特朗普抓住了貿(mào)易失衡的關(guān)鍵

Both US and European policymakers have misdiagnosed what ails the global economy. It is not a short-run, cyclical problem curable with textbook Keynesian stimuli (and exotics like quantitative easing). Rather, it is a long-term structural disequilibrium caused by chronic trade imbalances — the result, in turn, of manipulated currencies, mercantilist practices and poorly negotiated trade deals. Enter, stage centre, Donald Trump.

美國(guó)和歐洲的政策制定者都錯(cuò)判了全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的困境。它并非一個(gè)通過(guò)教科書般的凱恩斯式經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激(以及量化寬松等不尋常舉措)就能解決的短期周期性問(wèn)題，而是一個(gè)因長(zhǎng)期貿(mào)易失衡導(dǎo)致的長(zhǎng)期結(jié)構(gòu)性失衡，而長(zhǎng)期貿(mào)易失衡是匯率操縱、重商主義慣例和談判糟糕的貿(mào)易協(xié)議的結(jié)果。唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)站到了舞臺(tái)中央。

Before the era of globalisation, which began in earnest in the 1980s, US managers improved efficiency by substituting capital for labour in domestic factories. As globalisation has taken hold, executives have offshored entire factories as a more effective means of maximising profits.

在全球化(真正開始是在上世紀(jì)80年代)時(shí)代開啟之前，美國(guó)企業(yè)管理者通過(guò)在國(guó)內(nèi)工廠用資本取代勞動(dòng)力提高了效率。隨著全球化的推進(jìn)，作為一種更有效的利潤(rùn)最大化方式，企業(yè)高管們將整個(gè)工廠外包到海外。

This offshoring trend is mirrored in statistics that reveal a rapid narrowing of the US manufacturing sector. In the 1970s, manufacturing employed 20 per cent of the workforce. Today, that number has dropped to a mere 8 per cent — with more than 5m manufacturing jobs lost since 2000 alone.

這種外包趨勢(shì)在數(shù)據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)中得到了體現(xiàn)。數(shù)據(jù)顯示，美國(guó)制造業(yè)快速收縮。上世紀(jì)70年代，美國(guó)制造業(yè)聘用了全國(guó)20%的勞動(dòng)者。如今，這一數(shù)字降至區(qū)區(qū)8%，僅自2000年以來(lái)制造業(yè)就損失了500萬(wàn)個(gè)以上的就業(yè)崗位。

To those who would blame this decline primarily on automation, one need only point to Germany and Japan, which retain almost 20 per cent and 17 per cent of their labour force in manufacturing, respectively. These countries are worldwide leaders in robotics.

對(duì)于那些將這種收縮主要?dú)w咎于自動(dòng)化的人，我們只需讓他們看看德國(guó)和日本，這兩國(guó)分別將近20%和17%的勞動(dòng)者留在了制造業(yè)，而這兩個(gè)國(guó)家是機(jī)器人領(lǐng)域的全球領(lǐng)袖。

As the US manufacturing base has narrowed, the rate of productivity has fallen. During the 1970s growth in US unit labour costs was 6.8 per cent a year but it dropped to 3.6 per cent in the 1980s, 1.6 per cent in the 1990s and to 1.2 per cent so far this century.

隨著美國(guó)制造業(yè)基礎(chǔ)的收縮，生產(chǎn)率一直下滑。上世紀(jì)70年代，美國(guó)的單位勞動(dòng)成本每年增長(zhǎng)6.8%，80年代降至3.6%，90年代降至1.6%，本世紀(jì)至今為1.2%。

This productivity decline is likewise mirrored in the rise of outward foreign direct investment. During the 1970s, total US FDI was a mere $109.2bn. With globalisation, FDI grew 59.2 per cent to $174.8bn in the 1980s, $1.1tn in the 1990s and $3tn in the first decade of this century. Today, FDI is sprinting ahead at a $4tn rate.

生產(chǎn)率下滑反映在了對(duì)外直接投資(FDI)增長(zhǎng)上。上世紀(jì)70年代，美國(guó)的對(duì)外直接投資只有1092億美元。上世紀(jì)80年代，在全球化的推動(dòng)下，美國(guó)的對(duì)外直接投資增長(zhǎng)59.2%，至1748億美元，上世紀(jì)90年代和本世紀(jì)頭10年分別達(dá)到1.1萬(wàn)億美元和3萬(wàn)億美元。如今，對(duì)外直接投資正以4萬(wàn)億美元的速度向前挺進(jìn)。

Of course, not all outbound FDI has been due to offshoring. The decline in US manufacturing employment and the fall in US productivity — and associated slower US growth rates and stagnant wages — have, however, been greatly accelerated and amplified by a series of bad trade deals and chronic currency misalignments that prevent trade from coming back into balance.

當(dāng)然，并非所有對(duì)外直接投資都是因?yàn)橥獍Ｒ幌盗械脑愀赓Q(mào)易協(xié)議和長(zhǎng)期匯率失調(diào)阻止貿(mào)易恢復(fù)平衡，加快并放大了美國(guó)制造業(yè)就業(yè)的減少以及美國(guó)生產(chǎn)率的下滑——還有相關(guān)的美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增速放緩和薪資停滯。

This is hardly the conventional wisdom — whence the continued tilting at Keynesian windmills in both the US and Europe. New studies have, however, cast increasing doubt on the standard “gains from trade” arguments that have both justified and propelled globalisation. A joint study by Justin Pierce of the Federal Reserve and Yale School of Management’s Peter Schott attributes most of the 18 per cent decline in US manufacturing jobs from 2001 to 2007 to President Bill Clinton’s decision to grant China permanent normal trade relations status as part of Beijing’s accession to theWorld Trade Organisation in 2001. Other studies have concluded the “China trade shock” to be more of a zero-sum game, with American workers and the US economy on the minus side.

這很難說(shuō)是傳統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)。歐美的傳統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)都繼續(xù)傾向凱恩斯式的刺激。然而，新研究越來(lái)越讓人質(zhì)疑標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的“貿(mào)易利得”說(shuō)法，這種說(shuō)法既合理化又推動(dòng)了全球化。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)的賈斯汀•皮爾斯(Justin Pierce)和耶魯大學(xué)管理學(xué)院(Yale School of Management)的彼得•斯科特(Peter Schott)聯(lián)合開展的研究，將2001年至2007年美國(guó)制造業(yè)就業(yè)減少18%的多數(shù)原因歸為美國(guó)前總統(tǒng)比爾•克林頓(Bill Clinton)的一項(xiàng)決定：作為中國(guó)在2001年加入世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)的一部分，美國(guó)賦予了中國(guó)永久性正常貿(mào)易關(guān)系待遇。其他一些研究總結(jié)稱，“中國(guó)貿(mào)易沖擊”更多的是一種零和游戲，美國(guó)勞動(dòng)者和美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)處于不利地位。

The broader lesson here is that while exports do indeed create jobs, it is net exports that ultimately matter. When countries like the US and continents like Europe run massive and chronic trade deficits and countries like China do not allow freely floating currency movements to balance trade, bad things will eventually happen in the forms of accelerated offshoring, slower growth, falling productivity and stagnant wages.

更廣泛的教訓(xùn)是盡管出口確實(shí)會(huì)創(chuàng)造就業(yè)，但最終重要的是凈出口。如果美國(guó)等國(guó)和歐洲等大陸長(zhǎng)期處于大規(guī)模貿(mào)易赤字，而中國(guó)等國(guó)不允許匯率自由浮動(dòng)以平衡貿(mào)易，那么糟糕的結(jié)果最終會(huì)以外包加快、增長(zhǎng)放緩、生產(chǎn)率下滑以及薪資停滯的形式出現(xiàn)。

This is the economic and political landscape that the US now finds itself in, and it is no wonder that Mr Trump is so popular. Like Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, the Republican nominee understands America’s economic woes can only be addressed through comprehensive structural reforms, particularly in the areas of trade and tax policy.

這是美國(guó)現(xiàn)在所處的經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治情況，特朗普如此受歡迎也就不足為奇了。與上世紀(jì)80年代的羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)一樣，這位共和黨總統(tǒng)提名人選明白，美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)困境只能通過(guò)全面結(jié)構(gòu)性改革化解，尤其是在貿(mào)易和稅收政策領(lǐng)域。

For example, America’s 35 per cent corporate tax rate means businesses carry down only 65 per cent of pre-tax earnings to their post-tax net. Mr Trump’s proposed 15 per cent rate promises a 30 per cent higher earnings return than at present, and would thereby greatly improve the attractiveness of domestic investment.

例如，美國(guó)35%的企業(yè)稅稅率意味著，企業(yè)只能將65%的稅前利潤(rùn)計(jì)入稅后利潤(rùn)。特朗普提議的15%的企業(yè)稅稅率意味著企業(yè)利潤(rùn)將比目前提高30%，這將大大提高國(guó)內(nèi)投資的吸引力。

Mr Trump’s broader mission is to reinvigorate the US economy and restore faith in the global free trade order by ridding it of cheating and structural misalignments. Europe may want to take a page out of his playbook. This is particularly true when it comes to China. Here, Europe has lagged behind the US in imposing countervailing tariffs against dumping, and is now paying a very heavy price.

特朗普的更廣泛任務(wù)是通過(guò)消除欺詐和結(jié)構(gòu)性失調(diào)，恢復(fù)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的活力并重塑人們對(duì)全球自由貿(mào)易秩序的信任。歐洲可能會(huì)希望向他取經(jīng)。在涉及到中國(guó)的問(wèn)題上尤其如此。在征收反傾銷關(guān)稅方面，歐洲一直落后于美國(guó)，而且現(xiàn)在正付出非常沉重的代價(jià)。

The writer, a private international equity investor, is a senior policy adviser to the Trump campaign. Peter Navarro, business professor at the University of California, Irvine, contributed to this article

本文作者是一位私人國(guó)際股權(quán)投資者，是特朗普競(jìng)選團(tuán)隊(duì)的高級(jí)政策顧問(wèn)。加州大學(xué)歐文分校(University of California, Irvine)商學(xué)教授彼得•納瓦羅(Peter Navarro)對(duì)此文亦有貢獻(xiàn)。