數字時代要求反思競爭理論

Anxiety about the health of competition in the US economy — and elsewhere — is growing. The concern may be well founded but taking forceful action will require economists to provide some practical ways of proving and measuring the harm caused by increasing market power in the digital economy.

對美國(和其他地方)經濟競爭格局健康狀況的焦慮正在加劇。這些擔憂或許有理有據，但如果要采取有力舉措，就需要經濟學家們拿出一些切實可行的方式，來證明和衡量數字經濟中日益增強的市場支配力造成的危害。

The forces driving concentration do not affect the US alone. In all digital markets, the cost structure of high upfront costs and low additional or marginal costs means there are large economies of scale. The broad impact of digital technology has been to increase the scope of the markets many businesses can hope to reach.

推動集中化的力量并非只影響美國。在所有的數字市場中，高前期成本和低附加/邊際成本的成本結構意味著，存在著較大的規(guī)模經濟。數字技術的整體影響是擴大了許多企業(yè)能夠企及的市場范圍。

In pre-digital days, the question an economist would ask is whether the efficiencies gained by big or merging companies would be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. Another key question was whether it would still be possible for new entrants to break into the market.

在前數字時代，經濟學家提出的問題是，大企業(yè)或者正在合并的企業(yè)提高的效率，是否會以降低價格的形式傳遞給消費者?另外一個關鍵問題是，新入行者是否還有可能進入市場?

Digital platforms make these questions harder to answer. The basic economic theory, developed by Jean Tirole and others, establishes that in such markets one “side” will cross-subsidise the other. So the signal prices send about competition is completely different from in a traditional market. Platforms also generally expand into neighbouring markets, so the standard market definition exercises done by competition authorities are doubly uninformative.

數字平臺使這些問題變得更難以回答。按照讓•梯若爾(Jean Tirole)等人發(fā)展出的基本經濟理論，在數字時代的市場中，一“側”將對另一側形成交叉補貼。因此，在這類市場上，價格傳遞的有關競爭的信號與傳統(tǒng)市場截然不同。數字平臺通常還會擴張進入鄰近市場，因此競爭管理當局定義標準市場的做法更加缺乏依據。

Big digital companies argue that the consumer benefit they provide through free services is immense. So where is the harm? 數字領域的大公司主張，它們通過免費服務提供了巨大的消費者福利，那么危害在哪里?

They rely heavily too on competition among themselves, and the threat of digital disruption: just as Facebook quickly toppled MySpace, so it could be toppled in turn. They argue that competition for the market is intense, and some competition experts agree.

這些公司還非常依賴相互之間的競爭，以及數字顛覆的威脅：就如Facebook迅速顛覆了MySpace，Facebook本身也可能被顛覆。這些公司提出，數字市場競爭激烈，一些競爭專家也認同這一點。

This might be right, but we do not know. Economists are letting down competition regulators in failing to provide the tools for evaluating in specific cases the claim that — in a world of significant returns to scale and network effects — bigger is better for everyone.

這種說法或許正確，但我們不得而知。經濟學家們正使競爭管理當局感到失望，因為他們拿不出在具體個案中評判如下主張的工具：在規(guī)模和網絡效應獲得豐厚回報的世界，更大對每一個人都更好。

One much-needed tool is how to assess consumer benefits. 我們亟需的一件工具是消費者福利的評估方法。

Google and Facebook provide services consumers greatly value without taking money directly from them; but advertisers place great value on the services too, and their payments will be passed on ultimately to consumers in the price of whatever is being advertised. How high is that price? The network effects of digital platforms do produce real economic welfare gains, but nobody knows how big these are or who captures them.

谷歌(Google)和Facebook提供消費者非常重視的服務，并且沒有從消費者那里直接收取費用;但廣告商也非常重視這些服務，它們?yōu)檫@些服務支付的費用最終將以廣告產品或服務的價格的形式轉嫁給消費者。這個價格有多高?數字平臺的網絡效應的確會產生真正的經濟福利，但沒人知道這些經濟福利有多大，也沒人知道誰獲得了這些福利。

A second issue is how to take into account the interactions between markets, given that most platforms and tech companies steadily expand into other activities and markets. There has probably been too little focus in antitrust policy for a long time on the purchasing power of big companies.

第二個問題是如何考慮市場的相互作用，考慮到大多數數字平臺和科技公司正穩(wěn)步擴張進入其他活動和市場。長期以來，反壟斷政策對大公司購買力的關注很可能太少了。

A third issue, perhaps the most important, is the effect increasing concentration has on incentives to innovate and invest. The economic welfare gains from innovation will usually dwarf the gains from lower prices. Competition economics has always been poor at trying to quantify these relative gains, but the stakes are high now that innovation is seen as one of the main drivers of competition. How can potential challengers develop new technologies to topple an incumbent if they have to compete with an apparently zero price? For that matter, how will investment in physical networks or content get funded if an incumbent using the network and content captures all the profit downstream?

第三個，或許也是最重要的一個問題是，集中化程度提高對創(chuàng)新和投資的激勵力量有什么影響?創(chuàng)新帶來的經濟福利通常會超過降低價格帶來的經濟福利。競爭經濟學一直無法很好地在量化這一差值，但既然創(chuàng)新被視為競爭的主要推動力之一，這個差值就涉及重大利害關系。如果潛在的挑戰(zhàn)者不得不與貌似為零的價格競爭，他們怎么研發(fā)新技術來推翻現有企業(yè)?而且，如果現有企業(yè)利用網絡和內容捕獲了所有下游利潤，如何獲得資金投資于物理網絡或者內容?

Reversing the kind of increased concentration seen in the US takes a significant commitment of political capital and bureaucratic energy. These are more likely to be forthcoming if the analysis and evidence is there to back them up. It is up to the economists to provide the ammunition.

扭轉美國出現的這種集中化程度提高，需要投入可觀的政治資本，官僚體系也需要投入大量精力。如果有相關分析和證據作為依據，當局將更有可能采取行動。提供這些彈藥是經濟學家們的責任。

The writer is professor of economics at the University of Manchester

本文作者是曼徹斯特大學(University of Manchester)經濟學教授