為什么減少貿(mào)易赤字解決不了美國經(jīng)濟(jì)的根本問題
2018年中美貿(mào)易大戰(zhàn)不會(huì)出現(xiàn)了，至少現(xiàn)在不會(huì)。周一，在特朗普政府至少暫時(shí)放棄對(duì)中國進(jìn)口商品征收關(guān)稅的威脅之后，全球股市上漲。
But as negotiations proceed, a big question for the administration remains. Is the goal to make some supporters in farm states and energy extraction industries happy, and shrink the trade deficit temporarily?
但隨著談判的進(jìn)行，特朗普政府依然面臨著一個(gè)大問題。我們的目標(biāo)是取悅農(nóng)業(yè)州和能源開采行業(yè)的一些支持者，以及暫時(shí)減少貿(mào)易赤字嗎?
Or is it to reset a dysfunctional economic relationship between the world’s two biggest economies, in hope of ensuring that the United States maintains competitive footing in the industries of the future — even if dividends aren’t immediate?
還是重置世界上最大的兩個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體之間失調(diào)的經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系，以期確保美國在未來的產(chǎn)業(yè)中占據(jù)有競爭力的地位——盡管我們不能馬上獲得回報(bào)?
Over the weekend, Mr. Trump’s team de-escalated the trade war while seemingly choosing Option A.
上周末，特朗普的團(tuán)隊(duì)似乎選擇了前者，降級(jí)了貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。
The problem with this strategy is not just that the trade peace might prove less than durable. It creates a risk that after all the bluster and threats of the last few months, there will be no payoff in terms of solutions to bigger, longer-term problems.
這一戰(zhàn)略的問題不僅在于，這種貿(mào)易和平可能會(huì)被證明無法長久存在。它還造成了一種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，那就是，經(jīng)過過去幾個(gè)月所有的恫嚇與威脅，我們在解決更大、更長期的問題方面不會(huì)獲得任何回報(bào)。
The president has made reducing trade deficits a primary goal of international economic policy, ignoring the views of mainstream economists who view trade deficits as more a consequence of investment and savings decisions than a scorecard of national success. To that end he has demanded that the Chinese work to reduce the $335 billion trade deficit by $200 billion.
特朗普總統(tǒng)將減少貿(mào)易赤字作為國際經(jīng)濟(jì)政策的首要目標(biāo)，忽視了主流經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的觀點(diǎn)，他們認(rèn)為，貿(mào)易赤字更多是投資和儲(chǔ)蓄決策的結(jié)果，而非國家成功的計(jì)分卡。因此，特朗普要求中國減少3350億美元的貿(mào)易赤字中的2000億美元。
A joint statement from American and Chinese negotiators emphasized “meaningful increases in United States agriculture and energy exports.” Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin on Monday emphasized the potential for China to buy liquefied natural gas. And the president tweeted that under a potential deal, China would buy “practically as much as our Farmers can produce.”
美國和中國談判代表發(fā)表的聯(lián)合聲明強(qiáng)調(diào)了“美國農(nóng)業(yè)和能源出口的有意義增長”。周一，美國財(cái)政部長史蒂文·努欽(Steven Mnuchin)強(qiáng)調(diào)了中國購買液化天然氣的潛力。特朗普總統(tǒng)在Twitter上表示，根據(jù)一項(xiàng)潛在協(xié)議，“我們的農(nóng)民能生產(chǎn)多少，中國就將購買多少”。
If those purchases materialize, there could be political dividends for the president. American farmers have much to lose from a potential Chinese trade war, and stepped-up Chinese purchases of American soybeans and other commodities could be a boon. If those purchases are large enough to move the dial on the overall trade deficit with China, it would create an easy-to-measure win for the president on his pet issue.
如果這些購買成為現(xiàn)實(shí)，那么總統(tǒng)可能會(huì)獲得政治上的好處。如果與中國發(fā)生貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，那么，美國農(nóng)民會(huì)損失慘重，而中國增加購買美國的大豆等商品可能對(duì)他們有利。如果購買量足夠大，能夠改變與中國的整體貿(mào)易逆差，那么它將為總統(tǒng)創(chuàng)造他最看重的勝利。
“This is the stuff you can count and measure,” said Gary Clyde Hufbauer, a trade scholar with the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “It’s short-term, and instantaneous.”
“這個(gè)是可以計(jì)算和衡量的，”彼得森國際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)的貿(mào)易學(xué)者加里·克萊德·赫夫鮑爾(Gary Clyde Hufbauer)說，“這是短期的、臨時(shí)的。”
The administration’s approach might quickly reduce the headline level of the trade deficit, but it largely ignores the frustrations of American sectors that are the most promising sources for creating future good export-related jobs.
美國政府的做法可能會(huì)迅速降低貿(mào)易赤字的總體水平，但是對(duì)于美國那些最有望創(chuàng)造未來良好出口相關(guān)工作崗位的行業(yè)，它們的挫敗感在很大程度上被忽略了。
American companies that make automobiles, semiconductors and other complex products bemoan Chinese government requirements that force American firms to form joint ventures with Chinese companies, sharing their technology. They accuse those partners of widespread theft of intellectual property as they try to catch up in advanced technologies. Many American firms face Chinese competition that receives heavy state subsidies.
制造汽車和半導(dǎo)體等復(fù)雜產(chǎn)品的美國企業(yè)抱怨中國政府迫使它們與中國企業(yè)建立合資企業(yè)，并分享技術(shù)。他們指責(zé)這些合作伙伴在努力追趕先進(jìn)技術(shù)的過程中，普遍采取竊取知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的行為。許多美國企業(yè)面對(duì)著獲得高額政府補(bǔ)貼的中國競爭對(duì)手。
These are some of the most stubborn, longstanding issues in American-Chinese economic relations. But they aren’t likely to be fixed overnight, and even if the United States wins concessions, it won’t necessarily affect the trade deficit — especially in the next couple of years.
這些屬于美中經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系中最棘手、存在時(shí)間最長的問題。但它們不太可能在一夜之間得到解決，并且即使美國贏得讓步，也不一定會(huì)影響貿(mào)易逆差——尤其是在接下來幾年里。
This helps explain why some prominent advocates of a tougher stance toward China — who applauded President Trump’s tariff threats — are critical of the turn the negotiations have taken. 一些主張對(duì)中國采取更強(qiáng)硬立場的著名人士曾經(jīng)稱贊特朗普總統(tǒng)的關(guān)稅威脅，這有助于解釋他們?yōu)楹螌?duì)談判發(fā)生的轉(zhuǎn)變持批評(píng)態(tài)度。
The tariffs the president threatened “are designed to address China’s technology theft and their plans to dominate advanced and high technology manufacturing,” said Dan DiMicco, chairman of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, which advocates for a hard-line stance, in a statement. By contrast, “an agreement to sell agricultural and energy commodities is the result of bad negotiating and bad economic strategy.”
總統(tǒng)威脅要征收的關(guān)稅“是用來解決中國的技術(shù)竊取和他們主導(dǎo)先進(jìn)高科技制造業(yè)的計(jì)劃”，支持采取強(qiáng)硬立場的團(tuán)體“繁榮美國聯(lián)盟”(Coalition for a Prosperous America)的主席丹尼爾·迪米科(Daniel DiMicco)在一份聲明中說。相比之下，“出售農(nóng)業(yè)和能源商品的協(xié)議是談判不力和經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)略不佳的結(jié)果。”
Exports of agriculture were directly or indirectly responsible for 524,000 jobs in 2014, according to analysis by the International Trade Administration; petroleum and coal products were responsible for an additional 255,000. But combined that is less than 7 percent of the jobs tied to exports that year.
從國際貿(mào)易局(International Trade Administration)的分析來看，2014年農(nóng)業(yè)出口直接或間接創(chuàng)造了52.4萬個(gè)就業(yè)崗位，石油和煤炭產(chǎn)品又創(chuàng)造了25.5萬個(gè)。但它們加起來不到當(dāng)年和出口相關(guān)的工作崗位的7%。
Sectors like computers and electronic products and machinery were responsible for substantially more export-related jobs.
計(jì)算機(jī)、電子產(chǎn)品和機(jī)械等領(lǐng)域創(chuàng)造的出口相關(guān)工作崗位要多得多。
Mr. Hufbauer notes similarities with a strategy that American trade negotiators pursued with Japan in the 1980s, of “voluntary import agreements” in which the Japanese agreed to import more American semiconductors and other products.
赫夫鮑爾指出，目前的情況與80年代美國貿(mào)易談判代表同日本談判時(shí)采取的“自愿進(jìn)口協(xié)議”策略之間有相似之處。在“自愿進(jìn)口協(xié)議”中，日本同意從美國進(jìn)口更多半導(dǎo)體和其他產(chǎn)品。
Whatever the near-term benefits for particular American exporters, Japanese trade surpluses kept rising. 無論美國特定的出口商獲得了什么短期利益，日本的貿(mào)易順差持續(xù)增加。
In some ways the back-and-forth with China in recent days fits a common Trump negotiating pattern: Threaten bold, potentially disruptive action while making major demands, then seek a deal that is considerably more incremental.
在某些方面，最近幾天與中國的交鋒符合一種常見的特朗普談判模式：威脅采取可能會(huì)引起混亂的大膽行動(dòng)，同時(shí)提出主要的要求，然后爭取達(dá)成一項(xiàng)更為漸進(jìn)的協(xié)議。
Even some who are critical of the administration see value in more systemic rethinking of the relationship between the United States and China.
甚至一些對(duì)特朗普政府持批評(píng)態(tài)度的人，也看到對(duì)美中關(guān)系進(jìn)行更系統(tǒng)的反思是有價(jià)值的。
“Trade is not stuff of immovable structural forces of globalization,” said Jennifer Harris, a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute and former State Department official. “These are political choices that were made, and they could be unmade. So I disagree with a lot of the specific policy choices, but I at least appreciate the space Trump is opening up for us to remind ourselves how much agency we have.”
“貿(mào)易并不是全球化不可動(dòng)搖的結(jié)構(gòu)性力量，”羅斯福研究所(Roosevelt Institute)研究員、前國務(wù)院官員珍妮弗·哈里斯(Jennifer Harris)說。“這些都是人們做出的政治選擇，它們可以取消。因此，我不認(rèn)同很多具體的政策選擇，但我至少感謝特朗普為我們開辟的空間，提醒我們認(rèn)識(shí)到自己有多大的作用。”
But, she added, in this round of negotiations “it’s not clear what we’re getting for a lot of the concessions that have been made.”
但她接著說，在這一輪談判中，“不清楚我們在做出大量讓步后會(huì)得到什么。”
The Trump administration negotiating team has deep internal fissures, and this is an area where the hard-liners, including U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, are advocating the path that includes the highest risk of near-term economic disruption but also the greater likelihood of shifting the Chinese-American economic relationship in the longer run.
特朗普政府的談判團(tuán)隊(duì)存在嚴(yán)重的內(nèi)部分歧。其中，美國貿(mào)易代表羅伯特·萊特希澤(Robert Lighthizer)等強(qiáng)硬派主張的路線在近期擾亂經(jīng)濟(jì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)最高，但從長遠(yuǎn)來看改變中美經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系的可能性也更大。
The thing to watch in the weeks ahead is whether the administration faction seeking short-term wins and trade peace continues to prevail.
未來幾周要關(guān)注的是，政府內(nèi)部尋求短期獲勝與貿(mào)易和平的派系是否繼續(xù)占上風(fēng)。
