馬丁•舒爾茨(Martin Schulz)成為中左翼社民黨(SPD)的總理候選人,從根本上改變了德國政治局勢。它還改變了德國國內(nèi)圍繞不平等和歐洲未來展開的辯論,將對整個(gè)歐洲大陸產(chǎn)生重大影響。
Germany is regarded as an economic success story. Unemployment is at its lowest level since reunification in 1990; the trade surplus has reached a record high. And the government has just registered a fiscal surplus of €24bn, or 0.8 per cent of gross domestic product.
德國被視為經(jīng)濟(jì)成功的典范。失業(yè)率處于1990年兩德統(tǒng)一以來的最低水平;貿(mào)易順差達(dá)到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄新高。德國政府剛剛錄得240億歐元的財(cái)政盈余,相當(dāng)于國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的0.8%。
Yet, for all the good economic news, polls show that 70 per cent of Germans believe that inequality is excessive.
然而,盡管有這些經(jīng)濟(jì)上的好消息,但民調(diào)顯示,70%的德國人認(rèn)為不平等程度過于嚴(yán)重。
Data show that Germany is a highly polarised society, with the bottom 40 per cent of households having the same or a lower real income as 25 years ago.
數(shù)據(jù)顯示,德國是一個(gè)高度極化的社會,處于底端的40%的家庭的實(shí)際收入徘徊于、甚至低于25年前的水平。
Although full-time, permanent employment has increased, so has the number of precarious, part-time jobs. The number of working poor — those in work but earning less than 60 per cent of the median income — has doubled from 4.8 per cent in 2005 to 9.6 per cent today.
盡管永久性的全職就業(yè)人數(shù)增加,但不穩(wěn)定兼職工作人數(shù)也出現(xiàn)了增長。窮忙族(working poor)——那些雖然有工作,但收入不到中位數(shù)收入60%的人——的比例從2005年的4.8%增長一倍,至9.6%。
In short, Germany has a two-speed economy with a widening gap between successful export and tradeable sectors on the one hand, and services and nontradeable sectors on the other. Levels of social mobility and equality of opportunity are also poor.
簡言之,德國擁有雙速經(jīng)濟(jì),一方是蓬勃發(fā)展的出口和可貿(mào)易部門,另一方是服務(wù)業(yè)和不可貿(mào)易部門,兩者間的差距越來越大。社會流動(dòng)性水平和機(jī)會平等程度同樣很糟糕。
It not surprising, therefore, that a lively debate has begun on the effects of the “Agenda 2010” reforms deregulating the labour market and reforming social security, which were introduced in 2003 by the SPD government of Gerhard Schröder. Ironically, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats praise Agenda 2010 as a success, while elements in the SPD criticise it.
因此,并不令人意外的是,人們圍繞“2010議程”(Agenda 2010)改革的效果展開了激烈辯論——這些改革是2003年由格哈德•施羅德(Gerhard Schröder)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的社民黨政府推行的,旨在解除對勞動(dòng)力市場的監(jiān)管并改革社保制度。具有諷刺意味的是,德國總理安格拉•默克爾(Angela Merkel)所在的基民盟(CDU)認(rèn)為“2010議程”取得了成功,而社民黨的某些人批評它。
Last week, Mr Schulz promised to lengthen the duration of unemployment benefits and to reduce the number of precarious job arrangements if he is elected.
上周,舒爾茨承諾,如果他當(dāng)選總理的話,將延長失業(yè)救濟(jì)金發(fā)放期,并減少不穩(wěn)定的就業(yè)安排。
However, this debate on the merits of Agenda 2010 ignores the distinctive challenges that Germany faces. The country needs significant investment in a more inclusive education system and a revamp of family-friendly policies designed to create opportunities for women and other groups. It also needs to deregulate the services sectors to foster investment, productivity and incomes, as well as strengthening collective bargaining agreements.
然而,圍繞“2010議程”利弊的這場辯論忽視了德國面臨的獨(dú)特挑戰(zhàn)。德國需要大舉投資于更具包容性的教育體系,并且改善有利于家庭的政策,為女性和其他群體創(chuàng)造機(jī)會。它還需要解除對服務(wù)業(yè)的監(jiān)管,以促進(jìn)投資、生產(chǎn)率和收入,以及加強(qiáng)集體談判協(xié)議。
Meanwhile, the CDU has begun to attack Mr Schulz for his positions on the EU and the eurozone, particularly his advocacy of “eurobonds” as a way of relieving the debt crisis in the single currency area.
與此同時(shí),基民盟已開始攻擊舒爾茨關(guān)于歐盟和歐元區(qū)的立場,尤其是他呼吁推出“歐元區(qū)債券”來緩解歐元區(qū)的債務(wù)危機(jī)。
A debate in Germany on the future of Europe and the country’s role in it is certainly overdue. Europe was a non-issue in the 2013 federal elections for the mainstream parties, largely because the CDU and SPD feared that discussing it would play into the hands of the rightwing, Eurosceptic Alternative for Germany party.
當(dāng)然,德國早就應(yīng)該圍繞歐洲的未來以及本國在其中的角色展開辯論。在2013年的聯(lián)邦議院選舉中,歐洲對主流政黨根本不是一個(gè)議題,這在很大程度上是因?yàn)榛衩撕蜕缑顸h擔(dān)心,討論歐洲問題將會讓右翼政黨——對歐洲持懷疑態(tài)度的德國新選擇黨(Alternative for Germany)有機(jī)可乘。
There are risks for the rest of Europe, too. While Germany has traditionally been strongly pro-European, in recent years many in the governing parties have criticised the policies pursued by other EU member states and the European institutions, including the European Central Bank’s monetary policy.
歐洲其他國家也存在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。盡管德國傳統(tǒng)上堅(jiān)決支持歐洲,但在最近幾年,執(zhí)政聯(lián)盟政黨中的許多人批評了歐盟其他成員國以及歐洲機(jī)構(gòu)推行的政策,包括歐洲央行(ECB)的貨幣政策。
The return of Mr Schulz to domestic German politics has certainly shaken things up. The central question now is whether pro-European voices in both major parties will prevail in the debate he has opened up.
舒爾茨回歸國內(nèi)政壇(之前他是歐洲議會議長——譯者注)肯定起到了撼動(dòng)作用?,F(xiàn)在的核心問題是,兩大主流政黨的親歐派是否會在他開啟的辯論中占上風(fēng)。
The answer hinges on several factors, including the outcome of the French elections, the Brexit negotiations and whether the threats made by US President Donald Trump will push Germany to align more closely with its European neighbours.
答案取決于多個(gè)因素,包括法國選舉結(jié)果、英國退歐談判以及美國總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)帶來的威脅會不會推動(dòng)德國與鄰國更加團(tuán)結(jié)。