我們應該相信圣誕老人嗎?

Let’s say we agree with Church that Santa belief is a worthwhile state to get ourselves into because it protects the practice of gift-giving against the onslaughts of utilitarian rationality. Is it possible to do so? At first glance it would seem that the only way to do that would be through some sort of self-deception. Some part of me knows that the presents come from a supply chain stretching back to China, so if I want to believe they come from a jolly old elf, I need to lie to myself. I could perhaps use some combination of meditation techniques and psychoactive drugs to induce Santa belief. Maybe I could take psilocybin and have a group of my friends chant, “Santa exists! Santa exists!” while I am tripping my brains out. Socially, we could form a benevolent conspiracy, telling one another that Santa exists even though we know he doesn’t. Parents do that to children.

假如我們同意徹奇的觀點：相信圣誕老人存在論對我們而言是很合算的，因為能讓贈送禮物的慣例免受功利理性的攻擊。但我們如何才能相信他存在呢?乍看之下，只有通過某種形式的自我欺騙才能做到這一點。我隱隱約約地知道圣誕禮物來自一條可以一直延伸到中國的供應鏈，如果想要相信它們來自一個樂呵呵的老頑童，就得對自己撒謊。在同時使用某些冥想技巧和精神活性藥物的情況下，我興許能相信世界上真有圣誕老人。也許我可以來點兒裸蓋菇，然后在神游之際和朋友們一起反復呼喊，“圣誕老人存在，圣誕老人存在!”我們可以在社會上編織一個善意的謊言，告訴彼此圣誕老人真的存在——盡管知道事實并非如此。父母常對孩子這樣做。

And yet, how is that possible? Even if it’s desirable to game ourselves to believe in Santa, wouldn’t the part of us that chose to believe have to know it in order to carry out the deception? Wouldn’t the group of us — call them parents — have to lose the benefits of Santa belief in order to trick our kids? And if we succeeded in both lying to ourselves about Santa and covering up the cover-up, wouldn’t we thereby forgo the benefits that Church hoped to obtain? If we lied to ourselves about the existence of Santa and forgot the lie, then the existence of Santa would just be a fact to us, as prosaic as the existence of Chris Christie. We seem condemned to the romantic emotion of longing for what we can never have.

然而，這怎么可能?即使騙自己相信圣誕老人是件好事，我們也必須得先了解底細，才能騙得像模像樣，不是嗎?我們這些為人父母者，必須放棄圣誕老人信念帶給我們的好處，才能騙得了孩子，不是嗎?如果我們真的在圣誕老人的事情上對自己撒了謊，而且掩飾得毫無破綻，那我們就放棄了徹奇希望得到的好處，不是嗎?如果我們騙自己說圣誕老人真的存在，然后忘記這是個謊言，那么對我們來說，圣誕老人的存在就會像克里斯·克里斯蒂(Chris Christie)的存在一樣平淡無奇，是嗎?我們似乎被迫要接受一種浪漫情懷，要向往自己永遠無法擁有的東西。

I think the situation is jollier than that, because this account of self-manipulation and self-deception is wrong, insofar as its account of the self is wrong. The view that Santa belief is self-deception assumes that we have a clear self with preferences and beliefs, and that this self chooses to believe in Santa in order to get some things it wants, but there is reason to suspect that this is only a Cartesian myth.

我認為情況其實更加歡快一些，因為這種自我操縱和自我欺騙的闡釋并不正確，根源在于它對“自我”的闡述是錯誤的。認為相信圣誕老人是一種自欺之舉，這種看法假設我們在偏好和信念上存在清晰的自我意識，然后選擇相信圣誕老人，以便獲得一些想要東西，但是我們有理由來懷疑，這種看法只是個笛卡爾式的謬說。

As the early 20th century social scientist and philosopher Otto Neurath pointed out in his simile of the boat that must be rebuilt while it is still out at sea, we are always reconstructing our beliefs from a standpoint of continuing action and never have the opportunity to review them all at once. We come to awareness with things we say and do, images that excite us to reverence and disgust, and communities we are a part of. None of this is especially clear to us at the outset. What does it mean that I’m in my family? What does it mean that I want to be happy? What does it mean that I believe in democracy? We are in the family, want the happiness and believe in the democracy without having a clear idea what “family,” “happiness” or “democracy” are.

20世紀初的社會科學家和哲學家奧托·紐拉特(Otto Neurath)指出，我們總是從持續(xù)行動的角度來重建我們的信念，永遠不會有機會立刻審視它們，對此他做了一個比喻：船只必須在海上的時候重建。對于我們說和做的事情，激發(fā)我們崇敬和厭惡的場景，以及我們所在的社會，我們會逐漸產生意識。而在一開始，這一切對我們來說并不怎么清楚。我生活在家庭中，這是什么意思?我想過得快樂，這是什么意思?我相信民主，這是什么意思?我們無需對“家”、“幸福”和“民主”有清楚的概念，就已經生活在家庭中，想要過得快樂，而且相信民主了。

Each belief is the beginning of a voyage of self-discovery and self-transformation. We don’t have a fully realized self that investigates these questions. Rather, our self comes into focus and achieves its shape as we discover or decide what we believe and what is important to us.

每個信念都是一段自我發(fā)現(xiàn)和自我改造的旅程的起點。我們并沒有一個充分覺醒的自我在研究這些問題。實際上，是我們在發(fā)現(xiàn)或決定自己相信什么東西，有什么東西對我們很重要的時候，我們的自我才開始出現(xiàn)明確的輪廓，并塑造成形。

When it comes to Santa, some of us, like Virginia, have inherited him as a set of feelings, or images we love, or songs we sing, and it’s an option for us to move forward with him. In other words, we are not utility-maximizing agents trying to decide whether it’s worth it to believe in Santa. We come to be a self by the things we say, the relationships we form, and the goals we shoot for. If these are Santa-ish things, relationships and goals, then it makes sense to say we are coming to be ourselves as believers in Santa.

就圣誕老人來說，一些人像弗吉尼亞那樣，把他作為一系列感情，我們鐘愛的場景，或者我們唱的歌來對待，這是一個選項，我們可以和他一起前進。換句話說，我們并不是用效用最大化的理論，來決定是不是值得相信圣誕老人。通過我們說的東西，我們建立的關系，我們追求的目標，我們形成了一個自我。如果這是圣誕老人式的東西、關系和目標，那么就可以說，我們通過相信圣誕老人，成為了我們自己。

You could say that the self is a gift we have received from our language, our history, our biology, our culture and our family, and like a gift it is defined not by what it is but by how we use it and the quality of the relationships it brings. If we receive the gift of our self with gratitude and hand it on to others with generosity, we are not just believing in Santa, we’re being Santa-like.

可以說，這個“自我”是我們從語言、歷史、生理、文化和家庭那里獲得的禮物，就像其他禮物一樣，它的意義不僅在于它具體是什么東西，也在于我們如何使用它，在于它促進的關系的質量。如果我們對“自我”這件禮物心懷感激，并慷慨地用它造福別人，那么我們便不僅是圣誕老人的信徒，而且也成為了圣誕老人式的人。