美聯(lián)儲不應(yīng)過早考慮升息

I cannot recall a moment when the gap between whatmarkets expect the US Federal Reserve to do andwhat the Fed itself has forecast it will do has beenas large. Markets predict that the Fed will raise ratesonly to 1.6 per cent by the end of 2017; the FederalOpen Market Committee’s average forecast is 3.5per cent.

我想不起曾有哪一個時刻，市場預(yù)期美聯(lián)儲會做的事跟美聯(lián)儲自己預(yù)計要做的事差異如此巨大。市場預(yù)計美聯(lián)儲到2017年底會將利率提高到1.6%，而聯(lián)邦公開市場委員會(FOMC)的平均預(yù)計值為3.5%。

Such a divergence raises the risk of volatility and poses a communications challenge for theFed. More important, it raises the question of what should guide future policy.

這種認(rèn)知差異會帶來市場波動風(fēng)險，也讓美聯(lián)儲在向市場傳遞信息方面遇到挑戰(zhàn)。更重要的是，它引發(fā)了應(yīng)以什么來指導(dǎo)未來政策的問題。

 

 

Especially after Friday’s very strong employment report, there can be no doubt that cyclicalconditions are normalising. The unemployment rate now is at its postwar average level, andcontinues to fall. Job openings are above their historic average. Other indicators such as theinsured unemployment rate suggest a normal or rapidly normalising economy. All of thistaken in isolation would suggest that interest rates should not remain at zero much longer.

特別是最近強勁的就業(yè)報告出爐之后，周期性狀況正在恢復(fù)正常這一點已不再有疑問。眼下失業(yè)率處于戰(zhàn)后平均水平，并在繼續(xù)下降。職位空缺數(shù)量超過歷史平均值。參保失業(yè)率(IUR)等其他指標(biāo)顯示，經(jīng)濟已回歸正軌、或正迅速回歸正軌。只從這些來看，說明零利率不應(yīng)維持太長時間了。

On the other hand, the available inflation data suggests little cause for concern. The coreconsumer price index has averaged 1.1 per cent over the past six months; if housing costswere stripped out it would be zero. Wages actually fell in December and over the past yearemployment costs have risen 2.25 per cent which, in conjunction with productivity growth ofonly 1 per cent, suggests inflation of below 2 per cent. Perhaps most troubling: marketindications suggest inflation is more likely to fall than rise .

另一方面，現(xiàn)有通脹數(shù)據(jù)表明沒有什么可擔(dān)心的。核心消費價格指數(shù)(CPI)過去6個月的均值為1.1%，如果剔除住房成本，則核心CPI為0。去年12月工資實際上下跌了;過去一年的雇傭成本上漲了2.25%，而生產(chǎn)率僅增長了1%，這意味著通脹率不到2%。最令人不安的或許是：各項市場指標(biāo)顯示通脹率降低的可能性大于升高的可能性。

The Fed has rightly made clear that its decisions will be data dependent. The further key pointis that it should allow the flow of information on inflation rather than on real economic activityto determine its timing in adjusting interest rates. And it should not raise rates until there isclear evidence that inflation, and inflation expectations, are in danger of exceeding its 2 percent target. Here are four important reasons why.

美聯(lián)儲明確表示有關(guān)調(diào)息的決定將取決于數(shù)據(jù)，這是對的。更關(guān)鍵的一點是，它應(yīng)根據(jù)有關(guān)通脹、而不是實體經(jīng)濟活動的數(shù)據(jù)決定何時調(diào)息，并且不應(yīng)在有明確證據(jù)顯示通脹、以及通脹預(yù)期有可能超過2%目標(biāo)值之前升息。這么說有四個重要理由：

First, real wages for most workers have been stagnant. Median family incomes are down by 4.5per cent over the past five years and the economy is about $1.5tn — or $20,000 for theaverage family of four — below pre-recession estimates of its 2015 potential.

首先，大多數(shù)勞動者的實際工資一直停滯不前。過去5年家庭收入中值下降了4.5%，目前的經(jīng)濟規(guī)模比衰退前預(yù)測的2015年潛在經(jīng)濟規(guī)模低出約1.5萬億美元，相當(dāng)于每個家庭(按平均每家4口人計算)低于預(yù)測值2萬美元。

In such circumstances efforts to reduce demand and growth require a compellingjustification. Yet the idea that below normal unemployment will necessarily lead toaccelerating inflation as suggested by the so called Phillips curve is very uncertain. Contraryto such predictions, inflation did not decelerate by much even a few years ago whenunemployment was in the range of 10 per cent. Nor was there much evidence ofaccelerating inflation in the 1990s when the unemployment rate fell below 4 per cent.

在這種情況下，若要采取降低需求和抑制增長的措施，需有充分理由。然而，所謂的菲利普斯曲線(Phillipscurve)所描繪的情形——低于通常水平的失業(yè)率肯定會導(dǎo)致通脹加速上升——存在極大不確定性。與菲利普斯曲線預(yù)測的情形相反，就在幾年前，當(dāng)失業(yè)率達到10%水平的時候，通脹也并沒有降多少，而上世紀(jì)90年代，失業(yè)率降至4%以下時，也沒有多少證據(jù)顯示通脹升高。

Second, if inflation were to accelerate a bit this would be a good thing. It is now running andis expected to run below the Fed target. Prices are about 4 per cent below where they wouldhave been if 2 per cent inflation had been maintained since 2007. So there is a case for someinflation above 2 per cent to catch up to the Fed’s price level target path. They may also be acase for inflation a little bit above 2 per cent for the next few years to allow real interest rateslow enough to promote recovery when the next recession comes.

其次，假如通脹真的略有升高，那是件好事。眼下通脹率低于美聯(lián)儲目標(biāo)值，并且預(yù)計未來將繼續(xù)低于目標(biāo)值。假如通脹自2007年至今一直維持2%，那么物價水平將比現(xiàn)在高4%左右。因此，讓通脹升至略高于2%是有理由的，這樣可以讓物價水平追趕美聯(lián)儲的目標(biāo)物價水平?？紤]到目前的物價水平低于目標(biāo)水平，讓通脹在未來幾年維持在略高于2%還能夠讓實際利率變得足夠低，以便在下一次衰退到來時為推動復(fù)蘇提供空間。

Third, a plane that accelerates too rapidly as it takes off may cause passengers discomfortwhile a plane that accelerates too slowly may crash at the end of the runway. Historicalexperience is that inflation accelerates only slowly so the costs of an overshoot on inflationare small and reversible with standard tightening policies. In contrast, aborting recovery andrisking a further slowing of inflation is potentially catastrophic — as Japan’s experiencedemonstrates. So in a world where economic forecasts are highly uncertain, prudence inavoiding the largest risks counsels in favour of Fed restraint in raising rates.

第三，飛機起飛時加速太快會讓乘客感到不適，但起飛太慢，飛機可能會墜毀在跑道上。歷史經(jīng)驗顯示，通脹升高速度并不快，因此通脹超標(biāo)的成本很小，并且可通過實施常規(guī)緊縮政策來補救。相反，讓復(fù)蘇中斷、冒讓通脹進一步放緩的風(fēng)險卻可能造成災(zāi)難性后果——如日本的經(jīng)驗所示。因此，在這個經(jīng)濟預(yù)測高度不確定的世界里，出于避免最大風(fēng)險的審慎考慮，美聯(lián)儲應(yīng)謹(jǐn)慎對待升息。

Fourth, the US has never been more intertwined with the global economy. Higher interest ratesand the stronger dollar they would bring would mean greater debt burdens for debtorcountries, a growing US trade deficit that damages manufacturing, and growing protectionistpressures.

第四，美國與全球經(jīng)濟的聯(lián)系從未像現(xiàn)在這樣緊密。更高的利率、以及高息帶來的更強勢美元，意味著債務(wù)國的債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)將變得更重，美國貿(mào)易赤字會增加(不利于制造業(yè))，貿(mào)易保護主義壓力也會增強。

There is already a danger given all the problems in Europe, Japan and emerging markets thatsafe haven flows will drive the dollar up to the point where the US economy could besignificantly slowed. Raising rates without evidence of rising inflation could dramaticallyincrease real rates and exacerbate these risks.

鑒于歐洲、日本和新興市場的種種問題，目前已經(jīng)存在這樣的風(fēng)險：因資金流入避險貨幣，導(dǎo)致美元幣值升高到可能使美國經(jīng)濟顯著放緩的地步。在沒有證據(jù)顯示通脹升高的情況下升息，可能使實際利率大幅上升，加劇上述風(fēng)險。

None of this is to say that rates should never be raised or that inflation indicators might notjustify a rate increase before long. It is to say that the Fed could inject much neededconfidence in the economy today and minimise future risks by announcing and following astrategy of not raising rates until it sees the whites of inflation’s eyes.

這些并不意味著我們應(yīng)無限期推遲升息，也不意味著通脹指標(biāo)不可能在短期內(nèi)變得支持升息，而只是說，通過宣布和遵循這樣一種策略——“在沒有看到通脹的確鑿證據(jù)之前不升息”，美聯(lián)儲可使人們對經(jīng)濟重拾信心(這是當(dāng)前非常需要的)，并最大程度地減小未來的風(fēng)險。

The writer is Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasurysecretary

本文作者為哈佛大學(xué)(Harvard)查爾斯•W•艾略特大學(xué)教授(Charles W Eliot University Professor)，曾任美國財政部長