從“三十六計(jì)”，看中美博弈

The US decision to label China a “strategic competitor” confirms what could no longer be concealed: the world’s two most powerful countries are locked in a fervent rivalry. The question now is how damaging the tussle may become both for the two adversaries and the rest of the world.

美國(guó)把中國(guó)列為“戰(zhàn)略對(duì)手”(strategic competitor)的決定證實(shí)了不再被隱藏的事情：世界上最強(qiáng)大的兩個(gè)國(guó)家正處于激烈的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)當(dāng)中。現(xiàn)在的問(wèn)題是，這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)可能對(duì)這兩個(gè)對(duì)手和世界其他國(guó)家造成多大的破壞?

Some see the contest inevitably bearing out the deadly prophesies of the “trap” first identified by ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who described how the rise of Athens instilled a fear into Sparta that made war unavoidable. The past five centuries have seen 16 cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling one and in 12 of these cases the result was war, says Harvard professor Graham Allison.

有些人認(rèn)為，這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不可避免地將印證最早由古希臘歷史學(xué)家修昔底德(Thucydides)提出的“陷阱”的致命預(yù)言——修昔底德描述了雅典的崛起是如何讓斯巴達(dá)深陷恐懼當(dāng)中從而使戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)不可避免地發(fā)生的。美國(guó)哈佛大學(xué)教授格雷厄姆•阿利森(Graham Allison)表示，在過(guò)去500年里，有16個(gè)關(guān)于新崛起的強(qiáng)國(guó)威脅取代當(dāng)時(shí)占統(tǒng)領(lǐng)地位的老牌強(qiáng)國(guó)的案例，其中12例以戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)告終。

But a deeper view of China’s power accretion reveals strategies that are often more oblique than confrontational. Some of them appear faithful to the guileful lineage of the Chinese “36 stratagems”, a list of political, diplomatic and military tactics that date from around the same time that Thucydides was chronicling the Peloponnesian war in the fifth century BC.

但對(duì)中國(guó)實(shí)力增長(zhǎng)的更深層次的觀察顯示，中國(guó)更傾向于采取迂回的、而非對(duì)抗性的策略。一些策略似乎暗合“三十六計(jì)”。中國(guó)的“三十六計(jì)”描述了一系列政治、外交和軍事策略，差不多出現(xiàn)于公元前5世紀(jì)修昔底德記錄伯羅奔尼撒戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的同一時(shí)期。

Several of the stratagems emphasise the value in avoiding direct challenges to a stronger competitor while seeking to undermine it through “proximate strategies”, the best known of which is “replacing their beams with rotten timbers”. This describes disrupting an adversary’s structure by changing the rules they are used to following. The aim was to achieve victory while avoiding the seemingly inevitable war.

其中一些計(jì)策強(qiáng)調(diào)有必要避免直接挑戰(zhàn)比自己強(qiáng)大的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，同時(shí)尋求通過(guò)一套“并戰(zhàn)計(jì)”來(lái)削弱競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，其中最著名的一計(jì)是“偷梁換柱”。這種策略描述了通過(guò)改變對(duì)手習(xí)慣遵守的規(guī)則來(lái)破壞他們的架構(gòu)。目的是為了取得勝利，同時(shí)避免看似不可避免的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

Today too, China often appears keen to move alongside the US rather than take it on and build power structures that stand as alternatives to those that uphold the western-led global order.

今天同樣如此。中國(guó)往往表現(xiàn)得熱衷于與美國(guó)并肩前行，而不是與它斗并打造新的權(quán)力體系來(lái)取代支撐西方主導(dǎo)的全球秩序的權(quán)力體系。

“Right now I would describe the modus vivendi that the world has found as being parallel play,” said Lawrence Summers, the former US Treasury secretary, in a speech in November. “The west does its thing; China does its thing. Countries get a bunch of money from China and they do it China’s way. Countries get a bunch of money from us and they do it our way.”

美國(guó)前財(cái)長(zhǎng)勞倫斯•薩默斯(Lawrence Summers)今年11月在一場(chǎng)演講中表示：“當(dāng)前，我會(huì)把世界暫時(shí)達(dá)成的妥協(xié)局面形容為并行游戲。西方做它自己的事情，中國(guó)做它自己的事情。有的國(guó)家從中國(guó)那里得到一大筆錢，它們按照中國(guó)的方式做事。有的國(guó)家從我們這里得到一大筆錢，他們按照我們的方式做事。”

His concern was not war, but how long the beams that have held up the structure of global governance under Pax Americana may endure. While “everybody is very polite to everybody else” and all parties can still move forward together, he says the challenge remains: what is the system of global governance in which the US and the west and China are all going to participate in?

他擔(dān)心的不是戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，而是在“美國(guó)治下的和平”(Pax Americana)下支撐全球治理架構(gòu)的“梁”還能持續(xù)多久。盡管“人人都對(duì)他人禮貌相待”，各方仍然可以共同前進(jìn)，但他表示，挑戰(zhàn)依然存在：美國(guó)和西方以及中國(guó)都將參與的全球治理體系是什么樣子的?

Meanwhile, evidence of China’s parallel play is growing. The Belt and Road initiative (BRI), through which China intends to boost commerce with about 70 countries between Asia and Europe, puts Beijing in the driving seat of a new type of multilateralism. Run by a Communist party “leading group”, the BRI diverges from the US playbook in that it does not seek to negotiate a free trade treaty with member countries but promises a series of infrastructure projects financed and built by Beijing.

與此同時(shí)，不斷有證據(jù)顯示中國(guó)推行平行策略。中國(guó)“一帶一路”(BRI)倡議旨在促進(jìn)中國(guó)與約70個(gè)亞歐國(guó)家的貿(mào)易，它讓北京處于新型多邊主義的主導(dǎo)地位。由一個(gè)共產(chǎn)黨的“領(lǐng)導(dǎo)小組”運(yùn)營(yíng)的“一帶一路”與美國(guó)的游戲規(guī)則背道而馳，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)不謀求與成員國(guó)談判自由貿(mào)易條約，而是承諾由中國(guó)出資建設(shè)一系列基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目。

The BRI stands as a partial parallel structure to the World Trade Organization, within which China — in spite of its strongest objections — is not regarded as a “market economy”, putting Beijing at a disadvantage when it fights trade dumping cases levelled against it.

“一帶一路”在結(jié)構(gòu)上與世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)部分平行。中國(guó)在世貿(mào)組織內(nèi)沒(méi)有被視為“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)”國(guó)家(盡管中國(guó)對(duì)此表示強(qiáng)烈反對(duì))，這讓北京在應(yīng)對(duì)針對(duì)它的貿(mào)易傾銷案件時(shí)處于劣勢(shì)。

The ill will felt by Beijing over its status within the WTO may deepen following a decision this month by the US, EU and Japan to form an alliance to take on China over allegations that it unfairly subsidises its industries, forces foreign companies to transfer technology and engages in other unfair practices.

關(guān)于中國(guó)在世貿(mào)組織內(nèi)部的地位，北京方面將感受到更深的敵意，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)、歐盟和日本本月決定組建聯(lián)盟，共同指控中國(guó)對(duì)其產(chǎn)業(yè)提供不公平補(bǔ)貼、迫使外國(guó)公司轉(zhuǎn)讓技術(shù)，以及其他不公平做法。

“If the narrative since 1978 was of China’s slow integration to the international order and adoption of norms, it is turning now towards a systemic clash,” note François Godement and Abigaël Vasselier of the European Council on Foreign Relations think-tank.

智庫(kù)“歐洲對(duì)外交關(guān)系委員會(huì)”(European Council on Foreign Relations)的顧德明(François Godement)和阿比蓋爾•瓦塞爾耶(Abigaël Vasselier)指出：“如果說(shuō)1978年以來(lái)的敘事是中國(guó)慢慢融入國(guó)際秩序并遵守規(guī)則，那么現(xiàn)在的敘事正轉(zhuǎn)向系統(tǒng)性的沖突。”

In Europe, a China-led group called 16+1 brings together 11 members of the EU and five non-EU central and eastern European countries into a political and commercial grouping. All 16 members are also BRI countries, and several have signed up to significant Chinese-financed infrastructure deals, boosting Beijing’s influence inside the EU.

在歐洲，一個(gè)以中國(guó)為首的“16+1合作”機(jī)制把11個(gè)歐盟成員國(guó)和5個(gè)非歐盟的中東歐國(guó)家匯集成一個(gè)政治和商業(yè)組織。這16個(gè)成員國(guó)全都加入了“一帶一路”，其中幾個(gè)國(guó)家簽署了由中國(guó)提供資金的重大基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施協(xié)議，提升了北京在歐盟內(nèi)部的影響力。

Indeed, the country that Donald Trump identified along with Russia as “antithetical to US values and interests” bears the traits of a highly potent challenger.

確實(shí)，這個(gè)與俄羅斯一起被美國(guó)總統(tǒng)特朗普視為“與美國(guó)價(jià)值觀和利益相悖”的國(guó)家，具有強(qiáng)大的挑戰(zhàn)者的特征。

Contrary to longstanding arguments that China would collapse under the weight of its internal contradictions or become bogged down by huge domestic debts, Beijing’s authoritarian system is so far proving itself capable of nurturing world-class industries in e-commerce, big data, aspects of automation and some others.

與長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)有關(guān)中國(guó)將會(huì)因內(nèi)部矛盾而崩潰或者因巨額國(guó)內(nèi)債務(wù)而陷入困境的說(shuō)法相反，迄今的事實(shí)已經(jīng)證明，北京的威權(quán)體制有能力在電子商務(wù)、大數(shù)據(jù)、自動(dòng)化方面以及其他一些領(lǐng)域培育世界級(jí)產(chǎn)業(yè)。

If it sustains its rate of growth, China will eclipse the US as the world’s largest economy within the foreseeable future. A single-party state presiding over a non-market economy that is still “emerging” may then hold the whip hand in global commerce.

如果中國(guó)保持其經(jīng)濟(jì)增速，那么在可預(yù)見(jiàn)的未來(lái)，中國(guó)將超越美國(guó)成為世界第一大經(jīng)濟(jì)體。一個(gè)仍在“崛起”的一黨制非市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)國(guó)家接下來(lái)可能在全球貿(mào)易中處于支配地位。

The key issue then may not so much be how the world can avoid a “Thucydides trap” but how the west can repair the rotten timbers upon which its eviscerated governance structures rest.

那么關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題可能很大程度上不在于世界如何避免“修昔底德陷阱”，而是西方如何修復(fù)其治理架構(gòu)所依賴的已腐朽的柱子。