伙伴國有可能也通過實(shí)施緊急防御性關(guān)稅去回?fù)裘绹淖龇ā?/p>

The threat of a modern repeat of the disastrous Smoot-Hawley tariff, which kicked off the tit-for-tat trade protectionism of the Great Depression, has often been cited in recent decades. If these indications from Mr Trump’s administration are followed through, it is closer than ever to coming true.

近幾十年來，人們經(jīng)常提到在現(xiàn)代社會重啟災(zāi)難性的“司莫特-郝利關(guān)稅”(Smoot-Hawley Tariff)的威脅——這種關(guān)稅開啟了大蕭條(Great Depression)時期針鋒相對的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義。如果特朗普政府的這些跡象延續(xù)下去，那么這種關(guān)稅與現(xiàn)實(shí)之間的距離會比以往任何時候都要近。