敘利亞會(huì)變成以色列和伊朗的戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)嗎？

The downing of an Israeli warplane by Syrian air defences, after Israel said it brought down an Iranian drone launched from Syria into Israeli airspace, is the sort of lightning bolt that signals the alarming probability of a new regional war spinning out of the vortex of the Syrian civil war.

在以色列聲稱(chēng)擊落一架從敘利亞起飛后進(jìn)入以色列領(lǐng)空的伊朗無(wú)人機(jī)后，敘利亞防空部隊(duì)擊落了一架以色列戰(zhàn)機(jī)。這件事就像是一道警醒世人的閃電，表明從敘利亞內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的漩渦中可能引發(fā)出一場(chǎng)新的地區(qū)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

Any new war between Israel and Iranian forces and their allies, will not start now. But all the elements needed to ignite it are in place and on present trends it looks inexorable.

以色列和伊朗以及它們各自的盟友不會(huì)馬上就開(kāi)戰(zhàn)。但所有點(diǎn)燃戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)所需的要素都已齊備，按照目前的趨勢(shì)發(fā)展下去，打起來(lái)似乎是必然的。

The Israeli air force, long the lord of the Middle Eastern skies, is reckoned to have last lost a plane in 1982, the year Israel invaded Lebanon at the height of its neighbour’s civil war. This weekend it retaliated with a dozen air strikes inside Syria, including four that it said hit Iranian targets.

以色列空軍長(zhǎng)久稱(chēng)霸中東的天空，該國(guó)上一次損失戰(zhàn)機(jī)是在1982年——那一年黎巴嫩內(nèi)戰(zhàn)正是如火如荼的時(shí)候，以色列入侵了這個(gè)鄰國(guó)。最近，戰(zhàn)機(jī)被擊落的以色列采取了報(bào)復(fù)行動(dòng)，對(duì)敘利亞發(fā)動(dòng)了十幾次空襲——據(jù)以色列稱(chēng)，其中4次空襲擊中了伊朗目標(biāo)。

Starting in 2011, as part of the chain of uprisings optimistically dubbed the Arab Spring, Syria’s civil war has sucked in regional and global actors from Turkey to Iran, and the US to Russia. The intervention on the ground of Iran and allies such as Hizbollah, the powerful Lebanese paramilitary force that emerged out of Israel’s 1982 invasion, aligned with Russia’s air force since 2015, saved the minority regime of Bashar al-Assad from succumbing to a mainly Sunni rebellion.

2011年，作為被樂(lè)觀地稱(chēng)為“阿拉伯之春”(Arab Spring)的一系列起義的一部分，敘利亞內(nèi)戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)。許多國(guó)家都已卷入其中，中東地區(qū)的有土耳其、伊朗等，全球來(lái)看有美國(guó)、俄羅斯。伊朗及其盟友如黎巴嫩真主黨(一支實(shí)力強(qiáng)大的準(zhǔn)軍事力量，誕生于1982年以色列入侵黎巴嫩以后)在地面的干預(yù)，以及俄羅斯空軍自2015年以來(lái)的介入，使巴沙爾•阿薩德(Bashar al-Assad)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的少數(shù)族裔政權(quán)沒(méi)有在主要是遜尼派發(fā)起的叛亂中倒臺(tái)。

Seven years on, President Assad remains in office more than in power, as the ward of two states: Russia and Iran. Russia controls most of the air space of western Syria. Iran, through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hizbollah, and Iraqi and Afghan Shia militia, is consolidating a presence on the ground — part of Tehran’s drive to build a Shia Arab axis and land bridge from the Zagros Mountains to the Mediterranean. Israel regards this as strategically unacceptable.

七年過(guò)去了，在俄羅斯和伊朗兩國(guó)的庇護(hù)下，敘利亞總統(tǒng)阿薩德雖然權(quán)力被削弱但仍然在位。俄羅斯控制著敘利亞西部的大部分領(lǐng)空。伊朗通過(guò)其伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps)、真主黨以及伊拉克和阿富汗的什葉派民兵，正在鞏固其在敘利亞的勢(shì)力——這是伊朗打造什葉派阿拉伯軸心以及從扎格羅斯山脈到地中海的陸地走廊的計(jì)劃的一部分。以色列認(rèn)為該計(jì)劃在戰(zhàn)略上是不可接受的。

Israel, at war with Hizbollah episodically for more than 30 years, has avoided intervening directly in Syria’s war. But since 2013 it has carried out more than 100 air strikes inside Syria it says were aimed at Iranian arms destined for Hizbollah and, recently, what it described as an Iranian base. Israel, moreover, has said it cannot and will not accept two eventualities.

30多年來(lái)不時(shí)與真主黨發(fā)生戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的以色列原本避免直接干預(yù)敘利亞內(nèi)戰(zhàn)。但自2013年以來(lái)，以色列對(duì)敘利亞境內(nèi)發(fā)動(dòng)了超過(guò)100次空襲，聲稱(chēng)其空襲目標(biāo)是運(yùn)給真主黨——最近說(shuō)是運(yùn)到一個(gè)伊朗基地——的伊朗武器。況且，以色列已表態(tài)不能、也不會(huì)接受兩種情形。

First, if Iran and Hizbollah establish a permanent military presence in Syria, that is a casus belli, since it would open up a new front against Israel, alongside the Lebanese border to its north. Second, since Hizbollah fought it to a standstill over five weeks in 2006, the Lebanese militia has built a large arsenal of Iranian-supplied rockets that can reach deep into Israel. Israel says this stockpile — and missile manufacturing facilities it says it has detected in Lebanon — exceed its strategic tolerance.

第一，如果伊朗和真主黨在敘利亞建立永久性的軍事存在，這就是開(kāi)戰(zhàn)理由，因?yàn)閷脮r(shí)他們將能開(kāi)辟出一條對(duì)付以色列的新前線。第二，2006年真主黨曾與以色列開(kāi)打了超過(guò)5周的時(shí)間，直至休戰(zhàn)，自那時(shí)以來(lái)，這個(gè)黎巴嫩民兵組織已經(jīng)建立了龐大的軍火庫(kù)，里面裝滿(mǎn)了由伊朗供應(yīng)的火箭，可以直搗以色列腹地。以色列表示，該軍火庫(kù)的庫(kù)存——以及以方聲稱(chēng)在黎巴嫩偵察到的導(dǎo)彈制造設(shè)施——超過(guò)了其戰(zhàn)略容忍度。

This, as well as the game of chicken going on close to Israel’s borders, makes an eventual war more likely than not, turning Syria — and probably Lebanon — into a battlefield between Israel and Iran.

這一點(diǎn)，以及以色列邊境附近正在上演的“懦夫博弈”，導(dǎo)致最終爆發(fā)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的幾率大于不發(fā)生戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的幾率，那將把敘利亞——可能還有黎巴嫩——變成以色列和伊朗之間的戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)。

Such a war would be orders of magnitude more destructive than the existing mayhem in Syria’s crowded skies and contested territory: aside from the downed Israeli jet, a Russian plane was shot down by jihadis in Idlib and a Turkish helicopter was destroyed by Syrian Kurdish fighters (backed by the US but under attack by Nato ally Turkey) in north-west Syria. All this has happened in the past week.

這樣一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)在破壞性上會(huì)比敘利亞現(xiàn)在擁擠的天空和有爭(zhēng)議領(lǐng)土上的混亂高出幾個(gè)數(shù)量級(jí)。目前，除了被擊落的以色列戰(zhàn)機(jī)外，一架俄羅斯飛機(jī)在伊德利卜(Idlib)被圣戰(zhàn)分子擊落，還有一架土耳其直升機(jī)在敘利亞西北部被敘利亞庫(kù)爾德武裝分子(受美國(guó)支持，但遭到北約盟友土耳其的攻擊)擊毀。所有這一切都是在過(guò)去一周發(fā)生的。

Also last week and further east in the Euphrates valley, US air strikes obliterated a pro-Assad force, partly made up of Afghan Shia militia and Arab tribal fighters, as it moved against Washington’s Kurdish allies.

同樣在上周，在幼發(fā)拉底河流域東部，美國(guó)空襲摧毀了一支親阿薩德武裝力量(部分人員是阿富汗什葉派民兵和阿拉伯部落戰(zhàn)士)，當(dāng)時(shí)該部隊(duì)對(duì)美國(guó)的庫(kù)爾德盟友發(fā)動(dòng)了進(jìn)攻。

For the moment, neither Israel nor Iran look ready to add exponentially to this chaos. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, heads an ultra-right nationalist coalition but has always been more risk-averse than his bellicose rhetoric suggests. Iran’s clergy-dominated regime, no rhetorical slouch, will defend but probably not wish to risk its regional gains.

以色列和伊朗目前看來(lái)都無(wú)意讓這場(chǎng)混亂驟然升級(jí)。以色列總理本雅明•內(nèi)塔尼亞胡(Benjamin Netanyahu)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)一個(gè)極右翼民族主義執(zhí)政聯(lián)盟，他喜發(fā)好戰(zhàn)言論，但其實(shí)一直以來(lái)都沒(méi)那么愛(ài)冒險(xiǎn)。伊朗由神職人員掌控的政權(quán)在言論上也不遑多讓?zhuān)麄儠?huì)捍衛(wèi)自己的地區(qū)利益，但應(yīng)該不希望拿這些利益冒險(xiǎn)。

There is still the risk of miscalculation. Israel and Iran both believe in the utility of force to achieve their ends. Israel, moreover, is being egged on by Donald Trump, the US president, who looks set to undermine the nuclear restraint accord Iran agreed with six global powers in 2015; and encouraged surreptitiously by a Saudi Arabian-led Sunni Arab camp that is trying to roll back Iranian influence in the Levant and the Gulf.

誤判的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)仍然存在。以色列和伊朗都相信可以利用武力來(lái)達(dá)到目的。此外，以色列正受到美國(guó)總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的挑唆，后者似乎打算破壞2015年伊朗與六個(gè)大國(guó)簽署的核協(xié)議;以色列還受到由沙特牽頭的遜尼派陣營(yíng)的暗中慫恿，該陣營(yíng)試圖削減伊朗在地中海黎凡特地區(qū)(Levant)和海灣地區(qū)的影響力。

US secretary of state Rex Tillerson tours the Middle East next week, and will presumably urge restraint on Israel. But it is Russia, which under President Vladimir Putin has nurtured relations with Israel even as it has aligned with its enemy Iran, which is the only player with the capability to talk the two antagonists down from what could otherwise become a mechanical escalation towards war.

美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)卿雷克斯•蒂勒森(Rex Tillerson)本周訪問(wèn)中東，他可能會(huì)敦促以色列保持克制。但是，唯一有能力說(shuō)服兩個(gè)對(duì)手避免任由局勢(shì)自動(dòng)升級(jí)為戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的只有俄羅斯——在總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，俄羅斯雖說(shuō)已與以色列的敵人伊朗結(jié)盟，但它仍然與以色列鞏固了關(guān)系。