《我的知識之路》第五章 成長中的一次危機 下一個階段

CHAPTER V A Crisis In My Mental History, One Stage Onward

第五章 成長中的一次危機 下一個階段

For some years after this time I wrote very little, and nothing regularly, for publication: and great were the advantages which I derived from the intermission. It was of no common importance to me, at this period, to be able to digest and mature my thoughts for my own mind only, without any immediate call for giving them out in print. Had I gone on writing, it would have much disturbed the important transformation in my opinions and character, which took place during those years. The origin of this transformation, or at least the process by which I was prepared for it, can only be explained by turning some distance back.

此后幾年我很少寫作，定期發(fā)表的文章也一篇都沒有：我從這段間歇期中獲益匪淺。在此期間，我能夠消化完善我的思考，無人催促我立即寫出來發(fā)表，這對我來說是至關(guān)重要的。如果我當時繼續(xù)寫作的話，就會大大擾亂那幾年我的見解和性格的重要轉(zhuǎn)變。要解釋這個轉(zhuǎn)變的源頭，或者至少我為此準備的過程，就只能從較早前說起。

From the winter of 1821, when I first read Bentham, and especially from the commencement of the Westminster Review, I had what might truly be called an object in life: to be a reformer of the world. My conception of my own happiness was entirely identified with this object. The personal sympathies I wished for were those of fellow labourers in this enterprise. I endeavoured to pick up as many flowers as I could by the way; but as a serious and permanent personal satisfaction to rest upon, my whole reliance was placed on this; and I was accustomed to felicitate myself on the certainty of a happy life which I enjoyed, through placing my happiness in something durable and distant, in which some progress might be always making, while it could never be exhausted by complete attainment. This did very well for several years, during which the general improvement going on in the world and the idea of myself as engaged with others in struggling to promote it, seemed enough to fill up an interesting and animated existence. But the time came when I awakened from this as from a dream. It was in the autumn of 1826. I was in a dull state of nerves, such as everybody is occasionally liable to; unsusceptible to enjoyment or pleasurable excitement; one of those moods when what is pleasure at other times, becomes insipid or indifferent; the state, I should think, in which converts to Methodism usually are, when smitten by their first "conviction of sin." In this frame of mind it occurred to me to put the question directly to myself: "Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?" And an irrepressible selfself-consciousness distinctly answered, "No!" At this my heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All my happiness was to have been found in the continual pursuit of this end. The end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in the means? I seemed to have nothing left to live for.

從1821年冬天起，我剛開始讀邊沁的作品，尤其是從《威斯敏斯特評論》創(chuàng)刊起，我就有了一個真正可以稱為人生目標的東西，即要成為一名社會改革家。我對自己幸福的設(shè)想與這個目標完全相同。我希望得到的個人共鳴就是為此事業(yè)努力的同事的共鳴。在這個過程中，我努力獲得盡可能多的成就。但是，我把最為嚴肅、永久性的個人滿足全都毫無保留地寄托在這上面了。我習慣了慶幸過著自己喜歡的幸福生活，而這要把自己的幸福寄托在持久、遙遠的東西上，要總能實現(xiàn)一些進步，而又永遠不會因為完全實現(xiàn)而耗盡。有好幾年情況一直很好，那時世界總體上一直在進步，我的觀點也和別人的觀點結(jié)合一起，在努力促進進步，這似乎足以讓生活情趣盎然、充滿活力。但是，有一天我從這里面醒來，像從夢里醒來一樣。那是1826年的秋天，我處于神經(jīng)麻木的狀態(tài)，就像每個人偶爾都會有的情形一樣，感覺不到快樂或興奮。在別的時候應該是高興的心情，在這時變成乏味或冷漠。我認為，改信循道宗教的人第一次因“深信有罪”而備受折磨的時候，就是這種狀態(tài)。在這種心境下，我直接問了自己一個問題：“假如一生中所有的目標都實現(xiàn)了，你期盼的所有制度和觀念的改變都能立刻完全實現(xiàn)，這會不會是你巨大的幸福和快樂？”一個抑制不住的自我意識清楚地回答道：“不是！”這時，我心情低落極了，我建立生活的整個基礎(chǔ)坍塌了。我所有的幸福原本在于堅持不懈地追求這個目標。而現(xiàn)在目標已經(jīng)不再有吸引力了，我又怎么會繼續(xù)對實現(xiàn)目標的手段感興趣呢？我似乎沒有活著的目標了。

At first I hoped that the cloud would pass away of itself; but it did not. A night's sleep, the sovereign remedy for the smaller vexations of life, had no effect on it. I awoke to a renewed consciousness of the woeful fact. I carried it with me into all companies, into all occupations. Hardly anything had power to cause me even a few minutes' oblivion of it. For some months the cloud seemed to grow thicker and thicker. The lines in Coleridge's "Dejection"—I was not then acquainted with them—exactly describe my case:

最初，我希望陰云能自己散去，但是沒有。晚上好好睡一覺，是解決生活中小煩惱的特效藥，但對它卻沒有作用。我醒來后，重新意識到這個悲哀的事實。我?guī)е剿信笥涯抢铮剿泄ぷ髦腥?。幾乎沒有任何事情能使我忘記它幾分鐘。有幾個月，陰云似乎越積越厚了?？聽柭芍巍毒趩省防锩娴膸仔性姟耶敃r還沒讀過——準確地描述了我的情況：

A grief without a pang, void, dark and drear, A drowsy, stifled, unimpassioned grief, Which finds no natural outlet or relief In word, or sigh, or tear.

沒有劇痛的悲傷、空虛、憂郁、凄涼，困倦的、窒息的、沒有激情的悲傷，無法用語言、嘆息或淚水自然地排遣。

In vain I sought relief from my favourite books; those memorials of past nobleness and greatness from which I had always hitherto drawn strength and animation. I read them now without feeling, or with the accustomed feeling minus all its charm; and I became persuaded, that my love of mankind, and of excellence for its own sake, had worn itself out. I sought no comfort by speaking to others of what I felt. If I had loved any one sufficiently to make confiding my grief a necessity, I should not have been in the condition I was. I felt, too, that mine was not an interesting, or in any way respectable distress. There was nothing in it to attract sympathy. Advice, if I had known where to seek it, would have been most precious. The words of Macbeth1 to the physician often occurred to my thoughts. But there was no one on whom I could build the faintest hope of such assistance. My father, to whom it would have been natural to me to have recourse in any practical difficulties, was the last person to whom, in such a case as this, I looked for help. Everything convinced me that he had no knowledge of any such mental state as I was suffering from, and that even if he could be made to understand it, he was not the physician who could heal it. My education, which was wholly his work, had been conducted without any regard to the possibility of its ending in this result; and I saw no use in giving him the pain of thinking that his plans had failed, when the failure was probably irremediable, and, at all events, beyond the power of his remedies. Of other friends, I had at that time none to whom I had any hope of making my condition intelligible. It was however abundantly intelligible to myself; and the more I dwelt upon it, the more hopeless it appeared.

我試圖從最喜歡的書中尋求解脫，但沒有用。那些對過去高尚和偉大的記錄，我以前總能從中獲得力量和活力，但現(xiàn)在讀它們，我毫無感覺，或者僅僅有習慣性的感覺，卻喪失了曾有的魅力。我開始相信，我對人類的熱愛和對卓越本身的熱愛已經(jīng)耗盡了。我也沒有告訴別人我的感覺以尋求安慰。如果我瘋狂地愛著一個人，讓我覺得必須向他傾訴我的悲傷，我就不會陷入當時的境地了。我還覺得，我的痛苦并不是個有趣或者在任何方面可敬的沮喪。它不能博得同情。建議會是非常寶貴的，但我不知去哪里找尋。麥克白對醫(yī)生說的話，經(jīng)常浮現(xiàn)在我的腦海里。但是，沒有一個人能讓我寄希望于尋求這種幫助，即便是最微弱的希望。在我陷入任何實際困難的時候，自然應該去找父親幫忙，但在這種情況下，他是我最不愿意求助的人。所有跡象都讓我相信，他完全不了解我正在遭受的精神痛苦，即使能讓他理解，他也不是能夠治好它的醫(yī)生。我的教育完全是他的成果，他在教導我的時候從來沒有考慮過出現(xiàn)這種結(jié)果的可能性。如果失敗無法補救，并且完全超出了他的補救能力的話，讓他承受計劃失敗的痛苦，我覺得完全沒有用。當時，我也沒有指望任何朋友可以理解我的情形。然而，我自己卻非常理解，而且越細想，這情形越顯得絕望。

My course of study had led me to believe, that all mental and moral feelings and qualities, whether of a good or of a bad kind, were the results of association; that we love one thing and hate another, take pleasure in one sort of action or contemplation, and pain in another sort, through the clinging of pleasurable or painful ideas to those things, from the effect of education or of experience. As a corollary from this, I had always heard it maintained by my father, and was myself convinced, that the object of education should be to form the strongest possible associations of the salutary class; associations of pleasure with all things beneficial to the great whole, and of pain with all things hurtful to it. This doctrine appeared inexpugnable; but it now seemed to me on retrospect, that my teachers had occupied themselves but superficially with the means of forming and keeping up these salutary associations. They seemed to have trusted altogether to the old familiar instruments, praise and blame, reward and punishment. Now, I did not doubt that by these means, begun early, and applied unremittingly, intense associations of pain and pleasure, especially of pain, might be created, and might produce desires and aversions capable of lasting undiminished to the end of life. But there must always be something artificial and casual in associations thus produced. The pains and pleasures thus forcibly associated with things, are not connected with them by any natural tie; and it is therefore, I thought, essential to the durability of these associations, that they should have become so intense and inveterate as to be practically indissoluble, before the habitual exercise of the power of analysis had commenced. For I now saw, or thought I saw, what I had always before received with incredulity—that the habit of analysis has a tendency to wear away the feelings: as indeed it has when no other mental habit is cultivated, and the analysing spirit remains without its natural complements and correctives. The very excellence of analysis (I argued) is that it tends to weaken and undermine whatever is the result of prejudice; that it enables us mentally to separate ideas which have only casually clung together: and no associations whatever could ultimately resist this dissolving force, were it not that we owe to analysis our clearest knowledge of the permanent sequences in nature; the real connexions between Things, not dependent on our will and feelings; natural laws, by virtue of which, in many cases, one thing is inseparable from another in fact; which laws, in proportion as they are clearly perceived and imaginatively realized, cause our ideas of things which are always joined together in Nature, to cohere more and more closely in our thoughts. Analytic habits may thus even strengthen the associations between causes and effects, means and ends, but tend altogether to weaken those which are, to speak familiarly, a mere matter of feeling. They are therefore (I thought) favourable to prudence and clear-sightedness, but a perpetual worm at the root both of the passions and of the virtues; and above all, fearfully undermine all desires, and all pleasures, which are the effects of association, that is, according to the theory I held, all except the purely physical and organic; of the entire insufficiency of which to make life desirable, no one had a stronger conviction than I had. These were the laws of human nature, by which, as it seemed to me, I had been brought to my present state. All those to whom I looked up, were of opinion that the pleasure of sympathy with human beings, and the feelings which made the good of others, and especially of mankind on a large scale, the object of existence, were the greatest and surest sources of happiness. Of the truth of this I was convinced, but to know that a feeling would make me happy if I had it, did not give me the feeling. My education, I thought, had failed to create these feelings in sufficient strength to resist the dissolving influence of analysis, while the whole course of my intellectual cultivation had made precocious and premature analysis the inveterate habit of my mind. I was thus, as I said to myself, left stranded at the commencement of my voyage, with a well-equipped ship and a rudder, but no sail; without any real desire for the ends which I had been so carefully fitted out to work for: no delight in virtue or the general good, but also just as little in anything else. The fountains of vanity and ambition seemed to have dried up within me, as completely as those of benevolence. I had had (as I reflected) some gratification of vanity at too early an age: I had obtained some distinction, and felt myself of some importance, before the desire of distinction and of importance had grown into a passion: and little as it was which I had attained, yet having been attained too early, like all pleasures enjoyed too soon, it had made me blasé and indifferent to the pursuit. Thus neither selfish nor unselfish pleasures were pleasures to me. And there seemed no power in nature sufficient to begin the formation of my character anew, and create in a mind now irretrievably analytic, fresh associations of pleasure with any of the objects of human desire.

我的學習過程讓我相信，所有心理和道德上的情感和品質(zhì)，不管是好的還是壞的，都是聯(lián)系的結(jié)果。我們喜歡這個東西，討厭那個東西，進行這種行動或沉思很高興，而進行另一種卻很痛苦，這都是通過教育或經(jīng)驗的作用把愉快或痛苦的想法附加到這些東西上來實現(xiàn)的。從這種現(xiàn)象得出的推論就是，教育的目標應該是盡可能為有益的事物形成最強大的聯(lián)系。給所有對整體有益的東西以愉快的聯(lián)系。給對整體有害的東西以痛苦的聯(lián)系。我總是聽到父親堅持這一結(jié)論，我自己也深信不疑。這個學說看起來堅不可摧，但回想起來，現(xiàn)在我覺得好像我的老師都只是很膚淺地專注于形成和維持這些有益聯(lián)系的方法。他們似乎完全信任常用的舊手段，如表揚和批評、獎勵和懲罰?，F(xiàn)在我并不懷疑，如果這些方法使用得早并堅持不懈的話，就可能會創(chuàng)造出來痛苦和愉快的強烈聯(lián)系，尤其是痛苦的聯(lián)系，也可能會制造出能夠持續(xù)至生命盡頭都不減弱的渴望和厭惡。但是，這樣產(chǎn)生的聯(lián)系肯定總會有人為的和偶然的因素。這些痛苦和快樂是強行跟事物聯(lián)系起來的，而不是通過自然紐帶聯(lián)系起來的。因此我想，這些聯(lián)系應該在習慣運用分析能力之前就變得非常強烈和深刻，從而在現(xiàn)實中不會被拆開，這對于鞏固這些聯(lián)系至關(guān)重要。因為現(xiàn)在我看到了，或者覺得我看到了自己以前總是半信半疑的東西，即分析的習慣往往會折損感情。在其他思考習慣還未形成而分析精神仍沒有自然的補充和矯正的時候，確實如此。（我堅持認為）分析的優(yōu)點在于它往往會減弱和破壞由偏見造成的任何結(jié)果，它能讓我們從心理上區(qū)分開只是偶然結(jié)合在一起的想法，任何聯(lián)系最終都無法抵抗這種分解的力量，我們只能把對自然界永恒秩序的清楚認識歸功于分析。事物之間的真正聯(lián)系不依賴于我們的意志和感情。根據(jù)自然法則，在很多情況下一個事物在事實上和另一個事物密不可分。這些法則，按照我們清楚的感知和從想象中認識的程度，使我們對大自然中總是結(jié)合在一起的事物的認識在思想中結(jié)合得越來越緊密。因此分析的習慣甚至可能會加強原因和結(jié)果、手段和目標之間的聯(lián)系，但是總體上往往會削弱純粹感覺的東西（用大家熟悉的說法）。因此（我想）分析的習慣對于審慎和洞察力有利，但是永遠是激情和美德根基處的害蟲。最重要的是，它會摧毀所有由聯(lián)系而成的渴望和快樂，也就是說，根據(jù)我所持的理論，除了純物質(zhì)和感官的渴望和快樂以外，其他的都會被破壞掉。我比誰都更加深信不疑，分析的習慣絕不會讓生活變得愉悅。這些是人類本性的規(guī)律，我目前的狀態(tài)也是這些規(guī)律作用的結(jié)果。我所尊敬的人都認為，對人類的同情所產(chǎn)生的快樂，那種把為別人，尤其是為人類大規(guī)模地謀取福利作為生存目標的感覺，是幸福最偉大、最可靠的源泉。我深信這是真的，但是知道擁有某種感覺能讓我幸福，并不能給我這種感覺。我想教育為我創(chuàng)造這些感覺的力量還不夠強大，無法抵擋分析的毀滅性影響，而我的整個智力培養(yǎng)過程都使早熟又不成熟的分析成為我思想中根深蒂固的習慣。因此我想，我在旅程剛開始時就擱淺了，雖然有裝備精良的船只和舵，但是沒有帆。我對做了精心準備去努力實現(xiàn)的目標沒有真正的渴望，對美德或者公共利益沒有興趣，就像對其他事情一樣。虛榮心和抱負的源泉像仁愛的源泉一樣，似乎已經(jīng)在我體內(nèi)完全干涸了。（我回想起來）我在很小的時候虛榮心就曾獲得了一些滿足。在對榮譽和地位的渴望轉(zhuǎn)化為激情之前，我獲得了一些榮譽，覺得自己有些本事。事實上我獲得的很少，而且得到的太早，就像所有享受得太快的快樂一樣，它讓我對這種追求感到厭倦和冷漠。因此，無論是自私的或不自私的快樂，對我來說都不是快樂。自然界似乎也沒有什么力量能重塑我的性格，在一個如今無法復原分析能力的頭腦里創(chuàng)造出快樂與人類渴望的任何事物之間的新聯(lián)系。

These were the thoughts which mingled with the dry heavy dejection of the melancholy winter of 1826—7. During this time I was not incapable of my usual occupations. I went on with them mechanically, by the mere force of habit. I had been so drilled in a certain sort of mental exercise, that I could still carry it on when all the spirit had gone out of it. I even composed and spoke several speeches at the debating society, how, or with what degree of success I know not. Of four years continual speaking at that society, this is the only year of which I remember next to nothing. Two lines of Coleridge, in whom alone of all writers I have found a true description of what I felt, were often in my thoughts, not at this time (for I had never read them), but in a later period of the same mental malady:

這些想法夾雜著1826年憂郁的冬天里單調(diào)沉重的沮喪。這段時間里我還是能夠從事日常的工作。但只是憑借習慣的力量，很機械地進行下去。我在智力運用上接受過良好的訓練，因此可以在完全沒有活力的時候仍繼續(xù)進行。我甚至在辯論協(xié)會寫了好幾篇演講稿，做了好幾次演講，怎么做的或者做得怎么樣我就不知道了。在那個協(xié)會連續(xù)演說了四年，我?guī)缀跬耆洸磺宓闹挥羞@一年。在所有詩人當中，我只在柯爾律治的詩里面發(fā)現(xiàn)兩行對我的感覺的真實描述，這兩行詩經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)在我的腦海里，不是在這時（因為我還沒讀到），而是在這次成長危機的后期：

Work without hope draws nectar in a sieve, And hope without an object cannot live.

沒有希望地工作，如同把美酒裝進篩子，沒有目標的希望，無法存在。

In all probability my case was by no means so peculiar as I fancied it, and I doubt not that many others have passed through a similar state; but the idiosyncracies of my education had given to the general phenomenon a special character, which made it seem the natural effect of causes that it was hardly possible for time to remove. I frequently asked myself, if I could, or if I was bound to go on living, when life must be passed in this manner. I generally answered to myself, that I did not think I could possibly bear it beyond a year. When, however, not more than half that duration of time had elapsed, a small ray of light broke in upon my gloom. I was reading, accidentally, Marmontel's Mémoirs, and came to the passage which relates his father's death, the distressed position of the family, and the sudden inspiration by which he, then a mere boy, felt and made them feel that he would be everything to them—would supply the place of all that they had lost. A vivid conception of the scene and its feelings came over me, and I was moved to tears. From this moment my burthen grew lighter. The oppression of the thought that all feeling was dead within me, was gone. I was no longer hopeless: I was not a stock or a stone. I had still, it seemed, some of the material out of which all worth of character, and all capacity for happiness, are made. Relieved from my ever present sense of irremediable wretchedness, I gradually found that the ordinary incidents of life could again give me some pleasure; that I could again find enjoyment, not intense, but sufficient for cheerfulness, in sunshine and sky, in books, in conversation, in public affairs; and that there was, once more, excitement, though of a moderate kind, in exerting myself for my opinions, and for the public good. Thus the cloud gradually drew off, and I again enjoyed life: and though I had several relapses, some of which lasted many months, I never again was as miserable as I had been.

我的情況很可能不如自己想象的那樣特殊，而且我還相信很多人也經(jīng)歷過相似的情況。但是，我的教育的特質(zhì)賦予了這一普遍現(xiàn)象一個很特殊的特點，使得它看起來像是某種原因引起的自然結(jié)果，幾乎無法隨著時間消逝。我經(jīng)常問自己，如果生命必須以這種方式度過，我還能夠繼續(xù)活下去嗎，或者一定要繼續(xù)活下去嗎？我通常回答自己說，我覺得很可能無法忍受超過一年時間。然而至多剛過一半的時候，一小縷陽光打破了我的憂郁。我當時在讀馬蒙泰爾的《回憶錄》，很偶然地讀到有一部分講述他父親的去世、家人的哀傷，以及當時還只是個小男孩的他突然間受到的啟示，他感覺到，也讓家人感覺到他可以成為他們的一切——去替代他們失去的一切。對這個場景和感受逼真的想象震撼了我，我感動得落淚了。從這時起，我的負擔變輕了。以為所有感情都在內(nèi)心深處枯竭了的想法給我造成的壓力消失了。我不再絕望，我不是樹干，也不是石頭。我好像還有一些能夠形成品格的價值，具備追求幸福能力的東西。從一直存在的、無可救藥的悲慘感覺中解脫出來，我慢慢發(fā)現(xiàn)，生活中的平凡小事還能再次給我?guī)順啡?。我能再次從陽光、天空、書籍、交談和公共事務中找到快樂，雖不強烈，但是足以讓我高興。而且再一次有了為自己的信念，為公共利益而行動起來的興奮感，盡管是適度的興奮。就這樣，陰云慢慢散去了，我重新享受生活的樂趣。盡管復發(fā)了好幾次，有時還持續(xù)好幾個月，但是我再也沒有像以前那樣痛苦。

The experiences of this period had two very marked effects on my opinions and character. In the first place, they led me to adopt a theory of life, very unlike that on which I had before acted, and having much in common with what at that time I certainly had never heard of, the anti-self-consciousness theory of Carlyle. I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments of life (such was now my theory) are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing, when they are taken en passant, without being made a principal object. Once make them so, and they are immediately felt to be insufficient. They will not bear a scrutinizing examination. Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end external to it, as the purpose of life. Let your self-consciousness, your scrutiny, your self-interrogation, exhaust themselves on that; and if otherwise fortunately circumstanced you will inhale happiness with the air you breathe, without dwelling on it or thinking about it, without either forestalling it in imagination, or putting it to flight by fatal questioning. This theory now became the basis of my philosophy of life. And I still hold to it as the best theory for all those who have but a moderate degree of sensibility and of capacity for enjoyment, that is, for the great majority of mankind.

這段時期的經(jīng)歷對我的觀點和性格有兩個非常明顯的影響。首先，它引導我采納了一個人生理論，和我以前遵循的理論很不一樣，與卡萊爾的反自我意識理論倒有諸多相似之處，不過我當時自然對其聞所未聞。實際上，我一直堅信幸福是所有行為規(guī)則的檢驗標準，也是生活的目標，從沒動搖過。但是現(xiàn)在我覺得，這個目標只有在不把它當作直接目標的時候才能實現(xiàn)。（我想）只有這樣的人才會幸福，他們不以自己的幸福為目標，而是把精力聚焦在別的事物上。聚焦在別人的幸福、人類的進步甚至某種藝術(shù)或追求上，不是把它作為一種手段，而是把它本身當作理想的目標來追尋。這樣把目標定在別的事物上，他們也順便找到了幸福。當我們把生活中的快樂當作附帶品，而不是作為首要目標來對待時，它們就足以讓生活成為快樂的事情（這就是我現(xiàn)在的理論）。一旦把快樂作為首要目標，就會很快感覺到它們不夠用，也經(jīng)不起仔細的推敲。你一旦問自己是否快樂時，你就不再快樂了。唯一的辦法是把快樂以外的目標，而不是快樂本身作為生活的目標。讓你的自我意識，你的仔細觀察，你的自我審問都耗費在那個目標上面吧。另外，如果夠幸運的話，你能從空氣中呼吸到快樂，不必沉思或考慮，不會在想象中阻止它，或者用可怕的質(zhì)問讓它潰逃。這個理論現(xiàn)在成了我人生哲學的基礎(chǔ)。對于所有只擁有普通感受能力和享樂能力的人來說，換句話說，對于大多數(shù)人來說，我仍然認為它是最好的理論。

The other important change which my opinions at this time underwent, was that I, for the first time, gave its proper place, among the prime necessities of human well-being, to the internal culture of the individual. I ceased to attach almost exclusive importance to the ordering of outward circumstances, and the training of the human being for speculation and for action. I had now learnt by experience that the passive susceptibilities needed to be cultivated as well as the active capacities, and required to be nourished and enriched as well as guided. I did not, for an instant, lose sight of, or undervalue, that part of the truth which I had seen before; I never turned recreant to intellectual culture, or ceased to consider the power and practice of analysis as an essential condition both of individual and of social improvement. But I thought that it had consequences which required to be corrected, by joining other kinds of cultivation with it. The maintenance of a due balance among the faculties, now seemed to me of primary importance. The cultivation of the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed. And my thoughts and inclinations turned in an increasing degree towards whatever seemed capable of being instrumental to that object.

我的觀點那時經(jīng)歷的另一個重要變化就是我第一次把個人的精神文化當做人類福利的一個首要條件。我不再只重視外部環(huán)境的安排以及對人類思索和行動能力的訓練。我現(xiàn)在從經(jīng)驗中得知，被動的感受性也像積極的能力一樣需要培養(yǎng)，必須得到滋養(yǎng)、充實以及指引。我沒有片刻忽略或者低估從前看到的那部分真理。我從來沒有懷疑過智育，或者否認分析的能力和習慣是個人和社會進步的必要條件。但是，它的有些結(jié)果需要通過與其他培養(yǎng)形式結(jié)合起來得以修正。在各種能力之間保持適當?shù)钠胶庠谖铱磥硎亲钪匾?。情感培養(yǎng)成為我倫理和哲學信條中的基本點之一。任何看上去能有助于實現(xiàn)這個目標的東西都成為我的思想和愛好越來越關(guān)注的對象。

I now began to find meaning in the things which I had read or heard about the importance of poetry and art as instruments of human culture. But it was some time longer before I began to know this by personal experience. The only one of the imaginative arts in which I had from childhood taken great pleasure, was music; the best effect of which (and in this it surpasses perhaps every other art) consists in exciting enthusiasm; in winding up to a high pitch those feelings of an elevated kind which are already in the character, but to which this excitement gives a glow and a fervour, which, though transitory at its utmost height, is precious for sustaining them at other times. This effect of music I had often experienced; but, like all my pleasurable susceptibilities, it was suspended during the gloomy period. I had sought relief again and again from this quarter, but found none. After the tide had turned, and I was in process of recovery, I had been helped forward by music, but in a much less elevated manner. I at this time first became acquainted with Weber's Oberon, and the extreme pleasure which I drew from its delicious melodies did me good, by showing me a source of pleasure to which I was as susceptible as ever. The good, however, was much impaired by the thought, that the pleasure of music (as is quite true of such pleasure as this was, that of mere tune) fades with familiarity, and requires either to be revived by intermittence, or fed by continual novelty. And it is very characteristic both of my then state, and of the general tone of my mind at this period of my life, that I was seriously tormented by the thought of the exhaustibility of musical combinations. The octave consists only of five tones and two semitones, which can be put together in only a limited number of ways, of which but a small proportion are beautiful: most of these, it seemed to me, must have been already discovered, and there could not be room for a long succession of Mozarts and Webers, to strike out, as these had done, entirely new and surpassingly rich veins of musical beauty. This source of anxiety may, perhaps, be thought to resemble that of the philosophers of Laputa2, who feared lest the sun should be burnt out. It was, however, connected with the best feature in my character, and the only good point to be found in my very unromantic and in no way honorable distress. For though my dejection, honestly looked at, could not be called other than egotistical, produced by the ruin, as I thought, of my fabric of happiness, yet the destiny of mankind in general was ever in my thoughts, and could not be separated from my own. I felt that the flaw in my life, must be a flaw in life itself; that the question was, whether, if the reformers of society and government could succeed in their objects, and every person in the community were free and in a state of physical comfort, the pleasures of life, being no longer kept up by struggle and privation, would cease to be pleasures. And I felt that unless I could see my way to some better hope than this for human happiness in general, my dejection must continue; but that if I could see such an outlet, I should then look on the world with pleasure; content as far as I was myself concerned, with any fair share of the general lot.

我現(xiàn)在開始發(fā)現(xiàn)，以前讀到或聽說的關(guān)于詩歌和藝術(shù)是人類文化重要傳播工具的說法是很有意義的。但是通過親身經(jīng)歷開始了解此事，是過了一陣子之后的事了。我從兒童時代就非常喜歡的有想象力的藝術(shù)只有音樂，音樂的最佳作用在于激發(fā)熱情（在這一點上，它可能超越了其他藝術(shù)），在于高度提升品質(zhì)中已有的高尚情感。而音樂的刺激讓這種情感發(fā)光發(fā)熱，盡管這光和熱處于頂點的時間很短暫，但在其他時刻用于維持高尚的情感卻是很寶貴的。我經(jīng)常體驗音樂的這種效果。但是，和我所有愉快的情感一樣，它在我沮喪的那段時期也中斷了。我曾一次次地從這里面尋求安慰，但是沒有找到。趨勢扭轉(zhuǎn)后，我進入到恢復過程，而音樂在其中起到了促進作用，但是遠不如以前那般慷慨激昂。這時，我第一次聽了韋伯的《奧伯龍》，它那美妙的旋律向我展示了一種仍然容易感染我的快樂的源泉，我因而從中得到了極大的快樂，這對我很有益。然而，我覺得音樂帶來的快樂（特別是這種純粹的曲調(diào)帶來的快樂)會因熟悉而減弱，需要隔一段時間再聽，或者不斷翻新才能保持，這種想法把音樂帶給我的益處削弱了不少。音樂創(chuàng)作可竭盡性的想法嚴重地折磨著我，這既很符合我當時的狀態(tài)，也很符合這段時間我的總體心境。八度音階只有五個全音和兩個半音，它們只能按照有限的幾種方法組合在一起，而其中只有一小部分很美妙。并且在我看來，這一小部分中的絕大多數(shù)也一定已經(jīng)被人發(fā)現(xiàn)了，不可能再有空間讓很多人像莫扎特和韋伯一樣，創(chuàng)造出完全清新、無比豐富的音樂來。這種焦慮的源頭可能會被認為和勒普泰島上害怕太陽會燃盡的哲學家類似。然而，它是和我性格里最好的特質(zhì)聯(lián)系在一起的，也是在我非常不浪漫、毫不可敬的憂慮中能找到的唯一優(yōu)點。因為公正地看，我的沮喪是由于我幸福的構(gòu)成遭到了毀滅，盡管這種沮喪只能被說成是任性的，然而我一直在思考人類總體的命運，并且不能把它和我的命運分開。我感覺，我人生中的缺點一定也是人生本身的瑕疵。問題在于，如果社會和政府改革家能實現(xiàn)他們的目標，社會上的每個人都是自由的，物質(zhì)生活都是舒適的，人生中的快樂不再靠努力和艱難來維持的話，快樂是否就不再是快樂了。我覺得除非可以找到比這更好的為人類的總體幸福而努力的希望，否則我的沮喪就會繼續(xù)下去；但是如果我能看到這樣一條出路，我就應該愉快地看待世界。只要自己參與其中，公平地分享共同的命運，我就滿意了。

This state of my thoughts and feelings made the fact of my reading Wordsworth for the first time (in the autumn of 1828) an important event in my life. I took up the collection of his poems from curiosity, with no expectation of mental relief from it, though I had before resorted to poetry with that hope. In the worst period of my depression, I had read through the whole of Byron (then new to me), to try whether a poet, whose peculiar department was supposed to be that of the intenser feelings, could rouse any feeling in me. As might be expected, I got no good from this reading, but the reverse. The poet's state of mind was too like my own. His was the lament of a man who had worn out all pleasures, and who seemed to think that life, to all who possess the good things of it, must necessarily be the vapid, uninteresting thing which I found it. His Harold and Manfred had the same burthen on them which I had; and I was not in a frame of mind to derive any comfort from the vehement sensual passion of his Giaours, or the sullenness of his Laras. But while Byron was exactly what did not suit my condition, Wordsworth was exactly what did. I had looked into The Excursion two or three years before, and found little in it; and I should probably have found as little, had I read it at this time. But the miscellaneous poems, in the two-volume edition of 1815 (to which little of value was added in the latter part of the author's life), proved to be the precise thing for my mental wants at that particular juncture.

我的這種思想和情感狀態(tài)，讓第一次（1828年秋天）讀華茲華斯成為我人生中非常重要的事件。我是出于好奇才開始讀他的詩集的，并沒期盼從它那里得到精神慰藉，雖然我之前曾是帶著這種希望去讀詩的。在我最沮喪的那段時期，我讀了拜倫的全部作品（我當時并不熟悉），想看看一個被認為特別善于抒發(fā)強烈感情的詩人能否激起我內(nèi)心的任何情感。和預想的一樣，我從這種閱讀中沒得到任何好處，只有壞處。這位詩人的心境和我的極其相似。他的詩是消磨掉所有快樂的人的悲嘆，他似乎認為，人生對于所有擁有它的美好的人來說一定很乏味無趣，就像我對人生的感覺一樣。他的《哈羅爾德》和《曼弗雷德》帶有和我一樣的負擔。以我當時的心境，也無法從他的《異教徒》的強烈感官激情中，或者《拉臘》的憂郁中得到任何安慰。拜倫完全不適合我的情形，華茲華斯卻正好適合。兩三年前，我瀏覽了《漫游》，幾乎沒什么收獲。如果這時候讀的話，很可能還是收獲很少。但是1815年兩卷版的詩集中各種各樣的詩歌（在詩人的人生晚期，這本詩集沒有受到賞識），正好是那個特殊時刻滿足我精神需求的東西。

In the first place, these poems addressed themselves powerfully to one of the strongest of my pleasurable susceptibilities, the love of rural objects and natural scenery; to which I had been indebted not only for much of the pleasure of my life, but quite recently for relief from one of my longest relapses into depression. In this power of rural beauty over me, there was a foundation laid for taking pleasure in Wordsworth's poetry; the more so, as his scenery lies mostly among mountains, which, owing to my early Pyrenean excursion, were my ideal of natural beauty. But Wordsworth would never have had any great effect on me, if he had merely placed before me beautiful pictures of natural scenery. Scott does this still better than Wordsworth, and a very second-rate landscape does it more effectually than any poet. What made Wordsworth's poems a medicine for my state of mind, was that they expressed, not mere outward beauty, but states of feeling, and of thought coloured by feeling, under the excitement of beauty. They seemed to be the very culture of the feelings, which I was in quest of. In them I seemed to draw from a source of inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which could be shared in by all human beings; which had no connexion with struggle or imperfection, but would be made richer by every improvement in the physical or social condition of mankind. From them I seemed to learn what would be the perennial sources of happiness, when all the greater evils of life shall have been removed. And I felt myself at once better and happier as I came under their influence. There have certainly been, even in our own age, greater poets than Wordsworth; but poetry of deeper and loftier feeling could not have done for me at that time what his did. I needed to be made to feel that there was real, permanent happiness in tranquil contemplation. Wordsworth taught me this, not only without turning away from, but with a greatly increased interest in the common feelings and common destiny of human beings. And the delight which these poems gave me, proved that with culture of this sort, there was nothing to dread from the most confirmed habit of analysis. At the conclusion of the Poems came the famous "Ode," falsely called Platonic, "Intimations of Immortality": in which, along with more than his usual sweetness of melody and rhythm, and along with the two passages of grand imagery but bad philosophy so often quoted, I found that he too had had similar experience to mine; that he also had felt that the first freshness of youthful enjoyment of life was not lasting; but that he had sought for compensation, and found it, in the way in which he was now teaching me to find it. The result was that I gradually, but completely, emerged from my habitual depression, and was never again subject to it. I long continued to value Wordsworth less according to his intrinsic merits, than by the measure of what he had done for me. Compared with the greatest poets, he may be said to be the poet of unpoetical natures, possessed of quiet and contemplative tastes. But unpoetical natures are precisely those which require poetic cultivation. This cultivation Wordsworth is much more fitted to give, than poets who are intrinsically far more poets than he.

首先，這些詩強有力地觸動了我最強烈的一種快樂情感，即對鄉(xiāng)村事物和自然風光的熱愛。不僅我人生中的很多快樂都得益于它，就是最近我從最長時間的沮喪中解脫出來，也得益于它。在這鄉(xiāng)村美景的力量下，我打下了欣賞華茲華斯詩歌的基礎(chǔ)。此外，他描述的風景大部分在山間，而我年輕時曾在比利牛斯山脈旅行過，所以他描寫的是我理想的自然美。但是，如果華茲華斯只是把自然風景的美麗圖畫呈現(xiàn)在我面前，那他根本就不會對我產(chǎn)生任何重大的影響。司各特在這上面比華茲華斯做得還要好一些，而非常普通的風景要比任何詩人更有效。華茲華斯的詩歌之所以是治療我心情的良藥，是因為它們不僅表達了外部美，還表達了內(nèi)心感覺的狀態(tài)以及在美的刺激下帶有感情色彩的思想狀態(tài)。它們似乎就是我尋求的情感陶冶。從它們那里，我似乎找到了內(nèi)心喜悅、和諧和有想象力的快樂的源泉，這個源泉可以由整個人類分享。它與斗爭或者瑕疵毫無聯(lián)系，但是人類物質(zhì)和社會環(huán)境的每次改善都能使它變得更豐富。從它們那里，我似乎得知了，當生活中所有大不幸都被排除的時候，什么會是幸福的永久源泉。在它們的影響下，我立刻感覺更好了，更高興了。當然，即使在我們這個時代，也有比華茲華斯更偉大的詩人。但在當時，感情更深刻、更崇高的詩歌也不能像他的詩歌那樣影響我。我需要有人讓我感覺到寧靜的思索中有真實持久的快樂。華茲華斯教會了我不僅不需要逃避人類的共同感情和共同命運，反而應對其興趣大增。這些詩歌給我?guī)淼目鞓纷C明了只要有這種陶冶，最根深蒂固的分析習慣也沒什么可怕的。在這些詩歌的最后，出現(xiàn)了著名的“頌歌”，被人錯誤地稱為柏拉圖式“不朽的暗示”。其中，除了比他平時更甜美的旋律和節(jié)奏以及常被引用的兩段宏大但哲理膚淺的意象之外，我還發(fā)現(xiàn)他也有過和我類似的經(jīng)歷。他也感覺到年輕人享受人生的最初新鮮感不會持久，但是，他用現(xiàn)在他教我的這種方法尋求并得到了補償。結(jié)果我慢慢地但卻徹底地從我習慣性的沮喪中解脫了出來，再也沒有遭受過它的折磨。我一直重視華茲華斯，主要是因為衡量了他為我所做的這些而非其內(nèi)在價值。和最偉大的詩人相比，可以說他是沒有詩人氣質(zhì)的詩人，但是他擁有從容和喜愛沉思的風格。而無詩人氣質(zhì)正好是需要用詩歌陶冶的氣質(zhì)。華茲華斯遠比其他本質(zhì)上更像詩人的詩人適合給予這種陶冶。

It so fell out that the merits of Wordsworth were the occasion of my first public declaration of my new way of thinking, and separation from those of my habitual companions who had not undergone a similar change. The person with whom at that time I was most in the habit of comparing notes on such subjects was Roebuck, and I induced him to read Wordsworth, in whom he also at first seemed to find much to admire: but I, like most Wordsworthians, threw myself into strong antagonism to Byron, both as a poet and as to his influence on the character. Roebuck, all whose instincts were those of action and struggle, had, on the contrary, a strong relish and great admiration of Byron, whose writings he regarded as the poetry of human life, while Wordsworth's, according to him, was that of flowers and butterflies. We agreed to have the fight out at our Debating Society, where we accordingly discussed for two evenings the comparative merits of Byron and Wordsworth, propounding and illustrating by long recitations our respective theories of poetry: Sterling also, in a brilliant speech, putting forward his particular theory. This was the first debate on any weighty subject in which Reobuck and I had been on opposite sides. The schism between us widened from this time more and more, though we continued for some years longer to be companions. In the beginning, our chief divergence related to the cultivation of the feelings. Roebuck was in many respects very different from the vulgar notion of a Benthamite or Utilitarian. He was a lover of poetry and of most of the fine arts. He took great pleasure in music, in dramatic performances, especially in painting, and himself drew and designed landscapes with great facility and beauty. But he never could be made to see that these things have any value as aids in the formation of character. Personally, instead of being, as Benthamites are supposed to be, void of feeling, he had very quick and strong sensibilities. But, like most Englishmen who have feelings, he found his feelings stand very much in his way. He was much more susceptible to the painful sympathies than to the pleasurable, and looking for his happiness elsewhere, he wished that his feelings should be deadened rather than quickened. And, in truth, the English character, and English social circumstances, make it so seldom possible to derive happiness from the exercise of the sympathies, that it is not wonderful if they count for little in an Englishman's scheme of life. In most other countries the paramount importance of the sympathies as a constituent of individual happiness is an axiom, taken for granted rather than needing any formal statement; but most English thinkers almost seem to regard them as necessary evils, required for keeping men's actions benevolent and compassionate. Roebuck was, or appeared to be, this kind of Englishman. He saw little good in any cultivation of the feelings, and none at all in cultivating them through the imagination, which he thought was only cultivating illusions. It was in vain I urged on him that the imaginative emotion which an idea, when vividly conceived, excites in us, is not an illusion but a fact, as real as any of the other qualities of objects; and far from implying anything erroneous and delusive in our mental apprehension of the object, is quite consistent with the most accurate knowledge and most perfect practical recognition of all its physical and intellectual laws and relations. The intensest feeling of the beauty of a cloud lighted by the setting sun, is no hindrance to my knowing that the cloud is vapour of water, subject to all the laws of vapours in a state of suspension; and I am just as likely to allow for, and act on, these physical laws whenever there is occasion to do so, as if I had been incapable of perceiving any distinction between beauty and ugliness.

這樣的結(jié)果是，評價華茲華斯的優(yōu)點成為我第一次公開宣布新思維方式，并與我那些沒經(jīng)歷類似變化的同伴疏遠的誘因。在此類問題上，我當時最習慣和羅巴克交換意見，我勸他讀華茲華斯，他起先似乎也覺得華茲華斯很值得欽佩。但是我和大多數(shù)華茲華斯的追隨者一樣，強烈地抵制拜倫，既反對他的詩，也反對他對人們性格的影響。相反，作為行動派和奮斗派的羅巴克非常欣賞，也特別崇拜拜倫，他認為拜倫的作品是人類生活的詩歌，而華茲華斯的作品在他看來都是關(guān)于花朵和蝴蝶的。我們同意在辯論學會公開辯論，因此我們兩個晚上都在那兒討論拜倫和華茲華斯相形之下的優(yōu)點，各自背誦冗長的詩歌理論并舉例來說明這些優(yōu)點。斯特林也用一個精彩的演講提出了他自己獨特的理論。這是羅巴克和我在有分量的問題上第一次站在不同的立場上。從這時起，我們的分歧越來越大，盡管接下來幾年我們?nèi)允桥笥?。起初，我們的主要分歧在于感情熏陶。羅巴克在很多方面與邊沁主義者或者功利主義者的流行看法非常不同。他很熱愛詩歌以及大部分優(yōu)秀藝術(shù)。他特別喜歡音樂、戲劇表演，尤其是繪畫，他自己設(shè)計、描繪的風景畫很流暢，很美。但是他從來都不明白這些東西對性格的形成有何等幫助。就個人而言，他不像人們想象的功利主義者那樣缺乏感情，他的感情非常敏銳，非常強烈。但是，和大多數(shù)有感情的英國人一樣，他發(fā)現(xiàn)自己的感情非常礙事。與快樂的共鳴相比，他更容易受到痛苦的共鳴的影響，因此他在別處尋找快樂，希望自己的感情變遲鈍，而不是敏銳。確實，英國人的性格和英國的社會環(huán)境使得英國人基本不可能從表達共鳴中得到幸福。因此如果共鳴在英國人的人生規(guī)劃中無足輕重的話也不足為奇。在大多數(shù)其他國家，共鳴作為個人幸福的要素是極為重要的，是人們都習以為常的真理，不需要任何正式的聲明。但是，似乎大多數(shù)英國思想家為了使人們的行為仁慈而慈悲，都把它當作不可避免的災禍。羅巴克就是這種英國人，或者看起來是這樣。他幾乎看不到任何感情熏陶的好處，完全看不到通過想象培養(yǎng)感情的好處，他認為這只是在培養(yǎng)錯覺。我徒勞地勸說他，如果想法構(gòu)思得生動就會激發(fā)我們富有想象力的感情，這種感情不是幻想，而是事實，像物體的任何其他性質(zhì)一樣真實。在我們對事物的理解中這種感情絕不意味著錯誤和幻想，而是與該事物所有物質(zhì)的、精神的規(guī)律及關(guān)系的最精確的了解以及最完美的實踐認知相一致的。對落日染紅了晚霞之美的最強烈的感情，不會阻礙我知道云是水蒸氣，知道它遵從所有處于懸浮狀態(tài)的水蒸氣的定律。我同樣會一有機會就考慮這些自然規(guī)律，并依照這些規(guī)律行事，就好像我不能察覺美和丑的任何區(qū)別一樣。

While my intimacy with Roebuck diminished, I fell more and more into friendly intercourse with our Coleridgian adversaries in the Society, Frederick Maurice and John Sterling, both subsequently so well known, the former by his writings, the latter through the biographies by Hare and Carlyle. Of these two friends, Maurice was the thinker, Sterling the orator, and impassioned expositor of thoughts which, at this period, were almost entirely formed for him by Maurice. With Maurice I had for some time been acquainted through Eyton Tooke, who had known him at Cambridge, and although my discussions with him were almost always disputes, I had carried away from them much that helped to build up my new fabric of thought, in the same way as I was deriving much from Coleridge, and from the writings of Goethe and other German authors which I read during these years. I have so deep a respect for Maurice's character and purposes, as well as for his great mental gifts, that it is with some unwillingness I say anything which may seem to place him on a less high eminence than I would gladly be able to accord to him. But I have always thought that there was more intellectual power wasted in Maurice than in any other of my cotemporaries. Few of them certainly have had so much to waste. Great powers of generalization, rare ingenuity and subtlety, and a wide perception of important and unobvious truths, served him not for putting something better into the place of the worthless heap of received opinions on the great subjects of thought, but for proving to his own mind that the Church of England had known everything from the first, and that all the truths on the ground of which the Church and orthodoxy have been attacked (many of which he saw as clearly as any one) are not only consistent with the Thirty-nine Articles3, but are better understood and expressed in those Articles than by any one who rejects them. I have never been able to find any other explanation of this, than by attributing it to that timidity of conscience, combined with original sensitiveness of temperament, which has so often driven highly gifted men into Romanism from the need of a firmer support than they can find in the independent conclusions of their own judgment. Any more vulgar kind of timidity no one who knew Maurice would ever think of imputing to him, even if he had not given public proof of his freedom from it, by his ultimate collision with some of the opinions commonly regarded as orthodox, and by his noble origination of the Christian Socialist movement. The nearest parallel to him, in a moral point of view, is Coleridge, to whom, in merely intellectual power, apart from poetical genius, I think him decidedly superior. At this time, however, he might be described as a disciple of Coleridge, and Sterling as a disciple of Coleridge and of him. The modifications which were taking place in my old opinions gave me some points of contact with them; and both Maurice and Sterling were of considerable use to my development. With Sterling I soon became very intimate, and was more attached to him than I have ever been to any other man. He was indeed one of the most loveable of men. His frank, cordial, affectionate, and expansive character; a love of truth alike conspicuous in the highest things and the humblest; a generous and ardent nature which threw itself with impetuosity into the opinions it adopted, but was as eager to do justice to the doctrines and the men it was opposed to, as to make war on what it thought their errors; and an equal devotion to the two cardinal points of Liberty and Duty, formed a combination of qualities as attractive to me, as to all others who knew him as well as I did. With his open mind and heart, he found no difficulty in joining hands with me across the gulf which as yet divided our opinions. He told me how he and others had looked upon me (from hearsay information), as a "made" or manufactured man, having had a certain impress of opinion stamped on me which I could only reproduce; and what a change took place in his feelings when he found, in the discussion on Wordsworth and Byron, that Wordsworth, and all which that name implies, "belonged" to me as much as to him and his friends. The failure of his health soon scattered all his plans of life, and compelled him to live at a distance from London, so that after the first year or two of our acquaintance, we only saw each other at distant intervals. But (as he said himself in one of his letters to Carlyle) when we did meet it was like brothers. Though he was never, in the full sense of the word, a profound thinker, his openness of mind, and the moral courage in which he greatly surpassed Maurice, made him outgrow the dominion which Maurice and Coleridge had once exercised over his intellect; though he retained to the last a great but discriminating admiration of both, and towards Maurice a warm affection. Except in that short and transitory phase of his life, during which he made the mistake of becoming a clergyman, his mind was ever progressive: and the advance he always seemed to have made when I saw him after an interval, made me apply to him what Goethe said of Schiller, "er hatte eine fürchtliche Fortschreitung." He and I started from intellectual points almost as wide apart as the poles, but the distance between us was always diminishing: if I made steps towards some of his opinions, he, during his short life, was constantly approximating more and more to several of mine: and if he had lived, and had health and vigour to prosecute his ever assiduous self-culture, there is no knowing how much further this spontaneous assimilation might have proceeded.

我和羅巴克越來越疏遠了，卻開始和協(xié)會里面我們柯爾律治派的對手——弗雷德里克·莫里斯和約翰·斯特林——走得越來越近，兩人后來都很出名，前者是由于他的著作，后者是由于黑爾和卡萊爾給他寫的傳記。這兩個朋友中，莫里斯是位思想家，而斯特林是位演說家，還是熱情洋溢的思想評論員，當時他闡述的思想幾乎全都是莫里斯為他塑造的。有一陣子我曾通過艾頓·圖克與莫里斯相識（他們倆是在劍橋認識的），盡管我和他之間的討論幾乎總是爭論，但我還是從中得到很多東西，幫助構(gòu)建我的新思想，就像我那些年讀柯爾律治、歌德和其他德國作家的著作受益很多一樣。我非常尊敬莫里斯的品格和意志，還有他偉大的智力天賦，與我很樂意能給予他的稱贊相比，如果我說了些可能不足以顯示他的杰出的話，那也不是我情愿的。但我總覺得，莫里斯比我任何同輩人浪費的智力都要多。當然，也幾乎沒人有那么多可以浪費的智力。他有強大的概括能力，罕見的獨創(chuàng)性和辨別能力，能廣泛地領(lǐng)悟重要卻不明顯的真理，但他沒有用來在偉大的思想主題上提出更好的東西，以代替大量無價值的陳腐觀點，而是用來向自己證明，英國國教從一開始就什么都知道，那些真理——教會和正統(tǒng)觀念因它們而受到攻擊（其中有很多他和別人看得一樣清楚）——不僅和三十九信條一致，而且在這些條款中這些真理被理解和闡釋得比任何反對它們的人做得都好。對此我從來都沒能找到任何其他解釋，除了把它歸因于良心上的膽怯和性格上的天生敏感，這經(jīng)常迫使天賦極高的人接受天主教，因為與他們從自己的判斷得出的獨立結(jié)論相比，他們需要更穩(wěn)固的支持。任何認識莫里斯的人，都永遠不會想要把更庸俗的膽怯歸咎于他，即使他沒有通過采取和一些通常被認為正統(tǒng)的觀點最終爆發(fā)沖突，并發(fā)起高尚的基督教社會主義運動的手段以此向公眾證明自己沒有這種膽怯。從精神角度來看，與他最類似的人物是柯爾律治，不去看詩歌天賦，僅從智力上講的話，我想他明顯比柯爾律治更出眾。然而這時，他可能會被描述為柯爾律治的追隨者，而斯特林則被描述為柯爾律治和他的追隨者。我的舊觀點正在經(jīng)歷的改變給了我一些與他們接觸的機會。莫里斯和斯特林兩人都對我的發(fā)展起到了重要作用。我和斯特林很快就成了密友，我對他比曾經(jīng)對任何人都更加熱愛。他確實是個非常可愛的人。他性格坦率，熱忱，深情又開朗。熱愛顯現(xiàn)于最高尚和最平凡東西中的真理。他的性情慷慨大方，熱情洋溢，這也給他所采納的觀點染上了沖動的色彩，但是正如他會向他認為的對方的錯誤開戰(zhàn)一樣，他也能公平地對待所反對的學說和人，他給予自由和義務這兩個基本點同樣的熱愛，他結(jié)合了這么多優(yōu)秀品質(zhì)，不僅吸引了我，還吸引了所有像我一樣了解他的人。他思想開明，胸襟開闊，因此超越了當時我們觀點之間的巨大分歧，并和我成為朋友，他一點都不覺得困難。他告訴我他和別人是怎么看我的（道聽途說的消息），他們覺得我是“人造的”或機器制造的人，身上刻著別人的觀點，而我只能機械地復制。但當他和我討論華茲華斯和拜倫的時候，發(fā)現(xiàn)華茲華斯以及這個名字意味著的一切像屬于他和他的朋友一樣也“屬于”我時，他的感情發(fā)生了多大的變化啊。健康的衰退很快打碎了他所有的人生規(guī)劃，迫使他住到離倫敦較遠的地方，因此，在我們認識了一兩年之后，我們只能間隔很長時間才能見一次面了。但是（就像他在給卡萊爾的某封信中說的），我們見面的時候就像兄弟一樣。盡管他從來都不是一個造詣很深的思想家（從思想家這個詞的完整意義來講），但他思想開闊，而且在勇氣上遠遠超過莫里斯，這讓他超越了莫里斯和柯爾律治對他智力上的支配。盡管他直到最后還保持著對這兩個人強烈但有判斷的崇拜，尤其是對莫里斯是種熱烈的喜愛。在他的一生中，除了那一段很短暫的時間他錯誤地成為牧師之外，他的思想一直都在進步，每次在間隔一段時間后見到他時，他似乎總能讓我看到這種進步，這讓我把歌德評價席勒的話用在他身上，“他的進步真的是突飛猛進”。我和他認識的時候，兩人思想上的距離幾乎像兩極一樣遠，但是我們之間的距離總是在縮小。我向著他的某些觀點靠近了，他在自己短暫的一生中，也經(jīng)常越來越接近我的好幾個觀點。如果他還活著，健康和精力還允許他不斷地刻苦自學的話，真不知道這種自然的同化會進行到什么程度。

After 1829 I withdrew from attendance on the Debating Society. I had had enough of speech-making, and was glad to carry on my private studies and meditations without any immediate call for outward assertion of their results. I found the fabric of my old and taught opinions giving way in many fresh places, and I never allowed it to fall to pieces, but was incessantly occupied in weaving it anew. I never, in the course of my transition, was content to remain, for ever so short a time, confused and unsettled. When I had taken in any new idea, I could not rest till I had adjusted its relation to my old opinions, and ascertained exactly how far its effect ought to extend in modifying or superseding them.

1829年以后，我不再出席辯論學會。我已經(jīng)作了足夠多的演講，很高興去繼續(xù)我的自學和沉思，而且不需要立刻公布它們的結(jié)果。我發(fā)現(xiàn)自己以前學來的觀念結(jié)構(gòu)在很多新地方垮掉了，但我從來不允許它破碎，而總是忙著重新編織。在我思想轉(zhuǎn)變的過程中，我從來不會滿足于困惑和疑慮的狀態(tài)，即使這么短的時間也不行。在接受任何新觀點時，只有調(diào)整好它和我的舊觀點的關(guān)系，并確定它在修改或取代舊觀點的時候到底應該發(fā)揮多大的作用之后，我才能安心。

The conflicts which I had so often had to sustain in defending the theory of government laid down in Bentham's and my father's writings, and the acquaintance I had obtained with other schools of political thinking, made me aware of many things which that doctrine, professing to be a theory of government in general, ought to have made room for, and did not. But these things, as yet, remained with me rather as corrections to be made in applying the theory to practice, than as defects in the theory. I felt that politics could not be a science of specific experience; and that the accusations against the Benthamic theory of being a theory, of proceeding à priori by way of general reasoning, instead of Baconian experiment, shewed complete ignorance of Bacon's principles, and of the necessary conditions of experimental investigation. At this juncture appeared in the Edinburgh Review, Macaulay's famous attack on my father's Essay on Government. This gave me much to think about. I saw that Macaulay's conception of the logic of politics was erroneous; that he stood up for the empirical mode of treating political phenomena, against the philosophical; that even in physical science, his notion of philosophizing might have recognized Kepler4, but would have excluded Newton and Laplace5. But I could not help feeling, that though the tone was unbecoming (an error for which the writer, at a later period, made the most ample and honorable amends), there was truth in several of his strictures on my father's treatment of the subject; that my father's premises were really too narrow, and included but a small number of the general truths, on which, in politics, the important consequences depend. Identity of interest between the governing body and the community at large, is not, in any practical sense which can be attached to it, the only thing on which good government depends; neither can this identity of interest be secured by the mere conditions of election. I was not at all satisfied with the mode in which my father met the criticisms of Macaulay. He did not, as I thought he ought to have done, justify himself by saying, "I was not writing a scientific treatise on politics. I was writing an argument for parliamentary reform." He treated Macaulay's argument as simply irrational; an attack upon the reasoning faculty; an example of the saying of Hobbes, that when reason is against a man, a man will be against reason. This made me think that there was really something more fundamentally erroneous in my father's conception of philosophical method, as applicable to politics, than I had hitherto supposed there was. But I did not at first see clearly what the error might be. At last it flashed upon me all at once in the course of other studies. In the early part of 1830 I had begun to put on paper the ideas on Logic (chiefly on the distinctions among Terms, and the import of Propositions) which had been suggested and in part worked out in the morning conversations already spoken of. Having secured these thoughts from being lost, I pushed on into the other parts of the subject, to try whether I could do anything further towards clearing up the theory of Logic generally. I grappled at once with the problem of Induction, postponing that of Reasoning, on the ground that it is necessary to obtain premises before we can reason from them. Now, Induction is mainly a process for finding the causes of effects: and in attempting to fathom the mode of tracing causes and effects in physical science, I soon saw that in the more perfect of the sciences, we ascend, by generalization from particulars, to the tendencies of causes considered singly, and then reason downward from those separate tendencies, to the effect of the same causes when combined. I then asked myself, what is the ultimate analysis of this deductive process; the common theory of the syllogism evidently throwing no light upon it. My practice (learnt from Hobbes and my father) being to study abstract principles by means of the best concrete instances I could find, the Composition of Forces, in dynamics, occurred to me as the most complete example of the logical process I was investigating. On examining, accordingly, what the mind does when it applies the principle of the Composition of Forces, I found that it performs a simple act of addition. It adds the separate effect of the one force to the separate effect of the other, and puts down the sum of these separate effects as the joint effect. But is this a legitimate process? In dynamics, and in all the mathematical branches of physics, it is; but in some other cases, as in chemistry, it is not; and I then recollected that something not unlike this was pointed out as one of the distinctions between chemical and mechanical phenomena, in the introduction to that favorite of my boyhood, Thomson's System of Chemistry. This distinction at once made my mind clear as to what was perplexing me in respect to the philosophy of politics. I now saw, that a science is either deductive or experimental, according as, in the province it deals with, the effects of causes when conjoined, are or are not the sums of the effects which the same causes produce when separate. It followed that politics must be a deductive science. It thus appeared, that both Macaulay and my father were wrong; the one in assimilating the method of philosophizing in politics to the purely experimental method of chemistry; while the other, though right in adopting a deductive method, had made a wrong selection of one, having taken as the type of deduction, not the appropriate process, that of the deductive branches of natural philosophy, but the inappropriate one of pure geometry, which, not being a science of causation at all, does not require or admit of any summing-up of effects. A foundation was thus laid in my thoughts for the principal chapters of what I afterwards published On the Logic of the Moral Sciences; and my new position in respect to my old political creed, now became perfectly definite.

在為邊沁和我父親著作中的政府理論辯護時我經(jīng)常必須面對的一些沖突，以及對其他政治思想學派的了解，使我意識到那個自稱政府概論的學說本應騰出空間說明但卻沒有說明的很多事情。但是到那時為止，我仍然認為這些事情是把理論應用于實踐時要作的修正，而不是理論本身的缺陷。我覺得，政治學不應該是特定經(jīng)驗的科學。有人譴責功利主義理論不是44理論，譴責它用一般性的推理得出理論，而不用培根的實驗方法，這顯示了他們完全不了解培根原則和實證研究的必要條件。在這個當口上，《愛丁堡評論》上發(fā)表了麥考利攻擊我父親《論政府》的著名文章。這件事讓我思考了很多。我知道麥考利的政治學邏輯的觀念是錯誤的，他支持用經(jīng)驗主義的方法對待政治現(xiàn)象，反對用哲學方法；甚至在自然科學上，他的哲學探討觀念可能和開普勒的一致，但會排除牛頓和拉普拉斯。然而我還是感覺到，盡管他的語氣不得體（后來作者對這個錯誤作了非常充分、可敬的改正），但是他在這個問題上對父親的好幾處責難還是有道理的。父親的前提的確太狹窄了，只包含了政治學中的重要結(jié)論所依據(jù)的一小部分普遍真理。統(tǒng)治集團和整個社會的利益一致，在任何實際意義上，都不是善政依賴的唯一條件。這種利益一致也不能僅通過選舉制度得到確保。我根本不滿意父親處理麥考利的批評的方式。他沒有像我想象的那樣，通過說“我不是在寫一篇政治學的學術(shù)論文，我是在為議會改革作論證”來證明自己是正確的。他認為麥考利的論證完全不合理，是對推理才能的攻擊，也例證了霍布斯的一句名言：當理性無視人的時候，人也會無視理性。這讓我覺得，與我先前認為的相比，父親的哲學方法觀念應用在政治學上確實存在更根本性的錯誤。但是起初，我并沒有看清楚錯誤可能是什么。最后，我在學習其他東西的時候忽然想起來了。1830年初，我開始把邏輯學的一些觀點寫下來（主要是術(shù)語區(qū)分和命題意義），都是在之前提到的上午交談中提出來的，有一部分也是那時解決的。確保這些想法沒有丟失之后，我繼續(xù)努力探索這個主題的其他部分，試試看能不能更進一步全面地整理邏輯學的理論。我立刻抓住歸納法這個問題，暫時擱置推理問題，因為我們必須先獲得前提，然后才能從前提進行推理。目前，歸納法主要是尋找導致結(jié)果的原因的過程。在試圖弄清楚自然科學中追蹤原因和結(jié)果的方法時我很快發(fā)現(xiàn)，在更完善的科學中我們通過對特殊性的概括，形成了逐一考慮原因的趨勢，然后從那些單獨的可能性向下推論，找出同樣的原因結(jié)合起來引起的結(jié)果。然后，我問自己，這個推論過程的最終分析是什么？普通的三段論的理論顯然沒有給出解釋。我的做法（從霍布斯和我父親那里學的）是用我能找到的最好的具體例子，學習抽象的原理，我想起來動力學里的力的合成對我正在研究的邏輯過程來說是最完美的例子。因此，我去研究大腦在應用力的合成原理的時候究竟在做什么，結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)它只是在進行簡單的加法。它把一種力量的單獨作用加在另一種力量的單獨作用上。但是，這個過程合理嗎？在動力學以及物理學的所有精確分支里面，是合理的。但是在其他一些情況下，比如化學，就不合理了。那時我回想起來，在我小時候最喜歡的書——湯姆森《化學系統(tǒng)》的引言中，提到過跟這個類似的情況，并指出這是化學現(xiàn)象和機械現(xiàn)象的一個區(qū)別。這個區(qū)別立刻讓我弄清了政治哲學中讓我困惑的是什么東西。我現(xiàn)在明白了，一門科學要么是演繹的，要么是實證的，這取決于其所涉及的領(lǐng)域中，各種原因聯(lián)合造成的結(jié)果和分開造成結(jié)果的簡單相加是否相同。因此，政治學一定是門演繹的科學。這樣看來，麥考利和我父親都錯了。前者把政治學中哲學探討的方法等同于化學中純粹的實驗方法，而后者盡管采用演繹法是對的，但是選擇了錯誤的演繹法，沒有采用適當?shù)淖匀徽軐W的演繹法分支，而是選擇不適當?shù)募兇鈳缀螌W的演繹法分支，這根本就不是因果關(guān)系的科學，不需要也不容許對結(jié)果作任何概括。這為我后來出版的《論倫理學的邏輯》一書中的主要章節(jié)打下了思想基礎(chǔ)。我對自己的舊政治信條的新立場現(xiàn)在也非常明確了。

If I am asked what system of political philosophy I substituted for that which, as a philosophy, I had abandoned, I answer, No system: only a conviction that the true system was something much more complex and many-sided than I had previously had any idea of, and that its office was to supply, not a set of model institutions, but principles from which the institutions suitable to any given circumstances might be deduced. The influences of European, that is to say, Continental, thought, and especially those of the reaction of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth, were now streaming in upon me. They came from various quarters: from the writings of Coleridge, which I had begun to read with interest even before the change in my opinions; from the Coleridgians with whom I was in personal intercourse; from what I had read of Goethe; from Carlyle's early articles in the Edinburgh and Foreign Reviews, though for a long time I saw nothing in these (as my father saw nothing in them to the last) but insane rhapsody. From these sources, and from the acquaintance I kept up with the French literature of the time, I derived, among other ideas which the general turning upside down of the opinions of European thinkers had brought uppermost, these in particular: That the human mind has a certain order of possible progress, in which some things must precede others, an order which governments and public instructors can modify to some, but not to an unlimited extent: That all questions of political institutions are relative, not absolute, and that different stages of human progress not only will have, but ought to have, different institutions: that government is always either in the hands, or passing into the hands, of whatever is the strongest power in society, and that what this power is, does not depend on institutions, but institutions on it: that any general theory or philosophy of politics supposes a previous theory of human progress, and that this is the same thing with a philosophy of history. These opinions, true in the main, were held in an exaggerated and violent manner by the thinkers with whom I was now most accustomed to compare notes, and who, as usual with a reaction, ignored that half of the truth which the thinkers of the eighteenth century saw. But though, at one period of my progress, I for some time undervalued that great century, I never joined in the reaction against it, but kept as firm hold of one side of the truth as I took of the other. The fight between the nineteenth century and the eighteenth always reminded me of the battle about the shield, one side of which was white and the other black. I marvelled at the blind rage with which the combatants rushed against one another. I applied to them, and to Coleridge himself, many of Coleridge's sayings about half truths; and Goethe's device, "many-sidedness," was one which I would most willingly, at this period, have taken for mine.

如果問我用哪種政治哲學體系代替了已經(jīng)放棄的哲學，我的回答是沒有體系，只是一個信念，相信真正的體系遠比我之前知道的更復雜，更多面，它的職責在于提供原則，從這些原則中可以推導出適合任何特定環(huán)境的制度，而不是提供一套模范制度。歐洲思想的影響，更確切地說是歐洲大陸思想的影響，尤其是那些19世紀反抗18世紀的思想，現(xiàn)在正在向我涌過來。這些思想來自各個方向：柯爾律治，我甚至在信念改變前就開始興致勃勃地讀他的作品了；與我有私交的柯爾律治派的人；我讀過的歌德的作品；卡萊爾在《愛丁堡評論》和《外國評論》上的早期文章，盡管很長時間以來，我在這些文章中除了愚蠢的狂言什么都沒看到（我父親到最后也什么都沒看到）。從這些思想來源以及當時我一直熟讀的法國文學中，我得出一些看法，它們的重要性由于歐洲思想家的觀點被完全顛倒而顯現(xiàn)出來，尤其是以下這些：人類大腦對可能的進步有種秩序，在這種秩序之內(nèi)，有些事情必須先于另一些事情，這種秩序可以由政府和公眾指導人員進行一定的修改，但修改是有限度的。政治體制的所有問題都是相對的，不是絕對的，人類進步的不同階段不僅會有而且應該有不同的體制。政府要么就在社會上最強大的力量手里，要么就會傳遞到它的手里，至于那個力量是什么，不取決于制度，制度反而要取決于它。任何廣義的政治理論或政治哲學都假定先前有一個人類進步的理論，這和歷史哲學是一樣的。這些大體上正確的觀點被現(xiàn)在經(jīng)常和我交換意見的思想家們以夸張、曲解的方式所持有，并且他們像一般的保守派一樣，忽視了18世紀的思想家看到的那一半事實。盡管我在進步的某段時期也有一陣子低估了那個偉大的世紀，但是我從來沒有參與過反對它，而是像對待真理的那一面一樣，緊緊堅持真理的這一面。19世紀和18世紀之間的斗爭讓我想起盾牌的戰(zhàn)爭，它一面是黑的，一面是白的。我驚訝于戰(zhàn)士們互相猛攻時所帶有的盲目憤怒。我把柯爾律治很多關(guān)于半真理的名言用在他們身上，以及柯爾律治本人身上。我此時最愿意把歌德的“多面性”策略當成我自己的策略。

The writers by whom, more than by any others, a new mode of political thinking was brought home to me, were those of the St. Simonian school in France. In 1829 and 1830 I became acquainted with some of their writings. They were then only in the earlier stages of their speculations. They had not yet dressed out their philosophy as a religion, nor had they organized their scheme of Socialism. They were just beginning to question the principle of hereditary property. I was by no means prepared to go with them even this length; but I was greatly struck with the connected view which they for the first time presented to me, of the natural order of human progress; and especially with their division of all history into organic periods and critical periods. During the organic periods (they said) mankind accept with firm conviction some positive creed, claiming jurisdiction over all their actions, and containing more or less of truth and adaptation to the needs of humanity. Under its influence they make all the progress compatible with the creed, and finally outgrow it; when a period follows of criticism and negation, in which mankind lose their old convictions without acquiring any new ones, of a general or authoritative character, except the conviction that the old are false. The period of Greek and Roman polytheism, so long as really believed in by instructed Greeks and Romans, was an organic period, succeeded by the critical or sceptical period of the Greek philosophers. Another organic period came in with Christianity. The corresponding critical period began with the Reformation6, has lasted ever since, still lasts, and cannot altogether cease until a new organic period has been inaugurated by the triumph of a yet more advanced creed. These ideas, I knew, were not peculiar to the St. Simonians; on the contrary, they were the general property of Europe, or at least of Germany and France, but they had never, to my knowledge, been so completely systematized as by these writers, nor the distinguishing characteristics of a critical period so powerfully set forth; for I was not then acquainted with Fichte7's Lectures on The Characteristics of the Present Age. In Carlyle, indeed, I found bitter denunciations of an "age of unbelief," and of the present age as such, which I, like most people at that time, supposed to be passionate protests in favour of the old modes of belief. But all that was true in these denunciations, I thought that I found more calmly and philosophically stated by the St. Simonians. Among their publications, too, there was one which seemed to me far superior to the rest; in which the general idea was matured into something much more definite and instructive. This was an early work of Auguste Comte8, who then called himself, and even announced himself in the title-page as, a pupil of Saint Simon. In this tract M. Comte first put forth the doctrine, which he afterwards so copiously illustrated, of the natural succession of three stages in every department of human knowledge: first, the theological, next the metaphysical, and lastly, the positive stage; and contended, that social science must be subject to the same law; that the feudal and Catholic system was the concluding phase of the theological state of the social science, Protestantism the commencement, and the doctrines of the French Revolution the consummation, of the metaphysical; and that its positive state was yet to come. This doctrine harmonized well with my existing notions, to which it seemed to give a scientific shape. I already regarded the methods of physical science as the proper models for political. But the chief benefit which I derived at this time from the trains of thought suggested by the St. Simonians and by Comte, was, that I obtained a clearer conception than ever before of the peculiarities of an era of transition in opinion, and ceased to mistake the moral and intellectual characteristics of such an era, for the normal attributes of humanity. I looked forward, through the present age of loud disputes but generally weak convictions, to a future which shall unite the best qualities of the critical with the best qualities of the organic periods: unchecked liberty of thought, unbounded freedom of individual action in all modes not hurtful to others; but also, convictions as to what is right and wrong, useful and pernicious, deeply engraven on the feelings by early education and general unanimity of sentiment, and so firmly grounded in reason and in the true exigencies of life, that they shall not, like all former and present creeds, religious, ethical, and political, require to be periodically thrown off and replaced by others.

與其他作家相比，最能使我認識到一個新政治思考方式的作家，是法國的圣西門學派。1829年和1830年，我了解了他們的一些作品。當時，他們還處于思索的初期階段。他們還沒有把自己的哲學裝扮成一種信仰，也沒有構(gòu)思社會主義方案。他們只是剛開始質(zhì)疑世襲財產(chǎn)的原則。我絕對沒有準備追隨他們，即便只是到這種程度。但是他們第一次呈現(xiàn)給我人類進步自然順序的連貫觀點，給我留下了深刻的印象。尤其是他們把所有歷史劃分成建制時代和批判時代。在建制時代，（他們說）人類深信不疑地接受一些積極的信條，為他們的所有活動尋求權(quán)力，并或多或少地容納真理和調(diào)整以適應人類的需求。在這一信條的影響下，他們實現(xiàn)了和信條兼容的所有進步，并最終舍棄了它。這時，另一個充滿批判和否定的時代來臨了，在這個時代，人們失去了他們舊的信念，而沒有獲得任何新的、全面的或權(quán)威的信念，只是堅信舊的是錯的。希臘和羅馬多神教的時代，在受過教育的希臘和羅馬人真正信仰它的時間內(nèi)是個建制時代，接下來是希臘哲學家的批判或懷疑時代。另一個建制時代是應基督教而生的。相應的批判時代從宗教改革開始，從那時起一直持續(xù)到現(xiàn)在，在一個新的建制時代以更先進的信條取勝開始之前，這一時代不會完全停止。我知道這些觀點并非獨屬于圣西門學派；相反，它們是整個歐洲的財富，或者至少是德國和法國的。但是就我所知，從來沒有人像這些作家那樣把它們?nèi)嫦到y(tǒng)化，也沒有人像他們一樣強有力地提出批判時代的顯著特征。因為那時，我還沒讀過菲希特的演說集《當代特征》。我確實發(fā)現(xiàn)卡萊爾激烈地譴責“無信仰的時代”和如今這樣一個時代，我和當時的大多數(shù)人一樣，認為這一時代是支持舊的信仰模式激昂的抗議。但是這些譴責中所有正確的東西，我認為圣西門學派的人陳述得更冷靜，更有哲理性。在他們的出版物中，我也發(fā)現(xiàn)有一本遠比其他的更出眾。在這本書里面，總體的觀點被展開得更明確，更有啟發(fā)性。這就是奧古斯特·孔德早期的一個作品，他當時稱自己是圣西門的弟子，甚至在扉頁上公開這樣宣布。在這個小冊子里，孔德先生首次提出了他后來加以詳細闡述的學說，即人類知識的每個領(lǐng)域都有三個階段的自然演替——首先是神學的，接下來是形而上學的，最后是實證的階段。他主張社會科學也必須受相同規(guī)律的支配。封建制度和天主教制度是社會科學神學狀態(tài)的最后階段，新教是形而上學階段的開始，法國大革命的理論是它的結(jié)束，但實證階段尚未到來。這個學說和我現(xiàn)有的觀念很一致，似乎還顯示出了科學性。我已經(jīng)認為自然科學的方法是政治學的合適模型。但是，這時我從圣西門學派和孔德提出的一連串思考中得到的主要益處是，我比以往任何時候都更清楚地了解了一個過渡時代的特征，不再把這樣一個時代的道德和思維特征誤認為是人類的正常屬性。透過當代喧嘩的爭論和通常很軟弱的信念，我期望未來會結(jié)合批判時代和建制時代最好的特性：思想上無拘無束的自由，以及在不損害別人的情況下，個人所有行為方式的極大自由。但是，關(guān)于什么是對的，什么是錯的，什么是有益的，以及什么是有害的信念，已經(jīng)通過早期教育和一致的情感深深地銘刻在了感覺之上，并穩(wěn)固地植根于理智和人生的真正需求中，它們不會像以前和現(xiàn)在所有的宗教、倫理和政治信條一樣，需要定期地被拋棄和取而代之。

M. Comte soon left the St. Simonians, and I lost sight of him and his writings for a number of years. But the St. Simonians I continued to cultivate. I was kept au courant of their progress by one of their most enthusiastic disciples, M. Gustave d'Eichthal, who about that time passed a considerable interval in England. I was introduced to their chiefs, Bazard and Enfantin, in 1830; and as long as their public teachings and proselytism continued, I read nearly everything they wrote. Their criticism on the common doctrines of Liberalism seemed to me full of important truth; and it was partly by their writings that my eyes were opened to the very limited and temporary value of the old political economy, which assumes private property and inheritance as indefeasible facts, and freedom of production and exchange as the dernier mot of social improvement. The scheme gradually unfolded by the St. Simonians, under which the labour and capital of society would be managed for the general account of the community, every individual being required to take a share of labour, either as thinker, teacher, artist, or producer, all being classed according to their capacity, and remunerated according to their works, appeared to me a far superior description of Socialism to Owen's. Their aim seemed to me desirable and rational, however their means might be inefficacious; and though I neither believed in the practicability, nor in the beneficial operation of their social machinery, I felt that the proclamation of such an ideal of human society could not but tend to give a beneficial direction to the efforts of others to bring society, as at present constituted, nearer to some ideal standard. I honoured them most of all for what they have been most cried down for—the boldness and freedom from prejudice with which they treated the subject of family, the most important of any, and needing more fundamental alterations than remain to be made in any other great social institution, but on which scarcely any reformer has the courage to touch. In proclaiming the perfect equality of men and women, and an entirely new order of things in regard to their relations with one another, the St. Simonians, in common with Owen and Fourier, have entitled themselves to the grateful remembrance of future generations.

孔德先生很快離開了圣西門學派，有許多年我都沒有看到他和他的作品。但是我繼續(xù)與圣西門學派的人交朋友。他們的一個最熱情的擁護者，古斯塔夫·艾希塔爾先生，一直在告知我他們的進展，他當時在英國呆了挺長一段時間。1830年，他把我介紹給他們的領(lǐng)袖巴扎爾和昂方坦。只要他們持續(xù)公開發(fā)表教義，繼續(xù)宣傳改變宗教信仰，我就會讀他們寫的幾乎所有東西。在我看來，他們對自由主義普遍理論的批評有很多是重要的實情。部分由于他們的作品，我注意到舊的政治經(jīng)濟學價值非常有限，只是暫時性的，它把私有制和繼承看成不能廢止的事實，把生產(chǎn)和交換自由看成社會進步的靈丹妙藥。圣西門學派逐漸闡明的方案是這樣的：社會上的勞動力和資本的管理將著眼于社會的整體利益，每一個人都必須分擔一定量的勞動，不管是思想家、教師、藝術(shù)家，還是生產(chǎn)者，都按照他們的能力分類，按照勞動量分發(fā)報酬，在我看來這個方案遠比歐文對社會主義的描述更出眾。在我看來，他們的目標可取，合理，盡管他們的方法可能不靈。雖然我既不相信他們的社會機器的實用性，也不相信它能有利地運轉(zhuǎn)，但我覺得，宣布這樣一個理想的人類社會往往會為努力促使目前這樣一種構(gòu)建的社會更接近某種理想標準的人指明一個有益的方向。我最尊敬他們的地方，正是別人貶低他們的地方——勇敢、毫無偏見地對待家庭問題，家庭問題是最重要的問題，在所有偉大的社會制度中都需要比目前有更多重大的改變，但是幾乎沒有任何改革家敢于觸碰這個問題。在宣布男女完全平等，宣布他們彼此之間關(guān)系的全新秩序上，圣西門學派和歐文、傅立葉一樣，有資格被后人感激和記住。

In giving an account of this period of my life, I have only specified such of my new impressions as appeared to me, both at the time and since, to be a kind of turning points, marking a definite progress in my mode of thought. But these few selected points give a very insufficient idea of the quantity of thinking which I carried on respecting a host of subjects during these years of transition. Much of this, it is true, consisted in rediscovering things known to all the world, which I had previously disbelieved, or disregarded. But the rediscovery was to me a discovery, giving me plenary possession of the truths, not as traditional platitudes, but fresh from their source: and it seldom failed to place them in some new light, by which they were reconciled with, and seemed to confirm while they modified, the truths less generally known which lay in my early opinions, and in no essential part of which I at any time wavered. All my new thinking only laid the foundation of these more deeply and strongly, while it often removed misapprehension and confusion of ideas which had perverted their effect. For example, during the later returns of my dejection, the doctrine of what is called Philosophical Necessity weighed on my existence like an incubus. I felt as if I was scientifically proved to be the helpless slave of antecedent circumstances; as if my character and that of all others had been formed for us by agencies beyond our control, and was wholly out of our own power. I often said to myself, what a relief it would be if I could disbelieve the doctrine of the formation of character by circumstances; and remembering the wish of Fox respecting the doctrine of resistance to governments, that it might never be forgotten by kings, nor remembered by subjects, I said that it would be a blessing if the doctrine of necessity could be believed by all quoad the characters of others, and disbelieved in regard to their own. I pondered painfully on the subject, till gradually I saw light through it. I perceived, that the word Necessity, as a name for the doctrine of Cause and Effect applied to human action, carried with it a misleading association; and that this ssociation was the operative force in the depressing and paralysing influence which I had experienced: I saw that though our character is formed by circumstances, our own desires can do much to shape those circumstances; and that what is really inspiriting and ennobling in the doctrine of freewill, is the conviction that we have real power over the formation of our own character; that our will, by influencing some of our circumstances, can modify our future habits or capabilities of willing. All this was entirely consistent with the doctrine of circumstances, or rather, was that doctrine itself, properly understood. From that time I drew in my own mind, a clear distinction between the doctrine of circumstances, and Fatalism; discarding altogether the misleading word Necessity. The theory, which I now for the first time rightly apprehended, ceased altogether to be discouraging, and besides the relief to my spirits, I no longer suffered under the burthen, so heavy to one who aims at being a reformer in opinions, of thinking one doctrine true, and the contrary doctrine morally beneficial. The train of thought which had extricated me from this dilemma, seemed to me, in after years, fitted to render a similar service to others; and it now forms the chapter on Liberty and Necessity in the concluding Book of my System of Logic.

敘述我這段時間的生活的時候，我只詳細說明了一些新感想，在那以后，這些感想在我看來都是我思考方式確切進步的轉(zhuǎn)折點。但是，在那幾年過渡期里，我思考了許多問題，僅選擇這么幾點，對我的思考量說明得非常不充分。確實，這些思考的很大一部分在于重新發(fā)現(xiàn)眾所周知的東西，而它們也是我之前懷疑或者忽略的東西。但是，這種重新發(fā)現(xiàn)對我來說是種新發(fā)現(xiàn)，讓我完整地擁有真理，不是傳統(tǒng)的陳腔濫調(diào)，而是從頭到尾全新的真理。而且，這種發(fā)現(xiàn)幾乎總能給真理帶來一些新的角度，通過這種角度，新真理與我早期觀念中不廣為人知的真理達成一致，并似乎在修改它們的時候肯定了它們，而對這些早期觀念中的真理的重要部分，我在任何時候都沒動搖過。我所有的新思考只是把這些真理的基礎(chǔ)打得更深，更牢固，同時還經(jīng)常移除貶低它們作用的觀點里的誤會和混亂。例如，后來在我的沮喪幾次復發(fā)時，所謂的哲學必然性的理論像夢魘一樣壓在我的生活中。我覺得自己好像被科學地證明了就是先前環(huán)境下無助的奴隸；好像我和其他所有人的性格都是我們控制不了的力量塑造的，完全在我們的掌控能力之外。我經(jīng)常對自己說，如果我能不相信環(huán)境決定性格這一學說的話，將是多么大的安慰啊。我想起福克斯對抵抗政府學說的愿望，即希望它永遠不要被國王忘記，也不要被臣民記住，我說如果所有人都相信必然性理論只適用于別人的性格，而不相信也適用于他們自己的性格的話，將是件幸事。我苦苦思索這個問題，終于慢慢從里面看到了眉目。我意識到，必然性這個詞，作為應用于人類行為上因果學說的名稱，帶有使人誤解的聯(lián)想，這個聯(lián)想就是我以前經(jīng)歷的沮喪和無助的原因。我明白了，盡管我們的性格是環(huán)境決定的，但是我們自身的渴望能在很大程度上影響那些環(huán)境。自由意志學說里真正令人振奮和崇高的地方，在于堅信在自己性格的塑造上我們有真正的控制力。堅信通過影響周圍的一些環(huán)境，我們的意志能改變我們未來的習慣或能力。所有這一切都和環(huán)境學說完全一致，或者說就是環(huán)境學說，只是這次得到了正確的理解。從那時起，我在自己腦海里清晰地區(qū)分了環(huán)境學說和宿命論；完全拋棄了必要性這個易誤解的詞。我現(xiàn)在第一次正確理解了這個理論，它不再令人沮喪，除了我的精神痛苦減輕了之外，我也不用再承受認為一個學說是正確的，而相反的學說也對精神有益這個重擔之苦，這個擔子對于一個志在成為思想改革家的人來說是那么的沉重。把我從這個兩難困境中解脫出來的思路，在我看來，在之后的那些年，也適合為其他人提供相似的服務。現(xiàn)在，它成了我的《邏輯學體系》尾卷中“論自由和必然性”那一章。

Again, in politics, though I no longer accepted the doctrine of the Essay on Government as a scientific theory; though I ceased to consider representative democracy as an absolute principle, and regarded it as a question of time, place, and circumstance; though I now looked upon the choice of political institutions as a moral and educational question more than one of material interests, thinking that it ought to be decided mainly by the consideration, what great improvement in life and culture stands next in order for the people concerned, as the condition of their further progress, and what institutions are most likely to promote that; nevertheless, this change in the premises of my political philosophy did not alter my practical political creed as to the requirements of my own time and country. I was as much as ever a Radical and Democrat for Europe, and especially for England. I thought the predominance of the aristocratic classes, the noble and the rich, in the English Constitution, an evil worth any struggle to get rid of; not on account of taxes, or any such comparatively small inconvenience, but as the great demoralizing agency in the country. Demoralizing, first, because it made the conduct of the Government an example of gross public immorality, through the predominance of private over public interests in the State, and the abuse of the powers of legislation for the advantage of classes. Secondly, and in a still greater degree, because the respect of the multitude always attaching itself principally to that which, in the existing state of society, is the chief passport to power; and under English institutions, riches, hereditary or acquired, being the almost exclusive source of political importance; riches, and the signs of riches, were almost the only things really respected, and the life of the people was mainly devoted to the pursuit of them. I thought, that while the higher and richer classes held the power of government, the instruction and improvement of the mass of the people were contrary to the self-interest of those classes, because tending to render the people more powerful for throwing off the yoke: but if the democracy obtained a large, and perhaps the principal share, in the governing power, it would become the interest of the opulent classes to promote their education, in order to ward off really mischievous errors, and especially those which would lead to unjust violations of property. On these grounds I was not only as ardent as ever for democratic institutions, but earnestly hoped that Owenite, St. Simonian, and all other anti-property doctrines might spread widely among the poorer classes; not that I thought those doctrines true, or desired that they should be acted on, but in order that the higher classes might be made to see that they had more to fear from the poor when uneducated, than when educated.

此外，在政治學上，盡管我不再承認《論政府》中的學說是個科學的理論；盡管我不再認為代議制民主是完美的原則，而把它看成時間、地點和環(huán)境的問題；盡管我現(xiàn)在更把政治制度的選擇看作是道德和教育的問題，而不僅是物質(zhì)利益的問題，我認為它應該主要由以下考慮決定，即生活和文化中的何種重大進步是相關(guān)的人們進一步發(fā)展的條件，什么制度最有可能促進這種發(fā)展。然而，我的政治哲學前提的變化，并沒有改變我符合時代和國家需要的實際政治信念。我仍然是個激進分子和民主主義者，對歐洲來說如此，對英國尤是如此。我認為，在英國憲法中，貴族階層、貴族和富人的優(yōu)勢是值得盡一切努力擺脫的罪惡。不是由于稅金或任何類似的小麻煩，而是因為它是這個國家巨大的腐化力量。說它腐化，首先是因為，它把私人利益置于國家的公共利益之上，濫用立法權(quán)力為統(tǒng)治階級謀利益，從而使政府行為變成低級的公共不道德的樣板。其次，在更大程度上是因為大眾的尊敬主要縛在了社會當時狀態(tài)下的權(quán)力通行證上。在英國的制度下，財富——不管是世襲的還是后來獲得的——幾乎是政治影響力的唯一源泉。財富以及財富的標志，幾乎是唯一真正受人尊敬的東西，也是人們努力追求的主要目標。我想，只要上流階層和富有階層掌握政府權(quán)力，教育民眾和改善他們的生活就與其私有利益相悖，因為這樣容易使人們更有力量擺脫壓迫。但是，如果民主政治獲得較大的，也許是主要的控制力，那么富裕階層就可能會有興趣促進他們的教育，以期避開真正麻煩的錯誤，尤其是那些會導致不公平地侵害財產(chǎn)的錯誤。由于這些原因，我不僅一如既往地熱心擁護民主的制度，還真心希望歐文主義者、圣西門學派和所有反財產(chǎn)的學說能夠在貧窮階層中廣泛傳播。不是說我認為這些學說正確，或者希望人們按照它們行動，而是這樣可能會讓上流社會看到，沒受過教育的窮人比受過教育的更值得害怕。

In this frame of mind the French Revolution of July9 found me. It roused my utmost enthusiasm, and gave me, as it were, a new existence. I went at once to Paris, was introduced to Lafayette10, and laid the groundwork of the intercourse I afterwards kept up with several of the active chiefs of the extreme popular party. After my return I entered warmly, as a writer, into the political discussions of the time; which soon became still more exciting, by the coming in of Lord Grey11's Ministry, and the proposing of the Reform Bill. For the next few years I wrote copiously in newspapers. It was about this time that Fonblanque, who had for some time written the political articles in the Examiner, became the proprietor and editor of the paper. It is not forgotten with what verve and talent, as well as fine wit, he carried it on, during the whole period of Lord Grey's Ministry, and what importance it assumed as the principal representative, in the newspaper press, of Radical opinions. The distinguishing character of the paper was given to it entirely by his own articles, which formed at least three-fourths of all the original writing contained in it: but of the remaining fourth I contributed during those years a much larger share than any one else. I wrote nearly all the articles on French subjects, including a weekly summary of French politics, often extending to considerable length; together with many leading articles on general politics, commercial and financial legislation, and any miscellaneous subjects in which I felt interested, and which were suitable to the paper, including occasional reviews of books. Mere newspaper articles on the occurrences or questions of the moment, gave no opportunity for the development of any general mode of thought; but I attempted, in the beginning of 1831, to embody in a series of articles, headed "The Spirit of the Age," some of my new opinions, and especially to point out in the character of the present age, the anomalies and evils characteristic of the transition from a system of opinions which had worn out, to another only in process of being formed. These articles were, I fancy, lumbering in style, and not lively or striking enough to be at any time acceptable to newspaper readers; but had they been far more attractive, still, at that particular moment, when great political changes were impending, and engrossing all minds, these discussions were ill-timed, and missed fire altogether. The only effect which I know to have been produced by them, was that Carlyle, then living in a secluded part of Scotland, read them in his solitude, and saying to himself (as he afterwards told me) "Here is a new Mystic," inquired on coming to London that autumn respecting their authorship; an inquiry which was the immediate cause of our becoming personally acquainted.

法國七月革命時我的心境就是這樣的。它激起了我最大的熱情，可以說給了我一個新的生命。我立刻去了巴黎，被介紹給拉斐德，為我后來與極端民主黨派好幾個活躍的領(lǐng)袖保持交往打下了基礎(chǔ)?；貋硪院?，我以作家身份，熱心地加入了當時的政治討論。由于格雷勛爵內(nèi)閣的組成以及《改革法案》的提議，討論很快變得更加令人興奮。接下來幾年，我為報紙寫了大量的文章。差不多這時，曾經(jīng)有一段時間為《檢察報》寫政論的方布蘭克，成了這個報紙的所有者和主編。人們到現(xiàn)在也不會忘記，在格雷勛爵內(nèi)閣期間，方布蘭克是帶著什么樣的魄力和才干以及杰出的智慧堅持辦報的，也不會忘記《檢察報》作為激進主義觀點的主要代表在報界獲得的重要性。這個報紙出色的特質(zhì)全都是方布蘭克自己的文章所賦予的，幾乎占了該報所有原創(chuàng)作品的四分之三。但是另外的四分之一，我那些年的投稿比其他任何人都多。有關(guān)法國問題的所有文章幾乎都是我寫的，包括每周一次的法國政治總覽，這些文章經(jīng)常寫得很長。還有很多社論，評論一般政治、商業(yè)和財政立法以及我感興趣又適合報紙刊登的各種各樣的主題，包括偶爾的書評。僅僅就當時的事件和問題寫報紙文章，提供不了發(fā)展任何總體思考方式的機會。但是在1831年初，我嘗試在以《時代的精神》為題的一系列文章中，具體地表達我的一些新觀點，尤其是要指出當代特征中的畸形和罪惡，它們是從一個已經(jīng)破敗的觀念體系過渡到另一個尚在形成中體系時的顯著特征。我認為這些文章風格拖沓，不夠活潑鮮明，在任何時候都難讓報紙的讀者接受。但是，即便他們更有吸引力，這些討論的時機仍然不對，完全達不到預想的效果，因為在那個特殊時刻，偉大的政治變革即將發(fā)生，吸引了所有人的全部注意力。我知道它們只對卡萊爾產(chǎn)生了影響，他當時住在蘇格蘭一個偏僻的地方，獨自一人讀了這些文章后，他對自己說（正如之后他告訴我的那樣）“這是個新神秘主義者”，那年秋天去倫敦的時候，他就打聽它們的作者是誰。這次打聽是我們私下里成為好朋友的直接原因。

I have already mentioned Carlyle's earlier writings as one of the channels through which I received the influences which enlarged my early narrow creed; but I do not think that those writings, by themselves, would ever have had any effect on my opinions. What truths they contained, though of the very kind which I was already receiving from other quarters, were presented in a form and vesture less suited than any other to give them access to a mind trained as mine had been. They seemed a haze of poetry and German metaphysics, in which almost the only clear thing was a strong animosity to most of the opinions which were the basis of my mode of thought; religious scepticism, utilitarianism, the doctrine of circumstances, and the attaching any importance to democracy, logic, or political economy. Instead of my having been taught anything, in the first instance, by Carlyle, it was only in proportion as I came to see the same truths, through media more suited to my mental constitution, that I recognized them in his writings. Then, indeed, the wonderful power with which he put them forth made a deep impression upon me, and I was during a long period one of his most fervent admirers; but the good his writings did me, was not as philosophy to instruct, but as poetry to animate. Even at the time when our acquaintance commenced, I was not sufficiently advanced in my new modes of thought, to appreciate him fully; a proof of which is, that on his shewing me the manuscript of Sartor Resartus, his best and greatest work, which he had just then finished, I made little of it; though when it came out about two years afterwards in Fraser's Magazine, I read it with enthusiastic admiration and the keenest delight. I did not seek and cultivate Carlyle less on account of the fundamental differences in our philosophy. He soon found out that I was not "another mystic," and when for the sake of my own integrity I wrote to him a distinct profession of all those of my opinions which I knew he most disliked, he replied that the chief difference between us was that I "was as yet consciously nothing of a mystic." I do not know at what period he gave up the expectation that I was destined to become one; but though both his and my opinions underwent in subsequent years considerable changes, we never approached much nearer to each other's modes of thought than we were in the first years of our acquaintance. I did not, however, deem myself a competent judge of Carlyle. I felt that he was a poet, and that I was not; that he was a man of intuition, which I was not; and that as such, he not only saw many things long before me, which I could only when they were pointed out to me, hobble after and prove, but that it was highly probable he could see many things which were not visible to me even after they were pointed out. I knew that I could not see round him, and could never be certain that I saw over him; and I never presumed to judge him with any definiteness, until he was interpreted to me by one greatly the superior of us both—who was more a poet than he, and more a thinker than I—whose own mind and nature included his, and infinitely more.

我已經(jīng)提到過，卡萊爾的早期作品是促使我擴展早先狹隘信念的因素之一。但是我認為，單憑那些著作永遠也不會對我的觀點有任何影響。作品中包含的真理，盡管跟我從其他地方接受到的一樣，但是表現(xiàn)形式比其他真理都更不適合進入一個受過我那種訓練的大腦。它們似乎是模糊的詩歌和德國式的形而上學，里面唯一清晰的東西就是對作為我思考方式基礎(chǔ)的大部分觀點的強烈敵視。如宗教懷疑主義、功利主義、環(huán)境學說，以及對民主、邏輯學或政治經(jīng)濟學的任何重視。起初，我并沒有從卡萊爾那里學到任何東西，只是隨著我通過更適合我心理框架的媒介看到相同的真理時，我才從他的著作中辨別出這些真理。他提出真理時所帶有的奇妙力量當時確實給我留下了深刻的印象，在很長一段時間以來，我一直是他最熱烈的崇拜者之一。但是，他的作品給我的益處，不是作為哲學教導我，而是作為詩歌激勵了我。即使到我們開始認識的時候，我的新思考方式也還不夠先進，無法充分欣賞他的作品。一個證據(jù)就是他給我看他剛剛完成的最好、最偉大的作品《衣裳哲學》的手稿時，我還讀不懂。然而，差不多兩年后，它發(fā)表在了《弗雷澤雜志》上，我再讀的時候就帶著熱烈的崇拜和最強烈的喜悅了。我們觀點中的重大分歧并未阻止我追隨卡萊爾，與他交朋友。他很快發(fā)現(xiàn)，我并不是“另一個神秘主義者”，為了表示自己的誠意，我給他寫了封信，清楚地表明了我所有他最不喜歡的觀點，他回復說，我們之間的主要區(qū)別在于，我“至今還不是自覺的神秘主義者”。我不知道他到什么時候不再期盼我注定會成為神秘主義者。但是，盡管我們兩個人的觀點在接下來的幾年里都經(jīng)歷了很大的變化，我們的思考方式并沒比我們認識的最初幾年更靠近一些。然而，我認為自己不能勝任評價卡萊爾的工作。我覺得他是個詩人，而我不是；他是個富有直覺的人，而我不是。同樣地，他不僅能在我之前很久就明白很多東西，而我只能在別人把它們指出后才蹣跚跟隨并去證明，而且他能明白的很多東西很可能即使在被指出來后，我仍然不明白。我知道我無法了解他在想什么，也永遠不能肯定能看透他。我從不相信自己能明確地評價他，除非有一個遠比我們兩人都更出眾的人給我解釋以后才可以——那個人比他更有詩才，比我更有思想——這個人在思想和性情上要遠遠比他更豐富。

Among the persons of intellect whom I had known of old, the one with whom I had now most points of agreement was the elder Austin. I have mentioned that he always set himself in opposition to our early sectarianism; and latterly he had, like myself, come under new influences. Having been appointed Professor of Jurisprudence in the London University (now University College), he had lived for some time at Bonn to study for his Lectures; and the influences of German literature and of the German character and state of society had made a very perceptible change in his views of life. His personal disposition was much softened; he was less militant and polemic; his tastes had begun to turn themselves towards the poetic and contemplative. He attached much less importance than formerly to outward changes; unless accompanied by a better cultivation of the inward nature. He had a strong distaste for the general meanness of English life, the absence of enlarged thoughts and unselfish desires, the low objects on which the faculties of all classes of the English are intent. Even the kind of public interests which Englishmen care for, he held in very little esteem. He thought that there was more practical good government, and (which is true enough) infinitely more care for the education and mental improvement of all ranks of the people, under the Prussian monarchy, than under the English representative government: and he held, with the French Economists, that the real security for good government is "un peuple éclairé," which is not always the fruit of popular institutions, and which if it could be had without them, would do their work better than they. Though he approved of the Reform Bill, he predicted, what in fact occurred, that it would not produce the great immediate improvements in government, which many expected from it. The men, he said, who could do these great things, did not exist in the country. There were many points of sympathy between him and me, both in the new opinions he had adopted and in the old ones which he retained. Like me, he never ceased to be an utilitarian, and with all his love of the Germans, and enjoyment of their literature, never became in the smallest degree reconciled to the innate-principle metaphysics. He cultivated more and more a kind of German religion, a religion of poetry and feeling with little, if anything of positive dogma; while, in politics (and here it was that I most differed with him) he acquired an indifference, bordering on contempt, for the progress of popular institutions: though he rejoiced in that of Socialism, as the most effectual means of compelling the powerful classes to educate the people, and to impress on them the only real means of permanently improving their material condition, a limitation of their numbers. Neither was he, at this time, fundamentally opposed to Socialism in itself as an ultimate result of improvement. He professed great disrespect for what he called "the universal principles of human nature of the political economists," and insisted on the evidence which history and daily experience afford of the "extraordinary pliability of human nature" (a phrase which I have somewhere borrowed from him); nor did he think it possible to set any positive bounds to the moral capabilities which might unfold themselves in mankind, under an enlightened direction of social and educational influences. Whether he retained all these opinions to the end of life I know not. Certainly the modes of thinking of his later years and especially of his last publication were much more Tory in their general character, than those which he held at this time.

在我很久以前就認識的有識之士中，現(xiàn)在和我一致意見最多的是年長的奧斯丁。我提到過，他總是反對我們早期的宗派主義。后來，他和我一樣受到新的影響。他被任命為倫敦大學（現(xiàn)在的倫敦大學學院）的法學教授之后，為了講課做研究而在波恩住了一段時間。德國文學、德國人性格和社會狀態(tài)的影響，使他的人生觀產(chǎn)生了很明顯的變化。他的性情溫和了很多，沒那么好斗愛爭辯了，他開始轉(zhuǎn)向愛好詩歌和沉思。他不再像以前一樣那么重視外部變化，除非與此同時，內(nèi)部性情也得到更好的陶冶。英國人的生活普遍很自私，缺乏寬廣的思想和無私的愿望，還有英國所有階層熱衷的卑微目標，他都特別討厭。即便對英國人關(guān)心的那種公共利益，他也不太瞧得起。他認為，普魯士君主政體比英國的代議制政府實行了更多實際的善政（這是真的），更關(guān)心所有階層人民的教育和思想進步。和法國《經(jīng)濟學人》的觀點一樣，他認為真正確保善政的是“見多識廣的民眾”，不一定是民主制度的成果。但如果沒有這種制度也能有這些人的話，他們就會比這種制度更能發(fā)揮作用。盡管他贊成《改革法案》，但他還是預言，在治理上它不會產(chǎn)生很多人期盼的那種重大的直接的進步，事實上也確實如此。他說，這個國家不存在能做這些偉大事情的人。不管在他采納的新觀點上，還是在他保留的舊觀點上，我和他之間都有很多共鳴。和我一樣，他一直都是個功利主義者，他熱愛德國人，喜歡他們的文學，但他從來都沒有接受先天原則的形而上學，一點都沒有接受。他日益培養(yǎng)出一種德國信仰，一種詩歌和感覺的信仰，但明確的信條卻很少（如果有的話）。而在政治上（這是我和他最不同的地方），他不關(guān)心大眾制度的進步，幾乎是輕視它。但是他很高興地看到，要迫使權(quán)力階層去教育民眾，并讓他們記住永久改進他們物質(zhì)條件的唯一真正的方法是限制他們的數(shù)量，社會主義是最有效的方法。這時，他也沒有從根本上反對完全把社會主義當作進步的最終結(jié)果。他非常蔑視他所謂的“政治經(jīng)濟學家的人性普遍原則”，并堅持那些歷史和日常經(jīng)驗提供的“人性的非凡適應性”的證據(jù)（這個短語是我在某處從他那里借用的）。他還認為，即便在社會和教育影響的開明指導下，也不可能給可能會在人類身上展現(xiàn)的道德能力設(shè)下任何絕對的限度。我不知道他是否直到生命的盡頭還保持著這些觀點。當然，他晚年的思考方式，尤其是他最后出版的作品，從總體特征上看比這時更加保守。

My father's tone of thought and feeling, I now felt myself at a great distance from: greater, indeed, than a full and calm explanation and reconsideration on both sides, might have shewn to exist in reality. But my father was not one with whom calm and full explanations on fundamental points of doctrine could be expected, at least with one whom he might consider as, in some sort, a deserter from his standard. Fortunately we were almost always in strong agreement on the political questions of the day, which engrossed a large part of his interest and of his conversation. On those matters of opinion on which we differed, we talked little. He knew that the habit of thinking for myself, which his mode of education had fostered, sometimes led me to opinions different from his, and he perceived from time to time that I did not always tell him how different. I expected no good, but only pain to both of us, from discussing our differences: and I never expressed them but when he gave utterance to some opinion or feeling repugnant to mine, in a manner which would have made it disingenuousness on my part to remain silent.

我現(xiàn)在覺得自己和父親的思考和情感風格相差很遠。真的比雙方都進行全面平靜的說明和斟酌后能看出來的在現(xiàn)實中存在的差別還要大。但是，不能期待我父親會平靜、全面地解釋學說的基本要點，至少不會和一個在他看來，可能在某種程度上拋棄了他的標準的人這樣解釋。幸運的是，在當前的政治問題上，我們幾乎總是強烈的一致，而政治問題是他非常感興趣的，占據(jù)了他談話的主要內(nèi)容。對于我們觀點不一致的事情，我們談得很少。他知道，他的教育方式培養(yǎng)了我自主思考的習慣，讓我有時會持和他不同的觀點，他時常覺察到我不總是告訴他我們的觀點怎么不同。我知道，討論我們的分歧不會對我們兩個有任何好處，只會產(chǎn)生痛苦；我從來沒有表示過這些分歧，除非他表達一些與我不一致的觀點或感覺的方式，讓我覺得如果保持沉默就會顯得無誠意的時候才會這么做。

It remains to speak of what I wrote during these years, which, independently of my contributions to newspapers, was considerable. In 1830 and 1831 I wrote the five Essays since published under the title of Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, almost as they now stand, except that in 1833 I partially rewrote the fifth Essay. They were written with no immediate purpose of publication; and when, some years later, I offered them to a publisher, he declined them. They were only printed in 1844, after the success of the System of Logic. I also resumed my speculations on this last subject, and puzzled myself, like others before me, with the great paradox of the discovery of new truths by general reasoning. As to the fact, there could be no doubt. As little could it be doubted, that all reasoning is resolvable into syllogisms, and that in every syllogism the conclusion is actually contained and implied in the premises. How, being so contained and implied, it could be new truth, and how the theorems of geometry, so different in appearance from the definitions and axioms, could be all contained in these, was a difficulty which no one, I thought, had sufficiently felt, and which at all events no one had succeeded in clearing up. The explanations offered by Whately and others, though they might give a temporary satisfaction, always, in my mind, left a mist still hanging over the subject. At last, when reading a second or third time the chapters on Reasoning in the second volume of Dugald Stewart, interrogating myself on every point, and following out, as far as I knew how, every topic of thought which the book suggested, I came upon an idea of his respecting the use of axioms in ratiocination, which I did not remember to have before noticed, but which now, in meditating on it, seemed to me not only true of axioms, but of all general propositions whatever, and to be the key of the whole perplexity. From this germ grew the theory of the Syllogism propounded in the second Book of the Logic; which I immediately fixed by writing it out. And now, with greatly increased hope of being able to produce a work on Logic, of some originality and value, I proceeded to write the First Book, from the rough and imperfect draft I had already made. What I now wrote became the basis of that part of the subsequent Treatise; except that it did not contain the Theory of Kinds, which was a later addition, suggested by otherwise inextricable difficulties which met me in my first attempt to work out the subject of some of the concluding chapters of the Third Book. At the point which I have now reached I made a halt, which lasted five years. I had come to the end of my tether; I could make nothing satisfactory of Induction, at this time. I continued to read any book which seemed to promise light on the subject, and appropriated, as well as I could, the results; but for a long time I found nothing which seemed to open to me any very important vein of meditation.

我還應該談談這些年我寫的東西，除了給報紙的投稿之外，還有很多。1830年和1831年，我寫了五篇論文，后來以《論政治經(jīng)濟學中一些未處理的問題》的書名出版，除了在1833年的時候我改寫了第五篇的一部分外，其他的基本和現(xiàn)在見到的一樣。寫這些論文的時候沒打算要立刻發(fā)表。幾年后，當我把它們拿給一位出版商時，卻被他拒絕了。1844年《邏輯學體系》一書成功后，它們才得以發(fā)表。我也繼續(xù)思考邏輯學這個主題，和前人一樣，對于通過一般的推理就能發(fā)現(xiàn)新真理這個似乎矛盾的觀點，我也很迷惑。至于事實，則毋庸置疑。就像所有的推理都可以分解成三段論法，在每個三段論法中，結(jié)論實際上包含和隱含在前提里面，這沒什么可懷疑的。結(jié)論被這樣包含和隱含著，怎么能是新真理。幾何學的定理，表面上看與定義和公理如此不同，怎么會包含在它們里面。我想，這個困難是誰都沒有充分感覺到的，也還沒有被成功解釋清楚過?；萏乩推渌颂峁┑慕忉尡M管可以讓人暫時滿意，但在我心中總是還有一團迷霧籠罩在這個問題上。終于，在第二遍或第三遍讀杜格爾·斯圖爾特第二卷中論推理的章節(jié)時，我在每個點上都提問自己，并且盡可能地把書中提出的每個思想主題追查到底，我突然想起他說過在推理中用公理，我記得以前沒注意過，但是現(xiàn)在，在思索這個問題的時候，我覺得不僅公理可以用在推理中，而且所有普通的命題都可以，這似乎是解開整個困惑的關(guān)鍵。這個萌芽發(fā)展成了三段論的理論，在《邏輯學體系》的第二卷里提了出來。通過把它寫下來，我迅速把這個理論確定了下來?，F(xiàn)在，我更加希望能創(chuàng)作一部新穎、有價值的邏輯學作品，我從以前粗糙、不完善的手稿著手，開始寫第一卷。我現(xiàn)在所寫的東西，成了隨后的論文中相應部分的基礎(chǔ)。只是不包括后來加上去的《類別理論》，那是我草擬第三卷最后幾章的題目碰到困難時想出來的，要是沒有類別理論這些困難就無法解決。在我現(xiàn)在到達的這個關(guān)頭上，我停了下來，一停就是五年。我已經(jīng)到了極限了。此時，我無法寫出任何讓人滿意的關(guān)于歸納法的文章。我繼續(xù)讀任何看起來有希望為歸納法提供一線光亮的書籍，盡量利用它們的成果。但是在很長一段時間里，我沒找到任何能給我提供非常重要思路的東西。

In 1832 I wrote several papers for the first series of Tait's Magazine, and one for a quarterly periodical called the Jurist, which had been founded, and for a short time carried on, by a set of friends, all lawyers and law reformers, with several of whom I was acquainted. The paper in question is the one on the rights and duties of the State respecting Corporation and Church Property, now standing first among the collected Dissertations and Discussions; where one of my articles in Tait, "The Currency Juggle," also appears. In the whole mass of what I wrote previous to these, there is nothing of sufficient permanent value to justify reprinting. The paper in the Jurist, which I still think a very complete discussion of the rights of the State over Foundations, shewed both sides of my opinions, asserting as firmly as I should have done at any time, the doctrine that all endowments are national property, which the government may and ought to control; but not, as I should once have done, condemning endowments in themselves, and proposing that they should be taken to pay off the national debt. On the contrary, I urged strenuously the importance of having a provision for education, not dependent on the mere demand of the market, that is, on the knowledge and discernment of average parents, but calculated to establish and keep up a higher standard of instruction than is likely to be spontaneously demanded by the buyers of the article. All these opinions have been confirmed and strengthened by the whole course of my subsequent reflections.

1832年，我在《泰特雜志》的第一輯上寫了好幾篇文章，還給一個叫《法學家》的季刊寫了一篇，這本季刊是由一幫朋友創(chuàng)立并經(jīng)營了短暫的一段時間，他們都是律師和法律改革家，我和其中好幾個很熟。這里說的這篇文章，是關(guān)于國家在社團和教會財產(chǎn)上的權(quán)利和義務的，現(xiàn)在被收錄進《論述和討論》。我發(fā)表在《泰特雜志》上的一篇文章《貨幣騙局》也收錄在這里面。在這些文章之前，我寫的很多文章，都沒有足夠永恒的價值使得它們值得再版。我至今仍然認為，《法學家》上的那篇文章，對于國家在基金機構(gòu)上權(quán)利的論述非常完整，表明了我的觀點的兩個方面：一方面，我跟以往任何時候一樣，堅決支持所有捐款都是國家財產(chǎn)的學說，政府可以而且也應該支配這些捐款；另一方面，我不像過去那樣譴責捐款本身，還建議用它們償還國家債務。相反，我極力強調(diào)為教育設(shè)立基金條款的重要性，教育不能僅依靠市場需求，也就是說不能僅依靠普通父母的了解和眼力，而是要計劃好，設(shè)立并保持較高的教育標準，比商品購買者自發(fā)要求的標準還要高。所有這些見解都在我后來的整個思考過程中得到了證實和加強。