不堪設(shè)想的“特朗普總統(tǒng)”

　　There is nothing surprising about Donald Trump’s admiration for Vladimir Putin. The would-be US president and the Russian leader share an authoritarian bent. They disdain multilateral engagement in favour of the raw politics of power. Above all, they are transactional. Deals are to be shaped by narrow definitions of national interest, unconstrained by international rules or shared values.

　　唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)敬佩弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)，這沒有什么讓人驚奇的。這位美國總統(tǒng)候選人和俄羅斯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都有一種威權(quán)傾向。他們蔑視多邊接觸，喜歡原始的強權(quán)政治。最重要的是，他們都是交易型的人。協(xié)議將受到狹隘定義的國家利益的影響，不受國際規(guī)則或公認(rèn)價值觀的制約。

　　Mr Putin wants to erase the humiliation of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mr Trump promises to “make America great again”. The reason for the Russian leader’s bad personal relationship with Barack Obama is the US president’s wounding refusal to indulge the fantasy of superpower parity. Perhaps Mr Trump has the better understanding of Russian psychology. He never ceases to praise Mr Putin as a strong and decisive leader.

　　普京想抹掉蘇聯(lián)垮臺帶來的屈辱感。特朗普承諾“讓美國再次偉大”。俄羅斯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人跟巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)的個人關(guān)系很差，因為美國總統(tǒng)拒絕讓普京陶醉于兩個超級大國平起平坐的幻想，令他受傷?；蛟S特朗普更懂得俄羅斯人的心理。他一直稱贊普京是一個堅強果斷的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。

　　The Republican party’s contender for the White House is not alone in cosying up to the Kremlin. Populists across Europe — Marine Le Pen’s National Front in France, Nigel Farage’s UK Independence party and the fascist Jobbik and Golden Dawn in Hungary and Greece respectively — have all tipped their hats to Moscow. Mr Putin also has sympathisers on the left. Britain’s Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn is more comfortable denouncing US “imperialism” than challenging Russian revanchism.

　　向克里姆林宮示好的，并不只有這位美國總統(tǒng)候選人。整個歐洲的民粹主義者——馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)所屬的法國國民陣線(National Front)、奈杰爾•法拉奇(Nigel Farage)所屬的英國獨立黨(UKIP)、匈牙利的法西斯主義尤比克黨(Jobbik)和希臘的金色黎明黨(Golden Dawn)——都向莫斯科方面表達(dá)過敬意。普京在左翼陣營也有支持者。英國工黨(Labour)領(lǐng)袖杰里米•科爾賓(Jeremy Corbyn)更愿意譴責(zé)美國的“帝國主義”，而不愿挑戰(zhàn)俄羅斯的復(fù)仇主義。

　　Until recently the foreign policy establishment was quietly preparing for a Hillary Clinton presidency. Mr Trump’s candidacy was a nightmare it would surely wake up from on November 9. The mood has changed. As the polls have tightened, Republicans and Democrats have begun to imagine Mr Trump as commander-in-chief. A dark quip among US generals — that they would remove the circuit boards before handing over the so-called nuclear football — no longer seems quite so amusing.

　　直到不久以前，外交政策領(lǐng)域的體制內(nèi)人士一直在悄悄地為希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)做準(zhǔn)備。特朗普成為候選人是一場噩夢，這場夢注定會在11月9日醒來。情緒已發(fā)生了變化。隨著民調(diào)支持率差距的拉近，共和黨人和民主黨人都開始想象特朗普成為總司令的情形。美國將軍們當(dāng)中的一個黑色俏皮話——他們在移交所謂“核足球”(美國總統(tǒng)授權(quán)發(fā)動核攻擊所用的手提箱——譯者注)之前會把電路板取下來——不再顯得特別好笑了。

　　The fears are that the “shy” Trump supporters may not be showing up in the polls, that antipathy to Mrs Clinton could see centrists stay at home, and that the resolve of white working-class voters to punish the elites could overwhelm Mr Obama’s winning coalition of educated whites, Hispanics and African Americans. Faced with compelling evidence of Mr Trump’s mendacity, misogyny and racism, too many people reply that “he doesn’t really mean all that stuff”.

　　人們擔(dān)心，“害羞的”特朗普支持者或許沒有反映在民調(diào)數(shù)字中，對希拉里的厭惡可能讓一些持中間立場者呆在家里，白人工人階級選民懲罰精英的決心會壓倒當(dāng)年幫助奧巴馬取勝的受過教育的白人、西語裔和非洲裔美國人的聯(lián)盟。面對特朗普表現(xiàn)出的撒謊、厭女癥和種族主義的確鑿證據(jù)，太多人的回答是，“他并不真是那個意思”。

　　The organising fact for the rest of the world is that the US is the only nation that matters just about everywhere. It is no longer the hyperpuissance of the 1990s and has lost the appetite to remake the world, but the capacity of a thin-skinned, shoot-from-the-hip president to wreak havoc is chilling. A lot of people in Washington are trying to persuade themselves that the checks and balances in the system would restrain him. Judging from my conversations this week, they are not succeeding in the task.

　　在世界其他地區(qū)看來，基本事實是美國是唯一在世界各地都具有重要性的國家。美國不再是1990年代那個超級強國，也失去了重塑世界的意愿，但如果一位易怒、做事魯莽的總統(tǒng)上臺，那么其造成破壞的能力是令人恐懼的。在華盛頓，很多人在努力勸服自己，美國體制中的制衡機(jī)制將對他構(gòu)成約束。從我最近的談話判斷，他們在這項任務(wù)上沒有成功。

　　The obvious fear is that a temperamentally unstable president Trump would lash out in a crisis. Robert Gates, the Republican former US defence secretary, says simply that he is “unfit to be commander-in-chief”. Mr Trump’s reaction to the latest bomb outrage in New York fitted the pattern. The US had to “knock the hell out of them … do something serious over there” — “them” being indeterminate and “over there” being the Middle East.

　　人們顯然擔(dān)憂的是，氣質(zhì)上不穩(wěn)定的特朗普總統(tǒng)在危機(jī)期間將會失控。共和黨人、前國防部長羅伯特•蓋茨(Robert Gates)簡要地說，他“不適合擔(dān)任總司令”。特朗普對不久前紐約發(fā)生的爆炸事件的反應(yīng)符合這個模式。美國必須“痛打他們……在那里認(rèn)真地做些事”——“他們”不知道指誰，“在那里”指的是中東。

　　The bigger danger lies in Mr Trump’s promise to withdraw — to tear up trade deals such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, throw up trade barriers against China, repudiate the Paris climate change agreement and the nuclear deal with Iran, and abdicate responsibility for the security of east Asia and Europe. Mr Trump’s policies are shot through with contradictions but one constant drumbeat is his belligerent isolationism. America will go it alone. Hyper-realism, some call it. Dangerous is a better word.

　　更大的危險在于特朗普做出的撤退承諾——撕毀北美自貿(mào)協(xié)定(NAFTA)等協(xié)議、建立針對中國的貿(mào)易壁壘，拒絕批準(zhǔn)巴黎氣候變化協(xié)議和與伊朗達(dá)成的核協(xié)議，放棄保衛(wèi)東亞與歐洲安全的責(zé)任。特朗普的政策相互矛盾，但一個不變的主題是他好戰(zhàn)的孤立主義。美國將會單干。有些人稱之為“超現(xiàn)實主義”。一個更確切的詞是危險。

　　The present global order — the liberal, rules-based system established in 1945 and expanded after the end of the cold war — is under unprecedented strain. Globalisation is in retreat. At a conference in New York organised by the US branch of the Ditchley Foundation I heard a distinguished American elder statesman remark that he has never known a period when the world had been simultaneously buffeted by so many upheavals and crises.

　　當(dāng)前全球秩序——1945年建立并在冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后擴(kuò)大的自由主義的、以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的制度——正在承受前所未有的壓力。全球化正在后退。在紐約一場由迪奇雷基金會(Ditchley Foundation)美國分會組織的會議上，我聽到美國一位杰出的老年政治家表示，他從不知道有哪段時期，世界同時受到這么多巨變和危機(jī)的沖擊。

　　The list is a familiar one. Mr Putin is trying to redraw borders in Europe, the Middle East is in flames, European unity is fracturing, jihadi terrorism is spreading, pluralism is challenged by authoritarianism, China is contesting the status quo in the South China Sea and its neighbours are rearming in response, populists are storming the citadels across advanced democracies.

　　這是一份大家熟悉的清單。普京正試圖重畫歐洲國家的邊界，中東燃起戰(zhàn)火，圣戰(zhàn)恐怖主義行動在蔓延，多元主義遭到威權(quán)主義的挑戰(zhàn)，中國正試圖改變南中國海(South China Sea)的現(xiàn)狀，促使鄰國開始重新武裝自己，民粹主義者們在各個發(fā)達(dá)民主國家沖擊要塞。

　　To Mr Trump, the answer is American retreat. He wants to build walls. He questions the US security umbrella in the Pacific — maybe Japan and South Korea should get their own nuclear weapons? He undercuts the credibility of Nato’s defence of Europe — the US might stand by if Russian troops marched into the Baltic states. There is no sense in any of this that American national security is safeguarded by alliances and international order.

　　對特朗普而言，答案就是美國撤退。他想建造高墻。他質(zhì)疑美國在太平洋的安全保護(hù)傘——或許日本和韓國應(yīng)當(dāng)發(fā)展自己的核武器?他削弱了北約(Nato)保衛(wèi)歐洲的可信度——如果俄羅斯軍隊長驅(qū)直入波羅的海國家，美國或許會袖手旁觀。美國國家安全靠聯(lián)盟和國際秩序來保障的理念，對特朗普來說毫無意義。

　　If the polls are to be believed, Mr Trump has wrested momentum from Mrs Clinton in the presidential race. This does not mean he will win on November 8. The structure of the electoral college gives him only a narrow path to the White House. And there are three debates ahead. But the unthinkable has become the plausible. We should be more than worried. Neither America nor the world can afford a lurch into Trumpian isolationism.

　　如果民調(diào)結(jié)果可以相信，那么特朗普在總統(tǒng)競選中已奪走了希拉里的勢頭。這并不意味著他將在11月8日獲勝。選舉人團(tuán)的構(gòu)成，只給他留了一條通往白宮的窄路。前面還有幾場辯論。但是，不堪設(shè)想的事情已變得看似可信。我們應(yīng)當(dāng)感到異常擔(dān)憂。無論是美國還是世界，都承擔(dān)不起陷入特朗普式孤立主義的后果。