每天讀一點(diǎn)英文 那些激勵(lì)我前行的身影 15 多德的超級(jí)投資者們-格雷厄姆

格雷厄姆—多德的超級(jí)投資者們

Is the Graham and Dodd "look for values with a significant margin of safety relative to prices" approach to security analysis out of date?

格雷厄姆與多德追求“價(jià)值遠(yuǎn)超過價(jià)格的安全保障”，這種證券分析方法是否已經(jīng)過時(shí)?目前許多撰寫教科書的教授認(rèn)為如此。

Many of the professors who write textbooks today say yes. They argue that the stock market is efficient; that is, that stock prices reflect everything that is known about a company's prospects and about the state of the economy.

他們認(rèn)為，股票市場(chǎng)是有效率的市場(chǎng);換言之，股票價(jià)格已經(jīng)充分反應(yīng)了公司一切己知的事實(shí)以及整體經(jīng)濟(jì)情況：這些理論家認(rèn)為，市場(chǎng)上沒有價(jià)格偏低的股票，因?yàn)槁斆鞯淖C券分析師將運(yùn)用全部的既有資訊，以確保適當(dāng)?shù)膬r(jià)格。

There are no undervalued stocks, these theorists argue, because there are smart security analysts who utilize all available information to ensure unfailingly appropriate prices. Investors who seem to beat the market year after year are just lucky. "If prices fully reflect available information, this sort of investment adeptness is ruled out," writes one of today's textbook authors.

投資者能經(jīng)年累月地?fù)魯∈袌?chǎng)，純粹是運(yùn)氣使然。“如果價(jià)格完全反應(yīng)既有的資訊，則這類的投資技巧將不存在。”一位現(xiàn)今教科書的作者如此與寫道。

Well, maybe. But I want to present to you a group of investors who have, year in and year out, beaten the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index.

或許如此!但是，我要提供一組投資者的績(jī)效供各位參考，他們長(zhǎng)期的表現(xiàn)總是超越史坦普500種股價(jià)指數(shù)。

The hypothesis that they do this by pure chance is at least worth examining. Crucial to this examination is the fact that these winners were all well known to me and pre-identified as superior investors, the most recent identification occurring over fifteen years ago.

他們的績(jī)效即使純屬巧合，這項(xiàng)假說(shuō)至少也值得我們加以審查。審查的關(guān)鍵事實(shí)是，我早就熟識(shí)這些贏家，而且長(zhǎng)年以來(lái)便視他們?yōu)槌?jí)投資者，最近的認(rèn)知也有十五年之久。

Absent this condition - that is, if I had just recently searched among thousands of records to select a few names for you this morning -- I would advise you to stop reading right here. I should add that all of these records have been audited. And I should further add that I have known many of those who have invested with these managers, and the checks received by those participants over the years have matched the stated records.

缺少這項(xiàng)條件——換言之，如果我最近才從成千上萬(wàn)的記錄中挑選幾個(gè)名字，并且在今天早上提供給各位——我建議各位立即停止閱讀本文。我必須說(shuō)明，所有的這些記錄都經(jīng)過稽核。我必須再說(shuō)明，我認(rèn)識(shí)許多上述經(jīng)理人的客戶，他們長(zhǎng)年以來(lái)所收取的支票確實(shí)符合既有的記錄。

Before we begin this examination, I would like you to imagine a national coin-flipping contest. Let's assume we get 225 million Americans up tomorrow morning and we ask them all to wager a dollar. They go out in the morning at sunrise, and they all call the flip of a coin.

在進(jìn)行審查之前，我要各位設(shè)想—場(chǎng)全國(guó)性的擲銅板大賽。讓我們假定，全美國(guó)2.25億的人口在明天早晨起床時(shí)都擲出一枚一美元的銅板。早晨太陽(yáng)升起時(shí)，他們都走到門外擲銅板，并猜銅板出現(xiàn)的正面或反面。

If they call correctly, they win a dollar from those who called wrong. Each day the losers drop out, and on the subsequent day the stakes build as all previous winnings are put on the line. After ten flips on ten mornings, there will be approximately 220,000 people in the United States who have correctly called ten flips in a row. They each will have won a little over $1,000.

如果猜對(duì)了，他們將從猜錯(cuò)者的手中贏得一美元。每大都有輸家遭到淘汰，獎(jiǎng)金則不斷地累積。經(jīng)過十個(gè)早晨的十次投擲之后，全美國(guó)約有2.2萬(wàn)人連續(xù)十次猜對(duì)擲銅板的結(jié)果。每人所贏得的資金約超過1000美元。

Now this group will probably start getting a little puffed up about this, human nature being what it is. They may try to be modest, but at cocktail parties they will occasionally admit to attractive members of the opposite sex what their technique is, and what marvelous insights they bring to the field of flipping.

現(xiàn)在，這群人可能會(huì)開始炫耀自己的戰(zhàn)績(jī)，此乃人的天性使然。他們可能保持謙虛的態(tài)度，但在雞尾酒宴會(huì)中，他們偶爾會(huì)以此技巧吸引異性的注意，并炫耀其投擲銅板的奇異洞察力。

Assuming that the winners are getting the appropriate rewards from the losers, in another ten days we will have 215 people who have successfully called their coin flips 20 times in a row and who, by this exercise, each have turned one dollar into a little over $1 million. $225 million would have been lost, $225 million would have been won.

假定贏家都可以從輸家手中得到適當(dāng)?shù)莫?jiǎng)金，再經(jīng)過十天，約有215個(gè)人連續(xù)二十次猜對(duì)擲銅板的結(jié)果，每個(gè)人并贏得大約100萬(wàn)美元的獎(jiǎng)金。輸家總共付出2.25億美元，贏家則得到2.25億美元。

By then, this group will really lose their heads. They will probably write books on "How I turned a Dollar into a Million in Twenty Days Working Thirty Seconds a Morning." Worse yet, they'll probably start jetting around the country attending seminars on efficient coin-flipping and tackling skeptical professors with, " If it can't be done, why are there 215 of us?"

這時(shí)候，這群人可能完全沉迷在自己的成就中：他們可能開始著書立說(shuō)：“我如何每天早晨工作30秒，而在二十天之內(nèi)將—美元變成100萬(wàn)美元。”更糟的是，他們會(huì)在全國(guó)各地參加講習(xí)會(huì)，宣揚(yáng)如何有效地投擲銅板，并且反駁持懷疑態(tài)度的教授說(shuō)，“如果這是不可能的事，為什么會(huì)有我們這215個(gè)人呢?”

By then some business school professor will probably be rude enough to bring up the fact that if 225 million orangutans had engaged in a similar exercise, the results would be much the same - 215 egotistical orangutans with 20 straight winning flips.

但是，某商學(xué)院的教授可能會(huì)粗魯?shù)靥岢?mdash;項(xiàng)事實(shí)，如果2.25億只猩猩參加這場(chǎng)大賽，結(jié)果大致上也是如此——有215只自大的猩猩將連續(xù)贏得20次的投擲。

I would argue, however, that there are some important differences in the examples I am going to present. For one thing, if (a) you had taken 225 million orangutans distributed roughly as the U.S. population is; if (b) 215 winners were left after 20 days; and if (c) you found that 40 came from a particular zoo in Omaha, you would be pretty sure you were on to something.

然而，我必須說(shuō)明，前述事例和我即將提出的案例，兩者之間存在著若干重大差異。旨先，如果(a)你所選擇的2.25億只猩猩的分布狀況大致上和美國(guó)的人口分布相同;如果(b)經(jīng)過20天的競(jìng)賽，只剩下215只贏家;如果(c)你發(fā)現(xiàn)其中有40只猩猩來(lái)自于奧瑪哈的某個(gè)動(dòng)物園，則其中必有蹊蹺。

So you would probably go out and ask the zookeeper about what he's feeding them, whether they had special exercises, what books they read, and who knows what else. That is, if you found any really extraordinary concentrations of success, you might want to see if you could identify concentrations of unusual characteristics that might be causal factors.

于是，你會(huì)詢問猩猩管理員各種問題，它們吃什么飼料、是否做特殊的運(yùn)動(dòng)、閱讀什么書籍……換言之，如果你發(fā)現(xiàn)成功案例有非比尋常的集中現(xiàn)象，則你希望判定此異常的特色是否是成功的原因。

Scientific inquiry naturally follows such a pattern. If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer -- with, say, 1,500 cases a year in the United States -- and you found that 400 of them occurred in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables. You know it's not random chance that 400 come from a small area. You would not necessarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search.

科學(xué)的調(diào)查也遵循此一形態(tài)。如果你試圖分析某種罕見的癌癥原因——例如，美國(guó)每年只有1500個(gè)病例——而你發(fā)現(xiàn)蒙大拿州的某個(gè)礦區(qū)小鎮(zhèn)便產(chǎn)生400個(gè)病例，則你必然對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)氐娘嬎⒉』嫉穆殬I(yè)或其他種種變數(shù)產(chǎn)生興趣。你知道，在—個(gè)小鎮(zhèn)中發(fā)生400個(gè)病例，絕不是隨機(jī)因素所造成。雖然你未必了解病因，但你知道從哪里著手調(diào)查。

I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography. In addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an intellectual origin. I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville. A concentration of winners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to this particular intellectual village.

除了地理國(guó)家，還有其他方式可以界定起源。除了地理的起源，還有我所謂“智力的起源”。我認(rèn)為各位將在投資領(lǐng)域發(fā)現(xiàn)，不成比例的銅板投擲贏家來(lái)自于一個(gè)極小的智力村莊.它可以稱為“格雷厄姆一多德都市”。這個(gè)特殊智力村存在著許多贏家.這種集中現(xiàn)象絕非巧合所能夠解釋。

Conditions could exist that would make even that concentration unimportant. Perhaps 100 people were simply imitating the coin-flipping call of some terribly persuasive personality. When he called heads, 100 followers automatically called that coin the same way. If the leader was part of the 215 left at the end, the fact that 100 came from the same intellectual origin would mean nothing.

在某些情況下，即使非比尋常的集中現(xiàn)象也可能不重要。或許有100個(gè)只是模仿某一位極具說(shuō)服力的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，而依其主張來(lái)猜測(cè)銅板的投擲結(jié)果。當(dāng)他猜正面，100個(gè)追隨者也會(huì)自動(dòng)地做相同的猜測(cè)。如果這一位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者是屬于最后215位贏家之一，則這100也便屬于同一個(gè)智力起源，這項(xiàng)事實(shí)便不具有任何意義，因?yàn)?00個(gè)案例實(shí)際上只代表一個(gè)案例。

You would simply be identifying one case as a hundred cases. Similarly, let's assume that you lived in a strongly patriarchal society and every family in the United States conveniently consisted of ten members. Further assume that the patriarchal culture was so strong that, when the 225 million people went out the first day, every member of the family identified with the father's call. Now, at the end of the 20-day period, you would have 215 winners, and you would find that they came from only 21.5 families. Some naive types might say that this indicates an enormous hereditary factor as an explanation of successful coin-flipping. But, of course, it would have no significance at all because it would simply mean that you didn't have 215 individual winners, but rather 21.5 randomly distributed families who were winners.

同理，假定你生活在一個(gè)父權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)極為嚴(yán)密的社會(huì)，而美國(guó)每一個(gè)家庭都恰好以父親馬首是瞻。20天之后，你將發(fā)現(xiàn)215位贏家是來(lái)自于21.5個(gè)家庭。若干天真的分析師可能因此而認(rèn)為，成功地猜測(cè)鋼板投擲的結(jié)果，其中具有高度的遺傳因素。當(dāng)然，這實(shí)際上不具有任何意義，因?yàn)槟闼鶕碛械牟皇?15位個(gè)別贏家，而只是21.5個(gè)隨機(jī)分布的家庭。

In this group of successful investors that I want to consider, there has been a common intellectual patriarch, Ben Graham. But the children who left the house of this intellectual patriarch have called their "flips" in very different ways. They have gone to different places and bought and sold different stocks and companies, yet they have had a combined record that simply cannot be explained by the fact that they are all calling flips identically because a leader is signaling the calls for them to make. The patriarch has merely set forth the intellectual theory for making coin-calling decisions, but each student has decided on his own manner of applying the theory.

我所要考慮的這一群成功投資者，共有一位共同的智力族長(zhǎng)——本杰明•格雷厄姆。但是，這些離開此智力家族的孩童，都是依據(jù)非常不同的方法猜測(cè)他們自己的“銅板”。他們各自前往不同的地方，買賣不同的股票和企業(yè)，但他們的綜合績(jī)效絕對(duì)無(wú)法用隨機(jī)因素加以解釋。他們做相同的猜測(cè)，并不是因?yàn)轭I(lǐng)導(dǎo)者下達(dá)某一項(xiàng)指令，因此也無(wú)法用這種方式解釋他們的表現(xiàn)。族知只提供了猜測(cè)銅板的智力理論，每位學(xué)生都必須自行決定如何運(yùn)用這項(xiàng)理論。

The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this: they search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially, they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist's concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday, or whether it is January or July, etc. Incidentally, when businessmen buy businesses, which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the purchase of marketable stocks -- I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week or the month in which the transaction is going to occur.

來(lái)自“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的投資者所具備的共同智力結(jié)構(gòu)是：他們探索企業(yè)的價(jià)值與該企業(yè)市場(chǎng)價(jià)格之間的差異。事實(shí)上，他們利用其間的差異，卻不在意效率市場(chǎng)理論家所關(guān)心的問題：股票究竟在星期一或星期—：買進(jìn)，或是在一月份或七月份買進(jìn)……。當(dāng)企業(yè)家買進(jìn)某家公司時(shí)——這正是格雷厄姆一多德都市的投資者透過上市股票所從事的行為——我懷疑有多少人會(huì)在意交易必須發(fā)生于某個(gè)月份或某個(gè)星期的第一天。

If it doesn't make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday, I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those same businesses. Our Graham & Dodd investors, needless to say, do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model, or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact, most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focus on two variables: price and value.

如果企業(yè)的買進(jìn)交易發(fā)生在星期一或星期五沒有任何差別，則我無(wú)法了解學(xué)術(shù)界人士為何要花費(fèi)大量的時(shí)間和精力，探討代表該企業(yè)部分股權(quán)的交易發(fā)生時(shí)的差異。毋庸多說(shuō)，格雷厄姆一多德都市的投資者并不探討bate、資本資產(chǎn)定價(jià)模型、證券投資報(bào)酬本的變異數(shù)。這些都不足他們所關(guān)心的議題。事實(shí)上，他們大多數(shù)難以界定上述學(xué)術(shù)名詞。他們只在乎兩項(xiàng)實(shí)數(shù)：價(jià)格與價(jià)值。

I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior, the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked up substantially last week and the week before? Of course, the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now, in the age of computers, there are almost endless data available about them.

面對(duì)圖形分析師所研究的價(jià)量行為，我始終感覺驚訝。你是否會(huì)僅僅因?yàn)槟臣夜镜氖袌?chǎng)價(jià)格在本周或前一周劇揚(yáng).便決定購(gòu)買該企業(yè)呢?在日前電腦化的時(shí)代，人們之所以會(huì)大量研究?jī)r(jià)格與成交量的行為，理由是這兩項(xiàng)變數(shù)擁有了無(wú)數(shù)的資料。研究未必是因?yàn)槠渚呷魏喂τ?而只是因?yàn)橘Y料既然存在，學(xué)術(shù)界人士便必須努力學(xué)習(xí)操作這些資料所需要的數(shù)學(xué)技巧。

It isn't necessarily because such studies have any utility; it's simply that the data are there and academicians have [worked] hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

—旦擁有這些技巧，不去運(yùn)用它們便會(huì)帶來(lái)罪惡感，即使這些技巧的運(yùn)用沒有任何功用，或只會(huì)帶來(lái)負(fù)面功用.也在所不惜。如同一位朋友所說(shuō)的，對(duì)一位持鐵錘的人來(lái)說(shuō)，每—樣事看起來(lái)都像是釘子。

I think the group that we have identified by a common intellectual home is worthy of study. Incidentally, despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price, volume, seasonality, capitalization size, etc., upon stock performance, no interest has been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentration of value-oriented winners.

我認(rèn)為，這一群具有共同智力起源的投資者非常值得我們研究。雖然學(xué)術(shù)界不斷地對(duì)價(jià)格、成交量、季節(jié)性、資本規(guī)模以及其他變數(shù)，研究它們對(duì)股票績(jī)效的影響，但這群以價(jià)值為導(dǎo)向贏家的方法卻毫不受人關(guān)心。

I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation from 1954 through 1956. There were only four -- I have not selected these names from among thousands. I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after I took Ben Graham's class, but he turned me down as overvalued.

關(guān)于這一項(xiàng)績(jī)效的研究，我首先要追溯到從1954年到1956年間，工作于Greham—Newman公司的四位伙伴。我們總共四個(gè)人——我并不是從數(shù)以千計(jì)的對(duì)象中挑選這四個(gè)人。在我選修本杰明•格雷厄姆的課程之后，我要求進(jìn)人Graham—Newman公司擔(dān)任無(wú)給職的工作，但格雷厄姆卻以價(jià)值高估而拒絕了我的要求。

He took this value stuff very seriously! After much pestering he finally hired me. There were three partners and four of us as the "peasant" level. All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up, and it's possible to trace the record of three.

他對(duì)價(jià)值看得非常嚴(yán)重!經(jīng)我不斷地懇求，他最后答應(yīng)雇我。當(dāng)時(shí)公司有三位合伙股東，以及我們四位“學(xué)徒”。公司結(jié)束經(jīng)營(yíng)之后，我們四個(gè)人陸續(xù)在1955年到1957年間離開公司，目前只能夠追蹤其中三個(gè)人的投資記錄。

The first example (see Table 1*正文不附表格，可參考查詢文末所附的英文PDF文件) is that of Walter Schloss. Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years. Here is what "Adam Smith" -- after I told him about Walter -- wrote about him in Supermoney (1972):

第一個(gè)案例(*正文不附表格，可參考查詢文末所附的英文PDF文件)是華特•史洛斯。華特從來(lái)沒有念過大學(xué)，但他在紐約金融協(xié)會(huì)參加了本杰明•葛雷厄姆的夜間課程。華特在1955年離開Greham—Newman公司。以下是“亞當(dāng)•史密斯”——在我和他談?wù)撚嘘P(guān)華特的事跡之后——在《超級(jí)金錢》(Supermoney，1972年) 一書中對(duì)他所做的描述：

He has no connections or access to useful information. Practically no one in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports, and that's about it.

他從來(lái)不運(yùn)用或接觸有用的資訊。在華爾街幾乎沒有人認(rèn)識(shí)他，所以沒有人提供他有關(guān)投資的觀念。他只參考手冊(cè)上的數(shù)字，并要求企業(yè)寄年報(bào)給他，情況便是如此。

In introducing me to (Schloss) Warren had also, to my mind, described himself. "He never forgets that he is handling other people's money, and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss." He has total integrity and a realistic picture of himself. Money is real to him and stocks are real -- and from this flows an attraction to the "margin of safety" principle.

當(dāng)華特介紹我們認(rèn)識(shí)時(shí)，他曾經(jīng)描述“他從來(lái)沒有忘記自己是在管理別人的資金，這進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化了他對(duì)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的厭惡。”他有高尚的品格.并以務(wù)實(shí)的態(tài)度自持。對(duì)他來(lái)說(shuō).金錢是真實(shí)的，股票也真實(shí)的——并從此而接受了“安全邊際”的原則。

Walter has diversified enormously, owning well over 100 stocks currently. He knows how to identify securities that sell at considerably less than their value to a private owner. And that's all he does. He doesn't worry about whether it it's January, he doesn't worry about whether it's Monday, he doesn't worry about whether it's an election year. He simply says, if a business is worth a dollar and I can buy it for 40 cents, something good may happen to me.

華特的投資組合極為分散，目前擁有的股票遠(yuǎn)越過100支。他了解如何選股，將價(jià)格遠(yuǎn)低于其價(jià)值者出售給私人投資者。這便是他所做的一切。他不擔(dān)心目前是不是一月份，不在乎今天是不是星期一，也不關(guān)心今年是不是大選年。他的想法非常單純，如果某家公司值一美元，若我能夠以40美分買進(jìn)，我遲早會(huì)獲利。

And he does it over and over and over again. He owns many more stocks than I do -- and is far less interested in the underlying nature of the business; I don't seem to have very much influence on Walter. That's one of his strengths; no one has much influence on him.

他便是如此不斷地行動(dòng)：他所持有的股票種類遠(yuǎn)比我的多——而且比我更不關(guān)心企業(yè)的本質(zhì);我對(duì)華特似乎沒有太大的影響力。這是他的長(zhǎng)處之—，沒有人能夠?qū)λa(chǎn)生足夠的影響力。

The second case is Tom Knapp, who also worked at Graham-Newman with me. Tom was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war; when he came back from the war, he was a beach bum. And then one day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Columbia.

第二個(gè)案例是湯姆•科納普，他曾經(jīng)和我一起在Greham—Newman公司工作。湯姆于大戰(zhàn)之前曾在普林斯頓大學(xué)主修化學(xué)，大戰(zhàn)結(jié)束之后，他經(jīng)常在海灘游蕩。某一天，他得知大衛(wèi)•多德將在可倫比亞大學(xué)開夜間投資課程。

Tom took it on a noncredit basis, and he got so interested in the subject from taking that course that he came up and enrolled at Columbia Business School, where he got the MBA degree. He took Dodd's course again, and took Ben Graham's course. Incidentally, 35 years later I called Tom to ascertain some of the facts involved here and I found him on the beach again. The only difference is that now he owns the beach!

湯姆以旁聽方式選修該課程，之后他對(duì)投資學(xué)科產(chǎn)生了濃厚的興趣，于是正式注冊(cè)進(jìn)入哥倫比亞大學(xué)商學(xué)院，并且獲得了MBA學(xué)位。35年之后，我撥電話給湯姆，確定某些有關(guān)此一主題的事，我發(fā)現(xiàn)他仍然在海灘游蕩。惟—的差別是.他目前擁有一片海灘!

In 1968, Tom Knapp and Ed Anderson, also a Graham disciple, along with one or two other fellows of similar persuasion, formed Tweedy, Browne Partners, and their investment results appear in Table 2. Tweedy, Browne built that record with very wide diversification. They occasionally bought control of businesses, but the record of the passive investments is equal to the record of the control investments.

在1968年，湯姆與艾德•安德生——也是葛拉漢的信徒——以及其他一、兩位有共同信念的人，組成了帝地布朗合伙公司。帝地布朗合伙公司的投資高度分散。他們偶爾會(huì)從事控制股權(quán)的投資，但其被動(dòng)式的投資績(jī)效約略等于控權(quán)式投資的表現(xiàn)。

Table 3 describes the third member of the group who formed Buffett Partnership in 1957. The best thing he did was to quit in 1969. Since then, in a sense, Berkshire Hathaway has been a continuation of the partnership in some respects. There is no single index I can give you that I would feel would be a fair test of investment management at Berkshire. But I think that any way you figure it, it has been satisfactory.

表3是格雷厄姆-紐曼公司第三位員工的投資業(yè)績(jī)記錄。他在1957年成立巴菲特合伙公司。他做出的最明智的決策是在1969年結(jié)束合伙公司。從此之后，伯克夏.哈撒韋公司在某種程度上成為合伙公司的延續(xù)。我無(wú)法給各位單一的指數(shù)，用以合理地測(cè)試伯克夏公司的投資管理。但是，我認(rèn)為各位不論如何考驗(yàn)它，它的表現(xiàn)一直都令人滿意。

Table 4 shows the record of the Sequoia Fund, which is managed by a man whom I met in 1951 in Ben Graham's class, Bill Ruane. After getting out of Harvard Business School, he went to Wall Street. Then he realized that he needed to get a real business education so he came up to take Ben's course at Columbia, where we met in early 1951. Bill's record from 1951 to 1970, working with relatively small sums, was far better than average.

表四是紅杉基金經(jīng)理人比爾•盧昂的投資業(yè)績(jī)記錄，我在1951年格雷厄姆的講座中認(rèn)識(shí)他。哈佛商學(xué)院畢業(yè)之后，他進(jìn)入華爾街。稍后，他發(fā)覺需要接受真正的商業(yè)教育，于是參加了格雷厄姆在哥倫比亞大學(xué)開辦的講座，我們便相逢于1951年初。從1951年到1970年間。比爾所管理的資金規(guī)模相當(dāng)小，績(jī)效卻遠(yuǎn)比大盤來(lái)得好。

When I wound up Buffett Partnership I asked Bill if he would set up a fund to handle all our partners, so he set up the Sequoia Fund. He set it up at a terrible time, just when I was quitting. He went right into the two-tier market and all the difficulties that made for comparative performance for value-oriented investors. I am happy to say that my partners, to an amazing degree, not only stayed with him but added money, with the happy result shown here.

當(dāng)我結(jié)束巴菲特合伙公司的業(yè)務(wù)時(shí)，我要求比爾成立—個(gè)基金公司，來(lái)管理我們合伙股東的資金，他于是成立了紅杉基金。他成立基金的時(shí)機(jī)非常不利。他面臨兩個(gè)層次的市場(chǎng)，以及以價(jià)值為導(dǎo)向的投資者相當(dāng)難以運(yùn)作的情況。我十分樂于提及一點(diǎn).我的合伙股東不僅繼續(xù)委托他管理，還投入更多的資金，而且對(duì)他的表現(xiàn)十分贊賞。

There's no hindsight involved here. Bill was the only person I recommended to my partners, and I said at the time that if he achieved a four-point-per-annum advantage over the Standard & Poor's, that would be solid performance. Bill has achieved well over that, working with progressively larger sums of money. That makes things much more difficult. Size is the anchor of performance. There is no question about it. It doesn't mean you can't do better than average when you get larger, but the margin shrinks. And if you ever get so you're managing two trillion dollars, and that happens to be the amount of the total equity valuation in the economy, don't think that you'll do better than average!

其中并不涉及后見之明。比爾是我推薦給合伙股東的惟一人選，我當(dāng)時(shí)就表示，如果他的績(jī)效能夠高出史坦普指數(shù)四個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，這便是非常穩(wěn)固的表現(xiàn)。比爾的績(jī)效遠(yuǎn)甚于此，而且所管理的資金規(guī)模不斷地?cái)U(kuò)大。這使得管理愈來(lái)愈困難。資金規(guī)模是績(jī)效的拖累，這是毫無(wú)疑問的。這并不意味當(dāng)資金規(guī)模擴(kuò)大，你的表現(xiàn)便無(wú)法超越平均水準(zhǔn)，只是超越的幅度會(huì)縮小。如果你所管理的資金是2兆美元，則你的表現(xiàn)必然無(wú)法超越平均水準(zhǔn)，因?yàn)槟愕馁Y金規(guī)模便是整個(gè)股票市場(chǎng)的總市值。

I should add that in the records we've looked at so far, throughout this whole period there was practically no duplication in these portfolios. These are men who select securities based on discrepancies between price and value, but they make their selections very differently. Walter's largest holdings have been such stalwarts as Hudson Pulp & Paper and Jeddo Highland Coal and New York Trap Rock Company and all those other names that come instantly to mind to even a casual reader of the business pages.

我必須補(bǔ)充說(shuō)明一下，截至目前我們所觀察的記錄，投資組合在整段期間都幾乎沒有重疊。他們都是根據(jù)價(jià)格與價(jià)值間的差異來(lái)選股，選擇的標(biāo)的也截然不同。華特的最重要持股都是扎實(shí)的企業(yè)，如Hudson Pulp&Paper、Jeddo HighHand Coal、New York Trap Rock Company，即使是偶爾閱讀金融版新聞的人，對(duì)這些企業(yè)的名稱也耳熟能詳。帝地布朗公司所選擇的標(biāo)的則更是名不見經(jīng)傳的企業(yè)

Tweedy Browne's selections have sunk even well below that level in terms of name recognition. On the other hand, Bill has worked with big companies. The overlap among these portfolios has been very, very low. These records do not reflect one guy calling the flip and fifty people yelling out the same thing after him.

。另一方面，比爾的選擇標(biāo)的則是大型企業(yè)。這些投資組合極少出現(xiàn)重疊現(xiàn)象。他們的記錄并非由某人主導(dǎo)的猜測(cè)銅板，其他人則只聽命附和。

Table 5 is the record of a friend of mine who is a Harvard Law graduate, who set up a major law firm. I ran into him in about 1960 and told him that law was fine as a hobby but he could do better. He set up a partnership quite the opposite of Walter's. His portfolio was concentrated in very few securities and therefore his record was much more volatile but it was based on the same discount-from-value approach. He was willing to accept greater peaks and valleys of performance, and he happens to be a fellow whose whole psyche goes toward concentration, with the results shown. Incidentally, this record belongs to Charlie Munger, my partner for a long time in the operation of Berkshire Hathaway. When he ran his partnership, however, his portfolio holdings were almost completely different from mine and the other fellows mentioned earlier.

表5的投資業(yè)績(jī)來(lái)自于我的—位朋友，他畢業(yè)于哈佛法學(xué)院，并且成立了一家主要的法律事務(wù)所。我大約在1960年認(rèn)識(shí)他，并且建議說(shuō)，法律作為嗜好是件好事，但是他應(yīng)該做得更好。于是，他成立了一家合伙公司，他的操作方式和華特迥異，他的投資組合集中在極少數(shù)的證券，因此績(jī)效的變動(dòng)比較激烈，但他仍然依據(jù)相同的價(jià)值折價(jià)法從事投資。他愿意接受績(jī)效的上下震蕩，而他恰好是一位精神極度集中的人。他的名字是查理•蒙格，他是我在柏克夏公司從事操作的長(zhǎng)期合伙股東。當(dāng)他自己經(jīng)營(yíng)合伙事業(yè)時(shí)，他的投資組合和我或任何先前所提到的人完全都不同。

Table 6 is the record of a fellow who was a pal of Charlie Munger's -- another non-business school type -- who was a math major at USC. He went to work for IBM after graduation and was an IBM salesman for a while. After I got to Charlie, Charlie got to him. This happens to be the record of Rick Guerin. Rick, from 1965 to 1983, against a compounded gain of 316 percent for the S&P, came off with 22,200 percent, which probably because he lacks a business school education, he regards as statistically significant.

表6的投資業(yè)績(jī)屬于查理的一位好朋友——另一位非商學(xué)系出身的人——他畢業(yè)于南加州大學(xué)的數(shù)學(xué)系。畢業(yè)之后，他進(jìn)入IBM，曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任推銷員的工作。在我網(wǎng)羅查理之后，查理又網(wǎng)羅他。他的名字是瑞克•吉林。從1965年到]983年，史坦普指數(shù)的復(fù)利成長(zhǎng)率為316%，而瑞克的績(jī)效為22200%，這或許是因?yàn)樗狈ι虒W(xué)教育背景，他可以視為具有統(tǒng)計(jì)上的顯著性。

One sidelight here: it is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately to people or it doesn't take at all. It's like an inoculation. If it doesn't grab a person right away, I find that you can talk to him for years and show him records, and it doesn't make any difference. They just don't seem able to grasp the concept, simple as it is. A fellow like Rick Guerin, who had no formal education in business, understands immediately the value approach to investing and he's applying it five minutes later. I've never seen anyone who became a gradual convert over a ten-year period to this approach. It doesn't seem to be a matter of IQ or academic training. It's instant recognition, or it is nothing.

在此撇開主題：以40美分的價(jià)格買進(jìn)一美元的紙鈔，人若不能夠立即接受這項(xiàng)概念，就永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)接受它。它就像注射藥劑。如果它無(wú)法立即抓住這個(gè)人，則我認(rèn)為即使你長(zhǎng)期地說(shuō)服他，并且展示各種記錄，你也無(wú)法讓他接受。這是很單純的概念，但他們就是無(wú)法領(lǐng)悟。類似瑞克這樣的人，他完全沒有正式商學(xué)教育的背景，卻可以立即領(lǐng)會(huì)價(jià)值投資法，并且在五分鐘之后便加以利用。我從來(lái)不曾見過任何人，會(huì)在10年之后才逐漸地皈依這種方法。它似乎和智商或?qū)W術(shù)訓(xùn)練無(wú)關(guān)。它是頓悟，否則就是拒絕。

Table 7 is the record of Stan Perlmeter. Stan was a liberal arts major at the University of Michigan who was a partner in the advertising agency of Bozell & Jacobs. We happened to be in the same building in Omaha. In 1965 he figured out I had a better business than he did, so he left advertising. Again, it took five minutes for Stan to embrace the value approach.

表7是史坦.波爾米塔(Stan Perlmeter)的投資業(yè)績(jī)。他畢業(yè)于密西根大學(xué)藝術(shù)系，是Bozell&Jacobs廣告公司的合伙股東之—。我們的辦公室恰好于奧瑪哈市的同一幢大樓。1965年，他認(rèn)為我所經(jīng)營(yíng)的事業(yè)比他的行業(yè)要好，于是他離開廣告業(yè)。再—次地，史坦于五分鐘之內(nèi)就接受了價(jià)值投資法。

Perlmeter does not own what Walter Schloss owns. He does not own what Bill Ruane owns. These are records made independently . But every time Perlmeter buys a stock it's because he's getting more for his money than he's paying. That's the only thing he's thinking about. He's not looking at quarterly earnings projections, he's not looking at next year's earnings, he's not thinking about what day of the week it is, he doesn't care what investment research from any place says, he's not interested in price momentum, volume, or anything. He's simply asking: what is the business worth?

史坦所持有的股票與華特的不同。他所持有的股票也和比爾不同。他們都是獨(dú)立的記錄。但是，史坦買進(jìn)每—支股票時(shí)，都是因?yàn)樗@得的價(jià)值高于他所支付的價(jià)格。這是他惟一的考慮。他既不參考每一季的盈余預(yù)估值，也不參考明年的盈余項(xiàng)估值，他不在乎當(dāng)時(shí)是星期幾，也不關(guān)心任何的投資研究報(bào)告，他無(wú)視價(jià)格動(dòng)能、成交量與其他類似的變數(shù)。他只提出一個(gè)問題：該企業(yè)值多少錢?

Table 8 and Table 9 are the records of two pension funds I've been involved in. They are not selected from dozens of pension funds with which I have had involvement; they are the only two I have influenced. In both cases I have steered them toward value-oriented managers. Very, very few pension funds are managed from a value standpoint. Table 8 is the Washington Post Company's Pension Fund. It was with a large bank some years ago, and I suggested that they would do well to select managers who had a value orientation.

表8與表9的投資業(yè)績(jī)記錄分別屬于我參與的兩家退休基金，它們并非是從我所參與的十幾種退休基金中選擇出來(lái)的，他是唯一兩家我能夠影響其投資決策的退休基金。在這兩家基金中，我引導(dǎo)他們轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閮r(jià)值導(dǎo)向的投資管理人，只胡非常少數(shù)的基金是基于價(jià)值進(jìn)行投資管理的。表8是華盛頓郵報(bào)公司退休基金(the Washington Post Company's Pension Fund)的投資業(yè)績(jī)記錄。幾年之前，他們委托一家大型銀行管理基金，后來(lái)，我建議他們聘請(qǐng)以價(jià)值為導(dǎo)向的基金經(jīng)理，這樣能夠使投資業(yè)績(jī)更好。*本段采用劉建位的翻譯

As you can see, overall they have been in the top percentile ever since they made the change. The Post told the managers to keep at least 25 percent of these funds in bonds, which would not have been necessarily the choice of these managers. So I've included the bond performance simply to illustrate that this group has no particular expertise about bonds. They wouldn't have said they did. Even with this drag of 25 percent of their fund in an area that was not their game, they were in the top percentile of fund management. The Washington Post experience does not cover a terribly long period but it does represent many investment decisions by three managers who were not identified retroactively.

正如你在投資記錄中所看到的那樣，從他們更換基金經(jīng)理之后，其整體投資業(yè)績(jī)?cè)谒谢鹬幸恢泵星懊?。華盛頓郵報(bào)公司要求基金經(jīng)理人至少保持25 %的資金投資于債券，而債券未必是基金經(jīng)理人的投資選擇。因此，我在表中也將其債券投資業(yè)績(jī)包括在內(nèi)，而這些數(shù)據(jù)表明他們其實(shí)并沒有什么特別的債券專業(yè)技巧，他們也從未這樣吹噓進(jìn)自己，雖然有25%的資金投資于他們并不擅長(zhǎng)的債券領(lǐng)域，從而拖累了他們的投資業(yè)績(jī)，但其基金管理業(yè)績(jī)水平仍然名列前一百名之內(nèi)。華盛頓郵報(bào)公司退休基金的投資盡管并沒有經(jīng)過一個(gè)很長(zhǎng)的市場(chǎng)低迷時(shí)期的考驗(yàn)，但仍然足以證明三位基金經(jīng)理的許多投資決策并非后見之明。*本段為編輯增加，采用劉建位的翻譯

Table 9 is the record of the FMC Corporation fund. I don't manage a dime of it myself but I did, in 1974, influence their decision to select value-oriented managers. Prior to that time they had selected managers much the same way as most larger companies. They now rank number one in the Becker survey of pension funds for their size over the period of time subsequent to this "conversion" to the value approach.

表9的投資業(yè)績(jī)屬于FMC公司退休基金，我本人沒有管理過這家基金的一分錢，但我的確在1974年影響了他們的決策，說(shuō)服他們選擇以價(jià)值為導(dǎo)向的基金經(jīng)理。在此之前，他們采取與其他大型企業(yè)相同的方式來(lái)選擇基金經(jīng)理。在他們轉(zhuǎn)向價(jià)值投資策略之后，其投資業(yè)績(jī)目前在貝克退休基金調(diào)查報(bào)告(the Becker survey of pension funds)中超越其他同等規(guī)?；鸲械谝弧?/p>

Last year they had eight equity managers of any duration beyond a year. Seven of them had a cumulative record better than the S&P. The net difference now between a median performance and the actual performance of the FMC fund over this period is $243 million. FMC attributes this to the mindset given to them about the selection of managers. Those managers are not the managers I would necessarily select but they have the common denominators of selecting securities based on value.

1983年時(shí)，該基金共有8位任職1年以上的基金經(jīng)理，其中7位累積投資業(yè)績(jī)超過標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾指數(shù)。在此期間，F(xiàn)MC基金的實(shí)際業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)與基金平均業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)的凈回報(bào)差額是2.43億美元，F(xiàn)MC將此歸功于他們與眾不同的基金經(jīng)理選擇傾向，這些基金經(jīng)理未必會(huì)是我個(gè)人中意的選擇，但他們都具有一個(gè)共同的特點(diǎn)，即基于價(jià)值來(lái)選擇股票。*本段采用劉建位的翻譯

So these are nine records of "coin-flippers" from Graham-and-Doddsville. I haven't selected them with hindsight from among thousands. It's not like I am reciting to you the names of a bunch of lottery winners -- people I had never heard of before they won the lottery. I selected these men years ago based upon their framework for investment decision-making. I knew what they had been taught and additionally I had some personal knowledge of their intellect, character, and temperament.

以上這9項(xiàng)投資業(yè)績(jī)記錄都來(lái)自于“格雷厄姆一多德都市”　的“銅板投擲者”，是我根據(jù)他們的投資決策架構(gòu)，在多年前便選定了他們。我了解他們所接受過的訓(xùn)練，而且知道他們的智慧、個(gè)性和脾氣。我們務(wù)必了解，這群人只承擔(dān)了一般水準(zhǔn)以下的風(fēng)險(xiǎn);留意他們?cè)诠墒衅Ｈ跗陂g的記錄。

It's very important to understand that this group has assumed far less risk than average; note their record in years when the general market was weak. While they differ greatly in style, these investors are, mentally, always buying the business, not buying the stock . A few of them sometimes buy whole businesses. Far more often they simply buy small pieces of businesses. Their attitude, whether buying all or a tiny piece of a business, is the same. Some of them hold portfolios with dozens of stocks; others concentrate on a handful. But all exploit the difference between the market price of a business and its intrinsic value.

他們的投資風(fēng)格雖然大不相同，但心態(tài)上始終恪守：買進(jìn)的標(biāo)的是企業(yè)，而非企業(yè)的股票。他們當(dāng)中有些人偶爾會(huì)買下整個(gè)企業(yè)，但是他們經(jīng)常只是購(gòu)買企業(yè)的—小部分。不論買進(jìn)整體或一部分的企業(yè)，他們所秉持的態(tài)度完全相同。在投資組合，有些人持有幾十種的股票;有些人則集中少數(shù)幾支股票。但是，每個(gè)人都受惠于企業(yè)市場(chǎng)價(jià)格與其內(nèi)含價(jià)值之間的差值。

I'm convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a "herd" on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.

我相信市場(chǎng)上存在著許多沒有效率的現(xiàn)象。這些來(lái)自于“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的投資人成功地掌握了價(jià)格與價(jià)值之間的缺口。華爾街的“群眾”可以影響股票價(jià)格，當(dāng)最情緒化的人、最貪婪的或最沮喪的人肆意驅(qū)動(dòng)股價(jià)時(shí)，我們很難辯稱市場(chǎng)價(jià)格是理性的產(chǎn)物。事實(shí)上，市場(chǎng)經(jīng)常是不合理的。

I would like to say one important thing about risk and reward. Sometimes risk and reward are correlated in a positive fashion. If someone were to say to me, "I have here a six-shooter and I have slipped one cartridge into it. Why don't you just spin it and pull it once? If you survive, I will give you $1 million." I would decline -- perhaps stating that $1 million is not enough. Then he might offer me $5 million to pull the trigger twice -- now that would be a positive correlation between risk and reward!

我想提出有關(guān)報(bào)酬與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間的重要關(guān)系。在某些情況下，報(bào)酬與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間存在著正向關(guān)系。如果有人告訴我“我有一支六發(fā)彈裝的左輪槍，并且填裝一發(fā)子彈。你可以任意地?fù)軇?dòng)轉(zhuǎn)輪，然后朝自己扣一次扳機(jī)。如果你能夠逃過一功，我就賞你100萬(wàn)美元。”我將會(huì)拒絕這項(xiàng)提議——或許我的理由是100萬(wàn)美元太少了。然后，他可能建議將獎(jiǎng)金提高為500萬(wàn)美元，但必須扣兩次扳機(jī)——這便是報(bào)酬與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間的正向關(guān)系!

The exact opposite is true with value investing. If you buy a dollar bill for 60 cents, it's riskier than if you buy a dollar bill for 40 cents, but the expectation of reward is greater in the latter case. The greater the potential for reward in the value portfolio, the less risk there is.

在價(jià)值投資法當(dāng)中，情況恰巧相反。如果你以60美分買進(jìn)一美元的紙鈔，其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大于以40美分買進(jìn)一美元的紙鈔，但后者報(bào)酬的期望值卻比較高。以價(jià)值為導(dǎo)向的投資組合，其報(bào)酬的潛力愈高，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)愈低。

One quick example: The Washington Post Company in 1973 was selling for $80 million in the market. At the time, that day, you could have sold the assets to any one of ten buyers for not less than $400 million, probably appreciably more. The company owned the Post , Newsweek , plus several television stations in major markets. Those same properties are worth $2 billion now, so the person who would have paid $400 million would not have been crazy.

我可以舉一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的例子：在1973年，華盛頓郵報(bào)公司的總市值為8千萬(wàn)美元。在這一天，你可以將其資產(chǎn)賣給十位買家之一，而且價(jià)格不低于4億美元，甚至還能更高。該公司擁有華盛頓郵報(bào)、商業(yè)周刊以及數(shù)家重要的電視臺(tái)。這些資產(chǎn)目前的價(jià)值為4億美元，因此愿意支付4億美元的買家并非瘋子。

Now, if the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40 million instead of $80 million, its beta would have been greater. And to people that think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never been able to figure out why it's riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million than $80 million.

現(xiàn)在，如果股價(jià)繼續(xù)下跌，該企業(yè)的市值從8千萬(wàn)美元跌到4千萬(wàn)美元，其bate值也上升。對(duì)于用bate值衡量風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的人來(lái)說(shuō)，更低的價(jià)格使它受得更有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這真是仙境中的愛麗絲。我永遠(yuǎn)無(wú)法了解，用4千萬(wàn)美元，而非8千萬(wàn)美元購(gòu)買價(jià)值4億美元的資產(chǎn)，其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)竟然更高。

And, as a matter of fact, if you buy a group of such securities and you know anything at all about business valuation, there is essentially no risk in buying $400 million for $80 million, particularly if you do it by buying ten $40 million piles of $8 million each. Since you don't have your hands on the $400 million, you want to be sure you are in with honest and reasonably competent people, but that's not a difficult job.

事實(shí)上，如果你買進(jìn)一堆這樣的證券，而且稍微了解所謂的企業(yè)評(píng)價(jià)，則用8千萬(wàn)美元的價(jià)格買進(jìn)4億美元的資產(chǎn)，這筆交易基本上沒有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，尤其是分別以800萬(wàn)美元的價(jià)格買進(jìn)10種價(jià)值4000萬(wàn)美元的資產(chǎn)，其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更低。因?yàn)槟悴粨碛?億美元，所以你希望能夠確實(shí)找到誠(chéng)實(shí)而有能力的人，這并不困難。

You also have to have the knowledge to enable you to make a very general estimate about the value of the underlying businesses. But you do not cut it close. That is what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety.

另外，你必須有知識(shí)，而且能夠粗略地估計(jì)企業(yè)的價(jià)值。但是，你不需要精密的評(píng)價(jià)知識(shí)。這便是本杰明•葛拉厄姆所謂的安全邊際。

You don't try and buy businesses worth $83 million for $80 million. You leave yourself an enormous margin. When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you only drive 10,000 pound trucks across it. And that same principle works in investing.

你不必試圖以8000萬(wàn)美元的價(jià)格購(gòu)買價(jià)值8300萬(wàn)美元的企業(yè)。你必須讓自己保有相當(dāng)?shù)木彌_。架設(shè)橋梁時(shí)，你堅(jiān)持載重量為3萬(wàn)磅，但你只準(zhǔn)許1萬(wàn)磅的卡車穿梭其間。相同的原則也適用于投資領(lǐng)域。

In conclusion, some of the more commercially minded among you may wonder why I am writing this article. Adding many converts to the value approach will perforce narrow the spreads between price and value. I can only tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis , yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years that I've practiced it.

有些具備商業(yè)頭腦的人可能會(huì)懷疑我撰寫本文的動(dòng)機(jī)：更多人皈依價(jià)值投資法，將會(huì)縮小價(jià)值與價(jià)格之間的差距。我只能夠如此告訴各位，自從本杰明•格雷厄姆與大衛(wèi)•多德出版《證券分析》，這個(gè)秘密已經(jīng)流傳了50年，在我奉行這項(xiàng)投資理論的35年中，我不曾目睹價(jià)值投資法蔚然成風(fēng)。

There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult. The academic world, if anything, has actually backed away from the teaching of value investing over the last 30 years. It's likely to continue that way. Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.

人的天性中似乎存在著偏執(zhí)的特色，喜歡把簡(jiǎn)單的事情弄得更復(fù)雜。最近30年來(lái)，學(xué)術(shù)界如果有任何作為的話，乃完全背離了價(jià)值投資的教訓(xùn)。它很可能繼續(xù)如此。船只將環(huán)繞地球而行。但地平之說(shuō)仍會(huì)暢行無(wú)阻。在市場(chǎng)上，價(jià)格與價(jià)值之間還會(huì)存在著寬廣的差值，而奉行格雷厄姆與多德理論的人也會(huì)繁榮不絕。

【人物簡(jiǎn)介】

股市向被人視為精英聚集之地，華爾街則是衡量一個(gè)人智慧與膽識(shí)的決定性場(chǎng)所。本杰明·格雷厄姆作為一代宗師，他的金融分析學(xué)說(shuō)和思想在投資領(lǐng)域產(chǎn)生了極為巨大的震動(dòng)，影響了幾乎三代重要的投資者，如今活躍在華爾街的數(shù)十位上億的投資管理人都自稱為格雷厄姆的信徒，他享有“華爾街教父”的美譽(yù)。