美國(guó)精英的秘密恐懼

Almost 20 years ago, the columnist David Brooks caught the spirit of the age. His book Bobos in Paradise hailed the marriage between bohemian 1960s radicals and the money-chasing bourgeoisie of the 1980s. They had merged into the Clintons. In place of America’s Episcopalian elites came the meritocratic establishment. Anyone with talent could join. “From each according to his abilities, to each according to his abilities,” wrote Mr Brooks.

大約20年前，專(zhuān)欄作家戴維•布魯克斯(David Brooks)抓住了時(shí)代精神。他在《布波族：一個(gè)社會(huì)新階層的崛起》(Bobos in Paradise)一書(shū)中宣告了1960年代波西米亞激進(jìn)分子和1980年代追逐金錢(qián)的布爾喬亞的結(jié)合。這種結(jié)合的代表就是克林頓夫婦(the Clintons)這樣的人。美國(guó)的圣公會(huì)派精英們已被重視真才實(shí)學(xué)的建制派所取代。任何有才之士都可以加入。“各盡所能，按能分配。”布魯克斯寫(xiě)道。

This elite disliked glitzy consumption and lowbrow culture. Then, as now, Donald Trump topped the list of pariahs. His victory has strengthened and shattered their worldview. Beneath the conviction about Mr Trump’s wrongness lurks an angst that dare not speak its name. Mr Trump is a distraction from a reckoning that cannot be postponed forever.

這些精英不喜歡奢華消費(fèi)和低俗文化。那時(shí)，就像現(xiàn)在一樣，唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)高居賤民名單榜首。他的勝利鞏固、也粉碎了他們的世界觀。在斷言特朗普錯(cuò)了的背后，潛藏著一種不敢直接說(shuō)出來(lái)的焦慮。特朗普將人們的注意力引開(kāi)，讓人們暫時(shí)忘記了終極拷問(wèn)這回事，但這件事不能無(wú)限期推遲。

What will America’s elites see when they look inwards? The first will be the shock of self-recognition. Bourgeois bohemians thought they could have it both ways: capital accumulation and moral certainty with no trade-offs. If you studied hard and earned merit, there was plenty of room at the top.

當(dāng)美國(guó)的精英們審視自己的內(nèi)心時(shí)，他們會(huì)看到什么?首先將是自我認(rèn)知帶來(lái)的沖擊。布(爾喬亞)波(希米亞)族認(rèn)為他們可以兼顧：既積累資本，又占據(jù)道德優(yōu)勢(shì)，什么都不犧牲。如果你努力學(xué)習(xí)，獲得了真才實(shí)學(xué)，社會(huì)頂層的位置多得很。

But there was a flaw in this thinking. America’s elites have stored more wealth than they can consume. This creates three problems for everyone else. First, elites invest their surpluses in replicating their advantages. Kids raised in poorer neighbourhoods with mediocre schools stand little chance. Their parents cannot match the social capital of their wealthier peers. The drawbridge is rising. The gap between the self image of meritocratic openness and reality is wide. Psychologists call this “self-discrepancy”. Economists call it barriers to entry.

但這種想法有一個(gè)缺陷。美國(guó)精英們積累了花不完的財(cái)富。這給其他人帶來(lái)了三個(gè)問(wèn)題。首先，精英們把多余的財(cái)富投資于復(fù)制自己的優(yōu)勢(shì)。在學(xué)校一般的非富人區(qū)長(zhǎng)大的孩子，幾乎沒(méi)有機(jī)會(huì)躋身精英階層。他們的父母不像富人那樣擁有雄厚的社會(huì)資本。吊橋在收起。精英主義開(kāi)放的自我形象與現(xiàn)實(shí)之間的差距是巨大的。心理學(xué)家稱(chēng)之為“自我差異”。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家稱(chēng)其為進(jìn)入壁壘。

The second response to having such vast wealth is to create other kinds of scarcity. Since most people now have basic things — cars, smartphones and college education — material goods are no markers of success. Conspicuous consumption is played down. Scarce goods, such as an Ivy League degree or living in a neighbourhood where you do not need a car, are manically contested.

對(duì)擁有如此巨大財(cái)富的第二種反應(yīng)，是創(chuàng)造其他種類(lèi)的稀缺性。因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)在大多數(shù)人都擁有基本的物品——汽車(chē)、智能手機(jī)和大學(xué)教育——物質(zhì)方面的東西不是成功的標(biāo)志。炫耀性消費(fèi)收斂了。人們激烈爭(zhēng)奪的是稀缺商品，比如常青藤大學(xué)(Ivy League)的學(xué)位或居住在你不需要汽車(chē)的社區(qū)。

So are cultural advantages. America’s elites preach the gospel of a so-called stem education — science, technology, engineering and maths. But that is for other people. Social capital is about knowing what to say to whom and when, which is a sophisticated skill. Technical learning is for others. Children of the elites are learning how to raise money for philanthropic causes. Economists define this as a positional good. Sociologists call it virtue signalling. Mr Trump calls it political correctness.

文化優(yōu)勢(shì)也是一種。美國(guó)精英們宣揚(yáng)的信條是所謂科學(xué)、科技、工程及數(shù)學(xué)(英文首字母縮寫(xiě)為STEM)教育。但那是給其他人的。社會(huì)資本體現(xiàn)在知道在何時(shí)對(duì)誰(shuí)說(shuō)什么——這是一門(mén)復(fù)雜的技藝。技能學(xué)習(xí)是留給別人的。精英們的孩子們?cè)趯W(xué)習(xí)如何為慈善事業(yè)籌款。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家將此定義為地位商品(positional good)。社會(huì)學(xué)家稱(chēng)之為美德顯示(virtue signalling)。特朗普稱(chēng)之為政治正確。

The third challenge is the hardest to fix. Since there is too much capital chasing too few investment opportunities — what Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury secretary, calls “secular stagnation” — today’s America is cursed by an educational arms race. The jobs available do not match the qualifications millennials are acquiring. There is nothing relaxing about being a member of today’s aspiring classes. Kids must study harder and for longer than their parents to find jobs that do not often repay the effort.

第三個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)是最難解決的。由于有太多的資本追逐太少的投資機(jī)會(huì)——美國(guó)前財(cái)長(zhǎng)勞倫斯•薩默斯(Lawrence Summers)稱(chēng)之為“長(zhǎng)期性停滯”(secular stagnation)——如今，教育領(lǐng)域的“軍備競(jìng)賽”成了美國(guó)難以擺脫的詛咒。現(xiàn)有的工作崗位與千禧一代所獲得的文憑并不匹配。如今當(dāng)一個(gè)成功人士階層的子弟一點(diǎn)兒也不輕松。孩子們必須比他們的父母花更長(zhǎng)時(shí)間、更努力地學(xué)習(xí)，才能找到工作，而這些工作往往對(duì)不起他們付出的努力。

The children of the wealthiest do not need student loans and live off their parents’ capital. The rest are struggling to justify the expense. It is as though they were led up to the promised land at sundown. The ratio of effort to outcome is rising. The more people study, the lower the returns to education. You always need more credentials, which most cannot afford. Instead of capital, losers accumulate frustration.

最富有群體的孩子不需要學(xué)生貸款，而是靠父母的資本過(guò)活。其余的人則難以證明這高昂的投入是值得的。就好像他們?cè)谌章渲畷r(shí)被領(lǐng)向應(yīng)許之地。投入與產(chǎn)出的比例正在上升。學(xué)習(xí)的人越多，教育的回報(bào)就越低。你總是需要更多的文憑，這是大多數(shù)人都負(fù)擔(dān)不起的。輸家得到的是挫折感，而不是資本。

Which brings us back to Mr Trump. During the 2016 presidential election campaign, he said: “I love the poorly educated.” It seemed like a crass sentiment. But it appealed to many because it was the opposite of what other politicians would say. Mr Trump’s tweets betray his semi-literacy. He uses the word “their” when he means “there”. He talks of “unpresidented” when he means “unprecedented”. He uses quotation marks where they are not meant to “be”.

這把我們帶回到特朗普身上。在2016年總統(tǒng)競(jìng)選期間，他說(shuō)：“我熱愛(ài)沒(méi)怎么受教育的人。”這似乎是一種粗魯?shù)那榫w。但它吸引了很多人，因?yàn)檫@與其他政客的說(shuō)法恰好相反。特朗普的推文暴露了他是個(gè)半文盲。他想說(shuō)的是“there(在那里)”，寫(xiě)的卻是“their(他/她/它們的)”。他想說(shuō)的是“unprecedented(前所未有)”，寫(xiě)的卻是“unpresidented(不總統(tǒng))”。他在不該“有”引號(hào)的地方打引號(hào)。

Mr Trump’s antics are a comfort blanket to the cognitive elites. He validates our moral superiority. Yet he eats away at it too. Somewhere in our bourgeois subconscious is the realisation that Mr Trump is no accident. He holds up a cracked mirror to our illusions. When we mock him, he draws strength. When he provokes, we stumble. Yet we cannot help ourselves. He is deeply outrageous.

特朗普那滑稽反常的舉止是知識(shí)精英們的一塊安撫巾(comfort blanket)。他證實(shí)了我們的道德優(yōu)越感。但他也侵蝕了這種道德優(yōu)越感。在我們布爾喬亞潛意識(shí)中的某個(gè)地方，我們意識(shí)到特朗普并非偶然。他舉著一面破碎的鏡子，照出了我們的幻覺(jué)。當(dāng)我們嘲笑他時(shí)，他就汲取力量。當(dāng)他發(fā)起挑釁時(shí)，我們就犯錯(cuò)誤。然而，我們情不自禁。他令人太無(wú)法容忍了。

Therein lies our deepest secret. We need Mr Trump just as he needs us. It is a ghastly symbiosis. Without Mr Trump, there would be no distraction. We might be forced to examine whether we live up to our own values. Do we love the highly educated? Do they deserve by virtue of credentials to be celebrated? Or should we revisit what we mean by a fair society? Answers sought by email or Twitter — but in correct English if you please.

我們隱藏得最深的秘密就在這里。我們需要特朗普，就像他需要我們一樣。這是一種可怕的共生關(guān)系。沒(méi)有特朗普，就沒(méi)有人將大家的注意力引開(kāi)了。我們也許會(huì)被迫審視自己是否堅(jiān)守了自己的價(jià)值觀。我們喜歡受教育程度高的人嗎?他們是否因?yàn)槲沼形膽{而值得贊美?還是我們應(yīng)該重新審視我們所說(shuō)的公平社會(huì)?請(qǐng)通過(guò)電子郵件或推特把你的答案告訴我——但最好使用正確的英語(yǔ)。

[email protected] 譯者/何黎