歐盟能擊敗谷歌的安卓策略嗎
谷歌(Google)歐洲業(yè)務(wù)總裁馬特•布里廷(Matt Brittin)上周抱怨稱，歐盟(EU)官員“本可以更懂行一點(diǎn)”。如果谷歌沒有在與手機(jī)制造商所簽協(xié)議的每一頁上都標(biāo)注“機(jī)密”字樣，或許會(huì)有利于歐盟官員更懂行。
It is another tough week in Brussels for Alphabet,Google’s parent company. Having been assailed over the “right to be forgotten” in searchresults, how it competes in online shopping and the tax it pays in Europe, it faces EU antitrustcharges over its Android mobile software. With dominance of internet search comes a lot ofbother.
對谷歌的母公司Alphabet而言，這是其又一次在布魯塞爾吃苦頭的一周。針對在搜索結(jié)果中給予用戶“被遺忘權(quán)”(right to be forgotten)、網(wǎng)絡(luò)購物領(lǐng)域的競爭手段以及在歐洲繳稅等問題，谷歌已經(jīng)遭受過痛擊，而今，它又面臨歐盟對其安卓(Android)移動(dòng)操作系統(tǒng)提出的反壟斷指控。互聯(lián)網(wǎng)搜索領(lǐng)域的主導(dǎo)地位給谷歌帶來了很多煩擾。
In general, I sympathise with Mr Brittin. There are, as he says, “some places in Europe . . . wherethe first inclination is to protect the past from the future”. It is being harshly treated overhow it displays shopping results and the right of European citizens to eliminate search linksthey dislike. But on Android — perhaps the most important case for Google’s future — he iswrong.
總的來說，我比較同情布里廷。正如他所言，“歐洲某些地方的……第一反應(yīng)通常是保護(hù)過去不被未來碾壓”。在顯示購物搜索結(jié)果以及保護(hù)歐洲公民移除自己不喜歡的搜索鏈接的權(quán)利方面，谷歌都遭到了苛刻對待。但在安卓這個(gè)或許對谷歌未來最重要的案件上，他錯(cuò)了。
Google is Microsoft light. The way that it has exerted influence over how mobile phones run onAndroid is subtler and more calculated than Microsoft’s brute force approach to broadeningits desktop monopoly in the early 2000s. While Microsoft insisted on its right to repel allcompetitors by packing what it felt like into Windows, Google has left open a degree of choice.
谷歌比微軟(Microsoft)更高明。比起微軟在2000年代初為擴(kuò)大其對臺(tái)式機(jī)的壟斷而采取的強(qiáng)力方式，谷歌對手機(jī)如何運(yùn)行安卓系統(tǒng)施加影響的方式更不易被覺察、更處心積慮。微軟通過隨意所欲地在Windows系統(tǒng)中捆綁安裝各種軟件，強(qiáng)硬地堅(jiān)持其打擊所有競爭對手的權(quán)利，而谷歌則留出了一定的自由選擇余地。
Google’s strategy for Android has been a masterpiece of craftiness, a case fit for a businessschool study of how to advance without appearing to attack. Android “fosters competition atevery level of the mobile market”, Eric Schmidt, Google’s chairman, insisted repeatedly at aSenate committee in 2011. Yet, somehow, Google still ended up firmly in control.
谷歌的安卓戰(zhàn)略是縝密構(gòu)思的典范，適合作為商學(xué)院研究如何不露痕跡地進(jìn)攻的經(jīng)典案例。谷歌董事長埃里克•施密特(Eric Schmidt) 2011年在美國參議院委員會(huì)再三堅(jiān)稱，安卓系統(tǒng)“在移動(dòng)市場的各個(gè)層面都促進(jìn)了競爭”。然而，不知為何，谷歌最終依然實(shí)現(xiàn)了對市場的牢牢控制。
It is worth examining how Google did this — how Android ended up with 81 per cent of theglobal smartphone market last year, while Google applications such as search were loaded onmost of Europe’s Android phones. It was quite a coup but Margrethe Vestager, EUcompetition commissioner, should fillet the deals that helped to enable it.
值得我們研究的是，谷歌是如何做到這些的——去年，安卓占到了全球智能手機(jī)市場的81%，歐洲多數(shù)安卓版手機(jī)都安裝了谷歌搜索等谷歌應(yīng)用。谷歌確實(shí)下了一盤妙棋，但歐盟競爭事務(wù)專員瑪格麗特•維斯特格(Margrethe Vestager)應(yīng)該仔細(xì)研究一下幫助谷歌實(shí)現(xiàn)了這一結(jié)果的那些協(xié)議。
First, in 2005, Google acquired Android, a small company making an operating system based onLinux open source software. It seems implausible now but it worried at the time that itssearch franchise could be locked out of mobile by powerful phonemakers such as BlackBerry (itwas long ago).
首先，谷歌于2005年收購了安卓，那是一家小公司，設(shè)計(jì)了一款基于Linux開源軟件的操作系統(tǒng)。如今看來似乎難以置信，但當(dāng)時(shí)谷歌擔(dān)心，谷歌搜索可能會(huì)被黑莓(BlackBerry)等強(qiáng)大的手機(jī)制造商封殺(確實(shí)是很久以前的事了，久到黑莓還很強(qiáng)大)。
Although Google kept Android free, its claim to being open source is tenuous. Google controlssoftware development and makes any phone maker that wants to use the Android trademarkstick to its standards. Any company that “forks” Android, as Amazon did with the Fire phone —using the source code in its own way — loses the brand and the marketing clout that comeswith it.
雖然谷歌一直未對使用安卓系統(tǒng)收費(fèi)，但其開放源代碼的承諾卻經(jīng)不起推敲。谷歌控制著軟件開發(fā)，讓任何想使用安卓商標(biāo)的手機(jī)制造商都得遵循它的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。任何對安卓系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行“分支”(fork)、也就是用自己的方式使用源代碼的公司——如亞馬遜(Amazon)在Fire手機(jī)上嘗試的那樣——都無法再使用安卓這個(gè)品牌，也就喪失了這個(gè)品牌附帶的市場影響力。
Second, it skirted the legal trap that led to Microsoft being fined
