忘掉希臘 日本才是全球經(jīng)濟真正的定時炸彈

The eyes of the financial world are on the high dramaplaying out in Greece right now, and for goodreason. Greece’s attempts to renegotiate its debt willredefine how the member nations of the world’slargest economy—the European Union—interact foryears to come.

目前，金融界的注意力都集中在希臘這臺大戲上，這合情合理。希臘正在設法重新展開債務談判，這將重新定義歐盟這個全球最大經(jīng)濟體的成員國今后的互動方式。

But at the end of the day, even if Greece is forcedout of the euro, the wider effects will likely bemanageable. If Greece were to suffer a banking crisis and severe recession, its economy isn’tthat large (roughly the size of Louisiana’s), and European officials have done work to shore upthe EU financial system so that it could withstand the shocks of a Grexit.

但到了最后，就算希臘被迫退出歐元區(qū)，其整體影響仍可能處于可控范圍。即便希臘出現(xiàn)銀行業(yè)危機和嚴重經(jīng)濟衰退，但它的經(jīng)濟規(guī)模并不大(基本上和美國路易斯安那州相當)。同時，歐洲政府已經(jīng)采取措施來鞏固歐盟金融系統(tǒng)，以便后者能承受住希臘退出歐元區(qū)所帶來的沖擊。

 

 

But there’s another economic drama unfolding nearly 10,000 kilometers away from theMediterranean that will be far more consequential. The slowly unfolding fiscal crisis in Japanmight not have the same entertainment value as the action in Athens. After all, what’s moreriveting (and deliciously ironic) than watching the colorful and self-described Marxist Greekfinance minister YanisVaroufakis battle it out with the world’s most powerful woman, and formerEast German, Angela Merkel?

然而，在距地中海不到一萬公里的地方，另一出經(jīng)濟大戲正在上演，其影響將遠遠超過希臘。和希臘相比，日本財政危機的緩慢發(fā)酵可能沒有那么高的娛樂價值。畢竟，有什么能比觀看希臘和德國進行較量更引人入勝(而且?guī)в忻烂畹闹S刺意味)呢——一方是希臘財政部長雅尼斯o瓦魯法克斯，他妙趣橫生而且自詡為馬克思主義者，另一方是德國總理安吉拉o默克爾，她來自前東德，現(xiàn)在是全球最具影響力的女性。

Nevertheless, the situation in Japan, the world’s third largest economy, will have a greaterimpact on the global economy in the years to come than Greece ever will. And for agingWestern Democracies like the U.S., watching what unfolds in Japan may be like looking into acrystal ball of our own economic future.

不過，作為全球第三大經(jīng)濟體，日本的局勢對今后世界經(jīng)濟的影響將超過希臘。同時，對美國等進入老齡化社會的西方國家來說，觀察日本局勢的發(fā)展可能就像在水晶球里窺探本國經(jīng)濟的未來。

Takatoshi Ito, an economist at Columbia’s School of International & Public Affairs, arguedat a panel discussion on Monday that unless the Japanese government can raise its sales tax tonorth of 15%, from its current 8%, Japan’s economy will suffer a fiscal crisis sometimebetween 2021 and 2023. That’s because as Japan’s population continues to age, its famouslyhigh savings rate will have to fall, and the Japanese public will no longer be able to absorb thelarge amount of debt the government is assuming.

哥倫比亞大學國際和公共事務學院經(jīng)濟學家伊藤隆敏在周一舉行的座談會上指出，除非日本政府把消費稅率從目前的8%提高到15%，否則日本就會在2021-2023年之間出現(xiàn)財政危機。這是因為隨著人口繼續(xù)老齡化，日本必須降低其聲名遠播的高儲蓄率，而且日本公眾屆時將無力消化政府所背負的巨額債務。

Unlike Greece, the Japanese government can print as many yen as it wants to pay its debts—debts that are largely owned by the government, Japanese banks, and citizens. So there’s noreason Japan would have to default on its debt. But all that money printing, argued Ito, willlead to an inflation crisis and a serious decline in the Japanese standard of living.

和希臘不同的是，日本政府可以隨心所欲地通過印制日元來償還債務，而承擔這些債務的主要是日本的政府部門、銀行和民眾。因此，日本沒有理由一定要違約。但伊藤隆敏認為，這種印鈔行為將帶來通脹危機，并讓日本民眾的生活水平大幅下降。

Ito’s co-panelist, Japan scholar Gerald Curtis, doesn’t believe that the Japanese government willraise the sales tax to 15% any time soon. Prime Minister ShinzoAbe’sdecision to delay a salestax increase from 8% to 10% until 2017 is indicative of the government’s inability to forcesuch painful policies on the public. “It’s very hard for me to see how we get from here to there,”said Curtis. If Both Ito and Curtis are right, that means we’re just a few short years away froma fiscal crisis in Japan.

致力于研究日本政治的學者杰拉德o柯蒂斯也在這次座談會上發(fā)表了講話。他認為，日本政府不會在短時間內(nèi)把消費稅率提高到15%。把該稅率從8%上調(diào)至10%的計劃已被首相安倍晉三推遲到了2017年，這表明安倍政府沒有能力在國內(nèi)推行如此不受歡迎的政策。柯蒂斯說：“在我看來，找到提高稅率的辦法非常困難。”如果伊藤和柯蒂斯所言無誤，那就意味著日本將在短短幾年內(nèi)遭遇財政危機。

Others are not so sure. It’s been clear for two decades that Japan faces demographicdifficulties. Its low birthrate and cultural aversion to immigration means that its working agepopulation is shrinking at an alarming rate while the population of non-working retirees (whodemand expensive healthcare) is on the rise. This dynamic has lead countless traders to betagainst Japanese debt, with disastrous results, even though the demographic predictionsthat led traders to bet against the nation have come true.

其他人的態(tài)度則不那么肯定。二十年來，人口結(jié)構(gòu)一直是日本的難題，這一點是毋庸置疑的。出生率低，再加上對移民的文化排斥，這讓日本適齡勞動人口的減少速度達到了危險水平，不工作的退休人口(需要花費大量醫(yī)療保健資金)則不斷增多。這種態(tài)勢已經(jīng)促使無數(shù)交易員做空日本債券。

So why hasn’t there been a fiscal crisis in Japan, and should we believe prognosticators like Ito,who continue to say it’s imminent? For economists like Paul Krugman, worrying over a possibleinflation crisis in Japan seven years from now is crazy when you have a very real problem ofstagnant growth and deflation right now.

那么，為什么日本一直沒有出現(xiàn)財政危機呢?對于伊藤隆敏等不斷宣稱這場危機已經(jīng)迫在眉睫的預言家，我們是否應該相信呢?保羅o克魯格曼等經(jīng)濟學家認為，目前日本的增長停滯和通縮問題已經(jīng)非常嚴峻，在這種情況下，對可能在七年后出現(xiàn)的通脹危機感到擔心可謂荒誕之極。

At the same time, problems like chronic inflation, and deflation for that matter, can crop upunexpectedly and then be hard to thwart once they’ve reared their ugly heads. Sure, thedeveloped world’s main problem today is deflation, but Ito’s point is that if you rely solely onthe central bank to fund your debt for too long, people will look elsewhere to store their cash.One need only look to the U.S. economy in the 1960s and 1970s to see how quickly persistentinflation can turn into a serious economic problem. As economist Christina Romer points out ina 2007 paper, the inflation during that period was partly the result of policymakers’overoptimistic assumptions about the U.S. economy.

同時，像長期通脹這類問題，或者對于日本來說是長期通縮問題，會出人意料地浮出水面，而且一旦有了這樣的苗頭，就很難予以遏制。當然，發(fā)達國家當前的主要問題是通縮，但伊藤的觀點在于，如果國家長期以來僅依靠央行來還債，人們就會把他們的資金存放到別處。只要看看20世紀60年代和70年代的美國經(jīng)濟，就能明白長期通脹會多么迅速地演變?yōu)閲乐氐慕?jīng)濟問題。正如經(jīng)濟學家克里斯蒂娜o羅默在2007年發(fā)表的論文中所述，這一時期的通脹問題部分源于決策層對美國經(jīng)濟做出了過于樂觀的預期。

It’s entirely reasonable, given the developed world’s slowing productivity growth and Japan’sshrinking population, that the economic growth we’re seeing is close to as good as it will get.Ito’s point, then, is that we should be wary of delaying the inevitable, simply raise taxes now,and admit that growth in Japan is just not going to be that great in the coming decade.

鑒于發(fā)達國家生產(chǎn)率增速的不斷下降以及日本人口的不斷減少，因此，認為目前日本的經(jīng)濟增長率已經(jīng)接近上限的想法是完全合乎情理的。對此，伊藤隆敏的觀點是，人們應在推遲必做之事時慎之又慎，日本應馬上提高稅率，同時還應承認今后十年日本的經(jīng)濟表現(xiàn)并不會像想象的那樣美好。

No matter what happens to Japan, the U.S. and Europe should pay close attention. Thoseeconomies must also contend with the issue of slow growth and an aging population. Howmuch can government spending and central bank policy solve these problems? What happensin Japan over the next decade should give us a clear answer.

無論日本情況如何，美國和歐洲都應予以密切關注。這些經(jīng)濟體還必須應對增長緩慢和人口老齡化問題。政府支出和央行政策能在多大程度上解決這些問題呢?日本今后十年的局勢應該會給我們一個明確的回答。