小小芯片引發(fā)中美角力
小小芯片很少承載如此沉重的負(fù)荷。中國半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)在艱難起步后，如今發(fā)現(xiàn)自己成為了中美彼此沖突的政治目標(biāo)的焦點。
Chips are a key plank of China’s industrial plans, attracting a massive $150bn government subsidy. This reflects national angst over reliance on overseas markets — it spends more on importing semiconductors than oil — and a fear, as one banker puts it, of being left in the dark “in case the US flips the switch”.
芯片是中國產(chǎn)業(yè)計劃的關(guān)鍵支柱，受到1500億美元的巨額政府補貼。這反映出國家對依賴海外市場的擔(dān)憂——進(jìn)口半導(dǎo)體的支出超過了石油進(jìn)口的支出——也體現(xiàn)了另一層擔(dān)憂，用一位銀行家的話來說，“一旦美國關(guān)掉開關(guān)”，中國可能陷入黑暗之中。
Washington harbours its own fears: that these subsidies will distort the market, dent its own domestic industry, jeopardise the edge it has held in the technology and threaten security.
華盛頓也有自己的擔(dān)憂：中國這些補貼將會扭曲市場，沖擊美國國內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)，危及美國在相關(guān)科技領(lǐng)域的優(yōu)勢地位以及威脅國家安全。
“Chinese industrial policies in this sector, as they are unfolding in practice, pose real threats to semiconductor innovation and US national security,” wrote the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology in a letter to President Barack Obama earlier this month.
美國總統(tǒng)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)的科學(xué)技術(shù)顧問委員會(Council of Advisors on Science and Technology)本月早些時候在寫給總統(tǒng)的信中表示：“隨著中國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)政策逐漸落實，將對半導(dǎo)體創(chuàng)新和美國國家安全構(gòu)成真實的威脅。”
China consumes more than $100bn worth of semiconductors, or roughly a third of total global shipments, but produces just 6 to 7 per cent by value, according to consultancy Bain & Co. Many of the imported chips go into PCs, smartphones and other gadgets that are then exported, but there is still a yawning gap between the semiconductors made by domestic chipmakers and the number consumed by a gadget-hungry Chinese public.
貝恩咨詢公司(Bain & Co)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，中國每年消費的半導(dǎo)體價值超過1000億美元，占到全球出貨總量的近三分之一，但中國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)值僅占全球的6%-7%。許多進(jìn)口芯片被裝配于個人電腦、智能手機(jī)以及其他設(shè)備，隨后出口至海外，但國內(nèi)芯片商生產(chǎn)的半導(dǎo)體數(shù)量與中國公眾消費的半導(dǎo)體數(shù)量之間仍存在巨大缺口。
Early efforts to narrow this gap failed: a scattergun approach resulted in a highly fragmented sub-scale industry. McKinsey, the consultancy, calculates Beijing had invested in 130 fabrication plants across more than 15 provinces at one point.
早先縮減這種缺口的努力失敗了：“廣泛撒網(wǎng)”方式導(dǎo)致了半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)碎片化，廠商缺乏規(guī)模。咨詢公司麥肯錫(McKinsey)估算，中國曾經(jīng)在同一時期在逾15個省份投資了130家半導(dǎo)體工廠。
But lessons have been learned, says Mark Li, semiconductor analyst at Bernstein, pointing to Hong Kong- and New York-listed SMIC. Initially, he says, it wanted to be as good as the top manufacturers and invested heavily in high-end equipment, racking up losses as a result.
但伯恩斯坦(Bernstein)的半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)分析師Mark Li表示，他們已經(jīng)汲取了教訓(xùn)。他指的是在香港和紐約兩地上市的中芯國際(SMIC)。他說，最初中芯國際希望和一流制造商做得一樣好，大舉投資購置高端設(shè)備，結(jié)果出現(xiàn)虧損。
“They adjusted their strategy to be a follower, and stay one to two steps behind Taiwan’s TSMC [the industry leader as a foundry making chips for others] and lowered investment a bit and reduced their R&D investment.”
“他們調(diào)整了戰(zhàn)略，開始做一名跟隨者，落后臺灣的臺積電(TSMC)一兩步，稍微減少了投資并削減了研發(fā)支出。”臺積電是晶圓代工行業(yè)的領(lǐng)軍者。
SMIC, the fifth-biggest semiconductor foundry by revenues in 2015, according to Gartner, produces chip wafers mainly for communications and consumer devices. Roughly half its revenues come from overseas.
高德納(Gartner)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，按收入計算，中芯國際在2015年是全球第五大半導(dǎo)體制造商，主要生產(chǎn)用于通訊設(shè)備和消費產(chǎn)品的晶圓。該公司約一半的收入來自海外。
This has served SMIC well. Its shares have generated a total return of 27 per cent in the past 12 months, massively outperforming the benchmark Hang Seng index. Of the 28 coverage analysts tracked by Bloomberg, not one recommends selling and 22 have a ‘buy’ rating.
這對中芯國際很有利。其股價在過去12個月里的累計漲幅高達(dá)27%，遠(yuǎn)勝于基準(zhǔn)的恒生指數(shù)。在彭博(Bloomberg)追蹤的28個研究該股票的分析師里，沒有一人建議賣出，同時有22人給出了“買入”評級。
“Normally size gives you better margins, but SMIC defies this,” says Mr Li. “And that’s why it’s remarkable.” He estimates SMIC will lift revenues 30 per cent this year, compared with a 2 to 3 per cent rise predicted for UMC, Taiwan’s number two player.
Mark Li表示：“通常來說，規(guī)模會帶來更高的利潤率，但中芯國際不是這樣。這是它引人注目的原因。”他估計中芯國際今年收入將會增長30%，而臺灣排名第二的聯(lián)華電子(UMC)預(yù)計只會增長2%-3%。
But at a national level, SMIC is just one of China’s champions. More ambitious is Tsinghua Unigroup, which in July merged its memory chip operations with government-run XMC.
但就全國來說，中芯國際只是中國的冠軍企業(yè)之一。更具雄心的是紫光集團(tuán)(Tsinghua Unigroup)，后者在去年7月將其存儲芯片業(yè)務(wù)與政府運營的武漢新芯(XMC)合并。
Tsinghua has sought to plug another gap — a lack of leading-edge technology — by trying to buy overseas companies, including Micron of the US, for some $23bn. Yet it has been largely stymied by US regulators.
紫光尋求收購海外公司來彌補另一個差距——缺乏前沿技術(shù)——包括以大約230億美元的價格收購美國的美光(Micron)，但該交易基本上已被美國監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)阻撓。
Other attempts have met a similar fate. In February, Fairchild Semiconductor turned down a $2.6bn bid from Chinese state-backed enterprises over fears that the deal would be blocked by the US authorities.
中方其他收購努力遭受了類似的命運。在去年2月，飛兆半導(dǎo)體(Fairchild Semiconductor)拒絕了來自中國政府支持企業(yè)26億美元的收購報價，原因是擔(dān)心該交易被美國當(dāng)局阻撓。
Failure to buy-in technology is one of the biggest stumbling blocks to Beijing’s efforts to become a global power in chips, say analysts. “Buying technology from the US will be more and more difficult,” says Mr Li of Bernstein, who alludes to a blocked attempted acquisition of Aixtron to show that even European deals fail. “But I think China will continue trying.”
分析師表示，無法收購技術(shù)是中國成為世界芯片大國的最大障礙之一。伯恩斯坦的Mark Li表示：“從美國購買技術(shù)將越來越困難。”他指出，收購德國愛思強(qiáng)(Aixtron)受阻表明，即便在歐洲交易也難以完成。“但我認(rèn)為中國將會繼續(xù)嘗試收購。”
Roger Sheng, analyst at Gartner, says: “Without technology acquisition via [takeovers, joint ventures] or technology licensing, Chinese local companies still lack the capabilities to produce high performance processors and DRAM/flash [memory chips].”
高德納分析師Roger Sheng表示：“如果沒有(通過收購和合資)獲得技術(shù)或者取得技術(shù)許可，中國本土公司仍會缺乏生產(chǎn)高性能處理器和動態(tài)隨機(jī)存取存儲器(DRAM)/閃存芯片的能力。”
Kevin Meehan, who heads Bain’s Asia technology practice, adds: “They can make progress in total production capacity. But they don’t have a clear path to obtain leading-edge process technology.”
貝恩亞洲技術(shù)業(yè)務(wù)主管凱文•米汗(Kevin Meehan)補充稱：“他們可能在整體生產(chǎn)能力方面取得進(jìn)步，但他們沒有獲得前沿加工技術(shù)的清晰途徑。”
Nor is it just acquisitions at which the US is balking, as testified by this month’s report to President Barack Obama. In November, Penny Pritzker, US commerce secretary, attacked China’s $150bn plan, designed to ramp up Chinese-made integrated circuits at home to 70 per cent in 2025.
美國不僅僅在阻擾收購，本月美國官員對總統(tǒng)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)所作的報告證實了這一點。去年11月，美國商務(wù)部部長佩妮•普里茨克(Penny Pritzker)抨擊了中國擬投資1500億美元、到2025年讓集成電路自給率達(dá)到70%的計劃。
Despite setting a bold goal, Beijing has been less clear on how it plans to get there or how the spending will be directed. But multinational chipmakers have spotted the momentum shift and have begun setting up manufacturing and partnerships in China.
盡管制定了大膽的目標(biāo)，但北京方面沒有明確說明打算如何實現(xiàn)目標(biāo)或者如何支出這些資金。但跨國芯片制造商已經(jīng)看到了形勢變化，開始在中國設(shè)立制造工廠并展開合作。
The authors of the report to the US president, while noting that the $150bn spend is below the average $23bn spent annually on M&A by US semiconductor companies in the past five years, said acquisitions would help advance China’s aim. They identified two further strategies: “subsidies and zero-sum tactics”.
上述提交奧巴馬的報告的作者們表示，收購將幫助推進(jìn)中國的目標(biāo)。盡管他們也指出，1500億美元的支出低于美國半導(dǎo)體公司在過去5年年均230億美元的并購支出。他們還注意到了兩個更深層的戰(zhàn)略：“補貼和零和戰(zhàn)術(shù)”。
Three examples were listed of the latter, including “forcing or encouraging” domestic buyers to only purchase from local suppliers, “forcing” technology transfer in exchange for market access and intellectual property theft.
關(guān)于零和戰(zhàn)術(shù)列舉了三種情況，包括“迫使或鼓勵”國內(nèi)買家只向本土供應(yīng)商采購、“強(qiáng)迫”以技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓換取市場準(zhǔn)入以及竊取知識產(chǎn)權(quán)。
Analysts add a further risk, one that has repercussions across the globe: pricing. As one analyst baldly puts it, “China is good at getting into businesses,” as it did with solar panels. “They are also good at shrinking profit pools” — alluding to the consequent oversupply and collapse of prices.
分析師還指出了另一個已在全球產(chǎn)生影響的風(fēng)險：定價。正如一位分析師坦言的那樣，“中國擅長打入商業(yè)”，他們在太陽能面板領(lǐng)域就是這樣。“他們也擅長收縮利潤池”，這里指的是因此導(dǎo)致的供應(yīng)過剩和價格暴跌。
President-elect Donald Trump heightened concerns in December, when he raised the prospect of levying duties of up to 45 per cent on Chinese goods to level the playing field for US manufacturers.
美國當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)在去年12月的言論加劇了人們的擔(dān)憂，當(dāng)時他提出了對中國商品征收最高45%進(jìn)口關(guān)稅的可能性，目的是為美國制造商營造公平競爭環(huán)境。
Such tariffs could hurt not just Chinese companies, but also the multinational players such as Qualcomm, Intel and Samsung that have set up shop in China, through joint ventures or partnerships.
此類關(guān)稅傷害的可能不僅僅是中國公司，而且還有高通(Qualcomm)、英特爾(Intel)和三星(Samsung)等通過合資或合營方式在中國開展業(yè)務(wù)的跨國企業(yè)。
Some analysts point out that this co-operation, together with an ecosystem of suppliers on the ground, means China is closer to its goal of creating a globally competitive industry.
一些分析師指出，這種合作，加上實實在在的供應(yīng)商生態(tài)系統(tǒng)，意味著中國距離打造具有全球競爭力的半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)的目標(biāo)更進(jìn)了一步。
“They’ve done it in PCs, in high-speed rail — but haven’t done that yet in semiconductors,” says Mr Meehan. “They are certainly closer than they were, but they are going to face obstacles.”
米汗表示：“他們已經(jīng)在個人電腦和高鐵領(lǐng)域?qū)崿F(xiàn)了目標(biāo)，但在半導(dǎo)體領(lǐng)域還沒有實現(xiàn)目標(biāo)。他們當(dāng)然比過去更接近目標(biāo)，但他們還會面臨障礙。”
