伊朗抗議活動會推動油價上漲嗎？

What does the spread of street protests across Iran mean for the oil market? The immediate response, driven no doubt by the substantial amounts of speculative money that are in play, is likely to be an upward spike. But although the troubles are serious and fuelled by real hardship in a struggling economy, there is no objective justification for any increase. If anything, the demonstrations can be seen as the prelude to a fall in prices.

街頭抗議在伊朗各地蔓延對石油市場來說意味著什么?毫無疑問，由于大量投機資金的作用，最直接的反應可能是油價上漲。但是，盡管目前的問題很嚴重，且處于困境中的伊朗經(jīng)濟存在實實在在的困難、使得境況愈發(fā)嚴峻，但并沒有客觀理由來支撐油價上漲。真要說的話，示威活動倒可以被視為油價下跌的前奏。

The first point in support of this argument is that the protests are based in the country's cities and towns and not, so far, in the oil-producing regions. The disturbances in the southern port of Bandar Abbas are serious but there has been no report of any trouble near the Abadan refinery. Stories of an attack on pipelines in the south by Sunni Islamist jihadis have not been confirmed. As yet, there is no immediate reason to think oil production will be interrupted.

支撐該觀點的第一個理由是，抗議活動主要發(fā)生在伊朗的城鎮(zhèn)中，目前為止尚未波及石油出產(chǎn)地區(qū)。南部港口阿巴斯港(Bandar Abbas)的騷亂較為嚴重，但在阿巴丹(Abadan)煉油廠附近沒有出現(xiàn)問題。有關遜尼派伊斯蘭圣戰(zhàn)分子襲擊了伊朗南部輸油管道的報道，截至目前為止未得到證實。迄今為止，沒有直接理由認為伊朗石油生產(chǎn)會中斷。

The second point is that the overriding drive of every Iranian government over the last 38 years since the 1979 revolution has been to stay in power and preserve the Islamic Republic, even if that involves making sudden and radical changes in policy. And in this they have been remarkably successful and remarkably pragmatic. As any visitor to Tehran will notice Iranian society, below a thin theocratic layer, is open and, within limits, tolerant of different views. The country has a partial democracy in which real votes are cast.

第二個理由是，自1979年伊朗伊斯蘭革命以來，過去38年里每屆伊朗政府的首要目標都是繼續(xù)掌權并維系這個伊斯蘭共和國，即使這涉及做出突然而激進的政策轉(zhuǎn)變。他們一直在非常成功并且極為務實地這樣做。正如所有去過德黑蘭的人都會發(fā)現(xiàn)的那樣，在薄薄的一層神權統(tǒng)治之下，伊朗社會是開放的，并可以在一定限度內(nèi)容忍不同觀點。伊朗擁有部分的民主，選民投出的選票是真實的。

This means that whatever the rhetoric about using an “iron fist” to stop the protests the more likely response will be to try to buy off the protesters with increased public spending and subsidies for basic needs such as food and fuel. The obvious way to fund such spending would be to increase oil exports. With prices relatively high that is a temptation for many oil producers; for Iran it could be an imperative. It would not be surprising to see the country abandon its Opec quota.

這意味著，無論領導人口頭上說要怎樣用“鐵腕”來阻止抗議活動，更可能的反應是，通過增加公共支出、以及補貼食品和燃料等必需品來收買示威者。為此類支出提供資金的顯而易見的辦法是增加石油出口。在油價相對較高的情況下，增加出口對很多石油生產(chǎn)國都是一種誘惑;對伊朗而言，這可能勢在必行。因此如果伊朗不管歐佩克石油生產(chǎn)配額，將不令人意外。

Increased Iranian output and exports would come at a time when other factors in the market suggest a new year surge in production. The North Sea should very soon be fully back on stream after the Forties pipeline problems, and Libyan production should also be restored after the December pipeline fire. On these fundamentals it is hard to see prices being higher at the end of January than they are now.

伊朗增加石油產(chǎn)量和出口的時候，將正值市場其他因素顯示新的一年產(chǎn)量將激增之際。在Forties輸油管道故障解決后，北海油田應該會很快全面恢復供應，12月管道起火后產(chǎn)量下降的利比亞應該也會恢復正常供應。以這些基本面因素來看，1月底的石油價格很難超過現(xiàn)在的水平。

Those are all temporary factors but there is a longer-term issue. The weakness of the Iranian economy cannot be corrected by a few handouts and subsidies. There are serious problems of unemployment and falling living standards.

這些都是暫時性因素，但還有一個較長期的問題。伊朗經(jīng)濟的疲軟無法通過寥寥無幾的救濟和補貼來糾正。伊朗還存在失業(yè)和生活水平下降的嚴重問題。

Two years ago the Iranian government came to the decision, with some reluctance, that it had to accept constraints on its nuclear programme in order to remove the sanctions that have damaged economic development. This was another example of pragmatism in action.

兩年前，伊朗政府不太情愿地決定：為了擺脫破壞其經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的制裁措施，伊朗不得不接受對其核項目的限制。這是又一個伊朗發(fā)揮務實主義的例子。

The problem is that the sanctions have only partially been lifted. Most international companies, including those in the energy business, have stayed away for fear of US action against them if they do business with Tehran. That leaves the country short of investment, technology and buyers for many of its products.

問題在于，制裁只得到了部分解除。包括能源企業(yè)在內(nèi)的大多數(shù)跨國企業(yè)都一直對伊朗敬而遠之，因為擔心與德黑蘭方面做生意會讓自己遭到美國懲罰。這使得伊朗缺少投資、技術和買家來發(fā)展自己的很多產(chǎn)品。

The current protests could lead to a fresh outbreak of pragmatism in Tehran. A new deal, on both the development of nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of support for militant groups across the region from Yemen to Lebanon, is not impossible. A significant relaxation in sanctions would help the Iranian economy and would suit many would-be investors — including, of course, the international oil industry.

目前的抗議活動可能導致德黑蘭方面緊急采取新一輪實用主義舉措。簽訂一份關于發(fā)展核武器和不再支持從也門到黎巴嫩的整個地區(qū)的武裝組織的新協(xié)議，也不是不可能的事情。大幅放松制裁將有助于伊朗經(jīng)濟，并順應很多潛在投資者的心意——其中當然包括國際石油工業(yè)。

There is a vast amount of money waiting for access to one of the last great prizes for the oil industry — huge undeveloped resources with a low cost base. President Donald Trump would no doubt claim that his pressure had forced Tehran to accept a tough deal. Crucially, though, the Islamic revolution would survive and Iran's current government would remain in power.

目前有大量資金正等待進入石油行業(yè)最后的寶地之一——這里有大量資源尚未開發(fā)，而且成本水平較低。美國總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)必然會聲稱，是他的施壓迫使德黑蘭方面接受了一份難以下咽的協(xié)議。不過，關鍵在于伊斯蘭革命的碩果將得以保全，并且伊朗現(xiàn)任政府將繼續(xù)掌權。

Nothing is certain. Hardline ideology could prevail and force the government into a long, miserable confrontation with the people. The Saudis — who would prefer the Islamic Republic as a pariah state rather than see it returning to respectability and a role as the region's dominant state — could well try to block any agreement.

一切都說不準。強硬的意識形態(tài)可能壓倒其他因素、迫使伊朗政府陷入與人民漫長而痛苦的對立。更希望看到伊斯被視為賤民國家、而不是重新獲得尊重并恢復該地區(qū)主導國家地位的沙特人，很可能試圖阻止達成任何協(xié)議。

Whatever the outcome, there is a sense of instability and unfinished business across the Middle East; 2018 is not going to be a dull year.

不管結果如何，整個中東都存在一種不穩(wěn)定和事情還沒消停的感覺;2018年不會是沉悶的一年。

The writer is visiting professor and chair of the Kings Policy Institute at King's College London

本文作者為倫敦大學國王學院(King’s College London)國王政策研究所(Kings Policy Institute)的客座教授兼主席