企業(yè)太愛(ài)存錢(qián)困擾日本經(jīng)濟(jì)

Prime minister Shinzo Abe’s victory in the recent election in Japan opens up significant opportunities for political and economic change. But not in the case of one of the biggest structural problems facing the Japanese economy — the tendency of business to save vastly more than it invests, with deflationary consequences.

日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)在最近的大選中獲勝為政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)改革開(kāi)啟了重大機(jī)遇。但日本經(jīng)濟(jì)面臨的最大的結(jié)構(gòu)性問(wèn)題之一仍無(wú)起色，這個(gè)問(wèn)題就是企業(yè)儲(chǔ)蓄資金往往遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)投資，由此帶來(lái)通縮性后果。

In an ageing society like Japan’s, deflation ought to be a dwindling threat. Rising numbers of elderly people could be expected to save less while consumption should increase with age thanks to relatively generous pensions and healthcare. At the same time, a shrinking workforce should enjoy increased labour market power and demand higher wages.

在一個(gè)像日本這樣的老齡化社會(huì)里，通縮威脅理應(yīng)日漸式微。隨著老年人日益增多，得益于相對(duì)慷慨的養(yǎng)老金和醫(yī)療服務(wù)，儲(chǔ)蓄理應(yīng)下降，同時(shí)消費(fèi)應(yīng)該隨著年齡增長(zhǎng)而增加。與此同時(shí)，勞動(dòng)力日益減少應(yīng)該意味著勞動(dòng)者在就業(yè)市場(chǎng)上的力量上升，他們可以要求更高的薪資。

In the event Japanese households have reduced their savings close to zero. Yet this has been more than offset by the rise in corporate savings. At the same time wage growth has failed to materialise. Lifetime employees continue to value security of employment and feel a loyalty to the company, which keeps them docile. There has also been a big increase in the number of part time workers whose bargaining power is weak.

實(shí)際上，日本家庭的儲(chǔ)蓄的確下降至接近于零的水平。然而，這完全被企業(yè)儲(chǔ)蓄的增長(zhǎng)所抵消。與此同時(shí)，工資增長(zhǎng)未能實(shí)現(xiàn)。終身雇員繼續(xù)看重就業(yè)安全，并對(duì)公司保持忠誠(chéng)，這讓他們保持順從。談判實(shí)力較弱的兼職人員數(shù)量也大幅增加。

Too much income is trapped in a risk-averse corporate sector awash with record profits, while Japan suffers from a structural deficiency of consumer income. The country has only escaped a 1930s-style slump because the government has run huge deficits to sustain demand, at the cost of soaring public sector debt.

太多的盈余被厭惡風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的企業(yè)部門(mén)留存，這些企業(yè)的利潤(rùn)達(dá)到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄水平，同時(shí)日本遭遇消費(fèi)者收入結(jié)構(gòu)性匱乏的問(wèn)題。日本避免了上世紀(jì)30年代的那種衰退，只是因?yàn)檎\(yùn)行巨額赤字以維持需求，代價(jià)是公共部門(mén)債務(wù)飆升。

The Abe government’s response to cash hoarding has been to push for higher wages and try to make corporate governance more shareholder friendly. The companies act was amended in 2014 to promote better boards and a corporate governance code was introduced the following year. The aim was to enhance corporate performance and encourage co-operation with stakeholders while securing shareholder rights. A stewardship code was also brought in to prod institutional investors into engaging with company management.

安倍政府對(duì)企業(yè)囤積現(xiàn)金的回應(yīng)是呼吁提高薪資，并努力讓企業(yè)治理對(duì)股東更加友好。日本在2014年修訂了公司法以強(qiáng)化董事會(huì)職能，并在第二年出臺(tái)了企業(yè)治理?xiàng)l例。目的是增強(qiáng)企業(yè)表現(xiàn)，并鼓勵(lì)公司在保障股東權(quán)利的同時(shí)，與所有利益相關(guān)者合作。日本還推出了管理守則，以促使機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司管理。

While the reforms have encouraged a greater focus on returns on equity, there has been no radical change in business behaviour. As deputy prime minister Taro Aso acknowledged recently, there is an issue here of form versus substance. Akira Matsumoto, chairman of food group Calbee, declared at an OECD conference last month that his governance priorities were customers first, followed by employees, then the community, with shareholders trailing in fourth place. That view is widely shared by other business leaders. And Japan continues to have the lowest dividend payout ratio among the Group of Seven major developed countries.

雖然這些改革鼓勵(lì)了公司加大關(guān)注股本回報(bào)率，但商業(yè)行為并沒(méi)有發(fā)生根本變化。正如日本副首相麻生太郎(Taro Aso)最近承認(rèn)的那樣，這里存在著形式與實(shí)質(zhì)的問(wèn)題。食品集團(tuán)卡樂(lè)比(Calbee)董事長(zhǎng)松本晃(Akira Matsumoto)上月在經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織(OECD)的一個(gè)會(huì)議上宣稱(chēng)，他的治理重點(diǎn)首先是顧客，其次是員工，然后是社區(qū)，股東位居第四。其他企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人普遍認(rèn)同這一觀點(diǎn)，而日本在七國(guó)集團(tuán)(G7)中的股息支付率仍然是最低的。

The limited effectiveness of Japan’s governance reforms is, in one sense, unsurprising. Japanese company law in the postwar period made directors formally accountable to shareholders. But in a dispersed ownership system lacking dominant family shareholders, such accountability was meaningless. Companies were run in the interests of managers and workers. Indeed, the genius of the postwar Japanese model of capitalism was that it did away with capitalists. In place of the money motive as the motor for economic growth, it substituted the employees’ work ethic.

日本治理改革效果有限從某種意義上說(shuō)不足為奇，日本在戰(zhàn)后出臺(tái)的公司法使得董事們?cè)谡降膶用嫦蚬蓶|負(fù)責(zé)。但是在缺乏家族大股東的分散的所有權(quán)體系中，這種問(wèn)責(zé)制度毫無(wú)意義。公司為了經(jīng)理和工人的利益而經(jīng)營(yíng)。的確，戰(zhàn)后日本資本主義模式的高明之處在于排除了資本家。就經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)動(dòng)力而言，社會(huì)用員工的職業(yè)道德取代了金錢(qián)激勵(lì)。

The Japanese economy is currently enjoying a cyclical upturn. Yet Japan remains stuck with its structural savings surplus and governance scandals endure. When I asked Tomoyuki Furusawa, deputy director-general of the supervisory bureau of Japan’s Financial Services Agency, how long it would take for genuine shareholder accountability to emerge, he suggested five years.

日本經(jīng)濟(jì)目前正處于周期性好轉(zhuǎn)階段。然而日本仍然受到結(jié)構(gòu)性?xún)?chǔ)蓄盈余的困擾，同時(shí)治理丑聞?chuàng)]之不去。當(dāng)我問(wèn)日本金融廳(Financial Services Agency)監(jiān)督局官房擔(dān)當(dāng)古澤知之(Tomoyuki Furusawa)真正的股東問(wèn)責(zé)制將需要多久才能出現(xiàn)的時(shí)候，他提出要五年。

Responding to the same question, Mark Mobius of fund manager Franklin Templeton, opted for 20 years. He felt the stakeholder mindset was too entrenched to permit earlier change. Certainly governance reform alone seems unlikely to secure sweeping changes in business savings behaviour.

在回答同樣的問(wèn)題時(shí)，基金公司富蘭克林鄧普頓(Franklin Templeton)的麥樸思(Mark Mobius)給出的答案是20年。他覺(jué)得利益相關(guān)者的思維定勢(shì)太深，以至于不會(huì)允許更早的變革。當(dāng)然，單單治理改革似乎不太可能徹底改變企業(yè)儲(chǔ)蓄行為。