本月,當中國國務(wù)院總理李克強在全國人大會議上表示政府擔心“非金融企業(yè)杠桿率較高”時,中國房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商的財務(wù)總監(jiān)們肯定哆嗦了一下。
Balanced between their reliance on ballooning debt markets, which Beijing wants to bring under control, and a housing boom that authorities want to cool, developers have defied predictions of collapse for years.
多年來,房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商一直在依賴(政府希望收緊控制的)日益擴大的債券市場和(政府希望降溫的)房地產(chǎn)熱潮之間保持著平衡,從而避免了市場如人們預(yù)測的那樣崩盤。
Even now, few analysts are predicting disaster but they say high leverage is a rising risk as margins come under pressure.
即便是現(xiàn)在也幾乎沒有分析師預(yù)測房地產(chǎn)市場會爆發(fā)災(zāi)難,但他們表示,隨著利潤率面臨壓力,高杠桿的風險日益上升。
“China’s more heavily indebted developers are living on a knife’s edge,” says Andrew Collier, managing director of Orient Capital Research, an investment research group in Hong Kong.
香港投資研究集團Orient Capital Research董事總經(jīng)理安德魯•科利爾(Andrew Collier)表示:“中國負債較為嚴重的開發(fā)商正處在刀鋒邊緣。”
Real estate developers are facing a funding squeeze just as they are entering their first downturn in three years. House prices rose 40 per cent in big cities last year but have stalled in 2017. Single-digit price declines are expected this year and sales revenues for the bigger developers could fall by as much as 10 per cent, according to S&P Global Ratings, as transaction volumes decline. Last year, revenues rose 20 per cent.
房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商正面臨資金緊張,它們正進入3年來首次低迷。去年,中國大城市房價上漲40%,但2017年陷入停滯。根據(jù)標普全球評級(S&P Global Ratings)的數(shù)據(jù),隨著交易量下滑,預(yù)計今年房價將出現(xiàn)一位數(shù)下跌,規(guī)模較大開發(fā)商的銷售額可能會下降最多10%。去年,房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商銷售收入增長20%。
“China’s big developers stand out compared to their peers worldwide for being highly leveraged, thanks to their access to local banks and capital markets,” says Wang Xinling, lead analyst at China Policy, a think-tank in Beijing.
北京智庫中國政策評論(China Policy)的首席分析師王欣玲表示:“與全球同行相比,中國大型開發(fā)商高度負債的情況非常明顯,這種狀況是因為它們可以利用地方銀行和資本市場。”
On top of a slowing market, many funding sources favoured by property companies are coming under threat. Beijing began restricting funding last October, ordering regulators to limit equity and bond sales by developers as part of efforts to rein in the property market.
除了市場放緩,開發(fā)商青睞的很多融資來源正面臨威脅。去年10月,中國開始限制融資、命令監(jiān)管機構(gòu)限制開發(fā)商的股票和債券發(fā)行,這是控制房地產(chǎn)市場舉措的一部分。
Authorities have also clamped down on the inclusion of property loans in wealth management products, which had in effect allowed banks to keep a portion of their lending off the books. The ability to tap WMPs had become a key source of capital for developers, according to several analysts. 中國當局還一直打擊將房地產(chǎn)貸款納入理財產(chǎn)品的行為,這些理財產(chǎn)品實際上允許銀行將部分貸款轉(zhuǎn)移到資產(chǎn)負
債表以外。據(jù)一些分析師稱,能夠利用理財產(chǎn)品成為了開發(fā)商的一個重要資金來源。
“We believe the funding restriction will weaken Chinese property developers’ access to alternative financing and increase their cash flow burden,” says Cindy Huang, credit analyst at S&P Global Ratings.
標普全球評級的信貸分析師黃馨慧(Cindy Huang)表示:“我們認為,融資限制將削弱中國房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商利用其它融資來源的能力并加大他們的現(xiàn)金流負擔。”
Evergrande, China’s second-biggest property group by sales, is the most leveraged among mainland and Hong Kong-listed developers, according to data from Wind Information. Its net debt was 605 per cent of its equity as of June 2016, versus the sector average of 90.
根據(jù)萬得資訊(Wind Information)的數(shù)據(jù),在中國內(nèi)地和香港上市的房地產(chǎn)公司中,恒大(Evergrande)負債率最高。截至2016年6月,該公司的凈負債權(quán)益比為605%,行業(yè)平均水平為90%。以2016年銷售額計,恒大是中國最大的房地產(chǎn)公司。
“Evergrande is the poster child for the wackiness of the Chinese property market, where property is an asset to be held rather than something to live in,” says Anne Stevenson-Yang, director of research at J Capital Research.
美奇金(J Capital Research)研究主管楊思安(Anne Stevenson-Yang)表示:“恒大是中國房地產(chǎn)市場反常之處的典型代表,在中國,房地產(chǎn)被當做資產(chǎn)持有,而不是用來居住。”
The developer’s borrowings increased almost 50 per cent in the second half of last year to Rmb565bn ($82bn), according to a company filing last month.
根據(jù)上個月恒大披露的文件,去年下半年,恒大借款增長近一半,至5650億元人民幣(合820億美元)。
Yet the company has repeatedly refinanced debt in previous years from banks and bond investors emboldened, say JPMorgan analysts, by a perception that Evergrande is too big to fail.
然而,摩根大通(JPMorgan)分析師表示,前幾年,恒大多次從銀行和債券投資者那里對債務(wù)進行了再融資,認為恒大“太大而不能倒”的觀點給了銀行和債券投資者膽量。
Greenland Holdings, number four last year in terms of property sales, has similarly heavy debts. Its net debt to equity ratio was almost 300 per cent at the end of September, according to estimates by Huachuang Securities, an investment group. As of the end of June, it held net debt of Rmb185bn.
中國第四大房地產(chǎn)公司(以去年房地產(chǎn)銷售額計)綠地集團(Greenland Holdings)也背負著沉重的債務(wù)。根據(jù)投資集團華創(chuàng)證券(Huachuang Securities)的估算,到去年9月底,綠地集團的凈負債權(quán)益比接近于300%。到去年6月底,該公司凈負債為1850億元人民幣。
State-owned status is an added benefit that has given Greenland privileged access to loans in return for partnering with the government for infrastructure projects.
國有企業(yè)的身份是一項額外優(yōu)勢,綠地可以通過與政府合作開發(fā)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項目優(yōu)先獲得貸款。
“The property sector is the foundation for China’s economy,” says Jonas Short, head of NSBO China, a policy research group in Beijing.
北京政策研究機構(gòu)藍橡資本(NSBO)中國公司負責人喬納斯•肖特(Jonas Short)表示:“房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)是中國經(jīng)濟的基礎(chǔ)。”
Close links between corporate and state interests have tempted investors to consider big property groups as sure-fire investments, no matter the scale of their debt or asset quality.
企業(yè)和政府利益的密切聯(lián)系促使投資者把大型房地產(chǎn)公司視為穩(wěn)賺不賠的投資,而不管它們的債務(wù)規(guī)?;蛸Y產(chǎn)質(zhì)量如何。
“Foreign investors look at these companies and think — their bond yields are relatively high, and they must be backed by the government, so why not buy?” says J Capital’s Ms Stevenson-Yang.
美奇金的楊思安表示:“外國投資者看到這些公司,然后會認為,這些公司的債券收益率相對較高,并且它們肯定得到了政府的支持,那么為什么不買呢?”
Developers are also adept at avoiding writedowns on assets, often halting sales when prices begin to slip to preserve their valuations, adds Ms Stevenson-Yang.
楊思安補充說,房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商還善于避免資產(chǎn)減記,通常會在價格開始下跌時暫停銷售,以保護它們的估值。
Another tactic is to classify empty buildings as investment properties rather than inventory, which is marked at market prices. GMT Research, an accounting research group, said it visited 40 Evergrande developments and found that much of the company’s “investment properties” were empty hotels and shop fronts or abandoned parking lots.
另一個手段是將空置樓盤列為投資物業(yè)(而不是庫存),這些資產(chǎn)以市場價格計值。會計研究機構(gòu)GMT Research表示,該公司在探訪恒大40個開發(fā)項目后發(fā)現(xiàn),該公司的很多“投資物業(yè)”都是空置的酒店和底商或者廢棄的停車場。
“In China it’s not unusual for large development sites to take five to 10 years to be fully sold,” says Su Aik Lim, senior director at Fitch Ratings. “The question is whether they will be fully sold.”
“在中國,大型開發(fā)項目要花5到10年的時間才能全部賣掉,這是常有的事,”惠譽評級(Fitch Ratings)的高級總監(jiān)林樹毅(Su Aik Lim)表示,“問題是他們是否會全部賣掉。”
Yet so far there are few signs of acute financing strain among the biggest developers. Even as local bond markets closed, many property groups have this year tapped international markets, where appetite for their high-yielding paper remains robust.
然而,目前幾乎沒有跡象表明,大型開發(fā)商面臨嚴峻的融資壓力。隨著地方債券市場的關(guān)閉,很多開發(fā)商集團今年轉(zhuǎn)向國際市場,在這個市場,投資者對于中國房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商的高收益?zhèn)耘d趣高漲。
Last week Evergrande attracted bids worth $5.4bn for the sale of $1.5bn in bonds.
上周,恒大發(fā)行了15億美元債券,吸引了54億美元的超額認購。
“A lot of people have made money from buying these bonds at the bottom and there are real assets behind them, too,” says one China debt banker. “People feel like they’ve seen the worst and these guys are the survivors.”
“很多人因為抄底購買這些債券賺了錢,這些債券背后還有實物資產(chǎn)的支撐,”一位從事債券業(yè)務(wù)的中國銀行業(yè)人士表示,“人們覺得他們看到過最糟糕的情況,這些公司是幸存者。”