一帶一路引發(fā)印度矛盾心理

Talk of a new Silk Road may be intended to evokeromantic, non-threatening images of desertcaravans, ancient ships and trade in exoticcommodities. But China’s grand plan for a networkof railways, highways, pipelines and ports acrosscentral Asia, and around Southeast Asia isgenerating anxiety in New Delhi.

“新絲綢之路”的說法或許是有意喚起人們對沙漠商隊、古代商船以及舶來品貿(mào)易的不具威脅的浪漫聯(lián)想。但是，中國對橫穿中亞和環(huán)繞東南亞的鐵路網(wǎng)、公路網(wǎng)、輸油管線路以及港口的宏偉計劃，正在引起新德里方面的焦慮。

With the 3,488km border between the two Asian neighbours still a matter of formal dispute,Indian strategic policy analysts are divided on whether China’s new Silk Road project is astrategic and economic threat to their country — or an opportunity. Many see the project —which the Chinese have called One Belt, One Road (OBOR) — as something that must becarefully navigated, as Beijing develops large projects in countries that India considers part ofits natural sphere of influence. However, New Delhi lacks the financial power to offer a crediblealternative.

在這兩個亞洲鄰居之間3488千米的邊界仍然處于正式糾紛狀態(tài)的情況下，對于中國“新絲綢之路”項目是否對印度構(gòu)成戰(zhàn)略和經(jīng)濟威脅，抑或帶來機遇，印度的戰(zhàn)略政策分析人士意見分歧。很多人認為，必須謹慎應對中方所稱的“一帶一路”(One Belt, One Road)項目，因為中國將要在印度認為屬于其天然影響范圍的一些國家開發(fā)大型項目。然而，新德里方面缺乏提供可信替代選擇的財力。

“The Indian government is very careful about the way it handles the China rhetoric, and it isn’tready to come out arms swinging against OBOR, but it is sitting with its arms folded making itvery clear that it will not endorse the project if it doesn’t like the way it was put together as aChinese fait accompli,” says Shashank Joshi, a senior research fellow at the Royal UnitedServices Institute, a British defence and security think-tank.

“印度政府對待中國的措辭非常謹慎，它沒有準備好跳出來明確反對‘一帶一路’，但是它雙臂交叉坐著等待，表明如果它不喜歡這個項目被當作中方既成事實的方式，它就不會支持該項目，”英國國防和安全智庫——皇家聯(lián)合軍種研究院(Royal United Services Institute)高級研究員沙善•喬希(Shashank Joshi)表示。

“They cannot be seen to be outwardly hostile to a scheme which many smaller Asianneighbours view as a good opportunity for large flows of Chinese capital that India cannotdeliver,” he says.

“他們不能從表面上被看出來對一帶一路懷有敵意，因為該計劃被很多亞洲較小鄰國視為引入大量中國資本的良機，而這類資本是印度無力輸送的，”他表示。

Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at New Delhi’s Centre for Policy Research, seesChina’s new Silk Road initiative as a repackaging — in more palatable terms — of China’s so-called “string of pearls” strategy, which India views as an attempt to strategically encircle it.

新德里政策研究中心(Centre for Policy Research)戰(zhàn)略研究教授布拉馬•切拉尼(Brahma Chellaney)把中國的“新絲綢之路”計劃視為——以更容易讓人接受的方式——對中國“珍珠鏈”戰(zhàn)略的重新包裝;印度把這一戰(zhàn)略視為中國企圖對其實施戰(zhàn)略包圍。

The “string of pearls” theory argues that Chinese investment in ports in south Asia is aprecursor to developing overseas naval bases. China has, for example, already built a majorport at Hambantota in Sri Lanka, which overlooks important shipping lanes that carry much ofthe world’s oil trade, and which India views as strategically important for its own defence.

按照“珍珠鏈”理論，中國在南亞投資建設(shè)港口是開發(fā)海外海軍基地的先兆。例如，中國已經(jīng)在斯里蘭卡的漢班托特(Hambantota)建設(shè)了一個大型港口;斯里蘭卡瀕臨全球很大一部分原油貿(mào)易必經(jīng)的重要航道，同時印度認為斯里蘭卡對其自己的國防具有戰(zhàn)略重要性。

The visit of Chinese submarines at the Colombo port in 2014 raised fears that the facility’spurpose is not economic but military. Chinese investment is also planned for ports inBangladesh and Myanmar, raising concerns that they may serve a dual purpose.

2014年中國海軍潛艇訪問斯里蘭卡科倫坡港，此舉引發(fā)了人們對于該港的用途并非經(jīng)貿(mào)而是軍用的擔憂。中國在孟加拉國和緬甸投資的港口也在規(guī)劃中，引發(fā)了人們對于這些港口可能軍民兩用的擔憂。

“The new Silk Road is just a nice new name for the strategy they’ve been pursuing,” says MrChellaney. “They’ve wrapped that strategy in more benign terms. The Chinese dream is pre-eminence in Asia, and this goes to the heart of that dream.”

“‘新絲綢之路’只是給他們在一直追求的戰(zhàn)略換了一個好聽的新名字，”切拉尼稱，“他們給該戰(zhàn)略換了一身更加和善的包裝。中國的夢想是稱雄亞洲，而該計劃處于中國夢的核心。”

“It’s not just a trade initiative,” he says. “What China is doing has a strategic element that isincreasingly obvious.”

“它不只是一個貿(mào)易倡議，”他稱，“中國在做的事情帶有戰(zhàn)略元素，這一點日益明顯。”

India is most exercised about plans for a $46bn economic corridor linking China and Pakistan,India’s nuclear-armed neighbour and rival. That blueprint envisions goods travelling fromChina’s western region to Pakistan’s Gwadar, a once sleepy Arabian Sea port now run by theChina Overseas Port Holding Company. It is considered a staging point between central Asiaand the Gulf.

印度最擔心的是連接中國和巴基斯坦的460億美元經(jīng)濟走廊計劃;巴基斯坦是印度的鄰國以及對手，擁有核武器。按照該計劃的藍圖，商品將從中國西部運往巴基斯坦的瓜達爾港(Gwadar)。瓜達爾曾經(jīng)是坐落于阿拉伯海之濱的一個沉寂的港口，如今由中國海外港口控股有限公司(China Overseas Port Holding Company)經(jīng)營。它被認為是中亞和海灣地區(qū)之間的中轉(zhuǎn)點。

Part of the corridor will pass through Pakistan-held Kashmir, a territory that is still thesubject of a decades-old, unresolved dispute between India and Pakistan. Indian analysts saythat acceptance of the corridor would effectively acknowledge Pakistan’s rights over theterritory now under its control, while India’s own claims over Kashmir have yet to be resolved— something New Delhi considers unacceptable. “This is a large scale project bringingPeople’s Liberation Army personnel [said to be guarding some project locations] right into theheart of what India considers to be occupied territory,” Mr Joshi says.

中巴經(jīng)濟走廊的一部分將穿過克什米爾地區(qū)巴基斯坦控制的部分，該地區(qū)是印度和巴基斯坦之間好幾十年未能解決的領(lǐng)土糾紛的對象。印度分析人士表示，接受這條經(jīng)濟走廊相當于承認巴基斯坦對目前在其控制下的那部分克什米爾領(lǐng)土的主權(quán)，而印度本身對克什米爾的主權(quán)主張尚未解決——這在新德里方面看來是無法接受的。“這是一項大規(guī)模的工程，會把解放軍人員(據(jù)稱是為了守衛(wèi)一些項目地點)直接帶到被印度視為被占領(lǐng)土的心臟地帶，”皇家聯(lián)合軍種研究院的喬希表示。

At a recent conference in Gwadar, Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, accusedIndia of deliberately attempting to undermine the project. “India, our neighbour, has openlychallenged this development initiative,” he said. “We will not allow anyone to createimpediments or turbulence in any parts of Pakistan.”

最近在瓜達爾召開的一次會議上，巴基斯坦陸軍參謀長拉希勒•謝里夫上將(Raheel Sharif)指責印度企圖破壞該項目。“我們的鄰國印度公開叫板這個開發(fā)項目，”他稱，“我們不會允許任何人在巴基斯坦任何地方制造障礙或引起動蕩。”

But wary as India may be of Chinese ambitions, analysts say New Delhi needs to take ameasured approach to the new Silk Road, and embrace individual components.

但是，盡管印度可能對中國的野心抱有戒心，但是分析師稱，新德里需要有分寸地對待新絲綢之路，歡迎某些個別項目。

India is already a member of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which willfinance much of the infrastructure, potentially giving it some leverage over how the planunfolds.

印度已經(jīng)是中國主導創(chuàng)立的亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行(AIIB，簡稱亞投行)的成員國之一，而該行將為很多基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項目提供資金，這可能會使印度在該計劃如何展開的問題上具有一些影響力。

“For every belt they create, and every road that we create, can we create a slip road thatconnects Indian opportunities to the larger global market rather than reject it outright?” asksSamir Saran, of the Observer Research Foundation. “Can we … use their institutions to our ownadvantage?”

“對于他們創(chuàng)建的每一帶和每一路，我們能不能打造一條匝道，讓印度的機遇與更大的全球市場互聯(lián)互通，而不是把這個計劃一概拒之門外?”新德里觀察者研究基金會(Observer Research Foundation)的薩米爾•薩蘭(Samir Saran)稱，“我們能把他們的機構(gòu)為我所用嗎?”