成功的管理沒有神奇公式

成功的管理沒有神奇公式

AIRPORT BOOKSHOPS teem with guides that promise to teach executives the secrets of success. Read this tome, follow this philosophy, change your habits and you, too, can be a management titan. As a moment’s reflection on business history demonstrates, there is no sure-fire route to glory. Instead, running a company is a permanent exercise in juggling trade-offs. What is the right course of action may vary at different times, and in different industries.

機(jī)場(chǎng)書店里到處是號(hào)稱能向高管們傳授成功秘訣的指南?？纯催@本大部頭，聽聽那套管理哲學(xué)，改變你的習(xí)慣，你也可以成為一名管理大師。但對(duì)商業(yè)史稍加反思就能知道，世上并無(wú)必勝之道。相反，經(jīng)營(yíng)企業(yè)是一場(chǎng)永無(wú)休止的權(quán)衡利弊的把戲。時(shí)間不同、行業(yè)不同，成功之道可能也各不相同。

Take, for example, the pace of expansion. The fashion is for “upscaling”—creating a business model that can dominate its niche within a few years. This model’s turbocharged version, “blitzscaling”, is beloved of venture capitalists who dream of recreating the “network effects” that fuelled the rise of Google and Facebook. That is, in part, because most venture investments fail and a few big successes are needed to make up for all the duds.

以擴(kuò)張速度為例?，F(xiàn)在流行“快速”擴(kuò)張，即創(chuàng)造一種可在幾年內(nèi)稱霸所在利基市場(chǎng)的商業(yè)模式。這一模式還有加強(qiáng)版——“閃電擴(kuò)張”，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家對(duì)此尤為鐘情，他們夢(mèng)想再現(xiàn)當(dāng)年造就谷歌和Facebook的“網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)”。某種程度上，這是因?yàn)轱L(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資大多數(shù)都是失敗的，需要少數(shù)大獲成功的項(xiàng)目來(lái)彌補(bǔ)所有失敗的損失。

From the point of view of the entrepreneur, however, upscaling may well be a mistake. For a start, not all businesses are subject to network effects. Second, by expanding too fast, companies risk losing control of product quality and messing up their management structure. Building a business is like running a marathon, and few people win a long-distance race by setting off like Usain Bolt. The first Walmart store was opened in 1962 and it took another six years before the retail chain expanded outside its home state of Arkansas.

然而，從企業(yè)家的角度看，快速擴(kuò)張很可能是個(gè)錯(cuò)誤決策。首先，并非所有企業(yè)都能得益于“網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)”。其次，擴(kuò)張?zhí)?，產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量可能失控，管理結(jié)構(gòu)也會(huì)亂作一團(tuán)。經(jīng)營(yíng)企業(yè)就像跑馬拉松，長(zhǎng)跑比賽的贏家是不會(huì)像博爾特那樣起跑的。第一家沃爾瑪在1962年開業(yè)，六年后這家連鎖零售商才從老家阿肯色州擴(kuò)張到其他州。

The fashion for upscaling means that companies are encouraged to get their product to market as quickly as possible. The theory is that customers get a rough-and-ready prototype at the start, which is improved over time. This may work for smartphone apps, which are easy to update, but not for most other products, where a reputation for shoddiness may be impossible to shake off.

快速擴(kuò)張的風(fēng)潮促使公司盡快將產(chǎn)品推向市場(chǎng)。其理念是先給客戶不完善但可用的原型產(chǎn)品，之后再逐步改進(jìn)。對(duì)智能手機(jī)應(yīng)用而言這可能行得通，畢竟這些應(yīng)用很容易更新，但其他大多數(shù)產(chǎn)品卻不是這樣，因?yàn)橐坏┍成洗种茷E造的名聲，可能就無(wú)法洗脫了。

In his book on financial frauds, “Lying for Money”, Dan Davies, a former financial regulator, explains how companies must balance the goals of cost, quality and customer satisfaction. Focus too narrowly on cost and the quality of goods may suffer; concentrate on quality and costs will rise. Try to ensure both and the business may become so obsessed with its own production processes that it ignores customer needs.

曾任金融監(jiān)管官員的丹·戴維斯(Dan Davies)在他撰寫的有關(guān)金融詐騙的《說(shuō)謊騙錢》(Lying for Money)一書中解析了公司如何必須在成本、質(zhì)量和客戶滿意度等目標(biāo)之間做好權(quán)衡。過度關(guān)注成本，商品質(zhì)量可能會(huì)下降;只專注質(zhì)量，成本可能會(huì)上升。盡量兼顧這兩者，企業(yè)又可能一味執(zhí)著于自己的生產(chǎn)流程，以致忽視了顧客的需求。

Another trade-off is between centralisation and delegation. Early Victorian businesses resembled the army: generals (executives) handing down instructions to non-commissioned officers (foremen and overseers) who in turn directed the foot soldiers (workers). This hierarchical structure was devised for a world in which employees were required to follow a clear set of instructions.

另一項(xiàng)權(quán)衡是集權(quán)還是放權(quán)。維多利亞時(shí)代的早期企業(yè)很像軍隊(duì)：將軍(高管)向士官(工頭和一線管理人員)發(fā)出指令，再由后者指示步兵(員工)行動(dòng)。這種等級(jí)架構(gòu)是應(yīng)當(dāng)時(shí)員工須按明確指示來(lái)工作的大環(huán)境而生的。

As businesses became more sophisticated in the 20th century, organisations became much more elaborate. Companies were split into divisions by geography and product type. Middle managers took charge of functions such as marketing and finance. Eventually, though, businesses started to view these structures as expensive and overly bureaucratic.

到了20世紀(jì)，企業(yè)變得越來(lái)越復(fù)雜，組織方式也變得精細(xì)得多。公司按地域和產(chǎn)品類型劃分為不同部門。中層管理人員負(fù)責(zé)營(yíng)銷和財(cái)務(wù)等職能。然而，最終，企業(yè)開始覺得這些架構(gòu)太過昂貴和繁冗。

In the past 20 years or so management layers have been stripped away. A flat structure, with delegated decision-making, seemed more appropriate for a service-based economy. The idea of “agile” management, in which workers are frequently reassigned to multidisciplinary teams, is all the rage.

過去大約20年的時(shí)間里，管理層級(jí)被削減。決策權(quán)下放的扁平結(jié)構(gòu)似乎更適用于服務(wù)型經(jīng)濟(jì)。頻繁讓員工在不同的跨領(lǐng)域團(tuán)隊(duì)里輪崗的“敏捷”管理理念大行其道。

But this trend can likewise go too far. When power is dispersed, the result can be a confused mess. Some firms may conclude they are better off under centralised command.

但這種趨勢(shì)同樣會(huì)矯枉過正。權(quán)力被分散，結(jié)果可能是沒有頭緒、一片混亂。有些公司可能會(huì)得出結(jié)論，認(rèn)為集權(quán)管理更有利。

The last trade-off is between focus and diversification. The relegation of General Electric from the Dow Jones industrial average last year seemed like another nail in the coffin of the industrial conglomerate. Institutional investors can diversify their portfolios by investing in a range of sectors; they do not need a conglomerate to do it for them. Yet cash-rich tech giants are similarly buying promising startups, often with no obvious relation to their core business (think of Google’s purchase of Nest, which makes thermostats).

最后還有在專一與多元化之間的權(quán)衡。去年通用電氣被剔除出道瓊斯工業(yè)平均指數(shù)，似乎是給這家工業(yè)集團(tuán)的棺材板上又釘了一根釘子。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者可以通過投資多個(gè)行業(yè)來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)投資組合多樣化，而不需要一家企業(yè)集團(tuán)來(lái)代勞。然而，財(cái)大氣粗的科技巨頭還是這樣到處收購(gòu)前景光明的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司，而后者往往與前者的核心業(yè)務(wù)沒有明顯關(guān)聯(lián)，例如谷歌收購(gòu)恒溫器制造商N(yùn)est。

At some point the growth prospects of even the best products falter. For businesses to survive, they must find new things or services to sell. Choosing the right time to expand and diversify, and the right organisational structure to do it, is a matter of judgment. That judgment, and the flexibility to change plans, is what makes a good manager. It cannot be reduced to an in-flight read.

即便是最好的產(chǎn)品，到了某個(gè)節(jié)點(diǎn)，增長(zhǎng)前景也會(huì)不穩(wěn)。企業(yè)要生存就必須推出新產(chǎn)品或新服務(wù)。在合適的時(shí)機(jī)擴(kuò)張及推進(jìn)多元化，并選擇與之相配的組織架構(gòu)，這需要判斷力。這種判斷力及靈活變通正是優(yōu)秀的管理人員所必備的。這一切可沒辦法濃縮到一本飛機(jī)讀物中。