中國為何投票支持制裁朝鮮？

China this month moved to implement the sanctions on North Korea passed unanimously by the UN Security Council following Pyongyang’s repeated missile tests. Beijing said it will cut off imports of North Korean coal, iron ore and seafood in three weeks. The sanctions aim to cut North Korea’s $3bn in annual exports by a third. If universally implemented, they could have massive repercussions for the country’s economy.

中國已于本月15日起開始執(zhí)行聯(lián)合國安理會(UN Security Council)在朝鮮多次試射導(dǎo)彈后一致通過的制裁決議。中國當(dāng)時表示，政策緩沖期為3周，之后將不再為進口自朝鮮的煤、鐵礦石、水海產(chǎn)品辦理進口手續(xù)。這輪制裁旨在將朝鮮30億美元年度出口額削減三分之一。如果制裁得到全面執(zhí)行，可能會對朝鮮經(jīng)濟造成強烈影響。

Shortly after voting in favour of the new hard-hitting measures, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said: “Given China’s traditional economic ties with North Korea, China more than anyone will pay a price for implementing the resolution.”

在投票支持新的強硬制裁措施后不久，中國外交部長王毅表示：“鑒于中國同朝鮮的傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟聯(lián)系，執(zhí)行決議、付出代價的主要是中方。”

He added: “In order to maintain the international nuclear non-proliferation system and regional peace and stability, China will, as always, enforce the full content of relevant resolutions in a comprehensive and strict manner.”

他補充稱：“為了維護國際核不擴散體系，為了維護地區(qū)的和平穩(wěn)定，中方將一如繼往全面、嚴(yán)格執(zhí)行好有關(guān)決議的所有內(nèi)容。”

The statement rings hollow, given how little North Korea matters economically to Beijing. 考慮到朝鮮在經(jīng)濟上對中國的意義微乎其微，這份聲明聽上去很空洞。

Given the high stakes involved in the current round of sanctions, and how little is known about China’s economic ties to North Korea, it is worth considering just how insignificant the reclusive state is to China’s economy.

鑒于當(dāng)前一輪制裁關(guān)系之重大以及外界對中國與朝鮮經(jīng)濟聯(lián)系的了解之少，我們有必要考慮這個“隱士王國”對于中國經(jīng)濟到底有多不重要。

While China’s economic engagement with North Korea has grown at breakneck speed in recent years — despite the sanctions imposed on Pyongyang — it makes up only a minimal share of Chinese international trade. In fact, while China traded with North Korea to the tune of about $5.29bn in 2015, its total trade volume that year was $3.64tn. In other words, trade with North Korea makes up just over 0.1 per cent of China’s bilateral trade.

盡管朝鮮受到制裁，中國與朝鮮的經(jīng)濟接觸近年來仍飛速發(fā)展。但迄今為止，朝鮮在中國對外貿(mào)易中所占比例還是微乎其微。實際上，盡管2015年中國同朝鮮進出口總額達到52.9億美元左右，但同年中國進出口總額高達3.64萬億美元。換句話說，中國同朝鮮進出口總額僅占中國進出口總額的0.1%多一點。

China’s foreign investment in the hermit kingdom paints the same picture. At the end of 2015, China’s outward investment stock passed the $1tn mark for the first time. How much of China’s investment is in North Korea? That same year, the total figure was $625m. Therefore, in 2015, about 0.06 per cent of officially reported Chinese foreign assets were invested in North Korea. Much of China’s outward investment flows through offshore financial centers, and is therefore difficult to track, but these figures speak for themselves.

中國對這個“隱士王國”的投資也呈現(xiàn)類似的情況。2015年末，中國對外直接投資存量首次超過萬億美元大關(guān)。中國對朝鮮直接投資存量有多少呢?同一年，這個數(shù)字為6.25億美元。因此，2015年中國官方對外直接投資存量有約0.06%為對朝鮮直接投資存量。中國的大量對外投資通過離岸金融中心流出，因此很難追蹤，但這些數(shù)據(jù)已經(jīng)很說明問題了。

From the North Korean perspective the situation is quite different. China’s economic engagement has long represented Pyongyang’s lifeline. In 2015, more than 80 per cent of North Korea’s exports, largely coal, were destined for China. Its import basket is even more dependent on staying in Beijing’s good graces: more than 85 per cent of North Korea’s imports originate in China. Therefore, if Beijing imposes a chokehold on North Korea’s economy as agreed in the newest basket of sanctions, the effects on its economy will be devastating.

從朝鮮的角度來看，情況則完全不同。長期以來，與中國的經(jīng)濟接觸一直是朝鮮賴以維生的經(jīng)濟來源。2015年，朝鮮逾80%的出口(主要是煤)流向中國。朝鮮的進口更依賴于中國把它當(dāng)自己人：朝鮮逾85%的進口來自中國。因此，如果中國像最新一輪制裁要求的那樣，掐住朝鮮經(jīng)濟的喉嚨，對朝鮮經(jīng)濟的影響將是毀滅性的。

The Kim dynasty has proven to be remarkably resistant to sanctions. It is unlikely that the lifestyle of Kim Jong Un and his closest allies would change dramatically because of a deteriorating economic situation; the suffering would simply be passed down to ordinary North Koreans. That said, the sanctions will undoubtedly apply some pressure on the regime, and reduce the funds at its disposal for missile testing.

事實證明，金氏王朝明顯對制裁免疫。金正恩(Kim Jong Un)及其密友的生活方式不太可能因為經(jīng)濟局勢惡化而發(fā)生明顯變化;受苦的只會是朝鮮普通民眾。但即便如此，制裁無疑會對金正恩政權(quán)產(chǎn)生一些壓力，并減少其可用于導(dǎo)彈試驗的資金。

The imbalance in Chinese-North Korean economic relations is staggering. Beijing could virtually wipe out North Korea’s international trade and feel barely a sting in the process. Therefore, as Beijing decides whether and how to implement the sanctions on its north-east neighbour, economic considerations will hardly be part of its calculus.

中朝經(jīng)濟關(guān)系極度失衡。中國實際上能夠把朝鮮的國際貿(mào)易化為烏有，同時自己只受微乎其微的影響。因此，在中國政府決定是否以及如何對這個東北部鄰國實施制裁的時候，經(jīng)濟因素將幾乎不在其考量之內(nèi)。

On the other hand, the situation on the Korean Peninsula matters a great deal for Beijing in strategic terms. China has two key strategic concerns when it comes to the Korean Peninsula or, more specifically, the potential for a sudden downfall of the Kim dynasty. First, if the North Korean state collapsed overnight, up to 25m refugees would potentially pour into China’s borders. Second, if the Kim regime ceased to exist, a reunification like that experienced by Germany in 1990 would leave Beijing sharing a land border with a key US ally.

另一方面，朝鮮半島局勢在戰(zhàn)略上對中國非常重要。就朝鮮半島，或者更具體地說，就金氏王朝突然倒臺的可能性來說，中國有兩點關(guān)鍵的戰(zhàn)略關(guān)切。第一，如果朝鮮政權(quán)一夜之間崩潰，至多2500萬難民就可能涌入中國邊境。第二，如果金氏政權(quán)倒臺、朝鮮半島出現(xiàn)像德國在1990年經(jīng)歷的那種統(tǒng)一，中國就會與一個美國關(guān)鍵盟友在陸地上接壤。

Mr. Wang’s statement is designed to portray China’s decision in a self-sacrificing light. Yet the idea that China’s business and economic interests would be seriously hurt by sanctions against Pyongyang does not hold up to scrutiny.

王毅的聲明旨在將中國的決定描述為一種自我犧牲的舉動。然而，中國商業(yè)和經(jīng)濟利益將因制裁朝鮮而嚴(yán)重受損的觀點經(jīng)不起推敲。

China’s policy towards North Korea has and continues to be based on the strategic interest of maintaining the status quo in North Korea to avoid a refugee crisis or an encroachment by US allies. The sanctions vote was cast with the expectation that it poses minimal risk to the survival of the Kim regime, and the certainty that its effects on China’s economy will be negligible. David G. Landry is a PhD candidate at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

無論過去、現(xiàn)在還是將來，中國對朝政策始終基于其戰(zhàn)略利益，即維持朝鮮現(xiàn)狀以避免難民危機或者遭受美國盟友圍困。他們之所以投票支持制裁，是預(yù)計這種制裁對金氏政權(quán)生存的威脅微乎其微，對中國經(jīng)濟的影響肯定也將是可以忽略不計的。戴維•G•蘭德里(David G. Landry)是約翰•霍普金斯大學(xué)高級國際研究學(xué)院(Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies)博士候選人，鄧希煒是約翰•霍普金斯大學(xué)高級國際研究學(xué)院國際經(jīng)濟學(xué)助理教授