全球經(jīng)濟(jì)需要直升機(jī)撒錢 Helicopter drops might not be far away

　　The world economy is slowing, both structurally andcyclically. How might policy respond? Withdesperate improvisations, no doubt. Negative interest rates have already moved from theunthinkable to reality. The next step is likely to include fiscal expansion. Indeed, this is whatthe OECD, long an enthusiast for fiscal austerity, recommends in its Interim EconomicOutlook. But that is unlikely to be the end. With fiscal expansion might go direct monetarysupport, including the most radical policy of all: the “helicopter drops” of money recommendedby the late Milton Friedman.

　　世界經(jīng)濟(jì)正在放緩——既是結(jié)構(gòu)性的，也是周期性的。政策或?qū)?huì)如何應(yīng)對(duì)?毫無疑問，只能依靠不顧一切臨時(shí)拼湊出的各種措施。負(fù)利率早已從天方夜譚變?yōu)楝F(xiàn)實(shí)。下一步很可能要實(shí)施財(cái)政擴(kuò)張。實(shí)際上，這正是經(jīng)合組織(OECD)——財(cái)政緊縮政策的長(zhǎng)期擁護(hù)者——在其《年中經(jīng)濟(jì)展望》(Interim Economic Outlook)中給出的建議。但這可能還不算完，在推出擴(kuò)張性財(cái)政政策的同時(shí)，可能還會(huì)出臺(tái)直接的資金支持，包括所有政策之中最激進(jìn)的政策——已故經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家米爾頓•弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)建議的“直升機(jī)撒錢”(helicopterdrops)。

　　More recently, this is the policy foreseen by Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater, a hedge fund.The world economy is not just slowing, he argues, but “monetary policy 1” — lower interestrates — and “monetary policy 2” — quantitative easing — are largely exhausted. Thus, hesays, the world will need a “monetary policy 3” directly targeted at encouraging spending.That we might need such a policy is also the recommendation of Adair Turner, formerchairman of the Financial Services Authority, in his bookBetween Debt and the Devil.

　　對(duì)沖基金橋水公司(Bridgewater)創(chuàng)始人雷•戴利奧(Ray Dalio)最近已預(yù)見到了這一政策。他辯稱，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)不止是在放緩，但降息(一號(hào)貨幣政策)與量化寬松(二號(hào)貨幣政策)很大程度上都已彈盡糧絕。因此，他說，世界將需要以鼓勵(lì)消費(fèi)為直接目標(biāo)的“三號(hào)貨幣政策”。英國(guó)金融服務(wù)管理局(FSA)前主席阿代爾•特納(Adair Turner)在自己的著作《債務(wù)與魔鬼》(Between Debt and the Devil)中也給出了相同的政策建議。

　　Why might the world be driven to such expedients? The short answer is that the globaleconomy is slowing durably. The OECD now forecasts growth of global output in 2016 “to beno higher than in 2015, itself the slowest pace in the past five years”. Behind this is a simplereality: the global savings glut — the tendency for desired savings to rise more than desiredinvestment — is growing and so the “chronic demand deficiency syndrome” is worsening.

　　為什么世界或?qū)⒉坏貌徊扇∵@樣的權(quán)宜之計(jì)呢?簡(jiǎn)單來說，答案是：全球經(jīng)濟(jì)處于長(zhǎng)期放緩之中。經(jīng)合組織目前預(yù)計(jì)，2016年全球產(chǎn)出增速“不會(huì)高于2015年——2015年本身也是過去5年增速最慢的一年”。這背后的現(xiàn)實(shí)很簡(jiǎn)單：全球儲(chǔ)蓄過剩(合意儲(chǔ)蓄比合意投資增長(zhǎng)更多的趨勢(shì))日益嚴(yán)重，因此，“長(zhǎng)期需求不足綜合征”正在惡化。

　　This stage of demand weakness must be seen in its historical context. The long-term realinterest rate on safe securities has been declining for at least two decades. It has been nearzero since the financial crisis of 2007-09. Before then, an unsustainable western credit boomoffset the weakness of demand. Afterwards, fiscal deficits, zero interest rates andexpansions of central bank balance sheets stabilised demand in the west, while a creditexpansion funded massive investment in China. Loose western monetary policies and looseChinese credit policies also drove the post-crisis commodity boom, though China’sexceptional growth was the most important single factor.

　　必須用歷史的眼光看待這一階段的需求疲軟。在過去至少20年間，安全資產(chǎn)的長(zhǎng)期實(shí)際利率一直在下降——自2007-09年金融危機(jī)以來一直接近于零。而在金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)前，西方國(guó)家不可持續(xù)的信貸膨脹抵消了需求的疲軟。金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)后，財(cái)政赤字、零利率以及央行擴(kuò)大資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表穩(wěn)定了西方的需求，而在中國(guó)，信貸擴(kuò)張為大規(guī)模投資提供了資金。西方寬松的貨幣政策和中國(guó)寬松的信貸政策還帶動(dòng)了后危機(jī)時(shí)期的大宗商品繁榮——盡管中國(guó)一枝獨(dú)秀的增長(zhǎng)是最重要的單一因素。

　　The end of these credit booms is an important cause of today’s weak demand. But demand isalso weak relative to a slowing growth of supply. At the world level, growth of labour supplyand labour productivity have fallen sharply since the middle of the last decade. Lower growthof potential output itself weakens demand, because it lowers investment, always a crucialdriver of spending in a capitalist economy.

　　這輪信貸繁榮的結(jié)束是導(dǎo)致當(dāng)前需求疲軟的重要原因。但相對(duì)于放緩的供給增長(zhǎng)，需求還是很疲軟。從世界平均水平看，自上個(gè)10年的中期開始，勞動(dòng)力供給增速及勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率提升速度已經(jīng)大幅下滑。潛在產(chǎn)出增長(zhǎng)放緩本身就會(huì)削弱需求，因?yàn)樗雇顿Y減少，而投資在資本主義經(jīng)濟(jì)中一直是支出的關(guān)鍵驅(qū)動(dòng)力。

　　It is this background — slowing growth of supply, rising imbalances between desired savingsand investment, the end of unsustainable credit booms and, not least, a legacy of huge debtoverhangs and weakened financial systems — that explains the current predicament. Itexplains, too, why economies that cannot generate adequate demand at home are compelledtowards beggar-my-neighbour, export-led growth via weakening exchange rates. Japan andthe eurozone are in that club. So, too, are the emerging economies with collapsed exchangerates. China is resisting, but for how long? A weaker renminbi seems almost inevitable,whatever the authorities say.

　　可以解釋當(dāng)前困境的正是這一背景——供給增長(zhǎng)放緩、合意儲(chǔ)蓄與合意投資日益失衡、無法持續(xù)的信貸膨脹走到了終點(diǎn)、以及(尤其是)龐大的遺留債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)和虛弱的金融體系。這一背景還解釋了為什么那些國(guó)內(nèi)需求不足的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，不得不通過壓低匯率尋求“以鄰為壑”的出口拉動(dòng)型增長(zhǎng)。日本和歐元區(qū)如此。一些匯率暴跌的新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體亦是如此。中國(guó)還在挺著，但能堅(jiān)持多久呢?無論當(dāng)局怎么說，人民幣貶值幾乎不可避免。

　　No simple solutions for the global economic imbalances of today exist, only palliatives. Thecurrent favourite flavour in monetary policy is negative interest rates. Mr Dalio argues that: “While negative interest rates will make cash a bit less attractive (but not much), it won’tdrive . . . savers to buy the sort of assets that will finance spending.” I agree. I cannot imaginethat businesses will rush to invest as a result. The same is true of conventional quantitativeeasing. The biggest effect of these policies is likely to be via exchange rates. In effect, othercountries will be seeking export-led growth vis-à-vis over-borrowed US consumers. That isbound to blow up.

　　要消除目前的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡沒有簡(jiǎn)單的解決辦法，只有權(quán)宜之計(jì)。目前最受青睞的貨幣政策是負(fù)利率。戴利奧辯稱：“負(fù)利率將讓持有現(xiàn)金變得(稍微)不那么吸引人，但它不會(huì)促使……儲(chǔ)戶去購(gòu)買那種能夠?yàn)橹С鎏峁┵Y金的資產(chǎn)。”我同意這點(diǎn)。我無法想象企業(yè)會(huì)因此趕忙去投資。傳統(tǒng)的量化寬松政策也是如此。這些政策的最大影響可能會(huì)通過匯率體現(xiàn)出來。實(shí)際上，與過度借貸的美國(guó)消費(fèi)者相比，其他國(guó)家將尋求由出口拉動(dòng)的增長(zhǎng)。這種模式肯定會(huì)覆滅。

　　One alternative then is fiscal policy. The OECD argues, persuasively, that co-ordinatedexpansion of public investment, combined with appropriate structural reforms, could expandoutput and even lower the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product. This is particularlyplausible nowadays, because the major governments are able to borrow at zero or evennegative real interest rates, long term. The austerity obsession, even when borrowing costsare so low, is lunatic.

　　接下來，另一種解決辦法是財(cái)政政策。經(jīng)合組織令人信服的辯稱，協(xié)調(diào)地?cái)U(kuò)大公共投資，再加上適當(dāng)?shù)慕Y(jié)構(gòu)性改革，可能會(huì)提高產(chǎn)出、甚至降低公共債務(wù)與國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)之比。這種觀點(diǎn)眼下看來尤其有道理，因?yàn)槭澜缰饕獓?guó)家的政府能夠長(zhǎng)期以零實(shí)際利率甚至負(fù)實(shí)際利率借入資金。在借款成本處于如此低位之際還癡迷于財(cái)政緊縮政策，是極其愚蠢的。

　　If the fiscal authorities are unwilling to behave so sensibly — and the signs, alas, are thatthey are not — central banks are the only players. They could be given the power to sendmoney, ideally in electronic form, to every adult citizen. Would this add to demand? Absolutely.Under existing monetary arrangements, it would also generate a permanent rise in thereserves of commercial banks at the central bank. The easy way to contain any long-termmonetary effects would be to raise reserve requirements. These could then become adesirable feature of our unstable banking systems.

　　如果財(cái)政當(dāng)局不愿明智地采取行動(dòng)(唉，有跡象顯示他們確實(shí)不愿意)，那么央行就要唱獨(dú)角戲了。可以賦予央行向每一位成年公民發(fā)錢(最好是以電子形式)的權(quán)力。這會(huì)擴(kuò)大需求嗎?肯定會(huì)。在現(xiàn)有的貨幣安排下，這還會(huì)導(dǎo)致商業(yè)銀行存放在央行的存款準(zhǔn)備金永久性增加。避免產(chǎn)生任何長(zhǎng)期貨幣影響的簡(jiǎn)便辦法，是提高銀行存款準(zhǔn)備金率。這隨后可能會(huì)成為我們不穩(wěn)定的銀行業(yè)體系的一個(gè)理想特征。

　　The main point is this. The economic forces that have brought the world economy to zero realinterest rates and, increasingly, negative central bank rates are, if anything, nowstrengthening. This is what the world economy is showing. This is what monetary policy isindicating. Increasingly, this is what asset prices are demonstrating.

　　主要觀點(diǎn)如下。將全球經(jīng)濟(jì)帶入零實(shí)際利率、乃至讓越來越多央行實(shí)行負(fù)利率的經(jīng)濟(jì)因素，眼下不僅未見減弱，反而正在增強(qiáng)。這就是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)反映出的狀況，也是貨幣政策反映出的狀況。資產(chǎn)價(jià)格也越來越明顯地反映出這種狀況。

　　Policymakers must prepare for a new “new normal” in which policy becomes moreuncomfortable, more unconventional, or both. Can the world escape from the chronicdemand weakness? Absolutely, yes. Will it? That demands greater boldness. When one hasexhausted the just about possible, what remains, however improbable, must be the answer.

　　政策制定者必須準(zhǔn)備好迎接新一輪“新常態(tài)”，在這種新常態(tài)下，政策將變得更令人不安、更非傳統(tǒng)，或者兩者兼有。世界能否擺脫長(zhǎng)期需求乏力?當(dāng)然，答案是肯定的。會(huì)擺脫嗎?這需要更多勇氣。當(dāng)所有可能的方案都已窮盡時(shí)，剩下的肯定就是答案，不管它有多么不可思議。