拋棄“緬甸童話”

Myanmar today presents a more worrying picture than at almost any time since the darkest days of military dictatorship. The world's attention has rightly been focused on the Rohingya crisis and the plight of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children fleeing in one of the biggest refugee exoduses since the second world war.

當(dāng)今的緬甸比軍事獨裁最黑暗時期結(jié)束以來的幾乎任何時候都更令人擔(dān)憂。世界關(guān)注著羅興亞危機(jī)以及由此導(dǎo)致的二戰(zhàn)以來最大難民潮之一當(dāng)中的幾十萬男女老幼的苦難，這種關(guān)注并沒有錯。

The worst may not be over. Humanitarian needs are far from met and discussions have barely begun on possible refugee return or the investigation of human rights abuses.

最壞的情況可能還未結(jié)束。人道主義需求遠(yuǎn)未得到滿足，圍繞未來難民可能回國或者對侵犯人權(quán)行為進(jìn)行調(diào)查的討論幾乎還未開始。

There is a chance that western countries may respond with targeted sanctions. Even if formal sanctions are not imposed, international investor interest and tourism numbers will doubtless plummet. This is at a time when local business confidence is weak and banks unstable. Millions of the poorest people in Asia may soon face an unbearably bleak future.

西方國家有可能采取針對性的制裁措施作為回應(yīng)。即便不施加正式制裁，國際投資者的興趣和游客數(shù)量無疑都將急劇下滑。而當(dāng)前正值緬甸國內(nèi)商業(yè)信心羸弱，銀行不穩(wěn)定。亞洲最貧窮的數(shù)百萬民眾或許很快將面臨一個不堪忍受的暗淡未來。

Any economic downturn will directly threaten Myanmar’s already fragile peace process. The country is home to approximately 20 “ethnic armed organisations”, the largest of which is fielding more than 20,000 troops, and hundreds of local militia.

任何經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷都將直接威脅緬甸本已脆弱的和平進(jìn)程。緬甸國內(nèi)存在大概20支“少數(shù)民族武裝”，其中規(guī)模最大的一支擁有逾2萬兵力，還有數(shù)以百計的地方民兵。

Fierce fighting has erupted at times during the past few years and there are nearly 500,000 internally displaced people along the Thai and Chinese borders. Economic growth alone will not lead to peace, but without the pull of an inclusive and fast-developing economy, the peace process will have no steam.

過去幾年，激烈的戰(zhàn)斗不時爆發(fā)，在緬甸與泰國和中國接壤的邊界地帶有近50萬人流離失所。經(jīng)濟(jì)增長本身不會帶來和平，但如果沒有包容、快速發(fā)展的經(jīng)濟(jì)的拉動，和平進(jìn)程就會失去動力。

The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, responsible for the August attacks which set off the latest round of violence, may well strike again. There is an even worse scenario where international jihadi groups or others inspired by them target cities in central Myanmar, where 2m other, non-Rohingya Muslims, are for now living in peace with their Buddhist, Hindu and Christian neighbours. Imported terrorism could easily spark communal violence, with devastating consequences.

新一輪的暴力沖突是由若開羅興亞救世軍(ARSA)今年8月發(fā)動的襲擊引發(fā)的，該組織很可能再次發(fā)動襲擊。更糟糕的一個可能情形是，國際圣戰(zhàn)組織或受其鼓動的其他人將緬甸中部多個城市作為目標(biāo)，這些城市里生活著200萬非羅興亞穆斯林，目前他們與信仰佛教、印度教和基督教的鄰居們和睦相處著。外來的恐怖主義很容易在族群之間引發(fā)暴力，釀成災(zāi)難性后果。

For many in the west, Myanmar has been seen for decades almost exclusively as a Manichean struggle between the democracy movement, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and a faceless junta. Few have wanted to understand the depth and complexity of Myanmar’s challenges or help find a pragmatic way forward. Policy failures have had little political cost.

對于許多西方人，緬甸問題幾十年來幾乎一直被看作一場正義與邪惡的斗爭，一邊是由昂山素季(Aung San Suu Kyi)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的民主運動，另一邊是鐵板一塊的軍政府。很少有人愿意去了解緬甸所面臨挑戰(zhàn)的深度和復(fù)雜性，或者幫助緬甸尋找一條切合實際的發(fā)展道路。政策上的失敗幾乎沒有造成任何政治代價。

Inside the country, there is a myth of Myanmar as a rich country gone wrong, a belief in a golden age not long ago, ruined by military despots. The corollary to this is believing that a single shift, say to democratic government, is all that is needed to unlock potential and restore the country to its rightful place as one of the most prosperous in the region. An actual nuts and bolts programme for modernisation is nowhere to be found.

緬甸國內(nèi)存在一個將緬甸視為一個誤入歧途的富饒國家的神話，相信不那么久之前的緬甸處于一個黃金時代，只是被軍事獨裁者毀掉了。這種敘事的必然結(jié)果是，人們相信只需要一個轉(zhuǎn)變——比如轉(zhuǎn)向民主政府——就可以釋放這個國家的潛力，讓緬甸恢復(fù)其應(yīng)有的地位：本地區(qū)最繁榮的國家之一。但沒有人拿得出實現(xiàn)現(xiàn)代化的具體方案。

The tendency is to gloss over the effects of 20 years of sanctions, 30 years of self-isolation, 50 years of authoritarian rule, 70 years of internal war, and more than 100 years of colonialism.

人們傾向于輕描淡寫20年制裁、30年自我隔離、50年威權(quán)統(tǒng)治、70年內(nèi)戰(zhàn)以及100多年殖民統(tǒng)治的影響。

The impact of generations of virtually no public spending on health and education is everywhere to be seen. Xenophobic tendencies are entrenched across the political scene. State institutions are brittle and in many parts of the country practically non-existent. Progress on any front, even with maximum political will, will not be easy.

幾代人時期在醫(yī)療和教育上幾乎沒有公共支出造成的影響隨處可見。仇外傾向在整個政治體系中根深蒂固。國家機(jī)構(gòu)脆弱，而且在國內(nèi)的許多地方基本上不存在。即便有最大的政治意志，也不容易取得任何方面的進(jìn)步。

Some things have certainly improved in the past few years: political life is freer than at any time in half a century and at least a tentative transition has been made from military dictatorship to a quasi-elected government. No one wants to go back to isolation.

過去幾年，有些方面確實有了改善：政治生活比過去半個世紀(jì)以來的任何時候都自由，而且至少實現(xiàn)了從軍事獨裁向準(zhǔn)民選政府的初步過渡。沒人想要回到孤立狀態(tài)。

But the mix of challenges now facing the country is so great, it is hard to see a positive narrative continuing. It is not just the peace process, the economy, and the Rohingya crisis.

但這個國家如今面臨的眾多挑戰(zhàn)如此艱巨，很難看到一種積極的發(fā)展勢頭。挑戰(zhàn)不僅在于和平進(jìn)程、國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)和羅興亞危機(jī)。

Migration, urbanisation, climate change, and new feelings and agendas unleashed by a revolution in telecoms are reshaping the social landscape. Relations with China are at an inflection point, with the possibility of huge new infrastructure projects remaking Myanmar’s geography.

移民、城市化、氣候變化以及電信革命帶來的新感覺和議程，正在重塑社會面貌。與中國的關(guān)系正處于拐點，可能上馬的新的大型基建項目將重畫緬甸的地理面貌。

At the same time, almost no one is considering the long view. Just take northern Rakhine, site of today’s violence and tomorrow’s possible refugee return: what will it be in 10 or 15 years? A stop on a new super-highway between China and India? Or will climate change sink it into the sea?

與此同時，幾乎沒有人對緬甸的未來進(jìn)行長遠(yuǎn)考量。僅以北方的若開邦——當(dāng)前暴力及未來難民可能回歸之地——為例：10年或15年后這里會變成什么樣?它會成為中國和印度之間新建高速公路上的中間站?還是會因氣候變化被海水淹沒?

Even an experienced government aided by super technocrats would struggle to manage what Myanmar is having to manage, let alone plan for the future.

即便是一個有超強(qiáng)技術(shù)官僚輔佐的經(jīng)驗豐富的政府，都很難解決緬甸當(dāng)前不得不應(yīng)對的問題，更不用說對未來進(jìn)行規(guī)劃。

The outside world is absolutely right to prioritise the crisis at hand. It is equally important, though, to jettison once and for all the Myanmar fairytale, and to appreciate that working in Myanmar means working with a near-failed state; to redouble efforts to boost the country’s own abilities, in particular through investments in health and education; and, perhaps most of all, to help inject fresh thinking about an exciting future for all.

國際社會優(yōu)先處理眼下的危機(jī)一點兒沒錯。然而，同樣重要的是要徹底拋棄“緬甸童話”，意識到在緬甸開展工作意味著與一個近乎失敗的國家合作;要加倍努力以提升緬甸自身的能力，特別是通過對醫(yī)療和教育的投資;而且，或許也最重要的是，為所有人注入關(guān)于一個激動人心的未來的新思維。

Otherwise, the current crisis will be just the first of many to come.

否則，當(dāng)下的危機(jī)將成為未來更多危機(jī)的開端。

The writer is author of the forthcoming book ‘The Secret History of Burma’

本文作者即將出版《緬甸秘史》(The Secret History of Burma)一書