2014年蘇格蘭獨(dú)立公投以微弱劣勢(shì)告敗后,我曾認(rèn)為在有生之年再也不會(huì)看到蘇獨(dú),但我現(xiàn)在改變了想法。”
測(cè)試中可能遇到的詞匯和知識(shí):
cosmopolitan 世界主義的,四海一家的[,k?zm?'p?l?t(?)n]
Hanseatic League 漢薩同盟 (最早可追溯到12世紀(jì),兩個(gè)城市同意使用共同的民法和刑法,并在本城中保護(hù)彼此的商人。)
traction 牽引力['tr?k?(?)n]
SNP 蘇格蘭國民黨(Scottish National Party)
emulate 模仿;盡力趕上['emj?le?t]
hostility 敵意;戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)行動(dòng)[h?'st?l?t?]
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Scottish Nationalists succeed where Leavers fail(633 words)
By John Kay
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As a schoolboy in Edinburgh, I was taught that, long before the union with England, Scotland had been a cosmopolitan country. The ports on the east coast showed the influence of trade with the Netherlands and the Hanseatic League. The Scots language demonstrated continental influences. The citizens of Edinburgh would shout “gardyloo”, supposedly from the French “gare de l’eau”, before throwing their slops into the streets from the windows of the tall tenements of Edinburgh’s Old Town.
Even then, this example of early Scots sophistication did not convince. And the claim that their vote to stay in the EU — all districts of Scotland voted Remain in the referendum, and 62 per cent of the nation’s voters as a whole voted to stay in the EU — is the product of a broad-minded outlook not seen south of the border also misses a crucial point.
The reality is that the discontent with established politics that erupted in the Leave vote elsewhere in the country has found expression in other ways. As one student of Scottish politics, explaining the UK Independence party’s lack of traction north of the border, put it to me two years ago: “People in Scotland who are disgruntled and suspicious of foreigners [the English] already have a party they can vote for.”
The fracturing of the opposition Labour party’s traditional support in depressed areas of the north of England, which was decisive in securing an Out vote, paralleled the collapse of Labour’s vote in the west of Scotland in favour of the Scottish National party in the general election of 2015.
The great achievement of the SNP, now in government in Holyrood and with MPs in Westminster, has been to be a party of protest and a party of government at the same time. This is an achievement Brexiters will find hard to emulate.
While the Leave campaign and the SNP are disparate coalitions brought together by a common hostility, the SNP has a clearer and more positive vision of the future, and evidence of administrative competence has been absent on the Brexit side. A remarkable outcome of the Remain campaign was that the two most impressive political performers were women from Scotland: Nicola Sturgeon, the SNP first minister, and Ruth Davidson, leader of the opposition Scottish Conservatives. English politics is in chaos; Scottish politics is not.
But support in Scotland for the SNP, in large part a response to Labour’s failure, should not necessarily be equated with support for independence. The SNP cannot call a fresh referendum unless it is highly confident of winning it. A second No vote, even if close, would put an end to dreams of independence for a generation and perhaps forever, as in Quebec. And economic prospects for Scotland are less attractive with oil below $50 per barrel than when prices were twice that level.
On the other hand, one factor has changed decisively. If Scotland had voted for separation in 2014 the path to EU membership would have been slow. While the outcome would have been inevitable, countries with their own separatist movements, notably Spain but also perhaps Belgium and Italy, would probably have been obstructive.
Now, Scottish accession would be greeted with open arms. And while it probably does not make sense for an independent Scotland to join the eurozone, dallying with the prospect is a tease that might assist in negotiations with both the EU and the rest of the UK.
After the Scots independence referendum failed, narrowly, in 2014, I judged that independence was the likely outcome but probably not in my lifetime. It now seems likely that I will see it. Whether it is desirable is another matter altogether. As with Brexit itself, the economic impact of the change is greatly exaggerated by both sides and the costs of transition large.
請(qǐng)根據(jù)你所讀到的文章內(nèi)容,完成以下自測(cè)題目:
1. What demonstrated continental influences as mentioned?
A. the Scots language
B. the ports on the east coast
C. the citizens of Edinburgh
D. the French “gare de l’eau”
2. How many districts of Scotland voted Remain in the referendum about Brexit?
A. all
B. a half
C. 62%
D. zero
3. What is the reason of league between the Leave campaign and the SNP?
A. SNP is in government
B. weak administrative competence
C. common hostility
D. common friends
4. When was the Scots independence referendum?
A. 2012
B. 2013
C. 2014
D. 2015
[1] 答案 A. the Scots language
解釋:東海岸的港口顯示了蘇格蘭與荷蘭和漢薩同盟(Hanseatic League)貿(mào)易的影響。蘇格蘭語顯示出了歐洲大陸的影響。
[2] 答案 A. all
解釋:在英國脫歐公投中,蘇格蘭所有地區(qū)的投票結(jié)果都是留歐。
[3] 答案 C. common hostility
解釋:“脫歐”陣營和蘇格蘭民族黨都是被共同的敵意團(tuán)結(jié)在一起的復(fù)雜聯(lián)盟。
[4] 答案 D. 2015
解釋:文章提到如果蘇格蘭在2014年投票支持獨(dú)立,那么通向歐盟成員國身份的道路將會(huì)緩慢。2013年3月21日,蘇政府宣布2014年9月18日舉辦公投。