美國(guó)復(fù)蘇仍需顧及中國(guó)波動(dòng)

Jobs growth in the US is back. Over the past threemonths, official statistics show that the US hasadded more jobs than in any such period sinceSeptember-November 1997, at the height of theClinton boom. The freefall in oil prices is over. TheEuropean Central Bank has acceded to marketwishes and resorted to “QE” bond purchases. Thestrong dollar has wrought less damage on UScorporate profits than feared. What could possiblygo wrong?

美國(guó)的就業(yè)增長(zhǎng)已經(jīng)恢復(fù)。官方數(shù)據(jù)顯示，在過去三個(gè)月里，美國(guó)新增就業(yè)崗位比1997年9月至11月(當(dāng)時(shí)正值克林頓繁榮景象最鼎盛的階段)以來的任何時(shí)期都多。油價(jià)結(jié)束了急跌走勢(shì)。歐洲央行(ECB)滿足了市場(chǎng)期望，推出“量化寬松”債券購(gòu)買舉措。強(qiáng)勢(shì)美元對(duì)美國(guó)企業(yè)利潤(rùn)的影響，并未如人們擔(dān)憂的那么大。還有哪里可能出問題?

 

 

The answer, in a word, is “China”. The world’s second-largest economy contributes moretowards world growth than any other, and has many tools — due to its enormous foreignexchange reserves — with which to avert a crisis. But the litany of economic indicators flashingreasons for concern is growing longer.

答案很簡(jiǎn)單，那就是“中國(guó)”。中國(guó)是全球第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，它對(duì)世界增長(zhǎng)的貢獻(xiàn)超過其他所有國(guó)家，而且有許多規(guī)避危機(jī)的工具(歸因于其龐大的外匯儲(chǔ)備)。但引發(fā)人們擔(dān)憂的經(jīng)濟(jì)指標(biāo)正變得越來越多。

Economic growth numbers themselves are notoriously prone to revision. Diana Choyleva ofLondon’s Lombard Street Research, a long-term sceptic on China, estimates that Chinese realgrowth in domestic product dropped to 5 per cent last year, once the impact of “missing”output “almost equal to the size of Malaysia’s economy” added to the data at the end of lastyear is stripped out. This would represent a startling slowdown from the trend of the pasttwo decades.

經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)數(shù)據(jù)本身向來有修正的余地。倫敦朗伯德街研究(Lombard Street Research)的黛安娜•喬伊列娃(Diana Choyleva)長(zhǎng)期以來對(duì)中國(guó)抱懷疑態(tài)度，她估計(jì)，一旦考慮“近乎相當(dāng)馬來西亞經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模”的“遺失”產(chǎn)值對(duì)中國(guó)去年年底發(fā)布的數(shù)據(jù)的影響，其去年的實(shí)際國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)增長(zhǎng)率就會(huì)降至5%。這將意味著，與過去20年的增速相比，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)出現(xiàn)了驚人的放緩。

Electricity output, a “truth-telling” indicator that is hard to manipulate, is negative for thefirst time since the crisis year of 2009. Steel production is also its weakest since 2009. Themonthly ISM survey of purchasing managers, a great economic leading indicator where figuresabove 50 indicate that the economy is expanding, while figures below it suggest contraction,has dropped below 50 this month. The prices of the commodities most sensitive to therecently insatiable Chinese demand, iron ore and copper, have fallen severely over the pastyear.

發(fā)電量是一個(gè)很難受到操縱、并“可以反映事實(shí)真相”的指標(biāo)，該指標(biāo)自2009年爆發(fā)危機(jī)以來首次出現(xiàn)下降。鋼鐵產(chǎn)量也處于2009年以來的最低水平。每月發(fā)布的采購(gòu)經(jīng)理人指數(shù)本月降至50以下——采購(gòu)經(jīng)理人指數(shù)是一個(gè)靈敏的經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)先指標(biāo)，當(dāng)該數(shù)據(jù)高于50時(shí)表示經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張，當(dāng)數(shù)據(jù)低于50時(shí)表明經(jīng)濟(jì)收縮。鐵礦石和銅是對(duì)近年龐大的中國(guó)需求最為敏感的大宗商品，它們的價(jià)格在過去一年中大幅下跌。

Most concerning should be measures of the financial system. The growth in Chinese bankassets appears to have stalled, following an increase of some $17tn in total debt in the bankingsystem over the six years since the crisis. Managing this number gently down is a priority; thevital question, as ever, is whether the Chinese authorities can do it. The change in banks’reserve requirements this week, an effective monetary easing, was part of this process, butthere is a long way to go.

最令人擔(dān)心的應(yīng)該是金融體系的各項(xiàng)指標(biāo)。中資銀行資產(chǎn)增長(zhǎng)似乎已經(jīng)停滯，此前在自危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來的六年里，銀行業(yè)體系債務(wù)總額增加約17萬億美元。逐步削減債務(wù)是中國(guó)的優(yōu)先任務(wù)。和以往一樣，關(guān)鍵問題是中國(guó)當(dāng)局能否做到這一點(diǎn)。上周調(diào)整銀行存款準(zhǔn)備金率是這一過程的一部分，但中國(guó)仍有很長(zhǎng)的路要走——調(diào)整銀行存款準(zhǔn)備金率是有效的貨幣寬松措施。

Atul Lele, chief investment officer at Deltec International, estimates flows of “hot money” bytaking the change in foreign exchange reserves, and subtracting the changes that can beexplained by trade flows and by foreign direct investment. The balance is “hot money” in that itcan be moved swiftly by investors, and it appears to be sharply negative.

Deltec International首席投資官阿圖爾•萊勒(Atul Lele)，通過將外匯儲(chǔ)備變化數(shù)值減去貿(mào)易及外國(guó)直接投資所引起的變動(dòng)值來估計(jì)“熱錢”流動(dòng)的規(guī)模。其余額就是“熱錢”，因?yàn)檫@部分資金可以被投資者迅速轉(zhuǎn)移，如今這個(gè)數(shù)值似乎出現(xiàn)了非常大的負(fù)值。

Where has it gone? Some of it fuelled the rally at the end of last year, which saw the Shanghaistock exchange gain some 40 per cent in a matter of months. And much will have returned tothe booming asset markets of the US.

這部分錢哪里去了?其中一些引發(fā)了去年年底股市的上漲——上證綜指在短短幾個(gè)月時(shí)間里上漲約40%。還有許多資金應(yīng)該回流到了美國(guó)蓬勃發(fā)展的資產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)中。

This is a disquieting scenario. The Fed’s decision on whether to raise rates this summer is afinely balanced one, which is dependent on the data. Friday’s strong jobs report, which alsohelped show that various data points weighing against a move to more normal rates were eitherflukes or errors, unarguably raises the probability that US rates will indeed rise this summer.

這種場(chǎng)景令人不安。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)將會(huì)仔細(xì)權(quán)衡才會(huì)做出是否在今年夏天加息的決定——這將取決于經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)。上周五強(qiáng)勁的就業(yè)報(bào)告無疑提高了美國(guó)在今年夏季加息的可能性——該報(bào)告也有助于表明，反對(duì)轉(zhuǎn)向更正常利率舉措的多個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)點(diǎn)，要么是偶然現(xiàn)象，要么是出了錯(cuò)。

This matters for emerging markets, particularly China, which are driven by flows of dollars.When money started to flow back to the US in May 2013 when the Fed talked of “tapering” offQE bond purchases, many emerging markets instantly sold off. A rise in US rates wouldintensify such problems.

這對(duì)新興市場(chǎng)(尤其是中國(guó))至關(guān)重要——新興市場(chǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)受到美元流入的推動(dòng)。在2013年5月美國(guó)談?wù)?ldquo;逐步退出”量化寬松債券購(gòu)買舉措、資金開始回流美國(guó)的時(shí)候，許多新興市場(chǎng)立即大跌。美國(guó)利率上升將會(huì)加劇此類問題。

All of this is a reversal of fortune. In late 2008, it was the aggressive fiscal stimulus by Chinathat helped pull the rest of the world through the Great Recession.

所有這些都代表著形勢(shì)的逆轉(zhuǎn)。在2008年末，正是中國(guó)激進(jìn)的財(cái)政刺激政策幫助全球其他地區(qū)渡過了“大衰退”(Great Recession)。

Now, China needs help from exports to the US. The stronger US economy, and the strongerdollar and demand that it implies, should therefore be helpful. But foreign exchange could be acrucial stumbling block. China, long castigated for an artificially weak currency, has allowed itscurrency to appreciate gently against the dollar over the past five years. With other centralbanks aggressively easing monetary policy, and thus weakening their currencies against thedollar, this has sharply reduced China’s competitiveness, as the chart shows.

現(xiàn)在，中國(guó)需要向美國(guó)出口以提振經(jīng)濟(jì)。因此美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)、美元及其所暗含的更強(qiáng)勁需求應(yīng)該有所幫助，但匯率可能是一大絆腳石。中國(guó)一直以來因?yàn)槿藶閴旱腿嗣駧艆R率而遭受指責(zé)，但已經(jīng)在過去五年允許人民幣兌美元小幅升值。隨著其他央行激進(jìn)地放緩貨幣政策，從而讓本國(guó)貨幣兌美元貶值，中國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力將極大地遭到削弱。

China has let its own currency weaken by about 3 per cent against the dollar over the pastyear. Further dollar strength may force a more aggressive weakening — which could entail anintensified “currency war,” and financial stress within China.

在過去的一年里，中國(guó)已經(jīng)讓人民幣兌美元匯率下跌約3%。美元進(jìn)一步升值可能迫使中國(guó)更加激進(jìn)地貶值人民幣——這可能導(dǎo)致一場(chǎng)加強(qiáng)版的“貨幣戰(zhàn)”——以及中國(guó)內(nèi)部出現(xiàn)金融緊張局面。

Playing this out for investors remains difficult. As I said earlier this year, the valuations on offerin the US and emerging markets suggest that a steady move from the former to the lattershould pay off over the next decade or so. Abandoning emerging markets altogether isunlikely to pay off.

投資者依然很難擺脫這種局面。正如我今年早些時(shí)候說的那樣，美國(guó)和新興市場(chǎng)的估值情況表明，逐步從前者向后者轉(zhuǎn)移應(yīng)該能夠在未來十年左右的時(shí)間獲得回報(bào)。完全放棄新興市場(chǎng)不太可能取得成功。

But the disjunction between the strengthening US and the rest of the world is deepening. Anybig shifts in asset allocation would be unwise until that disjunction works itself out.

但經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)日益強(qiáng)勁的美國(guó)和全球其他地區(qū)之間的脫節(jié)正在加深。在這種脫節(jié)狀況自我修復(fù)之前，資產(chǎn)配置的任何重大轉(zhuǎn)變都將是不明智的。