美國威脅制裁中國大公司
美國威脅要就北京方面支持朝鮮對(duì)中國大型公司施加制裁，這一威脅引發(fā)了圍繞這些制裁措施可能采取的形式及其潛在后果的一場大猜測。
On Tuesday US president Donald Trump warned that the UN’s latest sanctions were “nothing compared to ultimately what will have to happen”, while Ed Royce, chairman of the House foreign affairs committee, said Washington should target “major Chinese banks doing business with North Korea”.
9月12日，美國總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)警告說，聯(lián)合國(UN)最新的對(duì)朝制裁“比起最終不得不發(fā)生的事情根本算不上什么”，而美國眾議院外交事務(wù)委員會(huì)主席埃德•羅伊斯(Ed Royce)稱，美國的目標(biāo)應(yīng)該是“與朝鮮有生意往來的大型中資銀行”。
The Financial Times has examined the most likely targets for unilateral US action against Chinese groups and the potential blowback from Beijing. Here are some key questions.
英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》研究了美國針對(duì)中資集團(tuán)的單方面行動(dòng)最有可能鎖定的目標(biāo)，以及北京方面可能會(huì)采取的反擊。下面是一些關(guān)鍵問題。
Why is the US considering further unilateral action?
為什么美國考慮采取進(jìn)一步的單方面行動(dòng)?
Mr Trump has identified the reining in of North Korea’s nuclear programme as his top foreign policy priority and has consistently urged China to do more to put pressure on its Communist neighbour. But Pyongyang’s weapons trials have continued unabated, with the regime testing numerous missiles this year and its sixth and largest nuclear bomb this month.
特朗普已將遏制朝鮮核計(jì)劃作為其外交政策的頭等大事，并一直敦促中國采取更多行動(dòng)向其共產(chǎn)主義鄰邦施壓。但平壤方面仍在繼續(xù)馬力全開地進(jìn)行武器試驗(yàn)，該政權(quán)今年進(jìn)行了多次導(dǎo)彈試驗(yàn)，本月更是進(jìn)行了第六次也是威力最大的一次核爆試驗(yàn)。
While the UN on Monday agreed its strongest sanctions yet against the Kim Jong Un regime, the resolution won support from China and Russia only after stronger US proposals, including a total oil embargo, had been watered down.
9月11日當(dāng)聯(lián)合國通過對(duì)金正恩(Kim Jong Un)政權(quán)采取迄今為止最嚴(yán)厲制裁的決議時(shí)，中國和俄羅斯投了贊成票;但相對(duì)于美國之前提出的一些更嚴(yán)苛的提議(包括完全的石油禁運(yùn))，此決議已有所折中。
Meanwhile, sanctions imposed by the US earlier this year on small Chinese companies such as Bank of Dandong, a regional lender based on the border with North Korea, have not inflicted significant pain on China.
與此同時(shí)，今年早些時(shí)候美國針對(duì)丹東銀行(Bank of Dandong)等中國小型企業(yè)實(shí)施的一系列制裁措施，并沒有讓中國感到切膚之痛。丹東銀行是一家位于中朝邊境的地方銀行。
“If the US only sanctions small players it confirms the view of many Chinese that the administration is a paper tiger,” says David Loevinger, former senior co-ordinator for China affairs at the US Treasury and managing director of emerging markets sovereign research at TCW Group. “The big question is whether the US will ‘go nuclear’ and cut off a medium-to-large Chinese bank from the US financial system.”
“如果美國只拿小企業(yè)開刀，就會(huì)坐實(shí)許多中國人的觀點(diǎn)，即美國政府是只紙老虎，”前美國財(cái)政部中國事務(wù)高級(jí)協(xié)調(diào)員、現(xiàn)任TCW集團(tuán)(TCW Group)新興市場主權(quán)研究董事總經(jīng)理的洛文杰(David Loevinger)說，“重要的是美國會(huì)不會(huì)‘動(dòng)真格’、切斷一家中到大型中資銀行與美國金融體系的聯(lián)系。”
Which Chinese companies are most likely to be targeted?
哪些中資公司最有可能成為目標(biāo)?
Large state-owned banks and energy companies appear to be in the crosshairs. Mr Royce cited state-owned Agricultural Bank of China, the country’s third-largest lender by assets, and China Merchants Bank, the sixth-largest, as possible targets.
大型國有銀行和能源公司似乎會(huì)被列為目標(biāo)。羅伊斯提出，國有的中國農(nóng)業(yè)銀行(Agricultural Bank of China)，以及招商銀行(CMB)可能會(huì)成為目標(biāo)。這兩家銀行分別是以資產(chǎn)計(jì)中國第三大和第六大銀行。
Peter King, a US congressman from New York, has also called for Bank of China, the country’s fourth-largest, to be among those facing sanctions. “UN must impose oil embargo on N Korea ASAP,” he said last week on Twitter. “If China or Russia veto, US must sanction any1 doing business with NK, including Bank of China.”
紐約州國會(huì)議員彼德•金(Peter King)還提出，中國第四大銀行中國銀行(BoC)也是制裁的目標(biāo)之一。“聯(lián)合國必須盡快對(duì)北韓實(shí)施石油禁運(yùn)，”他上周在Twitter上表示，“如果中國或者俄羅斯否決，美國必須制裁一切與北韓有業(yè)務(wù)往來者，包括中國銀行。”
Chinese banks had $142bn in US assets at the end of March, with BoC accounting for the largest share, according to Federal Reserve data.
根據(jù)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)的數(shù)據(jù)，截至3月底，中資銀行在美國擁有1420億美元的資產(chǎn)，其中中國銀行占的份額最大。
The Financial Times reported on Monday that branches of China’s five biggest banks had stopped opening new accounts for North Korean individuals and companies. But the impact of these moves was unclear, since much trade with North Korea occurs through Chinese intermediaries.
英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》周一報(bào)道，中國五大行的各網(wǎng)點(diǎn)已停止為朝鮮個(gè)人和公司新開賬戶。但這些舉措的效果還不清楚，因?yàn)榇蠖鄶?shù)中朝貿(mào)易都是經(jīng)由中國籍中間人完成的。
China National Petroleum Corp is another potential target. China supplies more than 90 per cent of North Korea’s crude oil imports, according to Eurasia Group. Most of that comes from CNPC.
中國石油天然氣集團(tuán)公司(China National Petroleum Corporation)是另一個(gè)潛在目標(biāo)。根據(jù)歐亞集團(tuán)(Eurasia Group)的數(shù)據(jù)，朝鮮90%的進(jìn)口原油都是中國供應(yīng)的。其中大多數(shù)來自中國石油天然氣集團(tuán)公司。
How exposed are Chinese companies?
中國公司遭受損失的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)有多高?
For China, much would depend on how US authorities calibrate their action. While the US assets of China’s six largest banks comprise only 1 per cent of their global total, a full shutdown of access to the US would have an outsized impact.
對(duì)中國而言，事情很大程度上取決于美國當(dāng)局將如何行動(dòng)。盡管中國六大銀行在美國的資產(chǎn)只占它們?nèi)蚩傎Y產(chǎn)的1%，進(jìn)入美國的通道完全關(guān)閉仍會(huì)對(duì)它們產(chǎn)生巨大的沖擊。
The central role of the US dollar in global trade and investment requires foreign banks to clear payments through the US, even if they are doing business elsewhere. That requires a dollar clearing licence from US authorities.
美元在全球貿(mào)易和投資中占據(jù)核心地位，因此即使非美國銀行是在美國以外的其他地方開展業(yè)務(wù)，也必須經(jīng)由美國來結(jié)算支付。這就需要美國當(dāng)局發(fā)放的美元結(jié)算許可證。
Sanctions against CNPC could also create collateral damage for US companies that work with the Chinese group. ExxonMobil, once led by now US secretary of state Rex Tillerson, sells 2.25m tonnes per year of liquid natural gas to CNPC’s Hong Kong-listed subsidiary PetroChina under a contract signed in 2009. Chevron, the second-largest US oil company, owns 49 per cent of a joint venture with PetroChina to develop a natural gas field in south-west China that began production in 2015.
制裁中國石油天然氣集團(tuán)公司也會(huì)對(duì)與其合作的美國公司造成連帶傷害。根據(jù)2009年簽署的一份合約，曾由現(xiàn)任美國國務(wù)卿的雷克斯•蒂勒森(Rex Tillerson)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的?？松梨?ExxonMobil)，每年向中國石油天然氣集團(tuán)公司在香港上市的子公司中石油(PetroChina)出售225萬噸液化天然氣。美國第二大石油公司雪佛龍(Chevron)與中石油的合資公司在中國西南部開發(fā)一塊天然氣田，雪佛龍持股49%，該項(xiàng)目從2015年開始產(chǎn)出天然氣。
Unilateral sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine illustrate the danger. Those measures destroyed a series of multibillion deals between Exxon and Rosneft, which is owned by the Russian government, to develop energy reserves in the Arctic and Siberia.
美國就俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭對(duì)俄羅斯實(shí)施的單邊制裁，體現(xiàn)了這其中蘊(yùn)含多大的危險(xiǎn)。這些制裁舉措讓?？松梨谂c俄羅斯政府所有的俄羅斯石油公司(Rosneft)之間一系列開發(fā)北極和西伯利亞能源儲(chǔ)備、數(shù)額達(dá)數(shù)十億美元的協(xié)議化為泡影。
How might China respond?
中國可能會(huì)如何應(yīng)對(duì)?
Experts say unilateral US moves against Chinese businesses would almost certainly spark retaliation against US companies, much of it unofficial.
專家們表示，美國對(duì)中國企業(yè)采取的單邊行動(dòng)幾乎肯定會(huì)招致中國對(duì)美國公司的報(bào)復(fù)，其中大多數(shù)將是非官方的報(bào)復(fù)行動(dòng)。
The campaign of “boycott diplomacy” and regulatory attacks on South Korean companies in response to Seoul’s decision to host a US missile shield offers a possible blueprint for China’s response.
在首爾決定部署美國導(dǎo)彈防御體系之后，中方展開了“抵制外交”，中國監(jiān)管部門也出手打壓韓國企業(yè)。這種做法為中國可能對(duì)美國行動(dòng)作何反應(yīng)提供了參照。
“Imposing US sanctions on big Chinese banks and companies would be a risky strategy. In general, they are not violating UN sanctions, so China will view it as a hostile act,” says David Dollar, former economic and financial emissary for the US Treasury in Beijing. “We can expect China to retaliate. It may do this in a subtle way, steering business away from US firms in a range of sectors such as aircraft, agriculture, and entertainment.”
“美國對(duì)大型中資銀行和企業(yè)實(shí)施制裁將是一項(xiàng)危險(xiǎn)的策略。總體上，它們并未違反聯(lián)合國的制裁，因此中國會(huì)將其視為敵對(duì)舉動(dòng)，”美國財(cái)政部前駐北京經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融特使杜大偉(David Dollar)說，“我們可以預(yù)見中國會(huì)報(bào)復(fù)。這種報(bào)復(fù)可能會(huì)以一種不易察覺的方式進(jìn)行，在航空、農(nóng)業(yè)和娛樂等一系列領(lǐng)域拿走美國企業(yè)的生意。”
Both Mr Dollar and Mr Loevinger say US business interests would probably work behind the scenes to oppose harsh action against China.
但杜大偉和洛文杰都表示，美國商業(yè)利益很可能在幕后做工作，阻止對(duì)中國采取嚴(yán)厲行動(dòng)。
“The US will still be reluctant to sanction large Chinese banks or [state-owned enterprises] given the risks of a strong negative reaction from Beijing and in international financial markets,” Scott Seaman and Evan Medeiros of Eurasia Group wrote in a note.
“考慮到北京和國際金融市場可能出現(xiàn)的強(qiáng)烈負(fù)面反應(yīng)，美國還是會(huì)不太情愿制裁大型中資銀行或者(國有企業(yè))。”歐亞集團(tuán)的斯科特•西曼(Scott Seaman)和麥艾文(Evan Medeiros)在一份簡報(bào)中寫道。
