FT社評：應(yīng)對中資收購提高標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

When Blackstone sold Strategic Hotels & Resorts — the owner of 16 luxury hotels in the US — to the Chinese insurer Anbang for $5.5bn in 2016, it did not need to consider the risk that Strategic would become the property of the Chinese state. This is, somewhat ironically, because hotel companies, whatever their name, are not strategic assets. Last week’s news that Beijing has seized Anbang and accused its former chairman, Wu Xiaohui, of fraud and embezzlement, was probably met with an indifferent shrug at Blackstone headquarters.

2016年，黑石(Blackstone)以55億美元的價(jià)格把在美國擁有16家豪華酒店的戰(zhàn)略酒店及度假村(Strategic Hotels & Resorts)賣給了中國保險(xiǎn)公司安邦(Anbang)，當(dāng)時(shí)黑石并不用考慮如下風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：戰(zhàn)略酒店及度假村可能會成為中國政府的財(cái)產(chǎn)。這有點(diǎn)諷刺，因?yàn)闊o論叫什么，酒店企業(yè)都不是戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)。上周的新聞稱中國政府已接管了安邦并指控其前董事長吳小暉集資詐騙與職務(wù)侵占，對這條新聞，黑石總部的人很可能會滿不在乎地聳聳肩。

The question of Chinese takeovers is much more fraught for other companies and, indeed, governments. Also last week, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States blocked a $580m takeover of Xcerra, a semiconductor testing company, by a China-backed investment fund. Cfius has blocked other semiconductor acquisitions by Chinese companies, apparently on the grounds that chip technology has military applications.

對于其他公司還有政府來說，中資收購的問題要令人憂慮得多。同樣在上周，美國外國投資委員會(CFIUS)阻止了一家中資背景的投資基金以5.8億美元的價(jià)格收購半導(dǎo)體測試設(shè)備商Xcerra。此前美國外國投資委員會阻止了一系列中資企業(yè)收購半導(dǎo)體公司，理由顯然是芯片技術(shù)具有軍事用途。

But national security interests in a narrow sense is not the only reason that targets and governments should treat Chinese offers with care. There are at least three others: reciprocity, transparency and data security.

但狹義的國家安全利益并不是目標(biāo)企業(yè)和政府應(yīng)當(dāng)謹(jǐn)慎對待中資收購提議的唯一原因。另外三個(gè)原因是：對等、透明度及數(shù)據(jù)安全。

All of the key sectors of China’s own economy — telecoms, cars, the internet, pharmaceuticals, education, media, and others — are either partially or completely closed to foreign acquisitions. When China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, its trading partners assumed that the country was on a path towards greater openness in its economy, and Beijing made commitments to this effect. Those commitments have not been fulfilled, and China shows few signs of becoming a market economy. Until the state opens its own markets to foreign takeovers, countries that respond in kind are acting within their rights, and perhaps their interests as well.

中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的所有關(guān)鍵部門——電信、汽車、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)、醫(yī)藥、教育、媒體等——都部分或完全不允許外資收購。2001年中國加入世界貿(mào)易組織(World Trade Organization)時(shí)，其貿(mào)易伙伴以為，該國的經(jīng)濟(jì)將一步步開放，中國政府也對此作出了承諾。這些承諾沒有兌現(xiàn)，中國也沒有表現(xiàn)出多少轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槭袌鼋?jīng)濟(jì)的跡象。在中國將其自己的市場面向外資收購開放之前，其他國家有權(quán)以其人之道還治其人之身，這樣做或許也符合這些國家自身的利益。

China’s corporate sector is the most indebted in the world. Indeed, Anbang seems to have been seized because the government feared it might fail to meet its liabilities, with systemic consequences. At the same time, takeover offers from China’s acquisitive conglomerates — most notably Anbang, Fosun, Dalian Wanda and HNA — often come with little information about the buyer’s balance sheet. This creates the risk that cash will be sucked out of the target once the deal is done, leaving it destabilised. Governments should insist on evidence of buyers’ financial strength before allowing economically important companies to be sold to any buyer, Chinese or otherwise.

中國企業(yè)是全世界負(fù)債最多的。事實(shí)上，安邦之所以被接管，似乎就是因?yàn)橹袊畵?dān)心其也許無法償還債務(wù)，從而產(chǎn)生系統(tǒng)性后果。與此同時(shí)，來自中國熱衷收購的企業(yè)集團(tuán)——最突出的是安邦、復(fù)星(Fosun)、大連萬達(dá)(Dalian Wanda)和海航(HNA)——的收購要約，常常對買家的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表情況語焉不詳。這就產(chǎn)生了這樣的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：一旦交易完成，現(xiàn)金就會被抽離出收購目標(biāo)，導(dǎo)致其處于不穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)。各國政府在允許具有重要經(jīng)濟(jì)意義的公司被出售給無論是中國還是其他地方的任何買家前，都應(yīng)堅(jiān)持讓買家出具證明其財(cái)務(wù)實(shí)力的材料。

Finally, China is an autocracy, where relations between corporations and the state are very close. Any deal where the target company holds significant personal data about its customers deserves special scrutiny.

最后，中國是一個(gè)專制國家，企業(yè)與政府間的關(guān)系非常密切。只要交易中的被收購企業(yè)持有客戶的重要個(gè)人信息，就應(yīng)該對交易嚴(yán)加審查。

China is a rising economic superpower with a huge savings surplus. Its government is keen on growth and influence. It is retraining its most aggressive buyers now, but the takeover offers will come back before long. This is no bad thing. Investment across borders should allow China and the rest of the world to develop stabilising mutual interests. But governments in the US, Europe, and elsewhere need to have a clear policy for dealing with Chinese takeover offers.

中國是一個(gè)正在崛起的、擁有巨大儲蓄盈余的經(jīng)濟(jì)超級大國。中國政府迫切想要實(shí)現(xiàn)增長、加強(qiáng)影響力。目前，中國正在整頓其最積極的買家，但收購熱潮不久就會卷土重來。這不是壞事。跨境投資應(yīng)該能讓中國和世界其他國家產(chǎn)生有助于穩(wěn)定的共同利益。但美國、歐洲和其他國家的政府需要有一個(gè)明確的政策來應(yīng)對中國的收購要約。

The approach must acknowledge China’s unique characteristics, and set explicit standards for reciprocity, transparency and data security. Vague insistence on “strategic interests” generally will encourage resentment in China and protectionism in other countries. The world should welcome Chinese capital, but only on mutually beneficial terms.

這一政策必須承認(rèn)中國的獨(dú)特性，并為對等、透明度和數(shù)據(jù)安全制定明確的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。模糊地堅(jiān)持“戰(zhàn)略利益”往往會激起中國的怨恨和其他國家的保護(hù)主義。世界應(yīng)該歡迎中國資本，但只能是以互惠互利為條件。