像巴菲特那樣投資

巴菲特

How Warren Buffett Does It

像巴菲特那樣投資

Fifty years ago, a young investor named Warren Buffett took control of a failing textile company, Berkshire Hathaway. “I found myself ... invested in a terrible business about which I knew very little,” Buffett relates in his annual letter to shareholders, which was released over the weekend. “I became the dog who caught the car.”

在50年前，一個(gè)名叫沃倫·巴菲特(Warren Buffett)的年輕投資者接手了一家經(jīng)營(yíng)不佳的紡織企業(yè)伯克希爾-哈撒韋(Berkshire Hathaway)。“我發(fā)現(xiàn)自己……投資了一樁糟糕的生意，而且我對(duì)它所知甚少，”巴菲特在周末發(fā)布的年度致股東信中寫道。“我像是一只終于追上了汽車的狗”——得償所愿，但不知道接下來(lái)該怎么辦。

Buffett describes his approach in those days as “cigar butt” investing; buying shares of troubled companies with underpriced stocks was “like picking up a discarded cigar butt that had one puff remaining in it,” he writes. “Though the stub might be ugly and soggy, the puff would be free.” He continues: “Most of my gains in those early years ... came from investments in mediocre companies that traded at bargain prices.”

巴菲特形容，他在那些日子的策略是“雪茄屁股”投資：從處境糟糕、股價(jià)過(guò)低的企業(yè)買進(jìn)股票，就像是“撿起別人扔掉的只剩一口的雪茄屁股，”他寫道。 “或許煙頭很丑陋，而且軟塌塌的，但剩下的那一口煙卻是免費(fèi)的。”他又說(shuō)：“我最初那段時(shí)間的收益，大都……來(lái)源于對(duì)股價(jià)超低的平庸企業(yè)的投資。”

But that approach had limits. It took Charlie Munger, the Los Angeles lawyer who has been his longtime sidekick, to show him that there was another way to win at the investing game: “Forget what you know about buying fair businesses at wonderful prices,” Munger told him. “Instead, buy wonderful businesses at fair prices.” Which is what Buffett’s been doing ever since.

但這種投資方式也有其局限。是查理·芒格(Charlie Munger)向他說(shuō)明，在投資游戲中取勝，還有另一種方法。這名洛杉磯的律師后來(lái)成了巴菲特長(zhǎng)期的左膀右臂。“忘掉你了解的那些用很棒的價(jià)格收購(gòu)普通公司的做法吧，”芒格對(duì)巴菲特說(shuō)。“應(yīng)該反過(guò)來(lái)用普通的價(jià)格收購(gòu)很棒的公司。”從那以后，巴菲特就一直如此行事。

He has done it in two ways. First — and this is what he is renowned for — he has bought stock in some of the great American companies of our time, stock that he has held not just for years, but for decades. Second, he has turned Berkshire Hathaway into a true conglomerate, which owns not just stocks but entire companies. Although Berkshire’s front office employs only 25 people, its companies have, in total, some 340,500 employees.

他這樣做時(shí)采取了兩種途徑。第一，他從當(dāng)下美國(guó)最大的一些公司購(gòu)買股票，不只是持有幾年，而是持有幾十年。他正是因此而被人稱道。第二，他把伯克希爾-哈撒韋轉(zhuǎn)變成了一個(gè)真正的企業(yè)集團(tuán)，不僅擁有股票，還擁有整家公司。盡管伯克希爾的總部只雇傭了25人，但其旗下公司總計(jì)雇傭了34.05萬(wàn)名員工。

How successful has the Buffett-Munger approach been? In the 50 years since Buffett took over Berkshire, its stock has appreciated by 1,826,163 percent. That is an astounding number.

巴菲特和芒格的投資策略有多么成功?在巴菲特接手伯克希爾以來(lái)的50年里，其股價(jià)上漲了1826163%。這可是個(gè)相當(dāng)驚人的數(shù)字。

You would think, given Buffett’s success, that more people would try to emulate his approach to investing. It is not as if he hasn’t tried to explain how he does it. Every year, you can find a Buffett tutorial in his annual letter that the rest of us would do well to absorb — and practice.

你可能會(huì)認(rèn)為，鑒于巴菲特取得了成功，應(yīng)該會(huì)有更多人試圖效仿他的投資策略。況且他也并非沒(méi)有解釋過(guò)自己的方法。每一年，人們都能從他的致股東信中，找到巴菲特式的投資指南，我們這些人如果掌握并加以實(shí)踐，就會(huì)受益匪淺。

In the current letter, for instance, he makes the case — which has been made many times before — that a diversified portfolio of stocks “that are bought over time and that are owned in a manner invoking only token fees and commissions” are less risky over the long term than other investment vehicles that are tied to the dollar. Clearly, that’s been his approach. He then goes on to bemoan the fact that too many investors — both little guys and investment professionals — do things that add risk: “Active trading, attempts to ‘time’ market movements, inadequate diversification, the payment of high and unnecessary fees ... and the use of borrowed money can destroy the decent returns that a life-long owner of equities would otherwise enjoy.”

例如，在今年的這封信里，他就闡述道，“在長(zhǎng)時(shí)間段里分別買進(jìn)，且持有時(shí)只產(chǎn)生小額管理費(fèi)和手續(xù)費(fèi)的”多樣化的股票投資，長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看風(fēng)險(xiǎn)遠(yuǎn)小于其他與貨幣掛鉤的投資工具。這一點(diǎn)他在過(guò)去就闡述過(guò)很多次。顯然，這一直是他的投資策略。接著他抱怨道，許多投資者，無(wú)論是散戶還是專業(yè)投資者，都會(huì)做加大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的事：“活躍地交易，試圖抓準(zhǔn)市場(chǎng)波動(dòng)的‘時(shí)機(jī)’，投資多元化不足，支付不必要且過(guò)于高昂的費(fèi)用……用借來(lái)的錢做投資，這些行為都可能會(huì)毀掉本來(lái)豐厚的回報(bào)。”

Another thing about Buffett is that he has never gotten caught up in fads. He only buys businesses that he understands and can predict where the business will be in a decade. He teaches this point in the current letter with a discussion of the conglomerates that sprung up in the 1960s and became the hot stocks of the moment. Jimmy Ling, who ran one such company, LTV, used to say that he looked for acquisitions where “2 plus 2 equals 5.”

巴菲特的另一個(gè)特點(diǎn)是，他從來(lái)不會(huì)陷入熱潮當(dāng)中。他只愿意收購(gòu)那些他理解，而且能預(yù)測(cè)10年后走向的公司。在今年的信中，他通過(guò)討論1960年代涌現(xiàn)出來(lái)，并成為當(dāng)時(shí)股市熱點(diǎn)的企業(yè)集團(tuán)，闡述了這一觀點(diǎn)。吉米·陵(Jimmy Ling)曾經(jīng)就經(jīng)營(yíng)過(guò)這樣一家名為L(zhǎng)TV的公司。他曾說(shuō)，他尋找的是“二加二等于五”的收購(gòu)項(xiàng)目。

LTV, as conceived by Ling, of course, ceased to exist decades ago (though the company would go through several transformations and bankruptcy court before shuttering its last vestige in 2002). “Never forget that 2 + 2 will always equal 4,” writes Buffett. “And when someone tells you how old-fashioned that math is — zip up your wallet, take a vacation and come back in a few years to buy stocks at cheap prices.”

吉米·陵所構(gòu)想的LTV當(dāng)然在幾十年前就已不復(fù)存在了(不過(guò)公司本身又經(jīng)過(guò)了幾輪轉(zhuǎn)型和破產(chǎn)法庭的手續(xù)，最后剩下的攤子到2002年才關(guān)閉)。“千萬(wàn)不要忘記，二加二永遠(yuǎn)等于四，”巴菲特寫道。“如果有人告訴你，這個(gè)數(shù)學(xué)算式太老套了，那就把錢收起來(lái)，去度個(gè)假，幾年之后再回來(lái)低價(jià)買進(jìn)股票。”

If it’s really this simple, why don’t more people try to invest like Buffett? One reason, I think, is that sound investing — buying when others are selling, holding for the long term, avoiding the hot stocks — requires a stronger stomach than most people have. When a stock is plummeting, it takes a certain strength to buy even more instead of selling in a panic. Most of us lack the temperament required for smart investing. The fundamental equanimity required to be a great investor is a rare thing.

如果真的這么簡(jiǎn)單，為什么沒(méi)有更多人嘗試像巴菲特那樣投資呢?我想，一個(gè)理由在于，穩(wěn)健的投資——在別人賣出時(shí)買進(jìn)、長(zhǎng)期持有、避開(kāi)熱門股票——需要有超出大多數(shù)人的膽色。股市大跌時(shí)，買進(jìn)更多股票，而不是驚慌地拋售，需要有某種力量才行。我們大多數(shù)人都缺乏明智投資所需的秉性。成為偉大投資者所需的骨子里的沉著鎮(zhèn)靜，是一種罕有的特質(zhì)。

The second reason is that investing the Warren Buffett way is a lot more complicated than he makes it sound. Can you predict where a business will be in 10 years? Of course not. But he can — and does.

第二個(gè)理由在于，像沃倫·巴菲特那樣投資，比他表達(dá)的要復(fù)雜得多。你能預(yù)測(cè)一樁生意10年后會(huì)怎樣嗎?當(dāng)然不能。但是巴菲特能，而且他預(yù)測(cè)對(duì)了。

In a few months, the faithful will flock to Omaha to attend Berkshire’s annual meeting — “Woodstock for capitalists,” Buffett likes to call it. For six hours, Buffett and Munger will be on stage, before some 40,000 people, cracking wise, while making their investment decisions sound like simplicity itself.

幾個(gè)月后，巴菲特的忠實(shí)擁躉就會(huì)涌向奧馬哈，參加伯克希爾的年會(huì)——巴菲特喜歡把這個(gè)活動(dòng)稱作“資本家的伍德斯托克”。巴菲特和芒格會(huì)在臺(tái)上待6個(gè)小時(shí)，面對(duì)4萬(wàn)名觀眾，大談投資智慧，并讓他們的投資決策聽(tīng)起來(lái)無(wú)比簡(jiǎn)單。