BEC中級商務(wù)英語閱讀講義精選：18

賣還是不賣?這是個問題

當(dāng)年購買這些股權(quán)的決定真英明。那些購入中資銀行股權(quán)的西方銀行，目前正在坐享高得離譜的資本利得。它們持有的9筆價值最大的中國上市銀行股權(quán)，目前大約值810億美元，而當(dāng)初的成本僅為110億美元。這些潛在利潤超過了全球各銀行迄今宣布的逾500億美元次貸相關(guān)資產(chǎn)注銷。這個泡沫似乎有助于填補(bǔ)因另一個泡沫破裂所造成的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上的窟窿。

As stakes go, these ones are well done. Western banks which bought positions in Chinese lenders are now sitting on almost ridiculous capital gains. The nine biggest listed stakes by value are now worth an estimated $81bn, compared with a cost of $11bn. The implied profits exceed the $50bn-odd of subprime write-offs that global banks have announced so far. One bubble, it seems, could help plug the balance sheet hole created by the collapse of another.

賣出這些股票的理由頗為強(qiáng)大。中國四大銀行的預(yù)期市盈率在25倍左右。會計處理方法差別很大——匯豐(HSBC)按成本價計算投資，而經(jīng)紀(jì)商兼交易商高盛(Goldman Sachs)必須按市價來記入其持有的股票頭寸。但正如美國銀行(Bank of America)上周所示，對于多數(shù)銀行而言，這些股份必須在賣出后，它們的一級資本充足率才會受益。

The case for selling is strong. China’s big four banks trade on forward price earnings multiples in the mid twenties. Accounting treatments vary – HSBC carries its investments at cost, while broker-dealer Goldman Sachs must mark its position to market. But for most banks, the stakes would have to be sold before their Tier 1 capital ratios would benefit, as Bank of America indicated last week.

這些考量不太可能影響那些持有真正戰(zhàn)略性股權(quán)的銀行。獲得破例待遇的花旗集團(tuán)(Citigroup)對未上市的廣東發(fā)展銀行(Guangdong Development Bank)擁有運營控制權(quán)。匯豐可能繼續(xù)持有其頗具影響力的股權(quán);不過，該公司也在擴(kuò)張其在中國內(nèi)地的分支網(wǎng)絡(luò)，以對沖這項賭注。其它西方銀行通常面臨股權(quán)禁售期，大體在2008年至2010年到期，不過，運用一點想像力，即可繞開這些禁售規(guī)定。但多數(shù)銀行也堅稱，賣出其持有的少數(shù)股權(quán)，可能導(dǎo)致它們喪失重大的戰(zhàn)略優(yōu)勢。

Such considerations are unlikely to sway those with genuinely strategic positions. Privileged Citigroup has operational control of unlisted Guangdong Development Bank. HSBC will likely hang on to its influential equity stakes, although it is hedging its bets by expanding its own mainland branch network. The other western banks typically face lock-ups that expire in 2008-2010, although these may be circumventable with a little imagination. But most also insist that selling their small stakes would forfeit big strategic advantages.

上述說法并不罕見——沃達(dá)豐(Vodafone)在中國移動(China Mobile)的持股令其獲利100億美元，但該集團(tuán)并未表現(xiàn)出售出這些股權(quán)的打算。此外還有一些證據(jù)表明，在這方面存在切實的商業(yè)利益——在中國工商銀行(ICBC)最近與南非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)銀行(Standard Bank)的交易中，高盛擔(dān)任了交易顧問。但事實上，西方銀行應(yīng)該考慮賣出這些股份，特別在其股東如今可以直接購買中國內(nèi)地銀行股票之后。這種現(xiàn)實主義做法確實有先例可循。?？松?Exxon)、殼牌(Shell)和英國石油(BP)曾“瞄準(zhǔn)”中國石化(Sinopec)上市，但到2005年，它們已經(jīng)撤離。與此同時，美國鋁業(yè)(Alcoa)剛剛悄然賣出了持有的20億美元中國鋁業(yè)(Chalco)股份，這就是雙方在2001年締結(jié)的“長期戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系”遠(yuǎn)景。

This is not an unusual argument – Vodafone, sitting on a $10bn profit from its China Mobile stake shows no inclination of selling. And there is some evidence of tangible commercial benefits – Goldman Sachs advised ICBC on its recent deal with South Africa’s Standard Bank. But the reality is that western banks should be considering selling out, particularly since their shareholders can now buy into Chinese banks directly. Such realism does have precedents. Exxon, Shell and BP, having “anchored” Sinopec’s floatation, had exited by 2005. Alcoa, meanwhile, has just uncerimoniously offloaded its $2bn position in Chinese counterpart Chalco – so much for the “long term strategic partnership” envisioned back in 2001.