特朗普若撕毀伊核協(xié)議將增強朝鮮核野心

To hear Donald Trump speak of Kim Jong Un is to imagine a cartoon character — a “rocket man” on a “suicide mission”. To watch the US president’s deeds, however, is to discover that the North Korean dictator is not as crazy as he makes him out to be.

聽唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)說起金正恩(Kim Jong Un)，你的腦海中會浮現(xiàn)出一個卡通人物——一個執(zhí)行“自殺式任務(wù)”的“火箭人”。然而，觀察美國總統(tǒng)的行為，你會覺得，那位朝鮮獨裁者并不像特朗普形容的那樣瘋狂。

I am thinking here of Mr Trump’s expected refusal to certify that Iran is in compliance with the nuclear agreement reached with world powers in 2015. If you are Mr Kim, you would conclude that you have been right all along: the US cannot be trusted, even when it puts its name to an international agreement.

在這里，我指的是特朗普預(yù)計將拒絕承認伊朗遵守了2015年與世界大國達成的核協(xié)議。如果你是金正恩，你會得出一個結(jié)論，自己自始至終都做對了：不能相信美國，即便它在國際協(xié)議中署上了自己的名字。

Seen from Pyongyang, the only way to deter an American invasion has always been to establish North Korea as a nuclear power that is both capable and willing to strike first or retaliate devastatingly. That is why China argues against excessive pressure on the regime. Mr Kim, says one official, would “prefer to die standing” than give in to the US.

從平壤的角度來看，要阻止美國入侵，從來都只有一個辦法，那就是將朝鮮打造為一個核大國，既有能力、也有意愿實施先發(fā)制人的打擊，或者進行毀滅性報復(fù)。這正是為什么中國反對向朝鮮政權(quán)過度施壓的原因。一名官員曾表示，金正恩“寧愿站著死”，也不愿向美國屈服。

Now Mr Kim will feel vindicated in his intransigence, and confident that his nuclear programme, far more advanced than Iran’s, remains the ticket to his regime’s survival.

如今金正恩將會認為自己不妥協(xié)是正確的，并堅信本國比伊朗先進得多的核計劃仍是維持其政權(quán)生存所必需的。

Mr Trump, who likes to keep us guessing about his intentions (“It’s the calm before the storm,” he said cryptically at the weekend, a statement many took as referring to North Korea) is set to conclude that Iran is in contravention of a historic deal that rolled back Tehran’s nuclear activities in return for sanctions relief. No matter that there is no evidence to that effect from the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose job it is to rule on compliance. Or that no other signatory to the agreement agrees with the US president.

特朗普喜歡讓我們猜測他的意圖(“這是暴風(fēng)雨來臨前的平靜”，他上周末神秘兮兮地說，許多人認為這一表態(tài)暗指朝鮮)，他即將認定，伊朗違背了歷史性的伊核協(xié)議——伊朗終止核活動以換取解除制裁的協(xié)議。特朗普不管國際原子能機構(gòu)(IAEA)并未給出伊朗違反協(xié)議的證據(jù)，也不在乎協(xié)議其他簽署國都不認同他的觀點。

Being Mr Trump, he could still change his mind and surprise us with a different outcome. But assuming he goes ahead with decertification, Congress will have to consider whether to re-impose sanctions on Iran or raise the pressure through other means.

因為他是特朗普，所以他仍有可能改變想法，帶來一個出乎我們意料的不同結(jié)果。但假設(shè)他執(zhí)意認定伊朗沒有遵守協(xié)議，美國國會將不得不考慮是否重新對伊朗實施制裁，或者通過其他手段加大對伊朗施壓。

Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader who had to be convinced by moderates in the regime of the benefits of the nuclear agreement, will have to answer hardliners who warned him against it.

曾被國內(nèi)溫和派說服、相信伊核協(xié)議會帶來好處的伊朗最高領(lǐng)袖阿亞圖拉阿里•哈梅內(nèi)伊(Ayatollah Ali Khamenei)，將不得不向那些告誡他不要認可該協(xié)議的強硬派作出解釋。

Meanwhile, from North Korea, Mr Kim will be watching. It is not just Iran’s predicament he is interested in. Sadly, he has already drawn lessons from the fate of other nuclear-aspiring leaders in the Middle East, with some of whom his regime collaborated. Those who wavered in their nuclear pursuit or were forced to abandon their programmes met an ugly death.

與此同時，坐鎮(zhèn)朝鮮的金正恩將注視著這一切。他感興趣的不只是伊朗的困境。唉，他早已從中東地區(qū)其他渴望擁有核武器的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人(其中一些還與平壤合作過)的命運中吸取了教訓(xùn)。那些動搖了追求核武決心或者被迫放棄了核計劃的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都死得很慘。

First, there was Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator who developed a nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programme in the 1980s. In the aftermath of the first Gulf war, Iraq was forced to get rid of all weapons of mass destruction. But Saddam played a cat-and-mouse game with inspectors, feeding suspicions that he was hiding parts of his arsenal. Those suspicions gave the US the justification it was looking for to launch the Iraq war in 2003, after which Saddam was hunted down, put on trial, and hanged.

首先是薩達姆•侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)，這位伊拉克獨裁者上世紀80年代就制定了研發(fā)核武器、化學(xué)和生物武器的計劃。第一次海灣戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束后，伊拉克被逼銷毀了所有大規(guī)模殺傷性武器。但薩達姆與核查人員玩起了貓捉老鼠的游戲，致使外界懷疑他藏匿了部分武器。這些猜疑，給美國2003年發(fā)動伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭提供了理由，后來薩達姆被抓獲，受審并被處以絞刑。

Extensive searches after the war, however, produced no weapons, leading some observers to speculate that Saddam had perpetuated the myth of WMD possession to maintain the climate of fear that helped him stay in power.

然而，戰(zhàn)后進行的大規(guī)模搜查并未發(fā)現(xiàn)任何此類武器。一些觀察人士因此推測，薩達姆任由自己擁有大規(guī)模殺傷性武器的謊話繼續(xù)流傳，是為了維持一種有助于他繼續(xù)掌權(quán)的恐怖氣氛。

Then there was Muammer Gaddafi, the mercurial Libyan leader labelled by Ronald Reagan as the “mad dog” of the Middle East. In 2003, after negotiations with the US and Britain, Gaddafi announced the dismantling of his nuclear programme. The decision paved the way for Libya’s rehabilitation. Less than a decade later, when the Libyan revolution erupted and Gaddafi threatened to attack the eastern city of Benghazi, a Nato-led coalition intervened and tilted the balance of power towards Libya’s rebels. Gaddafi was captured by rebels and killed.

接著是性格反復(fù)無常的利比亞領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人穆阿邁爾•卡扎菲(Muammer Gaddafi)，羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)曾說他是中東“瘋狗”。2003年，在與美英兩國談判后，卡扎菲宣布放棄核計劃。這一決定為利比亞復(fù)興鋪平了道路。但不到10年后，當利比亞爆發(fā)革命、卡扎菲威脅攻打東部城市班加西時，北約領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的聯(lián)軍進行了干預(yù)，使得戰(zhàn)場上的實力天平偏向了利比亞叛軍一邊?？ㄔ谱罱K被叛軍抓獲并擊斃。

Mr Kim, who is only 33 and wishing to prolong his own life and that of his regime, is gambling that his nuclear weapons will save him from a similar fate and force the US to accept North Korea as a nuclear power. It will turn out to be a grave miscalculation if the US and North Korea go to war. But when Mr Trump undermines the nuclear deal with Iran, he also reinforces Mr Kim’s belief that his gamble is worth taking.

年僅33歲、希望自己和金氏政權(quán)都能長久的金正恩賭的是，他手中的核武器將保護自己免遭類似命運，并迫使美國接受朝鮮成為擁核國家。如果美朝兩國爆發(fā)戰(zhàn)爭，那將是嚴重誤判的結(jié)果。但是，當特朗普破壞伊核協(xié)議時，他同時也將強化金正恩的信念，即擁核是一件值得冒險去做的事。