得不償失的工業(yè)間諜活動(dòng)

Normally, economists do not measure the antics of spies. But these are not entirely normal times; or not as far as the American business community and US Department of Justice is concerned.

正常情況下，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家不會(huì)衡量間諜行為有多愚蠢可笑。但現(xiàn)在并非完全正常的時(shí)期;或者說(shuō)，至少對(duì)美國(guó)企業(yè)界和美國(guó)司法部(DoJ)而言是不正常的。

In recent months, the DoJ has pursued cases where American officials think that spies for China have been stealing commercial secrets from American companies. This year, for example, the FBI apprehended Allen Ho, an American national born in Taiwan, and accused him of stealing nuclear technology for the state-owned China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN has stirred up controversy because it is one of the investors in the planned UK nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point).

最近幾個(gè)月，美國(guó)司法部一直在追查中國(guó)間諜案，美國(guó)官員們認(rèn)為，為中國(guó)工作的間諜在竊取美國(guó)公司的商業(yè)機(jī)密。例如，今年美國(guó)聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局(FBI)拘押了在臺(tái)灣出生的美國(guó)公民何則雄(Allen Ho)，指控他為中國(guó)國(guó)有的中廣核集團(tuán)(China General Nuclear Power Group)竊取核技術(shù)(中廣核引發(fā)爭(zhēng)議，因?yàn)樗怯?guó)擬議中的欣克利角(Hinkley Point)核電站的投資者之一)。

Separately, the DoJ and FBI have accused Chinese-born nationals of stealing know-how from advanced underwater vehicle technology to military-grade carbon fibre. They have even chased spies who tried to steal the technique for using titanium dioxide to make consumer goods appear ultra-white; this technology, owned by DuPont, is used for items ranging from the filling in Oreo biscuits to tennis court lines.

另外，美國(guó)司法部和聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局指控華裔美國(guó)人竊取各種專業(yè)技術(shù)，從先進(jìn)的水下潛航器技術(shù)到軍用級(jí)碳纖維。他們甚至追查一些間諜試圖竊取利用二氧化鈦?zhàn)屜M(fèi)品看上去顯得超白的技術(shù);這種技術(shù)由杜邦(DuPont)擁有，用于各種產(chǎn)品，從奧利奧餅干(Oreo)的餡料到網(wǎng)球場(chǎng)邊線。

US security officials say this is just the tip of an espionage iceberg — one that has forced the DoJ to switch its attention from traditional sleuthing to a keener focus on industrial spying.

美國(guó)安全官員們表示，這只是間諜活動(dòng)的冰山一角，大量間諜活動(dòng)已迫使美國(guó)司法部將注意力從傳統(tǒng)偵查轉(zhuǎn)向更密切關(guān)注工業(yè)間諜活動(dòng)。

As John Carlin, assistant attorney-general for national security, observes : “We still do the traditional spy cases. But a lot of the cases now are not traditional espionage, insofar as they’re not necessarily a trained member of the other country’s spy service. Instead, they’re getting the information by cyber-enabled means or stealing it by bribing an insider.”

負(fù)責(zé)國(guó)家安全事務(wù)的美國(guó)助理總檢察官約翰•卡林(John Carlin)認(rèn)為：“我們?nèi)栽趥刹閭鹘y(tǒng)的間諜案件。但現(xiàn)在很多案件并非傳統(tǒng)間諜案，因?yàn)樯姘溉藛T不一定是其他國(guó)家間諜組織受過(guò)訓(xùn)練的成員。他們通過(guò)網(wǎng)絡(luò)手段獲得信息或者通過(guò)收買(mǎi)內(nèi)部人士竊取信息。”

What has hitherto been missing from the DoJ policy shift, however, is a sense of economics. Although the FBI has estimated that industrial espionage costs American companies $19bn a year, nobody has examined the other side of the balance sheet: the impact on Chinese companies or anyone else.

然而，就美國(guó)司法部的政策變動(dòng)而言，此前被忽視的一點(diǎn)是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)評(píng)估。盡管聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局估計(jì)，工業(yè)間諜每年給美國(guó)企業(yè)帶來(lái)190億美元的損失，但沒(méi)有人考察這個(gè)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的另一面：對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)或者其他方面的影響。

Business leaders and politicians should look at fascinating work just published by economists Albrecht Glitz and Erik Meyersson. They examined the impact of one of the best-documented and systematically organised pieces of industrial espionage ever seen: the campaign by the East German Stasi to steal secrets from West German companies between 1969 and 1989.

企業(yè)高管和政治人士應(yīng)看看經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家亞伯雷希•格列茨(Albrecht Glitz)和埃里克•邁爾森(Erik Meyersson)剛剛發(fā)表的一篇引人入勝的論文。他們考察了迄今記錄最完整、系統(tǒng)化有組織的工業(yè)間諜活動(dòng)之一：1969年至1989年?yáng)|德情報(bào)和秘密警察機(jī)構(gòu)史塔西(Stasi)從西德公司竊取商業(yè)機(jī)密。

The researchers crunched 151,854 pieces of information in Stasi files that informants took from West German businesses. All were sorted into 16 categories, of which office appliances, computing and electronics was the largest. The data were compared with statistics about East German productivity then adjusted to remove impact from indigenous innovation (or ideas which were not stolen).

研究人員研究了史塔西檔案中的15.1854萬(wàn)條信息，這些信息是線人從西德公司獲取的。這些信息被分成16類(lèi)，其中辦公室用具、電腦和電子產(chǎn)品最多。研究人員把這些數(shù)據(jù)與東德生產(chǎn)率數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了對(duì)比，然后做出調(diào)整，排除了自主創(chuàng)新(或者并非來(lái)自竊取的創(chuàng)意)的影響。

Their conclusions are that East German companies enjoyed big productivity gains from spying. “For the East German economy, the immediate returns to industrial espionage were substantial.”

他們的結(jié)論是，東德公司從間諜活動(dòng)獲得大幅生產(chǎn)率提升。“對(duì)于東德經(jīng)濟(jì)而言，工業(yè)間諜活動(dòng)取得了立竿見(jiàn)影的顯著回報(bào)。”

This is chilling for American companies. It also offers easy ammunition for China-bashing US politicians such as Donald Trump, the Republican presidential nominee. But there is an important twist. After the Berlin Wall came down, East German industry collapsed. Economists have blamed this on problems such as an uncompetitive exchange rate. Mr Glitz and Mr Meyersson by contrast suggest that, because the Stasi was addicted to industrial espionage, East German companies did not pay enough attention to original research and development.

這將令美國(guó)企業(yè)不寒而栗。它也為敲打中國(guó)的美國(guó)政治人士提供現(xiàn)成的彈藥，例如共和黨總統(tǒng)提名人唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)。但這里有一個(gè)重要的情節(jié)轉(zhuǎn)折。在柏林墻倒下后，東德工業(yè)很快瓦解。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們一直將其歸咎于不具競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的匯率等問(wèn)題。相比之下，格列茨和邁爾森認(rèn)為，由于史塔西沉迷于工業(yè)間諜活動(dòng)，東德公司沒(méi)有對(duì)原創(chuàng)研發(fā)投入足夠多的關(guān)注。

They conclude that spying “may have proved productive [for East Germany] in catching up with its capitalist neighbours under a communist regime” because it was done on such an industrial scale. Yet in the long run this espionage actually hurt the economy.

他們總結(jié)稱，間諜活動(dòng)“在幫助東德在共產(chǎn)黨政權(quán)統(tǒng)治下趕上資本主義鄰國(guó)方面可能被證明為具有成效”，因?yàn)樗且怨I(yè)規(guī)模展開(kāi)的。然而，長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，這種間諜活動(dòng)實(shí)際上會(huì)損害經(jīng)濟(jì)。

Could this happen in the case of the US and China? The academic research is limited and the parallels are not exact. China has sophisticated intellectual capital of its own and is a vastly more successful economy than East Germany was.

就美國(guó)與中國(guó)而言，是否可能會(huì)發(fā)生同樣的情況?這方面的學(xué)術(shù)研究有限，對(duì)比也不完美契合。中國(guó)本身?yè)碛袕?qiáng)大的智力資本，而且遠(yuǎn)比當(dāng)年的東德經(jīng)濟(jì)成功。

Nevertheless, the next time Donald Trump, or anyone else, accuses China of stealing jobs and ideas, it is worth remembering this thought-provoking moral. Yes, industrial espionage provides for powerful political rhetoric. And, yes, it is likely to create drama at the DoJ in coming months. It has also hurt some US companies, as well as groups in Europe, Japan and South Korea.

然而，下次當(dāng)唐納德•特朗普(或者其他任何人)指責(zé)中國(guó)竊取就業(yè)和創(chuàng)意時(shí)，我們有必要記住這個(gè)發(fā)人深省的故事。沒(méi)錯(cuò)，工業(yè)間諜活動(dòng)提供了強(qiáng)有力的政治說(shuō)辭。同樣沒(méi)錯(cuò)的是，它可能會(huì)在未來(lái)幾個(gè)月在美國(guó)司法部制造戲劇。它還損害了一些美國(guó)公司以及歐洲、日本和韓國(guó)的企業(yè)。

But, in the long run, a country’s best economic weapon is its ability to keep producing new ideas, over and over again. American politicians should feel both comforted and challenged.

然而，長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，一國(guó)最好的經(jīng)濟(jì)武器是不斷產(chǎn)生新創(chuàng)意的能力。美國(guó)政治人士應(yīng)該既為此感到欣慰，也有受到挑戰(zhàn)的憂患意識(shí)。