為什么說中國不會發(fā)生債務(wù)危機？

Are rising debt-to-gross domestic product ratios around the world a sign that another financial crisis is looming? At a recent investment conference, I had a heated debate with an economist who claimed that rising indebtedness across the globe was a sure sign of renewed economic sickness and deterioration. “The Minsky moment will return,” he declared, pounding the table. He singled out China as the place where the next financial collapse would occur. Credit expansion there, he said, had grown “too much, too fast”.

在全球范圍內(nèi)，債務(wù)與國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的比率不斷上升，這是否意味著另一場金融危機即將來臨?在最近一次投資會議上，我和一位經(jīng)濟學(xué)家進(jìn)行了激烈的爭論，他認(rèn)為全球債務(wù)增長是經(jīng)濟又出了問題、經(jīng)濟狀況惡化的確切跡象。他拍著桌子說：“明斯基時刻將重新降臨。”他認(rèn)為中國將是下一次金融崩潰的發(fā)生地。他說，中國的信貸擴張得“太多太快了”。

For decades, the debt-to-GDP ratio has been widely used as the key gauge of a nation’s financial vulnerability. Nevertheless, this measure has proved to be misleading. In the mid-1990s, when Japan’s gross ratio approached 120 per cent, many concluded that the country was heading for fiscal ruin, which would inevitably collapse the bond market and the yen, and cause hyperinflation. What has happened since then is that the total ratio has risen to 250 per cent today, while Japanese government bond yields have fallen to zero. Japan has suffered decades of price deflation.

幾十年來，債務(wù)與GDP比率一直被廣泛用作衡量一個國家金融脆弱性的關(guān)鍵指標(biāo)。不過，這一指標(biāo)已被證明是誤導(dǎo)性的。上世紀(jì)90年代中期，當(dāng)日本的這個總比率接近120%時，許多人斷定日本即將陷入財政危機，這將不可避免地造成該國債券市場和日元崩潰，并導(dǎo)致惡性通脹。而實際上，日本現(xiàn)在的總比率已上升到250%，其國債收益率已降到零。日本經(jīng)歷了數(shù)十年的通貨緊縮。

Looking around the world, the levels of interest rates for different countries are negatively correlated with levels of total indebtedness. Countries that have borrowed aggressively — such as Japan, China and Singapore — have very low or zero interest rates. On the other hand, countries that have barely borrowed, including Brazil, Russia and Indonesia, usually pay very high interest rates. This negative correlation is highly significant, disproving the widely held notion that higher debt levels lead to higher risk premia at the macro level.

環(huán)顧全球，各國的利率水平與總債務(wù)水平呈負(fù)相關(guān)。大量積累了債務(wù)的國家——如日本、中國和新加坡——利率非常低或為零。另一方面，巴西、俄羅斯和印度尼西亞等幾乎沒有借債的國家通常利率極高。這種負(fù)相關(guān)性是非常顯著的，它在宏觀層面推翻了一個廣泛持有的觀點：較高的債務(wù)水平會導(dǎo)致較高的風(fēng)險溢價。

How is this negative correlation explained? Interest rates are the price of domestic savings, and countries with more abundant savings almost always have lower interest rates. Moreover, every economy needs to transform its domestic savings into investment, usually through the banking system. It is inevitable, therefore, that countries with higher savings rates have lower interest rates, but higher levels of credit creation (or debt-to-GDP ratios) — because banks need to extend more credit to move larger pools of savings into investment. This means there is nothing wrong with high-saver nations having high ratios.

這種負(fù)相關(guān)該如何解釋?利率是國內(nèi)儲蓄的價格，而儲蓄較多的國家?guī)缀蹩偸窍碛休^低的利率。而且，每個經(jīng)濟體都需要將國內(nèi)儲蓄轉(zhuǎn)化為投資——一般是通過銀行體系。因此，儲蓄率較高的國家不可避免地會有較低的利率，但會有較高的信貸創(chuàng)造水平——或債務(wù)與GDP比率，因為銀行需要發(fā)放更多的信貸，將較為龐大的儲蓄轉(zhuǎn)化為投資。這說明高儲蓄國家有著高債務(wù)比率是沒有問題的。

The fundamental problem with this ratio is that it only provides a narrow snapshot of an economy’s debt picture. Debt is a stock concept, while GDP is a flow. The ratio tells you more about how much of an economy’s accumulated savings have been allocated via the debt channel. It does not tell us anything about a country’s net asset position. Nor does it provide any information on debt-servicing costs or the mix of local versus foreign currency-denominated debt. As such, the debt-to-GDP ratio gives us almost no information on a nation’s ability to sustain its debt.

這一比率的根本問題在于，它只讓我們窺見了一個經(jīng)濟體債務(wù)圖景的局部。債務(wù)是一個存量概念，而GDP是一個流量。其比率更多地是告訴你一個經(jīng)濟體中累積的儲蓄有多少是通過債務(wù)渠道來配置的。它絲毫不說明一個國家的凈資產(chǎn)狀況，也沒有提供關(guān)于償債成本或本外幣債務(wù)構(gòu)成的任何信息。因此，債務(wù)與GDP比率幾乎提供不了關(guān)于一個國家償債能力的任何信息。

In recent years, the rapid escalation of China’s credit-to-GDP ratio has been watched keenly by the investment community. Many predict that a debt crisis in the country would be the next big event that would bring down the world economy and global financial markets. I disagree. China’s domestic saving rate is 48 per cent, which amounts to almost $6tn of new savings each year. This vast pool of savings primarily relies on state-owned banks for allocation. It is therefore inevitable that the country has a high credit-to-GDP ratio.

近年來，中國的債務(wù)與GDP比率的快速上升一直備受投資界關(guān)注。許多人預(yù)測中國的債務(wù)危機將是下一個會拖垮世界經(jīng)濟和全球金融市場的重大事件。我不同意這一觀點。中國的國內(nèi)儲蓄率達(dá)到48%，相當(dāng)于每年有近6萬億美元新增儲蓄。這個龐大的儲蓄池主要依靠國有銀行進(jìn)行配置。這不可避免地導(dǎo)致了中國的信貸與GDP的高比值。

Furthermore, so-called credit risk in China is, in fact, sovereign risk. The Chinese government often relies on bank credit to finance government stimulus programmes. In 2009, Beijing launched a fiscal package worth more than $600bn to combat the effects of the global recession that followed the financial crisis. Subsequently, Chinese bank credit growth climbed steeply, lifting the credit-to-GDP ratio to new highs. In essence, the Chinese government was using credit expansion to finance fiscal stimulus. This was a credit-based equivalent of the Troubled Asset Relief Program in the US. There, fiscal stimulus programmes are financed by increasing public sector debt. In China, they are often funded by depositors.

而且，中國的所謂信貸風(fēng)險實際上是主權(quán)風(fēng)險。中國政府往往依靠銀行信貸為政府刺激計劃提供資金。2009年，北京方面推出了價值逾6000億美元的財政方案，以應(yīng)對金融危機后全球經(jīng)濟衰退的影響。隨后，中國銀行信貸增速大幅攀升，令信貸與GDP比率一再創(chuàng)下新高。實質(zhì)上，中國政府是利用信貸擴張來為財政刺激提供資金。這相當(dāng)于是美國“問題資產(chǎn)救助計劃”(Troubled Assets Relief Program, Tarp)的一個基于信貸的對等措施。在美國，財政刺激計劃的資金來自不斷上升的公共部門債務(wù)。在中國，這些資金通常由儲戶提供。

China has a chronic current account surplus and has been a net creditor to the rest of the world for decades. Beijing’s outstanding public sector debt, valued at about $4tn, is dwarfed by the vast assets controlled by the various levels of governments. Therefore, China’s sovereign risk is extremely low. Importantly, the balance sheets of the Chinese state-owned banks, the government and the People’s Bank of China are all interconnected. Under these circumstances, a debt crisis in China is almost impossible.

中國的經(jīng)常賬戶長期處于盈余狀態(tài)，且?guī)资陙硪恢笔鞘澜缙渌胤降膬魝鶛?quán)國。與中國各級政府控制的巨額資產(chǎn)相比，中國的公共部門未償債務(wù)余額——據(jù)估計約4萬億美元——相形見絀。所以中國的主權(quán)風(fēng)險極低。重要的是，中國的國有銀行、政府和中國人民銀行(PBoC)的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表都是相互關(guān)聯(lián)的。考慮到以上這些情況，債務(wù)危機在中國幾乎是不可能發(fā)生的。

The writer is founding partner and chief global strategist at Alpine Macro

作者是Alpine Macro的創(chuàng)始合伙人兼首席全球策略師