不再耀眼的美國(guó)銀行業(yè)

A decade ago, Goldman Sachs reported that itsreturn on common shareholder equity had hit adazzling 39.8 per cent. It symbolised a gilded age:back in 2006, as markets boomed, the power — andprofits — of big banks seemed unstoppable.

10年前，高盛(Goldman Sachs)曾公布39.8%的耀眼凈資產(chǎn)收益率(return on common shareholder equity)。那代表著一個(gè)鍍金時(shí)代：在2006年，隨著市場(chǎng)的繁榮，大銀行的影響力(和利潤(rùn))似乎無(wú)法阻擋。

How times change. This week, American banksunveiled downbeat results, with revenues for the biggest five tumbling 16 per cent year-on-year. But Goldman was even weaker: net income was 56 per cent lower, while return on equity,a key measure of profitability, was 6.4 per cent, below even the sector average in 2015 of10.3 per cent.

時(shí)過(guò)境遷。最近，美國(guó)的銀行公布了令人沮喪的財(cái)報(bào)：最大的五家銀行的收入同比大減16%。但高盛的情況更糟：凈利潤(rùn)暴跌56%，衡量盈利能力的關(guān)鍵指標(biāo)股本回報(bào)率(ROE)為6.4%，甚至比2015年的行業(yè)平均水平(10.3%)還低。

A bank which was once so adept at sucking out profits that it was called a “vampire squid” (byRolling Stone magazine) is thus producing returns more commonly associated with a utility. Thephrase “flattened slug” might seem appropriate.

一家曾如此擅長(zhǎng)吸取利潤(rùn)、因而被(《滾石》雜志(Rolling Stone))冠以“吸血烏賊”(vampire squid)稱號(hào)的銀行，現(xiàn)在的回報(bào)率卻更像是一家公用事業(yè)單位。“扁平鼻涕蟲”這個(gè)稱呼似乎適合現(xiàn)在的它。

Is this just a temporary downturn? Financiers certainly hope so. After all, they point out, thisweek’s results did feature some upbeat (ish) points. None of America’s banks actually blew up inthe first quarter of the year, even though markets gyrated in dramatic ways; the post-crisisreforms have improved risk controls and reserves.

這只是暫時(shí)的低迷嗎?金融業(yè)人士肯定希望如此。畢竟，他們指出，今年第一季度的財(cái)報(bào)確實(shí)包含一些(微弱的)亮點(diǎn)。盡管今年第一季度市場(chǎng)大幅波動(dòng)，但美國(guó)的銀行沒有一家真正出現(xiàn)大問(wèn)題;后危機(jī)時(shí)代的改革已改善了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制和資本準(zhǔn)備金。

Meanwhile, banking in America looks healthier than in Europe, where the reform process hasbeen slower. Overall credit quality at American banks, outside the energy sector, does notseem alarming. Net interest margins are now increasing a touch, after several years of decline,because the Federal Reserve has raised rates.

與此同時(shí)，美國(guó)銀行業(yè)看上去比歐洲更健康——歐洲的改革進(jìn)程一直較為緩慢。美國(guó)各銀行的總體信貸質(zhì)量(除能源行業(yè)以外)看上去沒什么問(wèn)題。在經(jīng)歷了多年的下滑以后，凈利差現(xiàn)在正在擴(kuò)大，因?yàn)槊缆?lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)上調(diào)了利率。

The last quarter’s results might have been depressed by temporary geopolitical woes, such asbusiness uncertainty about Brexit, the American elections, oil prices and the Chinese economy.Once this angst fades away later this year, returns may rebound; analysts expect the GoldmanROE, for example, to move towards 10 per cent later this year. “The market feels a littlefragile,” says Harvey Schwartz, its chief financial officer. “[But] it feels like that is behind us.”

上一季度的財(cái)報(bào)可能受到暫時(shí)的地緣政治問(wèn)題的不利影響，例如業(yè)界對(duì)英國(guó)脫歐問(wèn)題的不確定、美國(guó)大選、油價(jià)和中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)。一旦這些擔(dān)憂在今年晚些時(shí)候消散，回報(bào)率可能會(huì)反彈;例如，分析師預(yù)測(cè)，高盛的股本回報(bào)率將在今年晚些時(shí)候向10%攀升。“市場(chǎng)感覺有些脆弱，”高盛首席財(cái)務(wù)官哈維•施瓦茨(Harvey Schwartz)表示，“(但)這種情況似乎已經(jīng)過(guò)去。”

Perhaps. But even if this “optimism” is justified, nobody should ignore the cognitive shift.After all, a decade ago, an ROE of 10 per cent was considered a disaster, not a relief, atGoldman Sachs. So perhaps the most important lesson from this week is this: if Americanregulators had hoped to make the banks look truly dull — not dazzling — in this post-crisisera, they are now succeeding better than anyone might have thought.

或許如此吧。然而即便這種“樂觀主義”有充分理由，我們也不應(yīng)忽視這種認(rèn)識(shí)上的變化。畢竟，在10年前的高盛，10%的股本回報(bào)率會(huì)被視為糟糕透頂，而非好消息。因此，或許上周帶給我們的最重要教訓(xùn)是：如果美國(guó)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)曾經(jīng)希望讓銀行在后危機(jī)時(shí)代變得業(yè)績(jī)平平(而非耀眼)的話，那么他們現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)比所有人可能想象到的更成功了。

It is not the first time this has occurred. In the 1920s, American finance also dazzled. Indeed,profits were so high that the economists Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef estimated thataverage banker pay was 1.6 times higher than other professions in 1928 (which, in a neat twistof history, was the same ratio seen in 2006.)

這種情況并非首次發(fā)生。上世紀(jì)20年代，美國(guó)金融業(yè)也曾光芒耀眼。實(shí)際上，當(dāng)時(shí)的銀行利潤(rùn)非常高，據(jù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家托馬•菲利蓬(Thomas Philippon)和阿里埃勒•雷謝夫(Ariell Reshef)估計(jì)，1928年，銀行家的平均工資是其他職業(yè)的1.6倍(歷史真是曲折迂回，2006年也恰好是這個(gè)數(shù)字。)

But when the 1929 crash happened, banks went bust and the financial sector subsequentlybecame more utility-like: so much so that between 1940s and 1960s the banker pay ratio wasnearer to 1.1. Tighter regulation was one reason for that. Another, less widely noticed, factorthat cut bank profits was the fact that real interest rates in the US and UK were kept slightlynegative in the postwar years, in a policy known as “financial repression”.

然而，1929年的大崩盤后，銀行紛紛破產(chǎn)，金融業(yè)后來(lái)變得更像是公用事業(yè)單位：最明顯的是在上世紀(jì)40年代至60年代，銀行家與其他職業(yè)的薪資比率接近1.1。更嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)管是原因之一。另外一個(gè)不太顯眼的壓低銀行利潤(rùn)的因素是，美國(guó)和英國(guó)的實(shí)際利率在戰(zhàn)后那些年保持在略低于零的水平，這一政策被稱為“金融抑制”(financial repression)。

The pattern is not entirely identical this time around, since there is nowhere near the samestate control over finance. But a regulatory squeeze is also under way, financial globalisationis in retreat and real interest rates are negative in some markets. And, unlike the 1950s,banks are also being disrupted by internet technology and the shadow banks. Pay isdeclining too: total compensation at Goldman Sachs is now 40 per cent lower than a yearbefore, reflecting an industry trend.

這一次的情況并非完全一樣，因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)在政府對(duì)金融的控制遠(yuǎn)不如從前。但監(jiān)管同樣在收緊，金融全球化在倒退，一些市場(chǎng)的實(shí)際利率為負(fù)。與上世紀(jì)50年代不同，銀行還正在被互聯(lián)網(wǎng)科技以及影子銀行顛覆。銀行業(yè)薪資也在下降：高盛現(xiàn)在的總薪酬比上一年下滑40%，這反映出一種行業(yè)趨勢(shì)。

Critics of Wall Street — such as Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton’s opponent in the Democraticprimaries — will certainly not shed a tear about this. Nor will some shareholders, who arguethat banks need to cut pay further if they are ever to boost their ROEs. And some regulators,such as Thomas Hoenig, vice-chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, fear thatthe reform process is still incomplete, particularly given the continued power of the bigbanks. Indeed, as the economist Henry Kaufman points out, one irony of the post-crisis worldis that big banks have become relatively bigger: the top ten players control 80 per cent of USassets.

華爾街的批評(píng)者們(例如民主黨初選中希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手伯尼•桑德斯(BernieSanders))肯定絲毫不會(huì)為之動(dòng)容。一些股東也不會(huì)，他們認(rèn)為，如果還想提高股本回報(bào)率，銀行需要進(jìn)一步降薪。一些監(jiān)管者(例如聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)副董事長(zhǎng)托馬斯•霍尼格(Thomas Hoenig))擔(dān)心，改革進(jìn)程仍未完成，尤其是考慮到大銀行仍擁有影響力。實(shí)際上，正如經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家亨利•考夫曼(Henry Kaufman)指出的那樣，危機(jī)后世界荒謬的一點(diǎn)是大銀行變得更大了：前10大銀行控制著美國(guó)80%的資產(chǎn)。

Nevertheless, if financiers or angry politicians want to find thrills in finance today, they shouldlook at asset managers, particularly the shadow banks. That is where some financiers are stillreaping returns of 40 per cent. In today’s boring world, few want to shout about that; least ofall if they used to work at Goldman Sachs.

然而，如果金融業(yè)人士或憤怒的政治人士希望在當(dāng)今的金融業(yè)找到一些亮色的話，他們應(yīng)該看看資產(chǎn)管理公司，尤其是影子銀行。在這一領(lǐng)域，一些金融業(yè)人士仍在獲得40%的回報(bào)率。在當(dāng)今這個(gè)沉悶的世界，這件事幾乎無(wú)人想要聲張;尤其是如果他們?cè)?jīng)效力于高盛的話。