文在寅交給金正恩的U盤里有什么？
韓國(guó)首爾——多年來(lái)，朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人金正恩一直在打擊活動(dòng)人士向他的孤立國(guó)家走私USB閃存盤的行動(dòng)，以防他的人民的思想受到外界、比如韓國(guó)流行音樂(lè)的影響。
But last month, when he met with the South’s president, Moon Jae-in, Mr. Moon handed him a USB drive that contained quite a different message.
但上個(gè)月，當(dāng)他與韓國(guó)總統(tǒng)會(huì)面時(shí)，文在寅一個(gè)把帶著相當(dāng)不同信息的U盤交給了金正恩。
In charts and video clips, Mr. Moon’s memory stick laid out a “new economic map for the Korean Peninsula,” including new railways and power plants for the impoverished North, should Mr. Kim abandon his nuclear weapons, according to South Korean officials.
據(jù)韓國(guó)官員說(shuō)，在閃存盤上，文在寅用圖表和視頻片段展示了一幅“為朝鮮半島設(shè)想的新的經(jīng)濟(jì)版圖”，包括為貧困的朝鮮修建新的鐵路和發(fā)電廠，前提是如果金正恩放棄核武器的話。
Mr. Moon based his sales pitch on the belief that Mr. Kim wants to become the North Korean equivalent of Deng Xiaoping, who oversaw the economic liberalization of China. In this view, Mr. Kim may be willing to transform his pariah state by trading in his nuclear arsenal for diplomatic and economic incentives he needs to achieve prosperity.
文在寅推銷的宣傳基于這樣一個(gè)信念，那就是，金正恩想成為朝鮮版的鄧小平，鄧小平領(lǐng)導(dǎo)了中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)自由化。這個(gè)信念認(rèn)為，為了改變他那被國(guó)際社會(huì)遺棄的國(guó)家，金正恩也許愿意拿自己的核武庫(kù)做交易，以換取為實(shí)現(xiàn)繁榮所需的外交和經(jīng)濟(jì)鼓勵(lì)。
It is a premise that will be tested when President Trump meets with Mr. Kim in a few weeks’ time. When Mr. Moon met with Mr. Kim on the inter-Korean border on April 27 to help set up the North Korea-United States summit, he handed over the USB drive to illustrate what benefits awaited Mr. Kim should he denuclearize.
這個(gè)假設(shè)將在幾周后特朗普總統(tǒng)與金正恩會(huì)面時(shí)得到檢驗(yàn)。文在寅于4月27日在朝韓邊境上與金正恩會(huì)面，幫助安排朝美峰會(huì)時(shí)，為了向金正恩說(shuō)明如果去核化會(huì)得到什么好處，把這個(gè)U盤交給了金正恩。
“Kim Jong-un’s desire to develop his country’s economy is as strong as, and even stronger than, his desire for nuclear weapons,” said Lee Jong-seok, a former unification minister of South Korea. “But he knows he cannot achieve the kind of rapid economic growth in China that he envisions for his country while keeping his nuclear weapons — because of the sanctions.”
“金正恩有發(fā)展本國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的渴望，這種渴望與他的核武器渴望一樣強(qiáng)烈，甚至更強(qiáng)烈，”韓國(guó)前統(tǒng)一部部長(zhǎng)李鐘奭(Lee Jong-seok)說(shuō)。“但他知道，如果他保留核武器的話，由于國(guó)際制裁，他無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)他為自己的國(guó)家所設(shè)想的、像中國(guó)那樣的經(jīng)濟(jì)快速增長(zhǎng)。”
Skeptics doubt Mr. Kim’s xenophobic regime will ever surrender its nuclear deterrent.
持懷疑態(tài)度的人不相信金正恩的仇外政權(quán)會(huì)有朝一日放棄自己的核威懾。
But since the inter-Korean summit meeting, many South Koreans have started to believe that Mr. Kim is a “trustworthy” reformer, according to recent surveys. A growing number of South Korean analysts have also begun arguing that Mr. Kim wants to follow the model of the South’s own past military dictators who focused on economic prosperity, or that Mr. Kim has convinced himself from China’s experience that he can pursue economic growth while maintaining one-party rule.
但最近的調(diào)查顯示，自從韓朝峰會(huì)以來(lái)，許多韓國(guó)人開始相信金正恩是一個(gè)“值得信賴的”改革者。越來(lái)越多的韓國(guó)分析人士也開始認(rèn)為，金正恩或想采用韓國(guó)過(guò)去的軍事獨(dú)裁者把注意力放在繁榮經(jīng)濟(jì)上的模式，或已經(jīng)被中國(guó)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)說(shuō)服，他可以在保持一黨統(tǒng)治的同時(shí)追求經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。
Such a theory was much harder to sell just months ago, when the 34-year-old North Korean was more often depicted as a bloodthirsty dictator and nuclear provocateur.
就在幾個(gè)月前，這種理論還很難被人接受。那時(shí)，這位34歲的朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人常常被描繪成一個(gè)嗜殺成性的獨(dú)裁者和核挑釁者。
Since taking power in 2011, Mr. Kim has executed scores of top officials, including his own uncle. He has also tested a hydrogen bomb and long-range missiles, claiming that he could hit the mainland United States with nuclear warheads.
自從2011年掌權(quán)以來(lái)，金正恩已經(jīng)處決了幾十名高級(jí)官員，其中包括自己的姑父。他還進(jìn)行了一次氫彈試驗(yàn)以及多次遠(yuǎn)程導(dǎo)彈試驗(yàn)，并聲稱他能用核彈頭打擊美國(guó)大陸。
Vilified as he was, however, Mr. Kim has also shown signs of being a reformer, granting farms and factories more autonomy, allowing more markets to open, and setting off a building boom in his showcase capital, Pyongyang. He exhorts his country to follow “international development trends” and “global standards” and even admits failing to deliver on his promise that his long-suffering people would “no longer have to tighten their belts.”
盡管人們這樣看他，但金正恩還是表現(xiàn)出了許多要當(dāng)改革家的跡象，他已經(jīng)賦予農(nóng)場(chǎng)和工廠更多的自主權(quán)，允許設(shè)立更多的市場(chǎng)，并在自己的櫥窗首都平壤掀起了一場(chǎng)建設(shè)熱潮。他敦促自己的國(guó)家緊跟“國(guó)際發(fā)展趨勢(shì)”和“世界水平”，甚至承認(rèn)未能兌現(xiàn)自己對(duì)長(zhǎng)期吃苦受難的人民作出的“不再需要勒緊褲帶”的承諾。
“My desires were burning all the time, but I spent the past year feeling anxious and remorseful for the lack of my ability,” Mr. Kim said in a nationally broadcast speech last year, a startling admission for a member of the family that has ruled North Korea with the help of a personality cult since its founding in 1948.
“我的愿望每時(shí)每刻都是火熱的，但在過(guò)去一年里，我因?yàn)樽约旱哪芰Σ蛔悖两诮箲]和悔恨之中，”金正恩在去年的一次對(duì)全國(guó)廣播的講話中說(shuō)，對(duì)自1948年成立以來(lái)一直借助個(gè)人崇拜統(tǒng)治朝鮮的家族的一員來(lái)說(shuō)，這是一次驚人的承認(rèn)。
After meeting him, Mr. Moon called Mr. Kim “open-minded and practical.”
與金正恩會(huì)面后，文在寅稱金正恩“思想開放和務(wù)實(shí)”。
Nowhere is Mr. Kim’s dilemma better seen than in his policy of “byungjin,” or parallel advance, which seeks a nuclear arsenal and economic development simultaneously. Under that policy, Mr. Kim has rapidly developed his country’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, arguing that a nuclear deterrent would make his country feel secure enough to focus on rebuilding the economy. But the world has responded by imposing crippling sanctions.
金正恩的困境在他的“并進(jìn)”政策中得到了再好不過(guò)的表現(xiàn)，該政策尋求經(jīng)濟(jì)與核武庫(kù)的并行發(fā)展。在這個(gè)政策指導(dǎo)下，金正恩迅速發(fā)展了朝鮮的核武器和彈道導(dǎo)彈項(xiàng)目，他認(rèn)為，核威懾能力將讓他的國(guó)家有足夠的安全感，從而能把精力放在重建經(jīng)濟(jì)上。但是，國(guó)際社會(huì)對(duì)此的響應(yīng)是采取嚴(yán)厲的制裁措施。
“Kim Jong-un is at a crossroads,” said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute in Seoul, South Korea’s capital. “He could advance his nuclear weapons program further and face a deeper isolation and possible economic ruin. Or he could use it as a bargaining card to win normalized ties and a peace treaty with the United States and economic recovery.”
“金正恩正處在一個(gè)十字路口上，”位于韓國(guó)首都首爾的世宗研究院(Sejong Institute)高級(jí)分析師鄭相昌(Cheong Seong-chang)說(shuō)。“他可以進(jìn)一步推進(jìn)他的核武器計(jì)劃，從而面臨更嚴(yán)重的孤立和可能的經(jīng)濟(jì)毀滅?；蛘撸部梢园押宋淦髯鳛橐环N討價(jià)還價(jià)的砝碼，以換取與美國(guó)關(guān)系的正?；⒑推綏l約和經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇。”
If Mr. Kim pursues the route of economic reform, energy and transport are the two areas where he most needs outside help. In his meeting with Mr. Moon, Mr. Kim admitted to the “embarrassing” condition of his roads and railways, South Korean officials said.
如果金正恩堅(jiān)持經(jīng)濟(jì)改革的路線，能源和交通是他最需要外界幫助的兩個(gè)領(lǐng)域。韓國(guó)官員說(shuō)，金正恩在與文在寅的會(huì)談中承認(rèn)，朝鮮的道路和鐵路狀況“令人尷尬”。
Trains running on electricity remain North Korea’s main means of transport, carrying 90 percent of its cargo and 60 percent of its passenger traffic, according to Ahn Byung-min, a senior analyst at the South’s government-funded Korea Transport Institute. But its rail systems are so decrepit that its fastest train, which runs to the Chinese border from Pyongyang, travels at 28 miles an hour. Other trains run at less than half that speed, Mr. Ahn said.
電氣化鐵路仍然是朝鮮的主要交通工具，承載著90%的貨運(yùn)量和60%的客流量，安炳民(Ahn Byung-min)說(shuō)，他是韓國(guó)政府支持的韓國(guó)運(yùn)輸研究所(Korea transport Institute)的高級(jí)分析師。但朝鮮的鐵路系統(tǒng)非常落后，運(yùn)行于平壤和中國(guó)邊境之間的列車是其最快的列車，這趟車每小時(shí)的速度只有45公里。安炳民說(shuō)，其他列車的速度還不到這個(gè)的一半。
Lacking cash for oil imports, North Korea produces all its electricity from hydroelectric dams and coal-burning power plants. But the country’s power industry is trapped in a vicious cycle, energy experts say. Chronic electricity shortages make it difficult to produce coal and transport it to power plants. People in search of firewood for heat and cooking have denuded their hills, causing floods and droughts and making silt pile up at dams. That cuts down hydroelectric generation.
由于缺乏進(jìn)口石油的外匯，朝鮮的電力全部來(lái)自水電站和燃煤發(fā)電廠。但能源專家說(shuō)，朝鮮的電力行業(yè)正陷入一個(gè)惡性循環(huán)。長(zhǎng)期的電力短缺讓煤炭生產(chǎn)以及將煤炭運(yùn)到發(fā)電廠變得困難。需要用柴火取暖做飯的人們已經(jīng)把朝鮮的山變成了荒山，導(dǎo)致洪水和干旱，也導(dǎo)致泥沙在大壩下面堆積，降低了水力發(fā)電的能力。
North Korea’s electricity generation amounts to only 4.4 percent of South Korea’s, according to Park Eun-jeong, an analyst at the South’s Korea Development Bank. The country prioritizes supplying electricity to lighting statues of Mr. Kim’s father and grandfather, who had ruled before him, while passengers wait for hours in trains unable to move because of power shortages, according to defectors from the country.
據(jù)韓國(guó)國(guó)家開發(fā)銀行(Korea Development Bank)分析師樸恩正(Park Eun-jeong，音)的說(shuō)法，朝鮮的發(fā)電量只相當(dāng)于韓國(guó)的4.4%。脫北者說(shuō)，朝鮮把電力優(yōu)先提供給為金正恩的父親和祖父的雕像照明，他們?cè)诮鹫髦敖y(tǒng)治過(guò)朝鮮，與此同時(shí)，乘客們只好在火車站上長(zhǎng)時(shí)間地等待因電力不足而遲遲不來(lái)的列車。
“Electricity is the Achilles’ heel for North Korea,” said Lee Jong-heon, an energy analyst in Seoul.
“電力是朝鮮的致命弱點(diǎn)，”首爾的能源分析師李忠憲(Lee Jong-heon，音)說(shuō)。
Mr. Moon’s proposal to modernize the North’s roads and railways and link them to the South’s is not just meant to help North Korea.
文在寅為朝鮮公路和鐵路實(shí)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)代化、把它們與韓國(guó)的系統(tǒng)連接起來(lái)的提議，不僅僅是為了幫助朝鮮。
South Korean policymakers say that the two Koreas must first integrate their economies to make the eventual reunification less chaotic. They also envision building trans-Korean railways to find faster and cheaper routes to export South Korean goods to China, Russia and Europe, and bring Russian oil and gas into the South through pipelines for its power-hungry economy.
韓國(guó)政策制定者說(shuō)，朝鮮和韓國(guó)必須先在經(jīng)濟(jì)上實(shí)現(xiàn)一體化，才能在最終實(shí)現(xiàn)統(tǒng)一時(shí)不發(fā)生太多的混亂。他們也設(shè)想通過(guò)建設(shè)橫貫朝鮮半島的鐵路來(lái)尋找向中國(guó)、俄羅斯和歐洲出口韓國(guó)產(chǎn)品的更快、成本更低的途徑，同時(shí)通過(guò)建設(shè)管道把俄羅斯的石油和天然氣輸送到韓國(guó)，以滿足其經(jīng)濟(jì)的能源需求。
But that is unlikely to happen until the North denuclearizes.
但這一切都不太可能發(fā)生，除非朝鮮實(shí)現(xiàn)無(wú)核化。
In 2007, the two Koreas temporarily connected two short stretches of railway across their border, but further efforts to reconnect the two systems have been suspended amid rising tensions over the North’s nuclear program. In 2004, South Korea opened a joint industrial park in the North Korean town of Kaesong and sent electricity to run it. But the park was closed after the North’s nuclear test in 2016.
2007年，朝鮮和韓國(guó)曾暫時(shí)性地把兩小段鐵路跨越邊界連接起來(lái)，但由于朝鮮核項(xiàng)目的緊張局勢(shì)不斷升級(jí)，重新連接兩國(guó)鐵路系統(tǒng)的進(jìn)一步努力一直處于擱置狀態(tài)。2004年，韓國(guó)在朝鮮的開城工業(yè)園區(qū)設(shè)立了一個(gè)聯(lián)合工業(yè)園，并為其運(yùn)作提供了電力。但朝鮮在2016年進(jìn)行了核試驗(yàn)后，該園區(qū)被關(guān)閉了。
Now, with Mr. Kim reportedly willing to discuss denuclearization, there are renewed hopes in the South.
如今，受有關(guān)金正恩愿意討論無(wú)核化的報(bào)道的鼓舞，韓國(guó)重新燃起了希望。
“Reunification can start with reconnecting energy and transport lines of the two Koreas,” said Mr. Lee.
“半島統(tǒng)一可以從重新連接兩國(guó)的能源和運(yùn)輸線路開始，”李忠憲說(shuō)。
