勿高估TPP的作用
當(dāng)亞太各國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人上周末匯聚利馬開會(huì)時(shí)，籠罩一切的一個(gè)話題是：唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)威脅拋棄12個(gè)國家簽署的《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TPP)。
The president-elect says he will begin his administration by serving notice of US withdrawal from the trade deal, which he labels a “disaster for our country”. His plans have stoked fears throughout the region that the era of Washington’s hegemony over trade, and its geopolitical influence more generally, is coming to an end. In Lima, a clearly delighted China signalled it was more than happy to take over as the main driver of trade policy.
這位當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)表示，他一上任就將宣布美國撤出該貿(mào)易協(xié)議。他認(rèn)為，TPP“對(duì)我國而言是一場災(zāi)難”。他的計(jì)劃加劇了整個(gè)亞太的恐懼：華盛頓方面在貿(mào)易事務(wù)上發(fā)揮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作用，以及在更廣泛意義上發(fā)揮地緣政治影響力的時(shí)代正在走向終結(jié)。明顯興高采烈的中國方面在利馬表示，它非常樂于接替美國，承擔(dān)起貿(mào)易政策主要推動(dòng)國的角色。
But while Mr Trump could do serious damage with another of his threats — huge import tariffs on China and Mexico — history suggests the importance of bilateral or regional deals in shaping world trade is often overstated. Nor does it appear that trade agreements are necessarily a cause rather than a consequence of geopolitical influence.
但是，盡管特朗普的另一項(xiàng)威脅——對(duì)中國和墨西哥征收高額關(guān)稅——可能帶來嚴(yán)重?fù)p害，然而歷史似乎表明，雙邊或地區(qū)協(xié)議對(duì)于塑造世界貿(mào)易的重要性經(jīng)常是被夸大的。貿(mào)易協(xié)定必然是地緣政治影響力的因(而不是果)的觀點(diǎn)看來也不正確。
The fear that a state-of-the-art US model will be replaced by an inferior Chinese system of rules looks overdone. Beijing does not have an extensive rival set of laws to propagate. Its favoured trade pact, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, is known to negotiators as “the stapler”. It does little more than gather together existing bilateral and regional agreements and has little content beyond cuts in goods tariffs.
對(duì)于先進(jìn)的美國模式將被落后的中國規(guī)則體系取代的擔(dān)憂，看來有點(diǎn)過頭。北京方面拿不出一整套與美國構(gòu)成競爭的法律來推廣。中國支持的《區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(RCEP)被談判代表們稱為“訂書機(jī)”。它只不過是匯集現(xiàn)有的雙邊和地區(qū)協(xié)定，除了削減商品關(guān)稅之外，幾乎沒有什么內(nèi)容。
The “China model” is not a disturbing diversion from a move towards deeper economic integration: it is essentially the status quo. If TPP fails, the US will have fumbled a chance to liberalise some trade in services and restrain state-owned enterprises from distorting markets. But that is a missed opportunity, not a catastrophe.
“中國模式”并沒有令人不安地偏離深化經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的努力：它其實(shí)就是現(xiàn)狀。如果TPP夭折了，美國將錯(cuò)過一個(gè)推動(dòng)一部分服務(wù)貿(mào)易自由化、阻止國有企業(yè)扭曲市場的機(jī)會(huì)。但這畢竟將是一個(gè)錯(cuò)失的機(jī)會(huì)，而不是一場大災(zāi)難。
More generally, eliding the difference between official agreements and real cross-border commerce in goods and services leads to overestimating the importance of what officials say as opposed to what business people do.
在更為普遍的意義上，忽略官方協(xié)定與實(shí)際的跨境商品服務(wù)貿(mào)易之間的差別，導(dǎo)致人們高估官員言論(而不是商人的實(shí)際行為)的重要性。
The rapid integration of Asian markets over the past 25 years, often to join US-oriented supply chains, was driven mainly by technical improvements in communication and digitisation, not formal reciprocal bilateral or regional trade pacts. The US has signed no large trade deal in Asia since the Uruguay Round of multilateral talks was completed in 1994, apart from bilaterals with South Korea and Singapore. Its influence has come from American businesses and consumers, not bureaucrats.
過去25年里亞洲市場的快速一體化(往往是為了加入面向美國的供應(yīng)鏈)的主要推動(dòng)力是通信與數(shù)字化方面的技術(shù)進(jìn)步，而不是互惠平等的正式雙邊和地區(qū)貿(mào)易協(xié)定。自1994年烏拉圭回合多邊談判結(jié)束后，除了與韓國和新加坡簽署雙邊協(xié)定，美國并未在亞洲簽署大型貿(mào)易協(xié)議。美國的影響力來自美國企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者，并非美國官員。
Instead, the most important liberalisation was a wave of unilateral tariff-cutting by emerging economies in the early 1990s, followed by a voluntary open agreement on information technology goods, not a conventional trade deal. Governments that want to open their markets will continue to do so, even without the TPP to coerce them.
相反，最重要的自由化是新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體在1990年代初發(fā)起的一波單邊削減關(guān)稅行動(dòng)，以及后來圍繞IT產(chǎn)品達(dá)成的自愿開放協(xié)議，而不是常規(guī)的貿(mào)易協(xié)定。想要放開本國市場的政府將繼續(xù)這么做，即使沒有TPP強(qiáng)迫它們也是如此。
As for the geopolitical role of trade deals, they may act as symbolic consummations of a foreign policy relationship, but do not necessarily deepen ties by themselves. For example, Washington showed solidarity with market-oriented Mexican governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s by including Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Two decades later, Nafta is not visibly bolstering ties. Instead, it has, perhaps unfairly, become a reviled symbol of American deindustrialisation.
至于貿(mào)易協(xié)議的地緣政治角色，它們或許象征著外交政策關(guān)系達(dá)到圓滿境界，但本身未必能深化雙邊關(guān)系。比如，在1980年代末和1990年代初，華盛頓方面為了同以市場為導(dǎo)向的墨西哥政府展現(xiàn)團(tuán)結(jié)，把墨西哥納入了北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定(NAFTA)。20年后，看不出NAFTA對(duì)兩國關(guān)系有支撐作用。相反，(這一點(diǎn)也許不公平)NAFTA成了飽受詬病的美國去工業(yè)化象征。
This is not to play down concerns about the US’s future in the Asia Pacific. If the US decides to draw back from its security role in the region, it would undermine the country’s prestige as the “indispensable nation”. But that is almost entirely unconnected with whether a particular trade deal succeeds or not. There are many other worries about Mr Trump’s trade policies, notably his calls for tariffs that could set off destructive trade wars. But the history of trade pacts as an instrument of foreign policy suggests the US role in Asia, and Chinese ambitions to replace it, will be determined by far more than just TPP.
這不是要淡化美國在亞太未來的擔(dān)憂。如果美國決定不再在亞太發(fā)揮安全保障角色，那將破壞美國作為“不可或缺的國家”的威望。但是，這跟某項(xiàng)特定的貿(mào)易協(xié)議成功與否幾乎毫無關(guān)系。特朗普的貿(mào)易政策還引起其他方面的擔(dān)憂——尤其是他的關(guān)稅呼吁可能引發(fā)毀滅性的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。但是，貿(mào)易協(xié)定作為一種外交政策工具的歷史似乎表明，美國在亞洲的角色、以及中國在亞洲取代美國的雄心，都將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不是一個(gè)TPP所能決定的。
